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ABSTRACT 
 
There is a growing consensus that the currently dominant economic practices, which 
excessively rely on incessant ‗profitability‘, fails appropriately to value ethical 
components of environmental problems: valuation of bearers of intrinsic value (e.g. all 
creatures), or again bearers of inherent and instrumental value (e.g. species and 
ecosystems). This has led to a systematic defect in relevant decision-making with 
diverse associated economic, social and environmental disbenefits.  
Although the UN formulation of sustainable development (as opposed to the 
currently dominant development paradigm) provides us with guidance on formulating 
an alternative framework for sustainable development, it involves some serious 
problems. Some of these problems suggest the need for revisions, while others seem 
fatal to the definitions as they stand.  This study argues that a different revision, 
suggested by the basic needs approach, can surmount the various problems, and 
present and defend a revised definition accordingly.  
The revised account recognises economic inequality and social injustice as the 
underlying causes for environmental injustice and thus appropriately focuses on the 
principles of environmental justice. This conveys a framework for corresponding 
systemically the interconnectedness between the seemingly competing aspects of 
sustainable development, the dynamic flux between development needs and 
environmental limits. I defend Attfield‘s version of biocentric consequentialism, which 
supplies a strong theoretical basis for such an ethically informed and comprehensive 
policy framework for sustainable development. Furthermore, I tackle different 
approaches to security and argue that it is hardly possible to attain a sustainable future, 
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while disregarding the human security view in its wider sense.   
The study examines in close detail the applicability of the proposed policy 
framework for sustainable development to developing countries, with special reference 
to Bangladesh. It offers a list of recommendations for Bangladesh and concludes that a 
sustainable future for Bangladesh (and developing countries at large) is for the most 
part reliant on the successful implementation of recommendations of the broad general 
kind made in this study.   
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Introduction 
 
What are the problems with the dominant economic practice of development? How are these 
problems related to environmental problems? What kind of possible solution does the policy of 
sustainable development offer to them? What role do ethical principles play in realizing a 
sustainable future - the key objective of sustainable development? It is the forgoing questions 
that much of the work in recent ethics and political theory has been concerned with addressing. 
While the replies may seem unproblematic, these queries benefit from critical analysis. Firstly, 
‗development‘, ‗sustainability‘ and ‗sustainable development‘ are formulated differently according 
to different viewpoints; secondly, the effect of sustainable development on human security and 
various aspects of justice (intra-generational justice, intra-generational justice, interspecies justice 
and our duties to protect biodiversity and ecosystems) are being omitted, arguably unwittingly, 
from the prevailing paradigm of development and related policies.    
From the reflections of the preceding paragraph, it is apparent that in attaining the key 
objective of sustainable development, it is important in the first place to reach an explicit and 
robust definition of sustainable development; secondly, a defensible normative value theory is 
called for with the help of which to reflect upon various moral questions and our responses (or 
judgments) to them as regards sustainable development. As such, a defensible comprehensive 
value theory provides the theoretical basis of a plausible framework for sustainable 
development, which satisfactorily addresses the bearings of sustainable development on 
pertinent issues of justice. 
 The central topics of this dissertation are development, environmental sustainability and 
human security. This dissertation is therefore organized around the interpretation of these topics 
and reasoning about related issues.  I have chosen to discuss these topics because the continued 
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existence of life including human beings on Earth and their security depends in large measure 
on success in formulating and operationalizing a policy framework for sustainable development 
or environmental decision-making that meets human basic needs and provides opportunities for 
other creatures to survive and flourish without undermining environmental limits. However, no 
common consensus has yet been reached on the part of the relevant scholars and researchers as 
regards the policy framework in question.  
My dissertation, therefore, addresses the need for a new policy vision for development, 
incorporating sustainability, suggesting a ‗joined up‘ policy approach. This would incorporate 
solutions to philosophical and ethical issues surrounding sustainable development, and would 
tackle economic, social and environmental problems together, to help close the gap between 
where we are now and where our aims for sustainable development imply that we ought to be. 
By drawing together viewpoints chosen from many different and varied sources, it will initially 
contrive to bring out the complexities of sustainable development, together with its contested 
nature; secondly, it will succeed in distinguishing the meaning and the justification of the topic in 
question. Furthermore, this study attempts to expose some of the crucial problems facing any 
attempt, in particular the dominant economic practice of development (characterised as it is by 
disparities of resources and control, and determined on the whole by high economic growth),  to 
procure various aspects of justice and to protect the environment. This study is ultimately 
devoted to the study of sustainable development and to shaping a comprehensive framework 
for sustainable development which can be applied to a developing country like Bangladesh.  
A broad range of thoughts of leading researchers and scholars in the field of development 
and environment will be discussed to illustrate the topics in question; this discussion will attempt 
to contribute to a plausible clarification of these topics, and to defend a plausible biocentric 
value theory so that a comprehensive framework for sustainable development and its application 
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to policies and decision making in developing countries may be supplied, with special reference 
to Bangladesh. The project aims to:  
  offer a comprehensive framework for sustainable development, striking the proper 
balance between development needs and environmental limits.   
  examine the prospect of applying the proposed framework for sustainable 
development to developing countries, using Bangladesh as a case of reference.  
With a view to realizing these specified aims, the objectives of this study are to: 
 explore the meaning and justification of topics, such as ‗development‘, ‗sustainability‘, 
‗sustainable development‘, ‗human security‘ and ‗environmental (ecological) problems‘;       
  address the ethical assumptions that underlie different uses of these thoughts; 
   repair the prevailing UN formulation of sustainable development and offer a 
supplemented version of sustainable development;  
  give an account of the origin and development of environmentalism and  consider  
philosophical problems for environmentalism;  
 introduce and defend a broad value  theory that advocates taking  into account the full 
range of values in all creatures (sometimes regarded as intrinsic value), species and 
ecosystems(sometimes regarded as inherent and instrumental values);  
 consider problems pertaining to the practice of a capitalistic political economy, and 
limitations of the prevailing ideas, such as economic democracy and ecological 
modernization, in remedying these problems. 
Bearing in mind the aims and objectives, over and above an introduction and 
conclusion, this dissertation comprises four parts. In the first chapter of Part One, the attitudes 
and arguments which recur most commonly concerning development are introduced and 
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illustrated. The second chapter of this part illustrates the issue of sustainability, taking into 
account the range of opinions held on it in all its key diversity.  In the third and fundamental 
chapter of this part, a critical analysis is offered to investigate the implications of the concept of 
sustainability for development. Following an analysis on the various competing definitions of 
sustainable development, this chapter is devoted to the discernment of its basic meanings, and 
also the justification of its operationalisation.   
Chapter one of Part Two contains an account of the origin and development of 
environmentalism. Chapter two of this part expounds some philosophical problems for 
environmentalism outlined by Elliott Sober. Following Attfield, this chapter refutes the alleged 
philosophical objections through appealing to a modified approach to environmentalism 
(without abandoning the traditional ethical principles). This modified approach to 
environmentalism is based on Attfield‘s normative ethical theory – biocentric consequentialism. 
The third chapter of this part is devoted to a critical pursuit of Attfield‘s version of biocentric 
consequentialism. The objectives of this chapter include clarifying the methodology of decision-
making with reference to developmental and environmental issues with a bearing on both 
present and future generations of non-human creatures as well as species and ecosystems. Here, 
it will be argued that Attfield‘s version of biocentric consequentialism is a strong contender for a 
normative foundation for environmental ethics, and hence should be considered as a strong 
theoretical basis for a comprehensive policy framework for sustainable development.  It is also 
argued here that the cogency of this stance (as an operational means to realizing the objective of 
sustainable development) speaks for itself.    
Part Three discusses environmental impacts of development activities and their 
implications for human security (in its wider sense) and sustainable development.  Here, issues 
considered include the genesis and contours of the wider approach to the concept of human 
security, the impacts of the existing development paradigm and how human security is affected 
13 | P a g e  
 
by it, and the range of values we bring to them. It also explain how over-reliance on the 
dominant economic paradigm of development and overuse, misuse and inefficient uses of 
resources have resulted, in countries all over the world, in a continuing deterioration of human 
security conditions, with special reference to Bangladesh. It is revealed here that the impacts of 
the lack of security from ‗wants‘ as well as of security from ‗fear‘ are evident in the ongoing 
intensification of poverty, violence, social vulnerability (especially in developing countries) and 
massive economic instability. The last chapter of this part discusses and justifies the view that 
while inefficient and excessive human interventions with insufficient supply of  natural resources 
are among the main internal (local) sources of human insecurity in Bangladesh, the problem of 
water sharing of the cross-border rivers, excessive exploitation of natural resources and 
emissions of greenhouse gasses (GHGs) by the affluent (which cause global warming and 
climate change) are among the major external (regional and global respectively) sources of 
human insecurity. Finally it is argued here that a sustainable future of Bangladesh chiefly relies 
on her ability to successfully address all these sources of human insecurities which in turn 
suggests a radical change in the currently dominant paradigm of development (in other words 
economic practice). 
Chapter one of Part Four deals with two prevailing approaches to realizing sustainable 
development: ecological modernization and economic democracy. This seeks a means of 
accommodating environmental objects within the framework (or the operation) of the dominant 
global economic practice. But, as I shall argue, the dominant economic practice to support 
command and control mechanisms - tending as it does to be managerial in style - and to take an 
instrumental view of environmental resources, is unable to realize the objectives of sustainable 
development. This chapter questions how well the objectives of sustainable development can be 
achieved within the traditional framework of the prevailing version, and also how far substantial 
progress depends upon the adaptation of our thoughts to some more satisfactory version.   
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 In chapter two of Part Four, in contrast with the dominant economic practice, I 
highlight an alternative framework for sustainable development that tends to involve a 
decentralized, ethically informed and less managerial approach. It has long been thought that 
economics is our best hope for formulating policy choices but that, to deliver on this promise, it 
must involve diverse values that are not purely economic and hence not invariably measurable. 
This chapter, therefore, explores where and how non-economic values (such as intrinsic value of 
non-human creatures and instrumental and inherent values of species and ecosystems) are 
involved in environmental policies. It explores various issues of justice - economic, social and 
environmental - that stem from these values, and also explores the role the issues of justice play 
at the heart of such policies. 
Chapters three and four of Part Four involve an attempt to apply the new framework for 
sustainable development, as proposed and defended in the previous chapter, to the specific 
situation of Bangladesh - the country of whose problems I have most experience and am most 
particularly concerned to help to alleviate. A list of broad common types of recommendations 
for Bangladesh will be offered here, on which a sustainable future for Bangladesh is largely 
dependent. Chapter four ends with recommendations for future research. Overall, Part Four 
involves one of the most vital concerns of my dissertation.  This may well be envisaged as a 
considerable contribution to Bangladesh in realizing her goals for sustainable development. In 
so doing, this dissertation focuses on one of the most challenging issues, the socio-economic 
emancification of the society that the government of Bangladesh has been trying to address 
since the country‘s political independence in 1971.  
The methodology I have employed in my study is (1) partly conceptual analysis with 
particular emphasis on normative reflection, together with sifting the best known and more 
cogent theories; (2) and partly inquiry into existing socioeconomic and environmental challenges 
in societies to identify  various relevant empirical facts and to consider relevant theories.  
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Besides the conceptual analysis, a less formal kind of inquiry is adopted to find empirical 
information in order to make appeal to this in redefining development, environmental problems 
and human security and analyse other related issues. The appropriateness of adopting this 
approach is implicit in the thought that suggesting satisfactory revised definitions of the above 
mentioned issues is hardly possible through merely doing a series of conceptual analyses. It is 
instead crucial to appeal to empirical facts (such as what has happened to developing countries, 
such as Bangladesh) in the process of redefining them. 
  Having discussed and defended Attfield‘s variety of biocentric consequentialism, which 
is a non-anthropocentric value theory, I have adopted this theory in this study to offer a fresh 
theoretical and interpretative approach, facilitating a revised framework for sustainable 
development. This normative value theory has a link with modern western ethics, as it adheres 
to the methodology of modern consequentialism. However, biocentric consequentialism 
modifies some of the standard themes of consequentialism. Among the major points of 
Attfield‘s modified reading of consequentialism are:  the relevant units are not single actions but 
practices; the relevant consequences are not confined to human interests but also include non-
human interests; and as opposed to the standard reading of consequentialism, his readings take 
into account the long term consequences of human activities for living creatures in general. 
Biocentric consequentialism seems to be more reasonable in addressing environmental problems 
at both local and global levels, for developing and developed countries, and the well-being both 
of humans and non-human creatures. This normative value theory is compatible with (and also 
supportive of) the ethical theory of many scholars in developing countries that environmental 
egoism and environmental imperialism are the main ideological origins of current environmental 
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problems (e.g. as claimed in environmental ethical theories devised in developing countries, such 
as those that are discussed by Joan Martinez-Alier1 and Ramachandra Guha 2). 
This study is not intended to give details of sustainability used in the discourses of 
science and technology. Examples include sustainable forestry, sustainable agriculture, 
sustainable engineering and so on. The current study is limited to the study of sustainability 
pertaining to economic and social development and aiming at shaping a comprehensive 
framework for sustainable development which overall can be applied to developing countries 
like Bangladesh. By offering a comprehensive approach, which incorporates ethical issues (i.e. 
various issues of justice) as the crucial part of its policy solutions, this study can be envisaged as 
a pioneering attempt in the field of policy decisions for Bangladesh as regards her development 
becoming sustainable, without undermining the prospect of global solutions to those problems, 
which are global in nature and scope.  
The policy framework for sustainable development proposed in this study seems to 
justify itself as a framework that is ethically informed and comprehensive. It achieves this by 
being sensitive to a range of challenges pertaining to developmental and environmental issues in 
Bangladesh, such as cross-border rivers, water sharing problems and problems that stem from 
the existing Farakka Barrage and Tipaimukh Dam (the construction work on this Dam is now 
just a matter of time since the agreement has already been signed by the relevant parties). Other 
issues include problems of salinity, deforestation, river bank erosion, global warming and climate 
change. The proposed framework is also supportive of the incorporation of ethical values into 
decision-making. Over and above the people in environmental decision-making positions in 
Bangladesh, the intended readership of this dissertation includes people in decision-making 
                                                     
1 Martinez-Alier is one of the proponents of this view. For more, see Martinez-Alier, J., The Environmentalism of the 
Poor: a Study of Ecological Concepts and Valuation, Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2002. 
2 Guha, R., ‗Radical American Environmentalism and Wilderness Preservation: a Third World Critique‘, 
Environmental Ethics , 11.1(1989), 71-83. 
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positions in developing countries as a whole. What is more, the overall undertaking of this study, 
in particular the suggested framework for sustainable development, is intended to help motivate 
researchers in the relevant fields to conduct further research on sustainable development, with 
due focus on wider ethical values, and its application to specific countries.  
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PART ONE 
 
THE ANATOMY OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
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Chapter One  
 1.1 Development 
There exists hitherto no broad agreement about when the concept of (social and economic) 
‗development‘ originated.  Indeed, available stances relating to the genealogy of this concept 
seem to be quite conflicting. While some proponents, for example, agree that development is 
closely bound up with the evolution of capitalism and the demise of feudalism (which on a 
historical time line covers the period between the early 13th century and the late 18th 
century1), others maintain that it emerged in the late 18th century, bearing a sense similar to 
that of the unfolding of a plot.2Nevertheless, most people appear to maintain a common 
view about its use throughout the 19th century. In this view, it is held that the concept of 
development was associated with natural or evolutionary matters and used to mean all the 
episodes of progress that were taking place within those areas.3 Here, ‗development‘ via 
progress means moving upward directly towards a peak. The 19th century Western 
narratives - whether literary, scientific or historical - involve progress ‗in a straight line‘ or in 
other words ‗linearity‘ as the central trait of the concept of development.   
About one century later, at the beginning of the 20th century, this concept underwent 
another major shift in its meaning and began to be used to refer to the economic 
                                                     
1Conteras, R., ‗How the Concept of Development Got Started‘ in Enrique, The E-Book on International Finance 
and Development, The University of Iowa Center for International Finance and  Development (1999), 
http://blogs.law.uiowa.edu/ebook/uicifd-ebook/part-1-i-how-concept-development-got-started>[accessed 1 
July 2009] (p.1).  In this article, Conteras argues that development is a concept that is tied to the evolution of 
capitalism.                            
2 This strand of thinking was expressed in a recent essay from an anonymous student.   
3 Progress is used here to mean the linear self fulfilment of something.              
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advancement of a people or region; this, in effect, resonates with the current understanding 
of the concept in question, and its dominance all over the world, especially in the West. A 
further source of variation about the meaning of the concept of development is the fact that 
the concept of development is bound up with the particular period in time when the concept 
is being uttered or used by the individual in question. Thus, for them, one must place this 
concept in a historical context in order to understand the diverse theories about it. 4 
Despite its existence for centuries in the West, the concept of development has 
begun to be used extensively by researchers, experts and practitioners (and also by people in 
general) across a wide range of disciplines for just over half a century.5 But no distinctive 
form or uniform approach has been found hitherto for its pursuit by the users, concerning 
its characterization and operationalisation; hence, there is still intense disagreement and 
uncertainty about what is the precise meaning of this concept. As a result, we hardly find any 
single meaning and/or distinctive definition of the term ‗development‘ thus far. As Des 
Gasper in his controversial book The Ethics of Development presents it: 
                        Development is a term ubiquitous in daily language. It can refer to the emergence or 
elaboration or evolution or improvement of almost anything.6 
 
                                                     
4  Contreras, p.15.   
5 Despite differences of opinions about the nature and/or definition of development, a number of thinkers 
have agreed on the point that the concept and practice of development dates from the end of Second World 
War. To be more specific, the view that ‗development dates from 1940s theory‘ has become quite popular, as is 
stated in Des Gasper, The Ethics of Development, 2004. However, Gasper traces it differently to other writers such 
as Sun Yat-Sen (the founder of republican China and the writer of the book International Development of China, 
published in 1922) and the work of Marshall Berman (who cites the character ‗Protagonist‘ in Johann Wolfgang 
von Goethe‘s drama Faust as discussing the ‗desire for development‘, in his, All That Is Solid Melts into Air, 
(London: Verso, 1983)), in which they show that the concept of development has been in extensive use from 
the early nineteenth century. For details, see Cowen, M. P. and Shenton, R.W.  ‗The Invention of 
Development‘, in Power of Development, ed. by Crush, J. (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 27-43. 
6 Gasper, D. The Ethics of Development (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), p.27. 
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And he also states: 
Even a single person is likely to use the term [development] in several ways, and   
across people we see further variation.7   
This observation is further recognized by Andrew Reed, who writes that:  
Development is a very general concept; ask any three experts to say what they mean 
by ‗development‘ and the likelihood is that you would be given three different 
definitions. 8 
 
Both Gasper and Reed in these passages eloquently reveal that there is no agreed 
precise meaning and/or definition of the concept of development. For Gasper, the concept 
of development can be considered and employed by a single person in several ways. Besides, 
Reed‘s account specifies that the definition of development might differ from person to 
person. Both Gasper‘s and Reed‘s remarks seem to imply that the central components in 
definitions of development are subjective judgments. The force of these remarks, however, 
diverges from the five diverse meanings of development mentioned at the outset:  (1) 
development is a concept that is closely bound up with the evolution of capitalism and the 
demise of feudalism; (2) development bears a sense similar to the unfolding of a plot; (3) 
development means an optimal evolutionary tendency of an entity; (4) development is a 
continuous economic advancement of a people or region; (5) development is a historically 
comprehensible concept. They are different in the sense that, in line with these narratives, 
elements in the definition of development are objective. Despite this conflict or 
                                                     
7 Ibid.p.25. 
8 Reed, A., Inequality and Development (London: Bell & Hyman Limited, 1985), p.21. 
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disagreement about objectivity, proponents of these narratives seem to share one thing 
about the concept of development, namely that it has positive connotations.  
In contrast, some other scholars, such as Gustavo Esteva and Vandana Shiva, 
entirely reject any positive connotations of the concept of development. For them, such 
connotations express the bias of relevant speakers, and typically stem from the dominant 
Western narratives of the concept. They mainly appear to condemn the self-proclaimed 
positive connotations of development due to its coercive and imperialistic implications for 
societies. Derived from the Enlightenment notion of inevitable progress, as has been 
illustrated by Esteva, this concept was devised in the 1940s to prevent upheaval and extend 
science and technology throughout the underdeveloped world. The implication of such an 
understanding of the concept of development for two-thirds of the world‘s population, 
according to Esteva, is:   
… a reminder of what they are not…a reminder of an undesirable, 
undignified condition.9 
 
Esteva spots that central elements in the U.S. President Truman‘s inaugural speech, delivered 
on January 20, 1949, are the dominant Western narratives of development. For him, Truman 
introduced the concept of underdevelopment in his speech to classify two thirds of the 
people on earth as defective. And soon after Truman‘s speech, the concept of ‗developed‘, as 
Esteva claims, became the euphemistic synonym for ‗rich‘ or ‗civilized‘, and 
‗underdeveloped‘ for ‗poor‘  or ‗uncivilized‘. Furthermore, the use of this concept, according 
                                                     
9 Esteva, G., ‗Development‘, in The Development Dictionary, ed. By Sachs, W. (London and Atlantic Highlands, 
NJ: Zed Books, 1992), p.10. 
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to Esteva, is nothing but cultural neo-colonialism on the part of the West, while through 
Truman‘s use of these terms, ‗underdeveloped‘ became simply another word for ‗poor‘. 
Basing her stance on feminist concerns, the Indian feminist Vandana Shiva criticizes 
the dominant Western narratives of development and holds the view that these narratives  
have been generated and relentlessly practised so as to dominate women and nature and 
subjugate and destroy indigenous culture. For her, all this represents the modern dominant 
patriarchal economic category that focuses only on profit, not life. The current dominant 
paradigm of development, for her, also dismisses forms of work that do not produce capital 
or profit, being non-productive. This so-called ‗non-productive‘ or ‗marginalized‘ work is 
typically women‘s. Hence, according to Shiva, ‗development‘, as conventionally understood, 
renders women‘s work invisible. But this invisible work, she says, is expected to be 
performed alongside ‗productive‘ work, and hence women become the most oppressed 
section of already oppressed societies. Thus the dominant Western narratives of 
‗development‘ have been relabeled ‗maldevelopment‘ by Shiva. Criticizing this, Shiva also 
writes: 
More commodities and more cash means less life - in nature (through 
ecological destruction) and in society (through denial of basic needs).10  
 
Here it is apparent that both Esteva and Shiva reject the dominant narratives of 
development, but for marginally different reasons. While Esteva rejects such narratives for 
their imperialist overtones (because development has historically oppressed groups, such as 
                                                     
10 Shiva, V., Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development (London: Zed Book, 1989), p.7. 
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aboriginal people and women, and hence, for him, its use is a neo-colonialist extension of 
those forces or oppressions), Shiva rejects such narratives on feminist grounds.   
Going back to Gasper‘s perspective mentioned earlier, development has no single 
meaning but rather multiple meanings. This claim has been clearly and widely illustrated by 
Gasper in his book The Ethics of Development. There he discerns ‗ahistorical‘ and ‗historical‘ 
conceptualizations of the concept of development as two major categories, and asserts that 
dozens of possible meanings and definitions of ‗development‘ could be listed under these 
categories. As he illustrates, the ‗ahistorical‘ category includes those definitions that identify, 
for instance, industrialization, urbanization, globalization, modernization, economic growth 
or progress as development. Conversely, the historically specific conceptualization category 
includes explicit historical reference, for instance, to the rise and expansion of Western 
European cultures from the 15th century. There again, in terms of different usages of the 
concept of development, he classifies the ahistorical and historical categories into two sub- 
streams, which he illustrates as neutral (non-evaluative) and evaluative usages of 
development: 
 A. More neutral (‗positive‘, non-evaluative) usages 
      1. Development as fundamental or structural change 
      2. Development as intervention, action 
B. More evaluative usages 
     1. Development as improvement, good change; or as the good outcome 
     2. Development as the platform for improvement, that which enables or allows 
improvement. 11 
                                                     
11 Gasper, p.28. 
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In its neutral usages, such as type A1, development is perceived as change, especially 
fundamental/structural change. Besides, type A2 considers development as action, 
intervention or something that is consciously aimed at improvement, which Gasper calls the 
transitive usage of ‗development‘. But no prefixes, such as ‗good‘ or ‗bad‘, ‗real‘ or ‗unreal‘ 
are added to the concept of ‗development‘ in these usages, which entails that scholars or 
practitioners here do not have to offer or imply any judgment as to whether the action or 
intervention is good or bad. Usages do not have to imply ethical values in order for their 
users to agree on applications of the concept. The typical example of this type of usage of 
the concept of development, according to Gasper, is the one that compares development 
with economic growth and measures it by gross national product (GNP) per capita. 
In contrast, ‗development‘, in its evaluative usages such as type B1, means 
improvement, good change, or an achieved improvement, a good state or situation. Here, 
‗development‘ refers to a desired or end state and this type is known as the achievement or 
end state definition of development. Besides, the evaluative usage of development in the 
form of type B2 distinguishes development as a platform for improvement, which facilitates 
or allows improvement. In other words, this type of usage refers development to the 
preconditions (such as opportunities, capacities, and/or choices), which permit what is 
desired. In this sense, anything that is instrumental towards improvement is development, 
and therefore usages of development here become value and theory relative.12 This variety is 
known as the opportunity or instrumental definition of development. Unlike neutral usages, 
people here (in types B1 and B2) do need, according to Gasper, to share ethical values in 
order to agree on their applications.  
                                                     
12  Ibid. p.31. 
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Gasper identifies types B1 and B2 (evaluative definitions) as the predominant branch 
and distinguishes it as the central focus of development ethics in comparison to the 
alternative approach - the neutral usages of development (types A1 and A2). But at the same 
time he also argues that there are lots of contrasts between evaluative definitions, such as 
between the ‗end-state‘ and the ‗opportunity‘ definitions. And these uncertainties and 
disagreements on the meaning of development most likely direct him to assert: 
There is no such precise, single meaning [of development]. Instead, we can 
increase our sensitivity to the types and range of meanings.13   
 
Gasper‘s classification of the concept of development and understanding of the 
notion of commonality in development warrant criticism. As has been observed, Gasper has 
distinguished development into two categories (in terms of its usages): ‗neutral‘ and 
‗evaluative‘, which involve, to say the least, three mutually exclusive meanings of 
development, such as ‗structural change‘, ‗intervention‘ and ‗improvement‘. Nevertheless, the 
fact of the matter is that the difference between seeing development as ‗intervention‘ and as 
‗improvement‘ is not one of mutual exclusivity. There is at least one aspect where they are 
found to overlap each other. For example, in both types of usages, practitioners, users and 
the people overall share a common perspective: ‗they aim towards improvement‘. Thus, 
listing   ‗intervention‘ under ‗A‘ category (neutral usages) seems to be a misrepresentation.  
Gasper‘s interpretation of the evaluative usages of development as ‗improvement‘ is 
also questionable. He argues that, in the evaluative usage of this concept, everyone who uses 
or understands the term has to share the ethical values that it embodies. But the examples 
                                                     
13 Ibid. p.25.                                                                                                                                                         
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considered below attest that things are otherwise. For an improvement of a very partial kind, 
which fails to merit appreciation of each and every individual of a given society, is also seen 
to be envisaged as an instance of development. 
Example 1: There are some instances of development as so-called ‗improvement‘ of 
a partial kind, that have occurred in the past, examples which suggest that such 
‗development‘ need not invariably be praised either by the users of the concept of 
‗development‘ or by the people of the society in question. For example, from some 
perspectives, development occurred in Singapore and South Korea in the mid 1990s, which 
was of a partial kind; it underwent a collapse in 1998, because it did not occur on a secure or 
sustainable basis and could have been planned for better, and is often criticized for these 
reasons. Thus, the concept of development as transformation that is often applied to the 
Singapore and South Korea of this period as an improvement of a very partial kind suggests 
that Gasper‘s view that development, in its evaluative usage, invariably requires everyone‘s 
recognition is an illicit generalization. 
Example 2: The Farakka Barrage14commissioned by the government of India on the  
River Ganges could be held to have promoted development in the state of West Bengal in 
India through diverting its water into the Hooghly River during the dry season, from January 
to June, in order to flush out the accumulating silt which in the 1950s and 1960s was a 
problem at the major port of Kolkata on the River Hooghly. This might be envisaged as 
‗development‘ by the Indian government or the policy makers in question, but this has not 
                                                     
14 Located in India, this barrage is 10 km from the border between India and Bangladesh, is the largest barrage 
in the world, and has recently been entered in the Guinness Book of World Records. 
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been praised at all by the people collectively, especially by the people of Bangladesh who 
have been directly affected due to living alongside the distributaries of the River Ganges.15 
Also, it is obvious that the people of West Bengal, who live in the area alongside the Ganges 
River between the Farakka barrage point and the Bangladesh border, might oppose the so-
called development initiative, being affected by that same initiative. This example further 
justifies the conclusion that Gasper‘s view that development, in its evaluative-usage, 
invariably requires everyone‘s recognition is an illicit generalization. 
Gasper‘s critical view about commonality in development discourse now may well 
raise a question:  is Gasper right in saying that there is no commonality in the divergences of 
meaning and definition of development? Michael Edwards‘ view is worth mentioning here; 
for him, among the major universal objectives of the concept of development are: 
 to be free from poverty and violence and the servitude these bring in their 
wake; 
 to be loved and enjoy a sense of belonging; 
 to feel more in control and less vulnerable to the vagaries of unaccountable 
power; 
 and to be subjects of their own destiny rather than objects of intentions of  
others.16 
In a variety of ways, Denis Goulet‘s17idea of a good life and John Finnis‘s18  concepts of well 
being share the same spirit and provide lists of universal values regarding development. 
                                                     
15 There are certain reasons behind this dissatisfaction and disagreement. Foreseeably, the Farakka Barrage cuts 
off Bangladesh's water supply, especially during the dry season when it is of the highest necessity. The diversion 
of the flow of the Ganges has caused serious damage to the down-stream area, i.e. in Bangladesh, through 
contributing to the rise of salinity in water, contaminating fisheries, hindering navigation and posing a threat to 
water quality and public health. More seriously, lower levels of soil moisture along with increased salinity have 
also led to desertification of the northern region of Bangladesh, which has been discerned as the prime reason 
behind the abject poverty of the people of that region and an irreparable threat to their livelihood. 
16 Edwards, M., Future Positive: International Co-operation in the 21st Century (London: Earth scan, 1999), p.4.              
17 Goulet, D., Development Ethics (London: Zed Books, 1995), p.4. 
18 Finnis, John (1987), ‗The Basic Value‘, in Ethics, ed. by Singer, P. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 
pp. 229-235.  
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These perspectives seem to suggest that diverse narratives of development share some 
objectives in common, which amount to commonality in development discourse. But 
Gasper‘s question ‗are the identified commonalities necessary or just coincidental amongst 
the subjectivisms?‘ makes the issue again debatable and more subject to varieties of 
perspective.  
Robin Attfield‘s analysis of the concept of development has been found to be 
supportive of their being a common concept of development. With a view to asserting such 
a stance, Attfield starts his argument by depicting the relationship between ‗disagreement‘ 
and ‗agreement‘:  
...there can only be disagreements where the parties agree about something too; 
otherwise they would not be disagreeing… [And] our uncertainties and 
disagreements [about development] make sense only because we share a common 
concept of development and of underdevelopment.19  
 
Attfield‘s understanding is that the one phenomenon (disagreement) does not make any 
sense without the other (agreement), which seems analogous to the relationship of two 
opposite sides of a coin. Further, he argues, agreement arises as a precondition of 
disagreement in some cases, while as a result of different ideological responses to the same 
facts or problems in other cases. He also argues that uncertainty and disagreement about 
development are not total, but rather: 
                                                     
19 Attfield, R., ‗Development: Some Areas of Consensus‘, Journal of Social Philosophy, XVII (1986), p.36.              
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…a sense of uncertainty is generated solely by concentrating on those questions 
which are left unresolved when many other questions have been answered already. 
These other questions may be for that reason less interesting. 20 
 
The ‗other questions‘, according to Attfield, can provide a sufficient basis for the area of 
agreement or for the common concepts of development and also their implementation. This 
idea, according to Attfield, is important as the implementation of the answers to those 
questions would enhance millions of people‘s lives and secure a fairer deal for the world‘s 
poor.  
In the light of this understanding, Attfield approaches ‗development‘ through the 
contrasting notion of ‗under-development‘. He illustrates under-development as a state of a 
society where various evils, such as poverty, disease, illiteracy, malnutrition, high rates of 
infant morality, low life expectancies, low average productivity, and very poor medical and 
educational facilities underpin one another. By contrast, for him, development is a state of a 
society where these evils are: 
…alleviated and replaced by the attainment of health, literacy, low rates of infant 
morality, high levels of life expectancy, high levels of productivity per head, good 
medical and educational facilities, and a sufficient spread of wealth in the 
population to allow the evils of underdevelopment to be avoided. 21 
 
Here, Attfield‘s understanding is that these are among the common elements by which social 
development can be determined. These common elements basically relate to humans‘ ‗basic 
needs‘, and for Attfield, fulfillment or realization of humans‘ ‗basic needs‘ is a qualification 
                                                     
20 Ibid. p.4. 
21 Ibid.   
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for development. In addition, he has pointed out that there is a conceptual connection 
between development and some other notions, such as self determination, participation and 
self-help. These notions involve humans‘ ‗autonomous participation‘ (in all their 
undertakings towards development) as another important prerequisite condition for 
development. Elimination of significant economic inequalities is also considered by him as a 
crucial condition to be fulfilled for a society concerned with its development. Besides, by 
‗development‘ he means both the ‗processes‘ (courses of action towards alleviation of the 
evils in question) and the states to which they lead (attainments). 
With reference to the relationship between economic growth and development, 
Attfield maintains that to define development as merely economic growth is to clearly under-
define it. For example, he argues, an oil-rich country with a high GNP (economic growth is 
measured by GNP) might have a high and sluggish illiteracy rate (which is one of most vital 
obstacles for development). Another problem with the practice of the GNP method, as has 
been mentioned by Attfield, is that it avoids taking into account those economic activities 
where no money changes hands.  
Instead of a teleological assertion of what development is, Attfield seems to interpret 
development by what it is not, i.e. by ‗underdevelopment‘. As he suggests, development is 
both (1) a process of moving away from a range of evils including a vicious circle of poverty 
and health insecurity towards a more satisfactory level of productivity, health and so on, and 
(2) the condition of a society which has largely attained more satisfactory levels. 
Furthermore, he argues that there are various interpretations of development, but among the 
various issues of debate and disagreement there is a commonality in them; this in turn 
generates a broad area of agreement about social and economic development. In addition, 
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Attfield‘s view maintains that development has to involve some degree of autonomy and self 
-help on the part of the society in question. In so doing, his view seems to tackle social and 
political issues of development over and above economic ones. 
Attfield has been found to interpret the concept of development on a broader cross-
disciplinary discourse level. At this point, he suggests that the concept of development has a 
‗core‘ meaning, which stems from its substantive core and from which there emerges a 
notion of commonality amongst the divergence of interpretations and practices of 
development across the disciplines and across societies; about this core meaning, he states:  
… [It] is that of something changing in the direction of the fulfilment or 
realisation of its good. 22 
 
Attfield suggests that the sense of the ‗core‘ meaning of ‗development‘ remains unchanged 
irrespective of its diversified usages in different areas of studies (such as psychology, biology 
and different branches of social science), despite the fact that the criteria on the basis of 
which ‗development‘ is determined across the disciplines may clearly be different. For 
instance, he states, in the case of humans (in terms of social development), the ‗core‘ 
meaning of ‗development‘ is that of something changing in the sphere of human endeavour 
towards the direction of the ‗fulfillment or realisation of their good‘, whilst the criteria used 
here in order to determine ‗development‘ are the fulfillment or realisation of humans‘ ‗basic 
needs‘, and ‗autonomous participation‘ in the process of development by the members of the 
respective society. Likewise, in the case of children (in terms of cognitive development), the 
                                                     
22 Attfield, R. & Hattingh, J., ‗Ecological Sustainability in a Developing Country Such as South Africa? A 
Philosophical and Ethical Inquiry‘, The International Journal of Human Rights, 6. 2 (2000), p.70. 
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core meaning of ‗development‘ is that of something changing towards the direction of the 
‗fulfillment or realisation of the children‘s good‘, although the criteria being used here are 
different (from the above mentioned criteria being used in the case of humans‘ social 
development), which involve children‘s overall progression issues, such as children‘s growth, 
speaking, walking and playing abilities, and capacities for interacting with their surroundings 
and their fellows with less difficulty, more independence and more self-confidence than 
before.  
Attfield seeks to allege here that there is a common core to the concept of 
development that endorses a common meaning amongst its various usages across the 
disciplines, such as social science, psychology and so forth (not only amongst social and 
economic usages), and also that over and above a common core of the concept of 
development, there can still be ‗specialised interpretations‘23 or ‗divergent conceptions‘24 of 
development, depending on diverse interpretations. 
What if we now compare Attfield‘s interpretation (or conceptualization) of 
development with that of other philosophers of development, especially Gasper? We then  
                                                     
23 Ibid., pp.70-74. 
24 For Attfield, the term ‗concept‘ can have two different senses. It is, in one sense, used (sometimes) to  mean 
the rough equivalent of ‗picture‘ or ‗cluster of beliefs‘ (empirical), which Attfield names as conception; in the other 
sense, it is used to imply the meaning (non empirical) of the term ‗concept‘, for which he reserves the term 
concept. He discerned these two senses of ‗concept‘ in view to clarifying the concept of ‗man‘, back in 1974, in 
his article, ‗On Being Human‘. However, this ‗taxonomy‘ can similarly be functional for the concept of 
‗development‘ in order to analyze and clarify its meaning. Given this resemblance, the ‗core‘ concept of 
development can be specified by the term ‗concept‘, while the ‗specialised interpretation‘ of the concept of 
‗development‘ might be designated by the term ‗conception‘. For details about the distinction between 
‗concept‘ and ‗conception‘, refer to Attfield, R., ‗On Being Human‘, Inquiry: an Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 
17 (1974), 175–192. 
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observe that there are some aspects of development about which they agree and others 
about which they disagree. Both Attfield and Gasper hold the same view about its 
relationship with economic growth. They claim that development is not identical with 
economic growth. As has been observed earlier, Gasper characterises ‗economic growth‘ as 
the most typical kind of morally neutral usage of the concept of development, while Attfield 
criticises it by saying that in many cases growth does not take place in step with 
development. A number of development theorists can be found who would agree with 
Attfield and Gasper regarding this issue and reject the view of development as economic 
growth. 
At this point both Gasper and Attfield seem to have got the point right because, in 
effect, it is hardly possible to attain goals of development merely through attaining (higher) 
economic growth. One of the things needed for accomplishing goals of development is the 
equitable distribution of the benefits that come from that of economic growth. Without the 
implementation of equitable distribution of economic growth (i.e. the principle of 
distributive justice), a society can hardly be able to alleviate its poverty. For the distribution 
of wealth within a country is more important that its average per person. For instance, Brazil 
has been heralded as an ‗economic miracle‘, yet this is not representative of the ongoing 
poverty of the majority of its people. The relationship between development in terms of 
economic growth in India and its ongoing poverty matches the scenario of Brazil. This 
suggests that the dominant development narrative that defines development as merely 
economic growth is defective. Thus, if there was ever a time to focus on an alternative 
interpretation and paradigm for development, that time is now. Otherwise, the pursuit of a 
high economic growth model of development by developed and rapidly growing developing 
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countries will ensure different causes of immense social deprivation for the world‘s poor 
through contributing in different ways to the ever expanding economic gap between the rich 
and the poor all over the world.  
On the other hand, what mainly distinguishes Attfield‘s view from Gasper (and Reed 
as well) is the commonality in development and its core meaning. As has been observed 
earlier, Attfield‘s view about ‗commonality‘ and/or ‗agreement‘ pertaining to social 
development appears to be indispensable, because none can reject any of the points (which 
he mentions in defining or characterising social development) as unnecessary or undesirable 
(for such development) or incompatible with the type of development in question.  Also, his 
characterisation of the concept of development, in terms of its ‗core‘ meaning, deserves 
greater attention. The ‗core‘ meaning of development, as Attfield states, entails fulfillment or 
realisation of something‘s ‗good‘ through a process of change; this also seems defensible, 
since development, so to say, apparently can only be used of those changes in an entity that 
bring about good in it, or else it would clearly be counterintuitive if it is distinguished by 
those ‗changes‘ which bring about bad transformations in the entity in question. In contrast, 
Gasper, as has been mentioned earlier, is suspicious about commonality in development as 
well as arguably about its core meaning, and states that there is no such agreement, or precise 
(or single) meaning, of the concept of development. Such discrepancy, holds Gasper, can 
only increase our sensitivity to the types and range of meanings of development.  
From the forgoing discussion, it seems that Gasper‘s view on development is open 
to criticism; and as opposed to his view, Attfield‘s view (as discussed above) merits 
recognition. Firstly, I find no logical reason to reject views supportive of a broad area of 
agreement about social development. However, one might ask two questions here: (1) are 
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the supplied points truly supportive of a broad area of agreement about social development? 
and (2) are these the only important aspects of development?. Reasonably, the answer, in my 
view, should be ‗yes‘, as no practitioner or theory can reject any of the concepts (such as 
attainment of health or literacy) as unnecessary or undesirable for social development of a 
society anywhere around the world. In answering the second question, Attfield‘s logic can be 
considered here. Attfield argues that if it so happens that this illustration has omitted any 
important aspects of development, then his case becomes stronger that we actually share a 
reasonably clear-cut notion of social development. The cogency of this argument speaks for 
itself.  
Secondly, I also find no logical reason to reject views supportive of ‗core‘ and 
‗specialised interpretation‘ meanings of the concept of development. As Attfield says, while 
the ‗core‘ meaning of development (i.e. something changing towards the direction of the 
fulfillment of its good) concerns one key aspect of development, the ‗specialised 
interpretation‘ meaning of it concerns another key aspect. The cogency of the idea of the 
core meaning of the concept of development in social contexts also speaks for itself. The 
‗specialised interpretation‘ meaning of development stems from various applications of the 
concept of ‗development‘ by different societies, cultures or interest groups in their own 
different ways. This point also seems sound. For example25, on socio-economic 
development, there will be Islamic interpretations, some involving Islamic banking, and there 
again the interpretations prevalent in Kerala (a Marxist interpretation) and in South Africa 
(where interpretations would be neither Islamic nor Marxist).  
                                                     
25 Attfield .R, Environmental Ethics: An Overview for the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2003), 
pp. 152-3.                                                                                                                                                                         
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Like the ‗core‘ meaning of development, the ‗specialised interpretation‘ meaning of 
development is also essential for right understanding and operation of the concept of 
development, as the values of a certain society or culture (on which specialised 
interpretations are grounded) are important elements of  criteria for defining the ‗well being‘ 
or ‗good life‘ of its members. Development policies or initiatives that do not respect local 
cultural or social values of the society in question often fail to achieve their development-
goals. For example, as Peter Coleridge mentions, attempts in Afghanistan to 'modernise' (or 
develop) the society by various rulers (especially by changing the role and status of women), 
including the Communists in the 1970s, have not only been unsuccessful but have also been 
the main cause of conflict (one of the key causes of underdevelopment) in that country.26 
Coleridge‘s view is based on the understanding that people generally act or behave in 
accordance with the values 27 (such as cultural, social or religious values) that they have 
respect for and that they feel threatened when their values are attacked or start to disappear. 
Thus, development goals (democracy, autonomy, literacy, health and so forth), according to 
Coleridge, have to be attained through changing peoples‘ perceptions (where transformation 
of peoples‘ understanding on a particular issue is really essential for achieving their ‗well-
being‘ or ‗quality of life‘), not their social, cultural or other traditional values.  
                                                     
26 Coleridge, P. ‗Development, Cultural Values and Disability: The Example of Afghanistan‘, in Disability and 
Development: Learning from Action and Research on Disability in the Majority World, ed. by Stone, E. (Leeds: The 
Disability Press, 1999), pp.149–167 (p.158) <http://disability-studies.leeds.ac.uk/files/archiveuk/stone-
chapter-10.pdf> [accessed 18 January 2008]  
27 For example, the ‗veil system‘ is in practice among the Pushtun (an ethnic group of Afghanistan) women in 
Afghanistan, and they have already internalised this system (as religious value) into themselves. Likewise, 
disabled people in Afghan society accept an inferior position in the social hierarchy 'as the normal state of 
things' and they have internalized this segregation for themselves. Therefore, the process of any so called 
development programme, say in Afghanistan, must start with bringing about changes in the perceptions of the 
persons being segregated. The same is true of Pushtun women‘s faith in the veil system.  
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The social or cultural values of a society fundamentally involve what the people of 
the relevant society understand, practise and own. Hence, people‘s well-being, in effect, 
require their own values (for some,28indigenous knowledge also) to be practised in order to 
accomplish various developmental goals, which in turn justifies people‘s self- participation in 
their own decision-making processes. Hattingh and Attfield designate this as ‗autonomous 
participation‘. The issue of specialised interpretations, as a result, opens up different ‗paths‘ 
or ‗roads‘ or ‗means‘ to development; while a development-goal itself can still be seen as the 
same or ‗homogeneous‘ 29, which Attfield distinguishes as the core meaning and the area of 
the common concept or agreement about development.    
Along the lines of Attfield‘s arguments and overall findings above, the concept of 
development, where it is short for social and economic development, is thus now to be 
defined as a state or condition of a society in which something is changing in the direction of 
the fulfilment or realisation of the wellbeing or basic needs, to say the least, of its members, 
ensuring their autonomous participation in the changes in question. 
The proposed definition of development warrants further attention in order to verify 
its capabilities of resolving queries, such as ‗Could development as thus defined here be 
endorsed by scholars such as Esteva and Shiva?‘; or in other words ‗Does Attfield‘s view on 
development complement the views of Esteva and Shiva?‘ Part of the answer to this 
                                                     
28 See, for example, Ellen, R., ‗Local knowledge and Sustainable Development in Developing Countries‘, in  
Global Sustainable Development in the 21st Century, eds. Lee, K., Holland, A. and McNeill, D. (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2000), pp. 162-186. 
29 Gasper, D., ‗Culture and Ethics of Development‘, Paper for Nationale Unesco Commissie Studiedag (The Hague, 
1993 (unpublished)), p.1. 
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question, however, may well derive from a statement made by Esteva himself, which is as 
follows:  
My people are tired of development. They just want to live‘30  
The implication of this statement is quite apparent. Through this statement he aims at 
representing the thought that commonly a person‘s minimal demand is simply to survive, 
not for luxury. But the dominant Western development narratives, as they have been 
criticized or characterized by Esteva, fail to meet the minimal demands of individuals. 
Rather, these narratives create multifaceted socio-economic and political challenges for all. 
These detrimental bearings of the dominant paradigm of development have eventually made 
Esteva reject the entire concept of development.   
Although Attfield does not reject the positive connotation of the concept of 
development, he clearly rejects its meaning and practice in the conventional sense, which, in 
turn, reinforces Esteva‘s objectives. And, foreseeably, with a view to achieving the same goal, 
Attfield seems to have offered an alternative version of development, where he maintains 
that neither evils nor economic growth made following the guidelines of the dominant 
paradigm constitute ‗development‘. Rather, it is something else which means moving away 
from evils towards a satisfactory level of life expectancy, health, literacy, productivity and so 
on, where some degree of autonomy and self-help are also exercised on the part of the 
population of the society in question throughout the whole process of achieving those 
satisfactory levels. The aspiration implicit in Esteva‘s above mentioned statement is the 
                                                     
30 Gustavo Esteva, ‗Development‘, in Wolfgang Sachs (ed.), The Development Dictionary, London and Atlantic 
Highlands, NJ: Zed Books,1992, pp. 6-25 (p. 23). 
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realization of human basic needs, which, in practice, looks congruous with the main 
aspiration of Attfield‘s view. 
Shiva‘s feminist concerns could also be alleviated through a combination of 
improvements in various development-goals, and enhancement of the autonomous and 
meaningful participation of the entire population, which involves women alongside men in 
decision-making processes and would therefore eradicate gender discrimination. 
Furthermore, Attfield‘s view seems to address issues of social justice through advocating an 
equal share of the benefits for both women and men resulting from their collective 
development-efforts. 
Thus it can be alleged, presumably, that ultimately it is not development that Esteva 
and Shiva oppose, but rather its imperialistic and paternalistic imposition. A form of 
development that withstands the above mentioned criticisms must therefore be 
unconventional. It must not be imposed from the West i.e. should not be directed from 
above, but rather should emerge from the community or the local inhabitants of the society 
in question. So far so good.  
As has been observed earlier, over and above her feminist concerns, Shiva also 
expresses her concern about the extinction of life in nature because of humans‘ excessive 
intervention with nature for economic benefit. A question may well be asked at this juncture: 
does Attfield‘s version of development address the environmental (or ecological) issues of 
development? It seems that although Attfield‘s alternative definition of development seems 
adequate to address Esteva‘s concern about the imperialist overtones of dominant western 
narratives of development and Shiva‘s concerns about gender discrimination, this definition 
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says nothing about the environmental limits to development. Thus, his version of 
development is not beyond criticism.  
Recognizing socio-economic, political and cultural aspects of development, the 
United Nations declared ‗the right to development‘ in 1986, which reads as follows: 
Development is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, 
which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire 
population and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful 
participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting 
therefrom.31  
This is in many ways an admirable definition, but unfortunately circular, since it includes the 
term (development) being defined in the definition itself. 32 However, this flaw with the UN 
definition of development could readily be removed through eliminating the circularity. 
Making a change in the UN definition of development, with a view to removing its 
circularity, we might readjust it as follows: ‗Development is a comprehensive economic, 
social, cultural and political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-
being of the entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free and 
meaningful participation in this process and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting 
therefrom‘.  
Although the adjusted version of UN definition of development is free from 
circularity,  it still warrants criticism because of maintaining salience about the environmental 
issues of development. This criticism is taken further by Nigel Dower; as he puts it:  
                                                     
31 United Nations, Declaration on the Right to Development, Preamble, Paragraph 2   
32Attfield, R., ‗Development Ethics‘ (Cardiff University: ENCAP, Philosophy Section (unpublished)), p.1.                                                                     
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 This is a rich ‗definition‘ in many ways, though lacking perhaps because it has no 
reference to the priority of poverty-reduction or to environmental constraints.33  
In the light of this understanding, it seems that over and above the dominant Western 
narratives of development, Attfield‘s version of development and the UN definition of 
development as well as its adjusted version supplied here seem to be inadequate. A further 
study on the concept of development is thus needed with appropriate focus on the omitted 
but crucial dimension of development: environmental issues of development. The 
environmental dimension is crucial for the concept of development in the sense that without 
tackling environmental limits to development no human efforts in pursuit of development 
can be sustainable. This suggests a thorough study of concept of ‗sustainability‘ to facilitate a 
justified version of sustainable development. This suggested study comprises the two 
following interconnected chapters. 
 
 
 
                                                     
33 Dower, N., World Ethics: the New Agenda (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), p.153. 
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Chapter Two 
1.2 Sustainability 
The concept of sustainability, like ‗development‘, is used frequently and in diverse ways in 
everyday discourse.  As every discourse uses its own selective vocabulary, they embody 
differences in thought, thus making definition of a single meaning of sustainability complex, 
and interdisciplinary collaboration far from straightforward. For instance, while 
‗sustainability‘ as envisaged by traditional neoclassical economics considers a short period of 
time, and while new classical economists consider their discipline adequate to the task of 
tackling the issue of sustainability (Nobel laureate economist Robert Solow‘s approach1 is an 
example), it generally requires a longer time horizon in its applications in ecological or 
environmental discourses.2  
Similarly, sustainability may involve different extents of the space horizon, ranging 
from the local sustainability of a bioregion, a city, or a food or water source to the globe 
itself.3 Also, sustainability is found embedded in engineering technologies – at the level of 
their own disciplinary matrix and selective focus – under special nomenclature such as ‗green 
engineering‘, engineering for ‗design and disassembly‘, or ‗life cycle‘ engineering.4  
                                                     
1 For details, see Solow, R., ‗Sustainability: An Economist‘s Perspective‘, in Economics of the Environment, ed. by 
Drofman, R. and Dorman, N.,  3rd edn (New York: W.W. Norton and  Co, 1991), pp. 179-187       
 
2 This aspect of sustainability is thoroughly studied in Costanza, R. N. B. and Haskell, B., eds, Ecosystem Health: 
New Goals for Environmental Management, (Washington DC: Island Press, 1992).Norton, along with Costanza and 
Haskell, in this context notes that ―An ecological system is healthy…if it is stable and sustainable – that is, if it 
is active and maintains its organization and autonomy over time …‖ p.9.                      
 
3 Carpenter, S. R., ‗ Sustainability‘, Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics (Volume 4, Academic Press, 1998), p.276      
4 Ibid., p.280.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
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‗Sustainability‘ is, on occasion, found to be understood as statements of fact, intent, or value 
to mean variously either a ‗journey‘ or ‗destination‘.5 This way of defining and expounding 
sustainability is complex, and has been described as a ‗dialogue of values‘ that confronts a 
‗consensual definition‘ of it.6 Concerning the challenges about the nature of sustainability 
and its goals, the notion of sustainability appears to have been interpreted from a range of 
perspectives in various discourses. While for some it is an important but unfocused concept 
like ‗liberty‘ or ‗justice‘,7 for others it is a feel-good buzzword with little meaning or 
substance.8 For some it is a call to action, and is therefore open to various political 
perspectives on possible routes to the goal of sustainability.9 
Myerson and Rydin‘s approach to sustainability has further added to the prevailing 
disagreement about the shared meaning of sustainability, by maintaining that   ‗sustainability‘ 
is culturally creative and ambiguous, and that it is more diverse than is suggested by the usual 
definition. This ambiguity, according to their view, originated from the common root ‗to 
sustain‘, which has a range of uses and diverse meanings. Of these meanings, some are in 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
5Between a Rock and a Hard Place: the Science of Geosequestration (Australia: the House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Science and Innovation, 2007) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/environ/chapter/report/chapter2.pdf.> [accessed 12 March 
2012]       
6 Ratner, B.D., ‗Sustainability as a Dialogue of Values: Challenges to the Sociology of Development‘, Sociological 
Inquiry, 74.1 (2004), pp. 50-69                                                                                                               
       
7 Pearce, D., Barbier, E. and Markandya, A., Sustainable Development Economics and Environment in the Third World 
(London: Earthscan, 2000) 
8 For more see Dunning, B., Sustainable Sustainability (California: Skeptoid, 2006) < http:// 
skeptoid.com/episodes/4005>[Accessed 12 March  2009];  Marshall, J.D. and Toffel, M.W., ‗Framing the 
Elusive Concept of Sustainability: A Sustainability Hierarchy‘, Environmental & Scientific Technology, 39.3 (2005), 
673–682; and also  Huddelson, B., Sustainability: The Overtly Ambiguous Buzzword, (Madrid: Mustang Daily, 2008) 
9 Markus J., Milne M.K., Kearins, K., & Walton, S., ‗Creating Adventures in Wonderland: The Journey 
Metaphor and Environmental Sustainability‘, in Organization, 13.6 (2006), pp. 801-839 < 
http://www.uniondelosoceanos.com/ > [accessed 16 February, 2009]     
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frequent use; for instance, ‗to keep alive‘, ‗to maintain‘, ‗to receive an injury‘, and so forth.10 
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines the word ‗sustainable‘ as: 
 
1. Capable of being borne or endured; supportable.                            
2. Capable of being upheld or defended; maintainable. 11 
 
The concept of sustainability has moved to the forefront of development policy 
discussions in the recent past (for nearly two decades). The indecisiveness concerning the 
(common) meaning of ‗sustainability‘, as described in the paragraphs above, warrants  further 
analysis and clarification of the concept in question in order to determine  its common 
meaning (if it has one at all) before utilizing it in the context of development and discerning 
its implications for various development plans and policies .   
The proponents of economic and social development as well as environmentalists 
have sought a general consensus about the meaning of ‗sustainability‘ in the context of 
‗development‘12. They assert that ‗sustainability‘ is an essential factor in development plans or 
policies, which are expected to have the capacity of continuing into the future, and also have 
the capacity to serve a great many purposes in the future.  
Nigel Dower – a seminal thinker in this field – argues that ‗sustainability‘ supplies 
moral justification of a policy or a plan both for its current practice and continuation into the 
                                                     
10 Myerson, G. and Rydin, Y., The Language of Environment: A New Rhetoric (London: UCL Press, 1996), p.103.                 
11 Ibid 
12 The proponents of economic, social development and also the environmentalists often have a tendency to 
refer the concept of ‗sustainability‘ to the issues of ‗development‘ with a view to discerning a crucial quality of  
acceptable development policies or plans for many future purposes. Stanley R. Carpenter mentions that 
‗―sustainability‘‘ is sometimes used interchangeably with ―sustainable development‖‗. For more see, Carpenter. 
S. R., ‗Sustainability‘, in Encyclopaedia of Applied Ethics, ed. by Chadwick, R. (San Diego: Academic Press, 1998), 
vol. IV, pp. 275-293 (p.276)  
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future. For Dower, when somebody endorses a practice as ‗sustainable‘, in addition to 
protecting the future, it is clearly expected to satisfy a range of moral criteria (whatever they 
may be) which the person/practitioner in question accepts. As Dower puts it: 
A form of development worth sustaining will at the very least not only protect the 
future, but also be : (a) just in terms of present social structures and practices of 
society; (b) non-damaging to the natural environment; (c) non-damaging to people 
in other countries; and (d) fair in relation to the like aspirations of other 
countries‘.13 
Sustainability is, as envisaged here by Dower, inevitably a quality crucial for desirable 
development practices, mainly because it satisfies moral conditions (such as the four 
proposed in the preceding quotation), and without which (or in the event of violation of any 
one of the proposed conditions) a form of development would be relatively unsustainable. 
Here, Dower seems to consider ‗sustainability‘ as a necessary condition for the desirability of 
a particular form (or a practice) of development.  
The similarity between Dower and many other proponents of economic and social 
development as well as environmentalists is that they all recognise a further requisite 
condition for ‗sustainability‘ besides its meaning as a ‗capability of being sustained‘. The 
dissimilarity between them is that while Dower seems to categorically refer to ‗desirability‘ as 
a necessary condition for sustainability, the environmentalists and the proponents of 
economic and social development refer to the capacity to serve a great many future purposes 
as a requisite condition for sustainability without making any precise reference to any specific 
purpose. However, it seems that there is no difficulty considering one or another of the 
                                                     
13 Dower, N., ‗Sustainability and the Right to Development‘, in International Justice and the Third World, ed. by 
Attfield, R. and Wilkins, B. (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 93-116 (p.112). 
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moral aspects of sustainability listed by Dower as a future purpose, thus suggesting that their 
approaches to sustainability can be mutually supportive. 
At least two important questions, according to Robin Attfield and Barry Wilkins, 
could arise from Dower‘s approach to sustainability: firstly, do the concepts of ‗sustainability‘ 
and ‗desirability‘ bear the same meaning, or is one (sustainability) logically similar to the 
other (desirability)? Secondly, cannot a practice be both sustainable and either bad or 
indifferent (valuationally or morally)? Attfield, along with Wilkins, replied to the first query 
by considering what is for them the problematic case of ‗sustainable arguments‘:   
…where sustainable arguments are sound or successful ones…their sustainability 
could thus be held to put them on a par with desirable entities in respect of their 
being fit to be desired. But where sustainable arguments are merely ones which are 
defensible, they may fail to be fit to be credited. 14 
Hence, sustainable arguments are not essentially desirable ones. Attfield and Wilkins turn 
next to sustainable processes: 
Often, of course, their very capacity for indefinite continuation itself makes 
sustainable processes or practices desirable; but this is far from invariably true, and 
thus, importantly, not a necessary truth. 15 
At this point, Attfield and Wilkins are not denying ‗sustainability‘ as a merit, rather pointing 
out that to have this merit is not necessarily to have all possible merits for a desirable 
practice or process.  
On another question, ‗cannot a practice be both sustainable and either bad or 
indifferent (valuationally or morally)?‘ Attfield and Wilkins‘s reply involves a positive answer 
to this question. Taking an example from an area which is considered a paradigm of 
                                                     
14 Attfield, R. and Wilkins, B., ‗Sustainability‘, Environmental Values, 3. 2 (1994), 155-158 (p.156) 
15 Ibid                                                                                                               
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sustainability (i.e. policies that are applicable to forestry or fisheries) they state (especially 
about policies of Maximum Sustainable Yield) that: 
…resources [e.g. of forestry or of fisheries] are harvested up to the point where a 
greater yield would undermine self-replenishment; and resources thus remain 
available at this level for every succeeding generation… [But] such practices 
sometimes strike at the interests of other nonhuman species (of the ocean or of 
the forests), and are thus open to ethical objection.16    
Attfield and Wilkins attempt here to emphasise the possibility of some decisive ethical 
objections (which might stem from their eventual bearing on the practice of existing policies 
on nonhuman lives and their interests) against policies of Maximum Sustainable Yield. This 
issue of moral vulnerability, as indicated by Attfield and Wilkins, characterises those policies 
as ‗undesirable‘ or ‗unjustified‘ (arguably being detrimental to nonhuman species) albeit 
‗sustainable‘ (in the sense that those policies could be practiced for the sake of the 
continuation of constant benefit for humanity, ignoring the interests of nonhuman life, into 
the indefinite future). For them ‗such a characterization would seem no less coherent than 
phrases (used of other practices) such as ―courageous but foolish‖ (e.g. whistling in the 
dark)‘.17 To justify their stance Attfield and Wilkins also refer to the instance of slavery and 
raise the question ‗was not slavery such? ‘ 18 
They go further to remind us that sustainability is, fundamentally, reliant on its scope 
or range, not on its good or bad bearings (while Dower maintains just the opposite and 
                                                     
16 Ibid. p.157                                                                                                                                                                  
17 Ibid.                                                                                                                                                                              
18  Ibid. Here the key point is that slavery, as a system, can be practiced for an indefinite period of time, albeit 
undesirable.    
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recognises a necessary link between the norm of sustainability and morality). As they put this 
issue:  
           …(in general) the broader the scope of a self reinforcing process, the greater is the 
likelihood of its remaining unassailed or intact…[T]ruly sustainable processes are 
liable to operate or be capable of operating worldwide – whether for better or for 
worse. 19 
In this part of the argument they try to argue that the issue of universalisability is also 
relevant to the concept of sustainability, not morality or desirability. To summarise their 
whole argument, a development policy or practice, although sustainable and capable of being 
operative world-wide (e.g., the policies of Maximum Sustainable Yield), can be undesirable 
or immoral.   
           Based on Attfield and Wilkins‘s stance, potential patterns in our practices with regard 
to sustainability could be divided into three categories: (1) sustainable, but unjust and 
undesirable; (2) sustainable, just and desirable; (3) sustainable, but morally indifferent. 
Presumably, the multiplicity of the form of sustainability practices led Attfield and Wilkins to 
assert the connection between issues of morality or desirability and the concept of 
sustainability.  
By contrast, Dower‘s view, as mentioned earlier, sees fulfillment of a ‗moral criterion‘ 
as inseparably linked to the concept of sustainability. In so doing he appraises ‗sustainability‘ 
as a normative concept (i.e. sustainability, in terms of this connection, is an essential quality 
of desirable practices, or, in other words is seen as a morally loaded concept). From the 
aforementioned three patterns of sustainable practices, Dower might agree to endorse the 
second category of sustainability (sustainable, just and desirable) as the only option for a 
                                                     
19 Ibid., p.158 
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‗truly‘ sustainable practice. Wilfred Beckerman, however, maintains that it is misleading to 
envisage ‗sustainability‘ as a moral concept:  
‗Sustainability‘ should be interpreted purely as a technical characteristic of any 
project, programme or development path, not as implying any moral injunction 
or over-riding criterion of choice.20 
 
Here Beckerman straightaway rejects any possibility of a necessary connection between 
‗sustainability‘ and ‗morality‘ or ‗value‘. This directly contests Dower‘s view and seems to 
support Attfield and Wilkins‘s stance, in a broad sense, though not utterly (because Attfield 
and Wilkins recognise that sustainability, in the context of a sound sustainability argument, 
may well play a role as one of the merits of the desirable practice in question). 
Given the diversity of construal, sustainability could now be divided into three 
specific categories: the first type could be labelled the ‗moral conception of sustainability‘ 
(e.g. Dower‘s approach to sustainability and also, in a sense, the approach of some 
proponents of economic and social development and some environmentalists fall into this 
category, which upholds the view that sustainability and morality are linked); the second type 
might be labelled the ‗contingent conception of sustainability‘ ( e.g. Attfield and Wilkins‘s 
approach to sustainability, which maintains that the connection between ‗sustainability‘ and 
‗morality‘ or ‗desirability‘ is contingent); and the third could be labelled the ‗technical 
conception of sustainability‘ (e.g. Beckerman‘s approach to sustainability, which maintains 
that the link between sustainability and morality is neither critical nor contingent, but rather 
negligible, sustainability being itself a technical matter).   
                                                     
20 Beckerman, W., ―Sustainable Development‘: is it a Useful Concept?‘, Environmental Values, 3.3 (1994), 191-
209 (p. 205). 
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Looking back to the preceding discussion, the points of agreement (i.e. ‗capable of 
being sustained‘ and ‗capable of being operated world-wide‘) between the thinkers here seem 
to be less crucial than the point they are disagreeing about (i.e. whether or not sustainability 
and morality are necessarily connected).  
Now a question may well be asked: is the three-fold classification of sustainable 
practices plausible? Should it be sound, it may well direct us to the assumption that 
sustainability involves a contingent link to morality, which, in turn, confronts all other 
approaches considered here except for that given by Attfield and Wilkins. An example may 
be considered here, at the risk of simplification, in the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971 
against Pakistan (the then west wing of Pakistan). While most of the then west wing-based 
Pakistan military government‘s policy initiatives and their implementation (during the pre-
liberation period)  in the east wing of Pakistan (now Bangladesh) could arguably be 
considered compatible with the interests of the government and the people (of the west 
wing) themselves, and in that sense desirable to them, those policy initiatives may well be 
envisaged as hostile to the people of the east wing of Pakistan in terms of their socio-
economic well-being, rights and autonomy, and hence being undesirable to them (the 
population of the east wing of Pakistan). To confront this fraught and discriminatory 
situation, the people of the east wing of Pakistan engaged in a war (or civil war, lasting for 
about nine months) against the west wing-based government of Pakistan and their military 
force, which eventually resulted in the independence of the east wing of Pakistan (i.e. the 
birth of People‘s Republic of Bangladesh) in 1971. Here, policy practices of the west wing-
based government of Pakistan applied to the east wing could be envisaged as ‗sustainable‘ 
in terms of their  perceived ability to be continued into the indefinite future, and also for 
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their ability to serve the interests of the people in the west wing, however undesirable to 
the people of the east wing of Pakistan. The undesirability of those policy initiatives, as has 
been mentioned here, was substantiated through a civil war.  
This example, however, supplies a further basis for the claim that a policy or practice 
could concurrently be sustainable and undesirable, which, in turn, seems to support 
Attfield and Wilkins‘ approach to sustainability. By the same token it appears to support 
the interpretation of sustainability that I have offered here through categorising sustainable 
practices into three types and arguing for the one defended by Attfield and Wilkins. A 
remark from Peter G. Brown concerning sustainability also seems to reaffirm the 
contingent-conception approach to ‗sustainability‘, hence supporting my reading of the 
concept in question. In substantiating his understanding about the concept of sustainability 
Brown states that:   
The proliferation of modern weapons may be sustainable, but undesirable, 
nevertheless. 21 
 
There again the idea is that ‗sustainability‘ could be comprehended as a characteristic of a 
starkly debatable practice or policy, and one far from desirable.  
Let us return to Attfield and Wilkins‘s reply to the question ‗cannot a practice be 
both sustainable and either bad or indifferent (valuationally or morally)?‘ Their reply seems 
to be plausible. Consider the example of tuna fishing which, as a practice of Maximum 
                                                     
21 Brown, P.G., Ethics, Economics and International Relations: Transparent Sovereignty in the Commonwealth of Life 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), p.85.  
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Sustainable Yield, may well be continued into the indefinite future, fulfilling human needs 
for generation after generation, and hence be sustainable. But it would also be immoral to 
continue with this, as tuna-fishing is a mortal threat to dolphins. Thus, the fishing of tuna 
can be seen to conflict with moral practice, despite being sustainable.  
Likewise, a Maximum Sustainable Yield policy or practice with regard to forestry may 
well be sustainable in the sense that it is ‗capable of being continued into the indefinite 
future‘ (allowing for some desirable practices of a society, such as fostering the scope of 
education, expanding medical facilities, and so forth), but undesirable in that it is not in the 
interests of animals in the forest. Consider the example. A policy of ‗cutting down a certain 
proportion of trees in the forest‘ – a policy or practice of Maximum Sustainable Yield – 
could be sustainable (in the sense that it could be continued into the indefinite future and be 
able to serve human interests over the generations) being a promoter of some desirable 
practices, such as education and health facilities of a society, yet immoral or undesirable as 
detrimental to the safety and survival of the animals in the forest, for example monkeys who 
need deep forest for their normal movement and continued existence. These two examples 
are arguably capable of substantiating the claim that a practice could be sustainable without 
being moral, thus defending the contingent-conception approach to sustainability. 
It now seems that the sustainability of a practice means it is able to be continued for 
an indefinite period of time as well as being able ( where appropriate)  to be operated 
worldwide. The concept of sustainability, indeed, remains a crucial (descriptive) characteristic 
of a system or a practice. However, it is misleading to maintain the view that being 
sustainable is synonymous with being desirable. The concepts of sustainability and morality 
are not inseparable; at times they can be overlapping, and at other times they confront each 
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other. The link between sustainability and morality is contingent (but not merely technical).  
The view of those normative ethicists, social theorists and environmentalists who maintain 
the view that they are inseparable is thus redundant. Separate concepts are therefore required 
to allow distinctive judgments to be made about the sustainability of a relevant practice, and 
about its justice. The next chapter involves an illustration of the meaning and implication of 
the concept of sustainability with regard to development. 
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Chapter Three 
 
1.3 Sustainable Development: Contrasting Views, Meaning and 
Justification 
 
1.3.1 Introducing Sustainable Development  
There was a tendency in the environmental literature of the 1970s and the 1980s to refer 
to the concept of sustainability purely in issues of environmental concern.1 Its use 
relating to development was initiated in the recent past (a little more than two decades 
ago) and since then hundreds of definitions of sustainable development have been made. 
The growing tendency to use the concept of sustainability in the context of development 
assumes explicit form in Stanley R. Carpenter‘s observation that ‗it [sustainability] is 
sometimes used interchangeably with ―sustainable development‖‘2.  
The official use of the concept of sustainable development began with the 
publication of the World Commission on Environment and Development‘s (WCED) 
report of 1987, Our Common Future3 (widely known as the Brundtland Report). This 
report offers a definition of sustainable development, which has hitherto been the most 
extensively used and the most often quoted definition. Also this report received 
                                                     
1 The Club of Rome, the first user of this concept of sustainability  in its modern sense, used it as 
‗environmental sustainability' and  brought it to extensive public attention in 1972 in its book The Limits to 
Growth. The core message of the book is that an ecological collapse would occur within the next hundred 
years owing to the rapid growth of the human population and uncontrolled increase in prosperity. For  
more see, Meadows, D. H., et al, The Limits to Growth: Report For The Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of 
Mankind ( New York: Universe Books, 1972). Also see Attfield, R., ‗Sustainability‘, forthcoming in: 
LaFollette, H. ed. International Encyclopaedia of Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2013) p. 1.                   
2 Carpenter. S. R., ‗Sustainability‘, in Encyclopaedia of Applied Ethics, ed. by Chadwick, R. (San Diego: 
Academic Press, 1998), vol. IV, pp. 275-293 (p. 276).                                                                                                                                 
3 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), p. 43.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
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widespread attention from practitioners and scholars and sustainable development 
became an issue of lively debate after the adoption of various measures, which were not a 
direct interpretation of the report but embodied a weakened version of it, as agreed by 
the leaders of 192 countries from all over the world at the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development in 1992, which was known as the Earth Summit and 
whose findings have been published in Agenda 21.4 
1.3.2 The Brundtland Definition of Sustainable Development 
 
The definition of the concept of sustainable development, set out by the World 
Commission on Environment and Development in its report (i.e. the Brundtland 
Report), is:   
development that meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.5 
The underpinning of this pioneering definition is the importance of consideration for the 
needs of future generations above and beyond the needs of present generations. This 
theme has emerged as the core element in this definition of sustainable development. 
The underlying reason behind this is the consideration that human interventions in the 
environment have great implications for future generations.  
The Brundtland definition of sustainable development has not only been 
employed ‗throughout Agenda 21 and its supporting documents, but also in numerous 
                                                     
4 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21(UNCED: New York, 1992) 
<http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/Agenda21.pdf> [accessed 15 March, 
2012]                   
5 WCED, p. 43.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
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documents published by governments and the private sector‘6. As Johan Hattingh 
remarks on this definition:  
This dominant definition [the Brundtland Definition] is a major point of 
convergence in the world today within the environmental debate. 7 
A similar assertion is found in the reaffirmation of the principles of sustainable 
development adopted in 1992 at the Rio summit by the UN Millennium Declaration of 
2000.8 Furthermore, the same spirit has been repeated in the starting paragraph of the 
Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development of 2002.9                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Although the repeated affirmations of the spirit or the principles of the 
Brundtland definition of sustainable development (adopted at the Rio summit in 1992) in 
different subsequent summits obviously launched the concept of sustainable 
development on its path to wide popularity, relevant researchers into the field of 
development have been found to disagree about its adequacy. While for many it is a 
canonical definition10, the dominant model11 or the most frequently quoted classic 
                                                     
6 Hattingh, J., ‗The State of the Art in Environmental Ethics as a Practical Enterprise: a View from the 
Johannesburg Documents‘, in Environmental Ethics and International Policy, ed. by ten Have, H.A.M.J. (Paris: 
UNESCO Publishing, 2006), pp. 191-216 (p. 201).                                                                                                                                  
7 Ibid, pp. 200-201.                                                                                                                                                       
8 United Nations, United Nations Millennium Declaration, General Assembly Resolution A/RES/55/2-55/2 
(New York: United Nations, 2000) <http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e. Html > 
[accessed 21 April 2009] 
9 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, 
(Johannesburg: United Nations, 2002)                                                               
<http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/POI_PD.> [accessed 21 April 
2009] 
10 Sachs, W., ‗Sustainable Development and the Crisis of Nature: On the Political Anatomy of an 
Oxymoron‘, in Living with Nature, Environmental Politics as Cultural Discourse, ed., by Fiseher, F. and Hajer, M. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 28.                                                                                                                                             
11 Hattingh, J., ‗The State of the Art in Environmental Ethics as a Practical Enterprise: a View from the 
Johannesburg Documents‘, in Environmental Ethics and International Policy, ed. by ten Have, H.A.M.J. (Paris: 
UNESCO Publishing, 2006), pp. 191-216 (p. 200).   
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formulation12, for others it is an unsatisfactory definition and open to a variety of 
criticisms.  
One of the main criticisms of the Brundtland Commission‘s definition of 
sustainable development is that, while economic sustainability, social sustainability and 
environmental sustainability are broadly recognised as the three main pillars of 
sustainable development in the current-relevant-literatures, there are no references to 
them in the definition of the Brundtland Commission. Hence, the suspicion arises how 
far sustainable development as defined by the Brundtland Commission will be able to 
proceed towards its professed goal. To begin with, the central point of advocacy of a 
sustainable form of society was the significance of limits to certain forms of growth, 
including ecological limits.13 This idea was presumably grounded in the belief                                                                                                                                                                            
that the concept of ‗growth‘ and that of ‗development‘ (prone to involve qualitative 
aspects) are not identical. For instance, while the concept of development, as defended in 
chapter one, involves attainments of various economic and social goals and recognition 
of ecological limits, the concept of economic growth entirely skips over these goals and 
limits. As the Brundtland definition does not involve any explicit recognition of such 
limits, it has been criticised.                                                                                                                                                                     
 However, upon closer inspection, one might notice that although the Brundtland 
Commission does not overtly refer to the social and environmental aspects of 
sustainability, non-anthropocentric value issues or any form of limits to growth within 
the definition, it discusses those very issues on several other occasions at different stages 
of the report (e.g. the Brundtland report touches on the issue of limits to growth on page 
                                                     
12Holland, A., ‗Must We Give up Environmental Ethics?‘, in Environmental Ethics and International Policy. ed. 
by ten Have, H.A.M.J. and others (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2006), pp. 191-216 (p. 119).  
13 Herman Daly and Dennis Clark Pirages belong to the group of proponents of sustainable forms of 
society. For details see Pirages, D. C., ed., The Sustainable Society, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977). 
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8; social and environmental aspects of sustainable development are discussed on page 75; 
page 57 of the report involves recognition of  non-anthropocentric values). In a passage 
that makes the point explicit, Attfield says,   
         There is no overt recognition of limits [in the Brundtland definition], even 
though the report goes on to show such recognition in the next sentence, 
and there is no overt recognition of environmental aspects of sustainability, 
although the report goes on to discuss ‗socially and environmentally 
sustainable development‘, and even to recognize non-anthropocentric 
values.14 
 Thus it may well be argued that, despite recognition of issues of social and 
environmental sustainability and non-anthropocentric values in several places in the 
report, and also despite the good intent of the authors of the Brundtland commission, 
the definition in question under-defines the concept of sustainable development as a 
result of not expressing concern about ecological limits and non-anthropocentric value-
issues (or through remaining silent about such issues) in the definition. Besides, the 
Brundtland commission‘s definition of sustainable development seems to serve only to 
articulate concern about meeting the needs of contemporaries and their descendants as 
opposed to introducing benevolent practices which contemporaries could endorse and 
convey to their descendants.15                                                                                                                 
 A further limitation of the Brundtland definition is the use of the criterion of 
‗needs‘ in defining the concept of sustainable development: the criterion of ‗needs‘, used 
in the definition, is vague and misleading. Wilfred Beckerman in this context argues that 
‗such a criterion is totally useless since ‗‗needs‘‘ is a subjective concept‘16. He adds that:  
                                                     
14 Attfield, R., Environmental Ethics: An Overview for the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 
2003), p. 128.   
15 Ibid.                                                                 
16 Beckerman, W., ―Sustainable Development‘: is it a Useful Concept?‘, Environmental Values, 3.3 (1994), 
191-209  (p. 194).                                                                                                                                                                                  
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 People at different points in time, or at different income levels, or with 
different cultural or national backgrounds will differ about the importance 
they attach to different ―needs‘‘. Hence the injunction to enable future 
generations to meet their needs does not provide any clear guidance as to 
what has to be preserved in order that future generations may do so. 17 
  Here Beckerman tries to clarify that the desirability of ‗needs‘ (e.g. for a particular stuff) 
may well differ from time to time, place to place and person to person. What is crucial to 
a person now could be trivial afterwards; also what is a ‗need‘ to someone could be 
unnecessary to somebody else. Beckerman here seems to have got the point right. For it 
has not been clarified in the definition which needs – crucial or trivial, survival or luxury 
– are essential to the realisation of sustainable development.  
Wolfgang Sachs goes along with Beckerman‘s observation, suggesting that the 
Brundtland definition leaves two crucial questions -- ‗What needs?‘ and ‗Whose needs?‘ -- 
open or unanswered; and it resolves the dilemma ‗nature versus justice‘ in favour of 
nature by sidestepping the crisis of justice. As Sachs formulates the questions and 
responds to them: 
Is sustainable development supposed to meet the needs for water, land, and 
economic security or the needs for air travel and bank deposits? Is it 
concerned with survival needs or with luxury needs? Are the needs in 
question those of the global consumer class or those of the enormous 
numbers of have-nots? The Brundtland report remains undecided 
throughout and therefore avoids facing up to the crisis of justice. 18                  
                                                     
17 Beckerman, W., ‗The Chimera of Sustainable Development‘, The Electronic Journal of Sustainable 
Development, 1.1(2007)< http://173-45-244-
96.slicehost.net/docs/The_Nature_of_Sustainable_Development.pdf>[accessed 22 April 2009]    
18 Sachs, W., ‗Sustainable Development and the Crisis of Nature: On the Political Anatomy of an 
Oxymoron‘, in Living with Nature, Environmental Politics as Cultural Discourse, ed., by Fiseher, F. and Hajer, M. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 23-41 (p. 29).                                                                                                                                         
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Here Sachs attempts to clarify that, in the key area of justice19, the Brundtland definition 
is unlikely to play any role or be operative. Furthermore the definition in question 
entirely omits issues of environmental limits (i.e. environmental sustainability).     
 Given this, searching for an alternative to the criterion ‗needs‘ seems to be 
essential in order to tackle the challenge posed by its ambiguous use in the Brundtland 
definition. Our needs are of various kinds, but all the varieties are not equally crucial. 
Thus, specifying our needs and then prioritising them could be an alternative solution to 
the challenge in question. The need of a malnourished individual for basic nutrition is 
clearly more important and urgent than the need of a rich individual for an expensive 
meal. The meeting of the basic needs of every individual, therefore, should be the priority 
in development. Specifying the basic needs is also not impossible because basic needs 
foreseeably remain almost the same (or hardly differ) across people all over the world 
irrespective of their colour, shape, race, period or place of birth, culture, education and 
so forth. What may differ widely here are the satisfiers of the basic needs, not the basic 
needs themselves. For example, a need to be without disease and a need for satisfactory 
shelter can be specified as basic needs without consultation of the relevant people in all 
races, classes and political orientations. And such specifications of basic needs are not 
representative of any particular metaphysical standpoint, or rigidly prescriptive view or 
specification.20 Thus the challenges (specifically the problem of ambiguity with the 
criterion ‗needs‘) may well be tackled through replacing the criterion ‗needs‘ with the 
criterion ‗basic needs‘. 
                                                     
19 Justice is used here to mean a state where questions, such as ‗What needs?‘ and ‗Whose needs?‘ are 
tackled in a clear and decisive manner. 
20 For details see Alkire, S., ‗Dimensions of Human Development‘, World Development, 30. 2 (2002), 181-
205. 
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Now an essential question may well be asked: is the ‗basic needs‘ approach to 
sustainable development capable of addressing all three of the main pillars of economic, 
social and environmental sustainability? One might say that it only addresses issues of 
economic and social sustainability, not environmental sustainability. In my view, the 
answer is promising (i.e. it addresses all three pillars) for two reasons. Firstly, through the 
practice of the basic needs approach, the gap between available resources and resources 
required can significantly be lessened, and consequently the target of economic 
sustainability can be achieved. The basis of this optimism is the view that fewer resources 
are needed for lessening the gap in question in a given period if meeting basic needs is 
the main objective, and also more resources become available with the practice of such a 
theory of the controlled use of resources as the basic needs approach.21 Secondly, 
through encompassing non-material needs (such as self-determination, self reliance, 
political freedom and security, participation in making the decisions that affect citizens 
and a sense of purpose in life and work22), the basic needs approach seems to be capable 
of addressing various challenges of social sustainability (such as huge illiteracy, gender 
discrimination and the like). Thirdly, over and above economic sustainability, the practice 
of the basic needs approach is also capable of addressing issues of environmental 
sustainability by reduced use of resources and the availability of more resources.                                                                                                                                                                                    
Although resolving the conflict between the satisfying of the basic needs of some 
and the affluent lifestyle of others is not entirely difficult, resolving conflicts between 
finely balanced needs and desires is more difficult. Despite the advantages mentioned 
above, the use of basic needs criteria might not be unequivocally operational in such a 
case. In this case institutions, tempered by reason, can offer guidance for making 
                                                     
21 Streeten, P., ‗The Distinctive Features of a Basic Needs Approach to Development‘, International 
Development Review, 19.3 (1997), pp. 8-16.                                                                                                                                       
22 Ibid  
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priorities between conflicting needs. In order to meet ‗basic needs‘ it may well be 
necessary temporarily to pursue projects that might not essentially be in line with 
sustainable development. Now a question may well be asked: is it acceptable to pursue a 
project that does not go directly in line with sustainable development? The answer is yes. 
For although such a project cannot be called a sustainable project, it would be expected 
to be adopted with a super-ordinate aim of reaching sustainability, eventually becoming 
supportive of the main objective of sustainable development, fulfilment of the basic 
needs of individuals. For example, a famine relief project is not a policy in line with 
sustainable development itself, but it would certainly be a good project to be undertaken 
before starting off a development activity which is sustainable. Projects that involve 
measures for making humans free from various diseases would also qualify as examples 
of good but not always sustainable projects. 
 One might not, however, be convinced by this adjustment (by virtue of the 
proposed new criterion ‗basic needs‘) and may well have doubts about the accuracy and 
or adequacy of this adjusted formulation. The proponents of the capabilities approach 
(which has been often recognised as one of the most promising contributions to the 
discourses on development) present a thorough critique of the basic needs approach. 
Among the most famous critics are Amartya Sen and Martha C. Nussbaum. While the 
capability approach was pioneered within economics by Amartya Sen, Martha C. 
Nussbaum initiated the same approach within philosophy.  
 Amartya Sen, criticising the basic needs approach, notes that:   
 …certainly, people have ‗needs‘, but they also have values, and in 
particular, they cherish their ability to reason, appraise, act and 
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participate. Seeing people in terms of their needs may give us a rather 
meagre view of humanity. 23 
Thus Sen argues that (sustainable) development is not to be defined either as an increase 
in GDP per capita, or in consumption, education, or health measures alone, or even as 
the fulfilment of (basic) needs, but rather as something else (i.e. expansion of 
capabilities24). In ‗The Concept of Development‘25, Sen focuses on the valuational aspects 
of development and redefines the concept so that the concerned people get clearer about 
what changes they want to bring about or at least promote. 
As a value laden concept, development, for Sen, encompasses human well being, 
quality of life and standard of living, and thus it aims at improving the types of life 
human beings are living. He also asserts that development is not all about theory and it is 
a matter of practice as well, which is why it is very important to define or conceptualise 
development in relation to what humans can and should be and do (beings and doings). 
To cover beings and doings Sen employs the term ‗functionings‘. In light of this 
understanding, he then defines ‗development‘ as improvement of certain human 
functionings and the expansion of human capabilities to so function. Capabilities, as he 
states, are a person‘s or group‘s freedom26 to achieve or promote functioning. They are 
also promoters of reasonable/real choices. But the selection of capabilities, he says, is a 
matter of value judgment, although he maintains that selection has to be done explicitly, 
and through a process of public debate, where possible. 
                                                     
23 Sen, A., ‗Why We Should Preserve the Spotted Owl‘, London Review of Books, 26.3(2004), pp. 164-184 (p. 
164).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
24 Capabilities are functionings that may relate to our existence (capability to drink clean water) or may not 
(those doings that are less crucial in term of our existence, such as capability to eat rich sweets or to visit 
relations). For details see Alkire, pp.181-205                                                                                                                                                                              
25 Sen, A., ‗The Concept of Development‘, in Handbook of Development Economics, ed. by Chenery, H. and 
Srinivasan, T. N. ( Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1988), pp. 9-26.                          
26 The concept of ‗capability‘, as has been explained by Sen, involves expansion of freedoms (substantive 
freedom). The word ‗freedom‘ has been re-established and construed by Sen as referring to the 
enhancement of ‗human capabilities‘ which entail decision making processes, plus prospects to attain 
desired results, in other words, the substantive freedom and enhancement of real choices that surely people 
have reason to value.                                         
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Sen suggests that, for a satisfactory analysis or definition of the concept of 
sustainable development, it is necessary to shift away from our focus on Brundtland‘s 
definition to one which concerns:   
the capabilities of people in the present without compromising the 
capabilities of people in the future. 27 
                                                                                                                                                            
Here Sen‘s interpretation seeks to remedy a supposed failing of the Brundtland definition 
which is rooted in the Brundtland Commission‘s over-reliance on the criterion ‗needs‘ in 
expounding the meaning of the concept of sustainable development. 
Sen‘s capability approach, however, is not beyond criticism either. Firstly his 
approach seems to be non-operational. For the range of functioning of basic human 
capabilities in Sen‘s approach is not precise. And absence of specificity and direction as 
to what sorts of capabilities are central is what makes Sen‘s approach non operational. 
Being indecisive, it also fails to determine the nature of the good life.   
 Secondly, Sen‘s capability approach is anthropocentric28 by being restricted to 
the analysis of human-related development issues alone (i.e. by advocating the expansion 
of human capabilities alone), not those of non-human living creatures. And being 
anthropocentric, his view will not be appropriate to define sustainable development 
adequately, because non anthropocentric values (such as the intrinsic value of non-
human living creatures, and the significance of species and ecosystems, in terms of their 
                                                     
27 Sen, A.K., The Ends and Means of Sustainability, (Tokyo: Key note address at The International Conference 
on Transition to Sustainability, May 2000) <.http://www.iisd.org/pdf/sen_paper.pdf> [accessed: 16 
March 2012] 
28 P.B. Anand defies this objection and states that ‗‗the universalism inherent in the ‗capability approach‘ is 
far from anthropocentric‘‘. A debate may well be continued on this issue. But there is no room here to 
continue it. For more see Anand, P.B., ‗Capability, Sustainability, and Collective Action: An Examination 
of a River Water Dispute‘, Journal of Human Development 81 (2007), 109-132 (p. 126). 
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distinctive roles, for the continued existence of all bearers of intrinsic value including 
humans) lie at the heart of environmental sustainability, one of the three pillars of 
sustainable development. 
Martha Nussbaum, a leading scholar of Aristotelian ethics, has been evolving the 
same (capabilities) approach with special emphasis on its philosophical underpinnings as 
well as its suitability to supply a list of central human capabilities. Being enormously 
influenced in her thinking by Aristotle‘s idea of human functioning, Marx‘s idea of ‗the 
truly human‘ and Kant‘s notion of the ‗inviolability and the dignity of the person‘, 
Nussbaum has developed a neo-Aristotelian account of universal values as a foundation 
for basic political principles (with the capacity to override competing political theories 
and social norms). Articulating Aristotle‘s notion of human functioning (human 
flourishing) in terms of capabilities (the set of valuable beings and doings), she identifies 
a list of basic capabilities which have value in themselves. For her, the items of the list are 
just separate components, distinct in qualities, and thus need to be addressed separately. 
A detailed account on one item of the list, she argues, does not cover the necessity or 
value of another one; thus promoting one item at the expense of another is eventually in 
vain (i.e. goes against human well-being). She acknowledges that the list of central 
capabilities is not complete or rigid, but rather flexible, and open to be tested (her list of 
central human capabilities has been revised several times29) against the strength of our 
intuitions. She wraps up her position by noting that: 
...the use of the list is facilitative rather than tyrannical: if individuals neglect 
an item on the list, this is just fine from the point of view of the political 
purposes of the list, so long as they don‘t impede others who wish to pursue 
it. And if they pursue an item not on the list, that is to be expected, and 
                                                     
29 The most recent version of Nussbaum‘s central human functional capabilities list has employed the 
headings: (1) life, (2) bodily health, (3) bodily integrity, (4) senses, imagination, and thought, (5) emotion, 
(6) practical reason, (7) affiliation, (8) other species, (9) play, (10) control over one‘s environment.                                                              
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exactly what the list is meant to make possible. It is in this sense that the list 
is, emphatically, a partial and not a comprehensive conception of the good.30 
 
It is apparent here that Sen and Nussbaum are concerned with developing a 
theory that is not only normative and empirical but also capable of directing policy. 
There is no doubt that this ‗capabilities ethic‘, in some respects, is an outstanding 
contribution to the development discourse. As David A. Crocker puts it:  
One reason for the importance of this ‗capabilities ethic‘ is that it fruitfully 
links, without confusion or fusion, those elements that have been 
unfortunately and even disastrously separated.31 
 
But, as it seems to me, Nussbaum‘s version of the capabilities approach has been more 
successful than Sen‘s one. Firstly, by arriving at a list of central elements of ‗truly human 
functioning‘, unlike Sen she intends direct political and constitutional application, and 
thereby seems to be successful in defending the capabilities approach from being 
criticised as non-operational. Secondly, Nussbaum‘s version is quite penetrating in the 
sense that, regardless of whether or not it is a thoroughly anthropocentric view, it gives a 
worthy clarification to the importance of the ‗capability ethics‘ that is compatible with 
and supportive of economic and social sustainability (two pillars of sustainable 
development) in terms of being functional in realising the wellbeing of contemporaries 
and future generations.  
                                                     
30 Nussbaum, M.C., Women and the Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), p. 96. 
31 Crocker, D. A., ‗Functioning and Capability: The Foundation of Sen‘s and Nussbaum‘s Development 
Ethic‘, Political Theory, 20.4(1992), 584-612, at page 588.  
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Furthermore, granted that Nussbaum apparently expresses concern for ‗other 
species‘ by putting this phrase in the list of central human functional capabilities, her 
version becomes distinct from Sen‘s. But, since she does not recognise the view that 
non-human living creatures have functional capabilities, her approach is anthropocentric, 
and thus warrants criticism on account of being so. As in Sen‘s approach, the issue of 
environmental sustainability has been omitted in Nussbaum‘s approach, and such 
omission leaves her approach open to criticism.  
  But still, to return to the basic needs approach, one serious objection, raised by 
Sen, remains to be answered: is the basic needs approach free from the objections (i.e. 
that the criterion ‗needs‘ is ambiguous and thus misleading; and that the criterion ‗basic 
needs‘ does not address the ‗valuation aspects‘ of development or issues of ‗humanity‘ 
relevant to sustainable development) that have been held relevant concerning the use of 
the criterion of needs in the Brundtland definition? Here are two reasons to be optimistic 
about the basic needs approach being free from the objections: (1) as opposed to the 
ambiguous use of the criterion ‗needs‘, the ‗basic needs‘ criterion is relatively precise, and 
comprises specified human needs; (2) Sen is not right in claiming that the criterion ‗basic 
needs‘ omits the valuation aspects of development or issues of humanity relevant to 
sustainable development because, as Paul Streeten rightly maintains, the basic needs 
approach includes a range of non-material values32, which effectively correspond to such 
valuation issues of development. Examples include, according to Streeten,   self-
determination, political freedom and security, participation in making the decisions that 
affect workers and citizens, national and cultural identity, and a sense of purpose in life 
and work. The plausibility of this assertion becomes more apparent when Streeten goes 
further on to say that:                                                                                                                                                                
                                                     
32 Streeten, p. 50.     
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BN [basic needs] is concerned not only with the undetermined but also with 
the unemployed: the aged, the sick, the disabled and orphaned children.‘ 33 
This attests to the view that the basic needs approach undeniably integrates economic 
sustainability and social sustainability, two pillars of sustainable development, through 
suitably focusing on material and non-material needs. Furthermore, this approach, as has 
been mentioned earlier, seems to uphold the issue of environmental sustainability, the 
third pillar of sustainable development, through advocating the reduced use of resources 
and availability of more resources.  
 
1.3.3 The Caring for the Earth Definition of Sustainable Development 
 
Although the Brundtland definition, as has been observed earlier, addresses issues of 
economic and partly social sustainability, another central issue, i.e. environmental 
sustainability, was less than explicitly addressed there.34 Given this, the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) Caring for the Earth later redefined the concept of 
sustainable development (with a view to avoiding such limitations) as:  
improving the quality of life while living within the carrying capacity of 
supporting ecosystems. 35                                                        
 
This is, indeed, another widely recognised classical and/or core definition36 of the 
concept of sustainable development. This definition relates ‗development‘ to the idea of 
                                                     
33 Ibid, p. 50.   
34 Attfield, 2003, p.128. 
35 The United Nations Environmental Programme/World–Wide Fund for Nature/World Conservation 
Union, Caring for the Earth: A Strategy for Sustainable Living (London: Earthscan, 1991). Also available at 
<http://coombs.anu.edu.au/~vern/caring/care-earth1.tx>[accessed 20 January 2012] (Ch.1)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
36 Jacobs, M., ‗Sustainable Development: A Contested Concept‘, in Fairness and Futurity: Essays on the 
Environmental Sustainability and Social Justice, ed. by Dobson, A. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 
21-45 (p. 23)                                                                                                                           
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‗quality of life‘ explicitly, and recognises environmental limits, while in turn remapping 
the contours37 of sustainable development. At the same time it involves progress towards 
discernment of the meaning of sustainable development from the point of view of 
justice; and here lies its main strength. The definition seems further to recognise 
distinctions between growth and development, which also involves progress towards a 
better understanding of the concept of sustainable development.  
Nevertheless, to begin with, the Caring for the Earth definition remains silent 
about ‗needs‘ (any type: basic or luxury), which is clearly a drawback. The Caring for the 
Earth definition concurrently, however, appears unintentionally to define sustainable 
development as an improvement in levels of human wellbeing in perpetuity (although 
not overtly so); and here lies arguably the central implication or, to be more specific, the 
central limitation of it. The commendation of the uninterrupted improvement of human 
wellbeing of this definition is rooted in the UN Declaration on the Right to 
Development of 1986, where the enthusiasm for uninterrupted improvement was 
candidly mentioned.38 This commendation is both impractical and immoral: impractical 
in the sense that it conflicts with the Second Law of Thermodynamics39; and immoral in 
the sense that it imposes an unwarranted load on earlier generations to facilitate 
                                                     
37 Economists who appraise the Caring for the Earth definition envisage human wellbeing as the only 
contestant being sustained. This is understandable because human wellbeing has intrinsic value from most 
viewpoints. But envisaging human well being as the one and only issue to be sustained is too narrow a 
view. For having goods and interests and also having the capacity to flourish (for details see chapter three 
of Part Two), non-human entities are bearers of intrinsic value like human beings. Hence the goods and 
interests of non-human entities merit being sustained. Besides, species and ecosystems, on which the 
continued existence of all living entities depends, also warrant being protected insofar as human capacity 
allows.                                                                                            
38 United Nations, Declaration on the Right to Development, (New York: United Nations, 1986) 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/41/a41r128.htm [accessed 15 March, 2012]    
39 According to the 2nd law, energy that has been lost due to interaction and transformation will not be 
recoverable by reversing the process. For details see, Chemistry for the Gifted and Talented: the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics  (London: Royal Society of Chemistry: Advancing the Chemical Science, 2012) 
<http://www.rsc.org/learnchemistry/content/filerepository/CMP/00/000/673/32.%20the%20second%
20law%20of%20thermodynamics.pdf>[accessed 15 June 2012]  
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relentless improvement of the quality of life for their descendants. Attfield remarks it as 
an ‗unfair burden‘ for the earlier generations, in a passage which reads as follows:   
This [definition] seems inequitable, and might also involve unfair burdens 
for earlier generations if they were required to make sacrifices to facilitate 
continual improvements of quality of life for their successors.40 
Wilfred Beckerman maintains that there is no logical reason for making all successors‘ 
lives better than those of their predecessors.41 And he eventually rejects the entire 
concept of sustainable development on grounds of justice between generations 
(intergenerational justice). 
Furthermore the Caring for the Earth definition warrants criticism for 
misrepresenting the concept of ‗carrying capacity‘. Carrying capacity is a biological 
concept, which is only applicable to non-human species, not to human beings. But this 
definition seems tendentiously to apply this concept to human populations. If we look 
back through the history of famine, what we find is that famine did not always occur in 
countries where the so called carrying capacity was exceeded. The flow of food and other 
environmental goods over borders, thanks to political will and transport expediency, has 
been found to defend many countries from the worst effects of famine, which is 
sometimes said to have occurred as a result of inadequate production of food within the 
territory of the country in question. Contrariwise, famine has been found to occur in a 
country where production of food was sufficient to feed its resident population, but 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
40 Attfield, R., ‗Development Ethics‘ (Cardiff University: ENCAP, Philosophy Section (unpublished)), 
pp.3-4   
41 Beckerman. W., ‗Sustainable Development and Our Obligations to Future Generations‘, in Fairness and 
Futurity: Essays on Environmental Sustainability and Social Justice, ed. by Andrew Dobson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), pp. 71-92  
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when some of that population could not afford to buy the food they needed. Consider 
the following example.42 USA, Europe and Japan all have exceeded the carrying capacity 
of land within their boundaries, yet all three regions have managed to avoid famine by 
importing the required amount of food support as well as exporting surplus production. 
Thus it seems that carrying capacity is not applicable to human populations of any 
ecological region, although it can sensibly be applied to the ecosystems of the earth as a 
whole and to non-human species which entirely count on their habitats for their 
subsistence food. As the Caring for the Earth definition applies this concept to human 
populations who are not confined to their supporting ecosystems for subsistence food, it 
involves an obvious misuse of the concept of carrying capacity. Thus correctly criticising 
this application as a misleading one Attfield states that: 
[Carrying capacity is] the capacity of a particular territory to support no more 
than a certain fixed number of a given non-human species. [But] this biological 
concept has sometimes been applied tendentiously to human populations, as if 
such populations were unaffected by trade and by social and international 
decisions. 43 
 
 Now questions remain: (1) whether or not the commendation of perpetual 
improvement in human well-being level, which problematises the Caring for the Earth 
definition of ‗sustainable development‘, can be repaired, and also (2) whether or not the 
difficulty arising due to the employment of the concept of carrying capacity in this 
definition can be overcome. The realisation of the unfulfilled basic needs of every 
individual is a pressing need. Thus the practice of the ‗basic needs‘ realisation involves a 
continual improvement in the levels of human wellbeing (which is development) until 
                                                     
42 Vanderheiden, S., ‗Two Concept of Sustainability‘, Political Studies, 56(2008), pp. 435-455. (Note 5, p. 
454). 
43 Attfield, 2003, p. 189.                                                                                                                      
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and unless these improvements through development are sufficient to realise all 
unfulfilled basic needs at the individual level. Thus development involves total 
participation of each individual all over the world. Success in realising unfulfilled basic 
needs will positively help improve human wellbeing at some acceptable level, and such 
improvement (through the realisation of basic needs) will, in favourable circumstances, 
be sustainable in perpetuity. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning here that the concept of 
‗basic needs‘ is compatible with some other needs that are required to be met (such as 
needs for cooperation, self respect and so on) being met, without contradiction. This 
seems to be supportive of my basic-needs-based revised approach to sustainable 
development.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Alan Carter‘s perspective on the concept of sustainable development seems to be 
supportive of the interpretation I have given in the paragraph above, and thus worth 
mentioning here. For Carter, there is no need to confine the concept of sustainable 
development to refer to a process of change which continues forever, because within the 
mainstream ‗development theory‘, as he says, some are found to argue that a 
precondition for ‗political modernisation‘ is a society achieving a certain level of 
economic development. Thus, he says we could plausibly use the concept of sustainable 
development to refer 
…to the attainment of a certain level that is viewed as a precondition for 
sustainable life styles: ‗development for sustainability‘ in other words. 44 
For him the idea of a certain level of economic development and commendation of 
attainment of that level in human wellbeing in perpetuity lie at the heart of a sustainable 
life style. Carter‘s observation seems to be compatible with my criticism and suggested 
revision of the Caring for the Erath definition of sustainable development. While 
                                                     
44 Carter, A., ‗Distributive Justice and Environmental Sustainability‘, The Heythrop Journal, XLI (2000), 449-
460 (p. 451). 
74 | P a g e  
 
arguably the main strength of Carter‘s notion of a certain level of development is implicit 
in the commendation of perpetual endeavour for the attainment of a certain level of 
economic development, the main strength of the notion of basic needs, adopted by 
myself, is by the same token implicit in the commendation of perpetual endeavour for 
the fulfilment of basic needs. As opposed to the suggestion of the Caring for the Earth 
definition, both Carter‘s suggestion and the one I have tried to develop here seem 
plausible. For, as has been mentioned earlier, a non-stop improvement in the quality of 
human life is not practicable (for it conflicts with the second law of Thermodynamics) 
and not moral either (for this very practice gives emphasis to the betterment of future 
generations which, in turn, imposes unfair burdens on  the present generation).  
Interpreted appropriately (in particular as has been suggested in the paragraph 
above),   the commendation of the Caring for the Earth definition (i.e. the constant 
improvement of the wellbeing of the entire population) can still be seen as  consistent 
with the three main pillars of sustainable development: economic, social and 
environmental sustainability. 
Given all this, however, it is now apparent that neither of the two attempts by the 
UN at a definitional formulation seems to be adequate as they stand. While the definition 
of the Brundtland Commission is flawed mainly for leaving the issue of sustainability 
under-defined (i.e. for omitting the issue of environmental sustainability) and using the 
vague criterion ‗needs‘, the Caring for the Earth definition is flawed mainly for 
commending (albeit indirectly) a perpetual improvement at the level of human wellbeing 
and inappropriately applying the biological concept of carrying capacity to human 
populations, as well as for remaining silent about human ‗needs‘ (or preferably basic 
needs). Thus a satisfactory or convincing definition of sustainable development must 
75 | P a g e  
 
make provision for addressing at least all the missing aspects, as mentioned above, of the 
Brundtland definition and the definition of Caring for the Earth; otherwise the claim of 
those who interpret the concept of sustainable development as a meaningless slogan or 
as a mere buzzword will begin to sound substantial. 
Before I head towards a conclusion about how we should define or best interpret 
the concept of sustainable development, it is worth mentioning how economists address 
the concept in question. Economists‘ theories of sustainability are broadly distinguished 
as ‗strong‘ and ‗weak‘ versions of sustainability. This distinction is based on the debate 
about what categories of ‗capital‘ (such as manufactured, or humanly generated, or 
natural capitals) are to be maintained.45 The strong version of sustainability involves an 
emphasis on natural capital and rejects the substitution of manufactured or humanly 
generated capitals for the natural kind, while the weak version of sustainability entails that 
aggregate capital (manufactured + human + natural) has to be maintained over time and 
endorses unlimited substitution between categories as long as aggregate capital remains 
non-diminishing.  
 The central focus of a range of recent works has been on the debates surrounding 
this distinction. Wilfred Beckerman, Herman Daly and Michael Jacobs are found to have 
exchanged views on this issue in Environmental Values during 1994 and 1995, which, 
according to Andrew Dobson, is a unique guide to this debate.46 There is no choice but 
to be very brief in discussing this exchange. Beckerman criticises both the strong and the 
weak versions of sustainability. Criticising the strong version, he states that it is morally 
                                                     
45 Victor, P. A., J. E. Hanna and A. Kubursi. ‗How Strong is Weak Sustainability?‘, Sustainable Development: 
Concepts, Rationalities and Strategies (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998), pp. 195-210(p. 196).              
 
46 Dobson, A. ‗Environmental Sustainability: An Analysis and a Topology‘, Environmental Politics, 5.3 (1996), 
pp. 401-428.          
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repugnant as well as totally impractical as it suggests deploying resources to protect 
natural capitals (such as minerals, air, water, soil, flora, fauna, and ecosystems), which 
‗could otherwise have been devoted to more urgent environmental concerns, such as 
increasing access to clean water or sanitation in the third world‘47. Criticising the weak 
version of sustainability, Beckerman argues that it ‗offers nothing beyond traditional 
economic welfare maximisation‘48. 
 Contrariwise, Herman Daly maintains that while Beckerman‘s rejection of the 
weak version of sustainability is praiseworthy, his understanding of strong sustainability 
‗is based on his mistaken definition of sustainability‘49. Beckerman‘s misrepresentation of 
strong sustainability is implicit in the assumption that man–made capital and natural 
capital are substitutes. For Daly, they are, rather, complementary50, not substitutes. He 
adds that, if the truth were the other way around, we would have been able to build, for 
example, the same house with half the materials (timbers), substituting extra saws and 
carpenters for the missing materials (timbers) in question. Thus Beckerman‘s 
representation of strong sustainability seems unduly strong, and by the same token his 
criticism of strong sustainability as morally repugnant seems unsound.     
 Michael Jacobs, another participant in this debate, complements Daly‘s 
standpoint, maintaining the view that ‗natural and human-made capitals are not infinitely 
substitutable‘51; they can only be complementary. For, according to Jacobs, there are 
some valued functions and services of the natural environment which are not 
                                                     
47 Beckerman, W. ―‗Sustainable Development‘: Is it a Useful Concept?‖ Environmental Values 3    (1994): 
pp.191-209, at p. 205.                               
48 Ibid., p. 191. 
49 Daly, H., ‗On Wilfred Beckerman‘s Critique of Sustainable Development‘, Environmental Values, 
4.1(1995), p. 53. 
50 With a view to clarifying the notion of ‗complementary‘, Daly refers to several concrete examples. He 
writes, ‗what good is a saw-mill without a forest; a fishing boat without populations of fish; a refinery 
without petroleum deposits? Ibid. p. 51.  
51Jacobs, M., ‗Sustainable Development, Capital Substitution and Economic Humility: A Response to 
Beckerman‘, Environmental Value, 4.1 (1995), 57-68 (p. 59).                                                         
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exchangeable ‗however much human-made capital is offered in return‘.52 And this 
assumption involves the need and efficacy of sustainability as a ‗constraint‘ on welfare 
maximisation, and plays the role of a radical response to Beckerman‘s complaint against 
the strong version of sustainability relating to the issues of constraints. Given this debate, 
the strong version of sustainability seems to be a satisfactory one as opposed to weak 
sustainability. The strong version of sustainability, through maintaining that the relation 
between man-made capital and natural capital is essentially one of complementarity, not 
substitutability (which is in turn supportive of provision for future generations), better 
fits the concept of sustainable development, and vice-versa. Furthermore, the strong 
version of sustainability (as opposed to Beckerman‘s too strong version of sustainability), 
appears to be committed to broader principles better meeting the three key requirements 
of sustainable development: economic, social and environmental sustainability.   
 The Brundtland report, by referring to social and environmental issues as well as 
non-anthropocentric value concerns, seems to have a strong and inevitable appeal in this 
context. What is needed when we distinguish loopholes in the UN definitions of 
sustainable development is to try supplying an adjusted version of it, so that the UN 
definitions become free from all anticipated criticisms (at least the ones that have been 
discussed above), and also merit appreciation from the perspective of the above 
mentioned strong version of sustainability as regards the use of various capitals.   
 The cure of the major difficulties with the Brundtland definition, as thus 
suggested above, involves two measures at the very least: (1) replacing  the criterion 
‗needs‘ with the criterion ‗basic needs‘; and (2) overtly recognising the issues of 
environmental limits in the definition (a recognition which involves expression of 
concern for various non-anthropocentric value issues such as the goods and interests of 
                                                     
52 Ibid. p. 63.    
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nonhuman life, and recognition of the values of different species and ecosystems and 
their role in protecting the life of all the bearers of intrinsic value on earth). The cure of 
the Caring for the Earth definition, on the other hand (as has been argued above), 
involves two measures as well, at the very least: (1) entirely rejecting the misleading use of 
the concept of carrying capacity, and (2) interpreting the commendation of perpetual 
improvement of the definition in a qualified sense, i.e. duly interpreting the scope of 
development (in order, as suggested above, to prioritise basic needs), a measure that 
makes it socially and environmentally sustainable.  
 
1.3.4 Redefining Sustainable Development  
 Understood as has been argued above, sustainable development could then plausibly be 
(re)defined as the state of a society that implements a procedure leading to attaining a 
certain level of economic wellbeing which is capable of satisfying the basic needs of 
contemporary and future human beings without compromising the opportunity for other 
living creatures to meet their basic needs, and which is also capable of being continued 
indefinitely both socially and environmentally.   
Now the question arises: are the UN definitions (i.e. the Brundtland definition 
and the Caring for the Earth definition) of sustainable development defensible in 
consideration of the understanding of the concept of ‗development ‗and ‗sustainability‘, 
which I argued and defended in chapter one and chapter two? As has been argued in 
these chapters, an improvement of a very partial kind, which does not address the 
environmental issues relevant to it, can be called development (chapter one), but it 
cannot be called sustainable development, since the pursuit of such a development does 
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not address environmental limits and thus would fail to continue for an indefinite period 
of time and cannot be practiced world-wide (chapter two).  
Form the findings of chapter one and chapter two as regards the traits of the 
concept of ‗development‘ and ‗sustainability‘, it can now be maintained that there are at 
least three key elements in sustainable development (which  are widely recognised as the 
three main pillars of sustainable development): economic sustainability, social 
sustainability and environmental sustainability, suggesting that the pursuit of 
improvements can be called sustainable development if and only if it is capable of 
addressing all three elements mentioned above.    
When the crucial problems have been identified and revised appropriately (in line 
with the revision suggested in the paragraphs above), the UN definitions of sustainable 
development in question seem to be consistent with the understanding of the concept of 
‗development‘ and ‗sustainability‘, which I argued and defended in chapter one and 
chapter two. For the revised definition of sustainable development, which amounts to a 
joined-up approach derived from blending the two non-comprehensive and on occasion 
misleading UN definitions of sustainable development discussed above, seems 
satisfactorily to address all three pillars of sustainable development: economic, social and 
environmental sustainability. 
Now two further but very significant questions may well be asked: Is the revised 
version of the UN definitions of sustainable development required to make sustainable 
development always morally satisfactory? Is the revised version of sustainable 
development required in actual fact morally attractive?  The answer to the first question 
is ‗no‘. For, as we argued in chapter two, the desirability or morality of actions or policies 
has nothing to do with their sustainability because the connection between sustainability 
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and morality is not necessary, but merely a contingent one. In the light of this 
understanding of the concept of sustainability, in distinguishing a practice or a scheme of 
sustainable development, we only need to see whether or not the policy or practice in 
question is able to be sustained for an indefinite future as well as able to be practised 
world-wide, not whether or not the policy or practice is morally desirable. As I argued in 
the same chapter, the so called policies of Maximum Sustainable Yield are the typical 
examples of sustainable development; but they are, on occasion, open to moral criticism.   
The answer to the second question, on the other hand, seems to be ‗yes‘. For, 
although as a definition of sustainable development, the revised definition need not make 
sustainable development morally desirable, as a matter of fact it appears more likely to 
make it ethically attractive. For, as has been argued earlier, (1) my revised definition of 
the UN definitions of sustainable development (suggested by the basic needs approach) 
is capable of addressing various issues of justice that the concept of sustainable 
development encompasses, which neither of the UN definitions can adequately address 
as they stand. The employment of the idea of basic needs in the supplemented definition, 
suggesting a practice of controlled use of resources, seems to help in attaining economic, 
social and environmental sustainability. (2) While through lessening the use of resources 
as well as increasing the availability of resources the supplemented version seems to be 
capable of addressing intra-generational justice, it seems to be capable of addressing 
environmental sustainability through furthering the scope of the basic needs approach to 
include the goods and interests of non-human living creatures (which qualify them to be 
bearers of intrinsic value like their human contemporaries). And this in turn attests the 
view that the basic needs approach is capable of addressing issues relating to our duties 
to protect species and ecosystems the preservation of which is indispensable for the 
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continued existence of all the bearers of intrinsic value (for details see chapter three in 
Part Two) without contradiction.      
Furthermore, as has been argued earlier, emphasising a satisfactory quality of life 
through the attaining (by deprived societies) or the maintaining (by developed societies) 
of a certain stage of improvement in human wellbeing levels (i.e. basic needs) in 
perpetuity, the supplemented version importantly seems to envisage intra-generational 
justice as an advance towards intergenerational justice. And in so doing it attempts to 
reinterpret the UN definitions of sustainable development in a plausible manner. More 
importantly this means that environmental sustainability is not the first priority for the 
deprived societies; it can only be fully expected of them once a certain level of 
development is achieved by them, and this helps make the supplemented version of 
sustainable development ethically more attractive and practically more viable (for more 
see chapter two, Part Four). 
       At this instant we can recall some of the examples I supplied in chapter two: the 
practice of slavery, the creation of Farakka Barrage by the Indian government on the 
cross border River Ganges, and the fishing of tuna fish. As a practice, these are all 
sustainable, but undesirable for their morally objectionable implications. It thus now 
seems apparent that sustainable policies are not required to be just in themselves, but the 
significance of justice means that they should be fit to make them moral in addition to 
sustainable. Through being able to accommodate this overall concern, without making 
justice a constituent element of sustainability, the revised version seems to be a justifiable 
definition of sustainable development.   
 Going back to Beckerman‘s understandable objection against the UN definition 
of sustainable development, it can now be replied that, given a suitable interpretation of 
82 | P a g e  
 
the scope of improvement (development), issues of justice (relating to the difficulty with 
the apparent commendation of perpetual improvement in human wellbeing) can be 
addressed; and thus the alleged objection of Beckerman against the UN definition can 
also be overcome in a justified manner.  
 A last but not least question is: does the possibility of frequent reinterpretation 
and misuse of the proposed adjusted definition of sustainable development logically 
entail abandonment? Attfields‘ remark on the very debatable concept of peace could be 
mentioned here as a reply to the question. As he puts it:  
 The concept of peace, to take a parallel case, has not been and should not be 
abandoned just because it is so frequently reinterpreted or misused.53  
We notice that this process has also been in operation in the development of the concept 
of democracy. It took two and a half thousand years before Dahl and Schumpeter could 
develop their ‗empirical theory‘ of democracy where they provided revised but 
recognisable conceptions of the widely-used concept of democracy 54; hence the answer 
to the latest question seems clear and goes in favour of the possibility of meaningful use 
of the concept in question. Jacobs‘s reading of the concept of ‗democracy‘ and his 
appraisal regarding the similarity between the concept of ‗democracy‘ and ‗sustainable 
development‘ reveals this issue with further clarity: 
How many definitions are there of ‗democracy‘? The most famous one 
(‗government   of the people, by the people, for the people‘) is comparable to 
the Brundtland definition of sustainable development: it is short and vague, 
and does not lend itself to precise interpretation and immediate application. 
But it captures the core idea. The   possibility of different interpretations 
does not mean that democracy is either meaningless or non operational. Both 
democracy and sustainable development contain key essential principles, 
which are substantive, meaningful and not redundant.55 
                                                     
53 Attfield, 2003, pp.126-127.   
54 Carter, p. 450.                                                                   
55 Jacobs, pp. 65-6.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
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Everything considered, the UN definitions (the Brundtland definition and the 
Caring for the Earth definition), if adjusted along the lines I have suggested here (i.e. the 
adjustment suggested by the basic needs approach), seem to turn out to articulate the 
concept of sustainable development as a meaningful and practicable concept. As well as 
all key traits of sustainability, the supplemented version of sustainable development 
appears to accommodate the issue of morality (but without making morality a constituent 
element of sustainability), which attests the view that the meaningful and practicable 
concept of sustainable development has been a justified concept all along.
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PART TWO 
HISTORICAL AND CURRENT TRENDS IN ENVIRONMENTALISM: 
TOWARDS A PREFERABLE NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORY 
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Chapter One 
 
2.1: Environmentalism: Origin and Development 
 
It is now commonly believed that human beings have no choice but to protect the 
environment since without its support (that is to say its air, water, food, energy, light, 
heat and other basic elements that are indispensable for the survival of a living being), all 
life forms on earth would end, including humans. Ironically, human activities have been 
found to be the main source of the problems that are damaging the environment. David 
Pepper, a prolific writer on modern environmentalism, states that 18th century classical 
science profoundly influenced humans‘ world view of nature, and developed a 
materialistic attitude through conceptualising nature as a manoeuvrable machine, and also 
as the source of transforming the material lot of the whole of mankind.1 This historical 
world view (a view which is widely known as modernism2) has been contributing to 
environmental degradation worldwide since its inception in the 18th century.   
  Instead of bringing about positive change in human life, as Pepper argues, 
modernism (through science and technology) has created enormous problems for 
humanity (through causing mass war, violence and repression, and nuclear and 
environmental threats). Furthermore, modernism (in the form of political theories, 
namely Liberalism and Socialism) has caused more harm to humanity than good. In light 
of this, a postmodern mistrust of modernism was developed, which, according to 
                                                     
1 Pepper, D., Modern Environmentalism: An Introduction (London: Routhledge, 1996), pp. 1-5 
2 David Pepper reads modernism as: (1) the 18th century enlightenment promise to control and manipulate 
nature to improve everybody‘s fortune through advancing high science and technology, and (2) the advent 
and application of the most influential political ideologies, namely Liberalism and Socialism, which talked 
of changing underlying social, political and economic realities to promote humanity. For details see Ibid, p. 
5   
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Pepper, constitutes the roots of modern environmentalism. In other words, modern 
environmentalism was born as a clear reaction to modernism.  
 The reaction to modernism, he asserts, has caused many of us not only to reject 
modernism but also to turn our attention back to pre-modern pro-environmental 
thoughts (such as holism, Gaianism, and nature worship) about nature, our relationship 
to it, and our place in the universe. These environmental thoughts, as many now claim3 
by echoing Pepper, have formed the basis of modern environmentalism.  
Among various human activities, the economic ones are often held to be culpable 
for the current environmental problems. The currently dominant development paradigm 
(which involves economic growth as its central theme and gives approval of unrestricted 
use of limited natural resources to attain such an economic goal) has a straightforward 
causal connection with the current environment problems. The prolonged and 
widespread application of the economic growth view is now often said to have affected 
the entire community of lives on earth, irrespective of species. For some4, modern 
environmentalism was born as a strong rejection of the current dominant economic 
practice, which has been contributing to environmental degradation worldwide.  
Now if we compare the economic growth view with modernism it is not difficult 
to find a close link between them, because both give approval for unlimited use of 
natural resources for changing the material lot of the whole of mankind. Although the 
phrase ‗economic growth‘ has not been exclusively mentioned in the modernism thesis, 
through advocating science, applying technology and implementing various political 
                                                     
3 Cosgrove, D., ‗Environmental Thought and Action: Pre-modern and Post-modern‘, Transactions of the 
Institute of British Geographers, 15.3(1990), pp. 344-58 
4 Martinez-Alier is one of the proponents of this view.  For more see Martinez-Alier, J., The 
Environmentalism of the Poor: A Study of Ecological Concepts and Valuation (Northampton: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Ltd., 2002) Ch.1. 
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theories, modernism seems to supply the most useful tools for the economic growth 
view to attain its goal.  
From the above discussion it has been observed that there are two human 
sources (in Pepper‘s phrase ‗cultural filters‘) of environmental problems, to say the least: 
modernism and economic growth. They are the origin of modern environmentalism and 
the rebirth of humans‘ old environmental beliefs and values. To begin with, the force of 
environmentalists‘ reaction to modernism and policies of economic growth and the level 
of maturity of environmentalism as an academic movement were not the same as their 
present-day strength and efficacy. Environmentalism is now a mature public movement 
unsurprisingly opposed to the aforementioned two environmentally unfriendly views. To 
reach the present stage, environmentalism had to pass through several phases. An 
account of the main phases of environmentalism is now provided.  
Reacting to mistreatment of the environment, some 150 years ago a few 
individuals began to protest. On some accounts, with the protests of those scattered 
voices, environmentalism was born.5 To be more specific, the opening phase of 
environmentalism launched its journey back in 1850 in reaction to a long-standing 
process of environmental exploitation with advanced science and technology, involving 
an unprecedented wave of mining, forest clearance, land drainage and factory building 
during the period of the industrial revolution between 1780 and 1850.6 The scattered 
proponents of the first phase of environmentalism realised that abuse of nature is neither 
good for nature nor for humans; but we can suppose that they presumably did not have 
                                                     
5 Reynolds, A., A Brief History of Environmentalism, (London, Channel 4 Television, November 2010)                                                                                                                                   
<http://www.channel4.com/science/microsites/S/science/nature/environment.html> [accessed 2 
December, 2010)                                       
6 Ibid. But Reynolds has mentioned 1730 as the beginning year of the industrial revolution.   
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any straightforward answer to the question: Do we protect the environment for our self 
interest or for its own sake? 
Environmentalism reached more solid ground once the idea of respect for nature 
had been taken up and published by the American environmentalist Henry David 
Thoreau (1817- 1862) in his classic book Walden in 1848.7 For him, humans experience 
the most harmonious life when living with nature. With this publication, 
environmentalism stepped into its second phase. Thoreau‘s reflection was strongly 
defended by the harmonious philosophy of the Scottish-born visionary and early 
conservationist John Muir (1838-1914), who also founded the Sierra Club, a US 
conservation organisation, in 1848. The main concern of this wilderness lover was to 
leave larger areas of wilderness untamed, because, for him, the disappearance of 
wilderness is a loss to humanity since, as he argued, wildernesses are spiritual places.                                                                     
The reflections of the second phase of environmentalism were able to exercise a 
considerable influence on individuals, which is still continuing as a strong division of 
environmental commitment. The significant influence of this deeper stance of 
environmentalism in the societies of that period is implicit in the establishment of 
national parks in many developed countries, such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada. 
The establishment of the first conservation based organisations, like the Royal Society for 
the Protection of Birds (RSPB) in 1893, and the National Trust in 1894 in Britain, was a 
further outcome of the environmental campaigning of visionaries, such as Thoreau and 
Muir.     
                                                     
7  Thoreau, H. D., Walden (1848), reprinted in Writings of Henry David Thoreau, vol. 2, p.12 (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1906)         
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A development towards the third phase of environmentalism occurred (in terms 
of humans‘ growing awareness about the plight and value of endangered wildlife) during 
the period between 1900 and 1950 after William Hornaday‘s (1854-1937) Our Vanishing 
Wildlife: Its Extermination and Preservation8 had been published in 1913, where he attempted 
to draw readers‘ attention to the plight of endangered wildlife. He referred to the world‘s 
only living wild pigeon, Martha, which died in Cincinnati zoo. The wild pigeon was once 
the most populous bird on the planet, but had been hunted to extermination within just a 
half century.  
The third phase of environmentalism attained rather more solid ground when 
Aldo Leopold (1887-1948), a former US Forestry Service official and University of 
Wisconsin and Iowa State University Professor, published his book A Sand County 
Almanac in 1949.9 This is arguably one of the most influential books on conservation ever 
written. In this book Leopold expressively and ardently advocated humans‘ duty to 
protect the stability of nature. He advocated the same ethical sense of responsibility of 
humans towards nature as towards humanity, which raised an urgent issue of moving 
from the traditional ethical theory towards a comprehensive ethical theory that includes 
‗nature‘ besides ‗humans‘ as moral patients.10 Since then a debate has been running 
among environmentalists, and the matter of concern of the debate is whether humans 
can or should extend their ethical consideration to include non-human creatures and 
nature. At about that time (1951), Britain designated ten national parks to protect them 
from further development.    
                                                     
8  Hornaday, W. T., Our Vanishing Wild Life: Its Extermination and Preservation (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 
1913)                         
9 Leopold, A., (1887-1948), A Sand County Almanac (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949)  
10 This phrase was introduced in Warnock, G.J. The Object of Morality (New York and London: Methuen, 
1971), p.148                                                                                                                                                                                          
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A further development occurred in environmentalism (i.e., the fourth phase of 
environmentalism) after the groundbreaking 1962 book of an American marine biologist 
Rachel Carson, Silent Spring11, was published. In her book Carson described how 
chemicals such as pesticides and insecticides were contaminating the environment, and 
particularly how farms, forests, gardens and wildlife were being poisoned. Insect life was 
dying out due to pesticide and insecticide use, which meant no food for birds, and 
eventually a silent spring. People were also in grave danger of cancer due to over-use of 
insecticides (such as DDT). Overall she illustrated the close relationship between the 
living and the non-living parts of nature, focusing on the ecological impacts of human 
development activities. The influence of Carson‘s work was enormous, and through this 
environmentalism was for the first time galvanised into an organised force, and a solid 
organisational platform. Conservation biology was introduced as a branch of biology at 
about the same time. Being largely influenced by her work, conservation biologists 
demonstrated that, due to human overuse of biomass, species dependent on biomass are 
harmed, which results in gradual loss in forest areas.12 This is a case where 
environmentalism seems to be defended by scientists (conservation biologists). 
 The fifth phase of environmentalism emerged through the establishment of 
environmental pressure groups, namely Friends of the Earth in 1969 and Greenpeace in 
1971. Friends of the Earth was born on account of the disagreement of the director of 
the Sierra Club with its policy on several issues (e.g., the Sierra Club‘s lack of opposition 
to nuclear energy); Greenpeace, on the other hand, was born as a result of some people 
being concerned about military nuclear testing and the preservation of various 
                                                     
11 Carson, R. L., Silent Spring (Boston: A Mariner Book Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962)                                                                          
12 Haberl, H., ‗Human Appropriation of Net Primary Production as an Environmental Indicator: 
Implications for Sustainable Development, AMBIO, 26.3 (1997), pp. 143-146 
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endangered species of whales. In addition, both Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace did 
flagship campaigns for pandas and tigers, and developed increased popular awareness 
about trade in seal fur, elephant ivory and rhino horn.  
In the very next year, 1972, Barbara Ward and Rene Dubos published an 
outstanding report Only One Earth: The Care and Maintenance of a Small Planet13, bringing 
about a remarkable change in the evaluation of development in the 20th century. This 
report was published to offer a framework for the proceedings of the UN Conference on 
the Human Environment (which is widely known as the primary defining event of the 
ten-yearly Earth Summits).  Though providing extended knowledge of the living 
environment to a greater degree, this report for the first time introduced a modified idea 
of development, focusing on environmental limits.  
 Held in Stockholm, and participated in by 113 nations, this first event of 
international environmentalism mainly addressed the environmental impacts of 
industrialisation. Two decisive achievements of the conference were the 26 principles of 
the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, an 
Action Plan for the Human Environment and an Environmental Fund, and the 
establishment of the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), which 
coordinated the following Earth Summits. Another significant outcome of the fifth phase 
of environmentalism was the explicit recognition of an economic and social gap between 
developed countries (First World) and developing countries (Third World). The 
conference clearly exposed that the rich not only degrade the environment but also 
receive a disproportionate share of global wealth. These economic and social divides are 
                                                     
13 Ward, B., and Dubos, R., Only One Earth: The Care and Maintenance of a Small Planet (New York: W.W. 
Norton and Company, 1972) 
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still arguably on the rise. Martinez-Alier argues that environmental concern at that point 
(in the 1970s) surfaced due to the material concern about growing chemical poisoning 
and nuclear risks, not because the Western economy had reached ‗a post material stage‘. 14 
Another famous report, The Limits to Growth,15 issued by the Club of Rome, was 
published in the same year of 1972, making the year momentous for the progress of 
environmentalism. Like the UN Conference on the Human Environment‘s report Only 
One Earth, the report of the Club of Rome stated that global environmental constraints 
would have a serious impact on global developments in the 21st century. It gave emphasis 
to developing an alternative paradigm to the conventional paradigm of economic 
practice.   
Shortly before the 1970s, two publications in Science i.e., Lynn White‘s 1967 paper 
‗The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis‘16and Garrett Hardin‘s 1968 paper ‗The 
Tragedy of the Commons‘,17 began a deep intellectual debate concerning environmental 
issues. Much time during this decade was spent debating the themes of the two papers. 
Although the debates in question revolved around issues such as historical, theological, 
or religious, not ethical or philosophical issues, they greatly attracted philosophers‘ 
attention.    
                  Before philosophers joined the debate in the 1970s, the environmental debate 
(about reasons for the protection of the environment) was revolving around non-
philosophical issues, not philosophical or ethical issues. The standard understanding 
about the value of the environment was that what is bad for the environment is bad for 
                                                     
14 Martinez-Alier, p.4  
15 Meadows, D. H., et al, The Limits to Growth: Report For The Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of 
Mankind ( New York: Universe Books, 1972) 
16 White, L., ‗The Historical Roots of Out Ecological Crisis‘, Science, 155(1967), pp. 1203-1207 
17 Hardin, G., ‗The Tragedy of the Commons‘, Science, 162(1968), pp.1243-1248  
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humans. Environmentalism was exposed to a new dimension, the ethical dimension of 
environmental problems, through the participation of philosophers in environmental 
debate. Philosophers have importantly introduced the issue of value into environmental 
debates. Since then almost every environmental decision has faced an ethical challenge as 
such, and embodied the more fundamental enquiry: Do we care about nature for our 
sake or for its own sake?  
 Environmental concerns developed during the later Cold War period comprised 
the sixth phase of environmentalism. At this stage the world was preoccupied with issues 
relating to the Cold War, and thus the environment was less a focus of attention for the 
politicians and others involved with that issue. Nevertheless the participation of 
astronomers and marine biologists in the environmental debate has distinguished this 
phase with a precise importance. While astronomers have referred to light pollution 
(which obstructs the clear view of the night sky), marine biologists have drawn attention 
to noise pollution (which threatens the sonar navigation of dolphins and whales). This 
had, so to say, an effect on a minority only, and the majority overlooked such 
environmental problems because they were not immediate. But the international 
community took it seriously when it heard about the hole in the ozone layer that causes 
skin cancer; to save ourselves dying form skin cancer we rapidly stopped and adopted 
international agreements and ceased using chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in our sprays, 
flame retardants, refrigerators, propellants and solvents.            
 The most important event during this phase was the creation of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) by the UN General Assembly 
in 1983. Gro Harlem Brundtland, the then Prime Minister of Norway, was appointed 
chairperson of this commission. The WCED become famous after its report (known as 
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the Brundtland report) was published in 1987.18 This report has managed to attract 
attention from most environmentalists all over the world by officially introducing the 
concept of ‗sustainable development‘. The commission attempted to recognise both 
human needs and environmental limits in the definition of sustainable development, 
focusing on the triangular link between economic, social and environmental issues.  
The seventh phase of environmentalism encompasses the decade when the Earth 
Summit occurred in Rio, Brazil, in 1992. This phase is significant, precisely because of 
introducing the concept of sustainable development together with institutional (United 
Nations) initiatives to implement it in its member countries. The important finding at this 
stage of environmentalism is that environmental problems have a direct link to the issues 
of economic inequality and social injustice. For example, the summit agreed to the point 
that global warming, loss of biodiversity and use of dangerous poisons have deleterious 
effects on human socio-economic conditions. Thus the leaders agreed to combat such 
environmental problems.  
The process leading to the famous Kyoto Protocol (1997) was introduced at Rio, 
which required participant countries to cut carbon dioxide emissions by 5.2% within the 
period up to 2008 to 2012.  The success of this protocol in attaining its professed goal is 
incomplete because some developed countries that rely on the oil trade, like the US and 
Saudi Arabia, were concerned at how much the agreement would cost them. They were 
putting their short-term interests first and refused to commit to anything on the carbon 
emissions front. Furthermore, developing countries like China and India were exempted 
from most of the Kyoto deadlines and yet they were growing at exceptional rates, using 
                                                     
18 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987) 
 
95 | P a g e  
 
dirty coal and cow dung as fuel, and are now the fastest growing consumers of fossil 
fuels as prosperity brings automobiles and increased energy generation on the scene.  
The eighth and the last phase of environmentalism encompasses the decade of 
the 2000s. The Earth Summit during this phase occurred in August 2002, in 
Johannesburg, South Africa. This summit is notable for identifying five areas, water and 
sanitation, energy, health, agriculture and biodiversity, which are said to have been 
considered the most important sectors for human wellbeing. Another distinctive aspect 
of this summit is the fact that the developing countries became vocal, demanding their 
interests be given greater importance. Some might refer to a commitment to stop the loss 
of fish stocks and forests, as well as to halve the number of people in the world who lack 
basic sanitation by 2015, as examples of achievement at the Johannesburg summit. 
Environmentalists are found to comprehensively criticise this summit as one that was 
hijacked by corporate interests.19 They criticise the US, Japan and oil companies for 
discouraging the promotion of renewable energy sources (wind and solar power) to 
facilitate their own economic benefit.    
Environmentalism, as has been discussed above, had to pass through some eight 
phases to reach the present level. Martinez-Alier illustrates the progress of 
environmentalism (or the environmental movement) dividing it into three varieties (in his 
words, three intertwined currents): (1) the cult of wilderness, (2) the gospel of eco-
efficiency, and (3) the environmentalism of the poor.20 In the first current he covers 
those issues (particularly, the issues of reverence towards nature), which this writer has 
attempted to discuss in connection with the above-mentioned second and third phases of 
environmentalism. The second current involves concerns with the effect of economic 
                                                     
19 See note 5 
20 Martinez-Alier, p.1 
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growth on pristine areas as well as on the agricultural, urban, and industrial economy, and 
also with the sustainable management of the resources of nature backed by several 
branches of ecology and economics.  This current represents the above-mentioned 
fourth, sixth, seventh and eighth phases of environmentalism. Instead of merely focusing 
on economic growth, this current involves a stance, which suggests striking a balance 
between economic growth, social wellbeing and environmental limits, which is now 
widely known as sustainable development. 
 In the third and last current, Martinez-Alier attempts to cover areas such as 
issues of environmental justice. He labels this current the environmentalism of the poor 
(or popular environmentalism, or livelihood ecology, or liberation ecology), which stem 
from local, national, regional and global ecological distribution conflicts (which involve 
not only conflicts of interest but also conflicts of values) generated by economic growth 
and social inequalities. Through this categorisation, Martinez-Alier shows that not all 
environmentalists think and act the same.  While some environmentalists have sought to 
support the economic growth view because of the technological promise it bears, and 
while some other environmentalists have sought to support only wilderness, there is a 
group of environmentalists who uphold a third view, the environmentalism of the poor, 
which addresses environmental problems based on the thoughts emerging from the 
global movement for environmental justice. The issue of justice, which this current 
upholds, appears to be raised (without being tackled) in the above mentioned eighth 
phase and in some sense in the fifth phase of environmentalism. 
Despite many disagreements at various levels (such as at governmental or non-
governmental levels, or in local or global institutions), environmentalism has now 
reached a more mature and organised stage compared to its earlier phases. In recent 
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times, people are increasingly seen to recognise environmental problems as caused by 
humans. Also, they are seen to recognise that they have no choice but to reassess their 
position of the environment and to make effective efforts to explore the way to address 
their development needs without undermining environmental limits. But unfortunately 
the achievement in the first Earth Summit (1992) to this end was not sufficiently 
satisfactory. Although it directed the participants in the right direction, distinguishing the 
area of  most pressing concern, i.e., the issue of environmental justice, through 
recognising a big economic and social gap between the First World and the Third World, 
and also through exposing the fact that the rich enjoy a disproportionate share of global 
wealth, the first Earth Summit (1992) failed to supply appropriate policy-decisions 
recognising ecological distribution conflicts at various levels: local, national, regional and 
global.  What is more, no progress towards that goal of rectifying ecological distribution 
conflicts has been achieved by the subsequent summits, suggesting that like the first one, 
corporate interests have also hijacked the Johannesburg Earth Summit 2002.    
Now whatever advancement we have made so far seems clearly to be an outcome 
of the campaigning of environmentalists over the last 150 years. But just as the 
environmentalists of the first phase found 150 years ago, present-day environmentalists 
do not have any common view about the answers to the question: Do we protect the 
environment for our self interest or for its own sake?  Preferably one can answer this 
question by saying that humans can and should find room for both human needs and 
environmental limits. Although environmental ethicists/philosophers seem to share a 
common view that humans are responsible for current environmental problems and that 
modernism and policies of growth have played a vital role in creating such problems, 
they hardly maintain any common view as regards the value of or reason(s) for protecting 
the environment. For instance, while some philosophers (such as Holmes Rolston 
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III21and Baird Callicott22) argue that, besides instrumental value, the environment (i.e., 
both the living and the non-living part of the environment ) has its own value (intrinsic 
value), which needs to be recognised in order to plausibly address environmental 
problems, other philosophers ( such as Mark Sagoff23, Eugene Hargrove24 and Bryan 
Norton25) argue that the value of the environment is either symbolic or aesthetic or 
instrumental, not intrinsic, and so studies on environmental problems can plausibly be 
continued without recognising the intrinsic value of nonhuman creatures and of the non-
living part of the environment (they believe that human beings are the only bearers of 
intrinsic value). Despite many intra-group disagreements among the philosophers, the 
former stance can be regarded as ecocentric intrinsic value theory (one of the types of 
nonanthropocentrism), while the latter can be regarded as anthropocentric value theory 
(or anthropocentrism). Some other philosophers (such as Paul Taylor26and Robin 
Attfield27), who maintain another view, biocentrism, argue that it is not merely human 
beings that matter in ethics because non-human creatures have a good of their own, and 
thus have moral standing like humans. By saying this, they condemn anthropocentrism. 
Besides, they argue that the non-living part of the environment does not involve moral 
standing as it has no good of its own (although, according to them, it involves crucial 
instrumental value in much the same way lifeboats do). They limit moral standing to 
living creatures. Given this, for biocentrists, both anthropocentrism and ecocentrism are 
                                                     
21 Rolston, H. III, Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in The Natural World (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1988)                                                                                          
22 Callicott. J. B., In Defence of the Land Ethic (Albany: Suny Press, 1989)                                                                             
23 Sagoff, M. The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law,and the Environment (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988) 
24 Hargrove E.C., Foundations of Environmental Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1989)                                      
25 Norton, B.G., Why Preserve Natural Diversity? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988)        
26 Taylor, P.W., Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1986)                
27 Robin Attfield, The Ethics of Environmental Concern (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983)                               
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extreme views and thus defective. Contrariwise, focusing on a life centred view, 
biocentrists claim their view to be plausible on a theoretical level and thus one that 
should be reflected in environmental policy and decision making.  
From the foregoing discussion it seems that there, indeed, exists a considerable 
amount of disagreement among philosophers regarding the value of the environment (in 
particular, of the nonhuman living and nonliving parts of the environment). Although 
proponents of environmentalism over the last 150 years have managed to distinguish and 
also agree on the key sources of environmental problems (i.e. human activities), 
environmental ethicists/philosophers hitherto have not been able to reach a general 
agreement about the justification of or ethical reason(s) for preserving the environment. 
Three dominant theoretical trends, to say the least, underpinning the environment‘s value 
have been developed in environmentalism: anthropocentrism, biocentrism and 
ecocentrism (the latter two trends are often regarded as non-anthropocentrism). Since 
humans are recognised by anthropocentrists to be the sole reference point of value and 
nature is recognised to be instrumental to human ends, anthropocentrism is characterised 
as a human-centred view. Contrariwise, being the two major trends in non-
anthropocentrism, biocentrism and ecocentrism have developed as more nonhuman-
centred views. While sometimes the human-centred view is seen as a shallower form of 
environmentalism, the nonhuman-centred view is seen as a deeper stance. There again 
the two non-anthropocentric views (biocentrism and ecocentrism) have also been found 
to maintain distance between them concerning the value of two different parts of the 
environment: living and non-living. All the views here are defended by their proponents 
through various arguments, but which stance is more logical is still a matter of debate.   
It is unquestionably true that the biosphere is crucial for the survival for all 
creatures that live on it. But it is also true that humans cannot survive without a certain 
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level of environmental modification. Environmentalism sometimes seems to miss out to 
reflect this reality in its approaches. For instance, while ecocentricism appears to merit 
appreciation for addressing the issue of environmental limits with due focus, it warrants 
criticism for sometimes omitting human development needs. Anthropocentrism has 
often been criticised for the opposite reason: for addressing development needs and 
sometimes omitting environmental limits. The crucial task now for the researchers into 
this field, therefore, is to tackle philosophical problems that emerge from these kinds of 
omissions, with a view to developing and or defending a theoretical trend that will be 
able to address on a par human survival issues (i.e. development needs) and the 
significance of protecting the integrity of the biosphere (i.e. environmental limits). 
Through recognising the moral standing of all living creatures as bearers of the intrinsic 
value and rejecting intrinsic value of nature, but treating its role as crucial for life, 
biocentrism seems to maintain a middle-of-the-road-view, striking a balance between 
development needs and environmental limits. The subsequent two related chapters 
encompass the recommended investigations: they cover philosophical problems for 
environmentalism and the possibility of biocentrism as a preferable normative paradigm 
for environmentalism.  
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Chapter Two 
 
2.2    Philosophical Problems for Environmentalism 
 
In recent times it has often been objected that traditional moral theories are 
anthropocentric and inimical to environmental concerns because they entirely omit the 
environmental underpinnings required by policy objectives. Contrariwise, 
environmentalism, as a radical re-evaluation of traditional ethical norms, is said to have 
filled this gap through upholding the environmental underpinnings in relevant ethical 
deliberations and policy objectives. A group of scholars1, however, are of the opinion 
that environmentalism, whatever its ‗practical political effectiveness‘, faces substantial 
philosophical difficulties in justification. In an influential paper2, Elliott Sober attempts to 
outline philosophical problems for environmentalism with special reference to species 
preservation, and to argue that environmentalists cannot appeal to anything that could be 
used as the basis for species preservation, without disparaging the familiar principles of 
ethical arguments. A critical interpretation of Sober‘s allegation against environmentalism 
is provided below in greater detail.  
The argument from the unforeseeable value (or future use) of endangered species 
is one of the environmentalists‘ major arguments for species preservation. Sober opens 
by problematizing this argument. As Sober paraphrases it:   
                                                     
1 Sagoff, M., ‗On Preserving the Natural Environment‘, Yale Law Review, 84(1974), pp. 205-38; Sober, E., 
‗Philosophical Problems for Environmentalism‘, in The Preservation of Species, ed. by Norton, B. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 173-194.  
2 Sober, p. 175. 
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 Although we might not now know what use a particular endangered species 
might be to us, allowing it to go extinct forever closes off the possibility of 
discovering and exploring a future use.3 
 
What Sober objects to is the environmentalists‘ attempt to make ignorance of the value 
of endangered species into a reason for action. In so doing, as Sober argues, 
environmentalists create a philosophical problem, which amounts to an ‗argument from 
ignorance‘. For him, there is no problem with the argument‘s assumption that we have 
obligations as regards future generations. By the same token he argues that there is no 
philosophical problem with the environmentalists‘ argument when they claim that we 
should preserve an endangered species for its recognised instrumental values or aesthetic 
values, but a problem arises when they suggest that we ought to preserve them for their 
unforeseeable future uses. To defend his position, Sober refers to the phrase ‗out of 
nothing, nothing comes‘4. He argues that a rational decision requires premises about what 
is ‗true‘ and ‗valuable‘ (in decision-theoretical jargon, he says, the inputs are probabilities 
and utilities); but being based on total ignorance, it is hard for the environmentalist 
argument ‗to assign probabilities and utilities precisely here‘5, thus showing itself to be 
irrational.  
Furthermore, he argues that if we are entirely ignorant about what consequences 
the loss of an endangered species may generate then we should take seriously the 
possibility that the consequence of the loss of the endangered species in question could 
be beneficial as easily as it could be deleterious. This being so, ignorance of a species‘ 
value, for him, supplies no justification for any action or policy, or for any omission 
                                                     
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., p. 175. 
5 Ibid. 
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either. To go over the main points of Sober‘s argument here, the argument from the 
unknown value of species amounts to the argument from ignorance, and ignorance is no 
more an argument for preservation than it is for extinction.  
At some point, Sober illustrates the rationality of risk-taking.  He uses the 
example of air-travel and tries to show that although flying means taking a risk, it is 
worth taking, for it is rational to do so. For him, while an air-journey involves a slim 
chance of disaster, it simultaneously involves a high probability of a typically rather 
modest benefit. Based on this understanding he proceeds to claim that it is rational to ‗be 
willing to allow a species to go extinct in order to built a hydro-electric plant‘6, suggesting 
that there is no problem with our decision of undertaking air-travel, or, by parity, 
building a hydro-electric plant and allowing a species to become extinct, due to both 
arguments being based on probabilities (as opposed to the argument from ignorance).     
If the aforementioned characterization of the environmentalist argument (as ‗the 
argument form ignorance‘ and irrational) by Sober is fair, it seems to involve a serious 
philosophical challenge for environmentalism. Sober, however, does not seem to have 
got the underlying character of the environmentalist argument right. While the 
aforementioned environmentalist argument could still be interpreted as just based on an 
unknown possibility, it could instead be based on probabilities. And this makes Sober‘s 
characterization of the environmentalist argument, as a mere appeal to ignorance, 
vulnerable to criticism. This seems to receive expression in Robin Attfield‘s statement, 
which runs as follows:    
While the environmentalist argument could still be interpreted as simply based 
on an unknown possibility, it could instead be based on probabilities itself. 
Indeed, granted the large number of medicines that have been discovered from 
wild species, and the implicit appeal to benefits of this kind implicit in phrases 
                                                     
6 Ibid., p. 176.                                                                                                                         
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about the species being potentially crucial to humanity, this is likely to be the 
underlying character of the environmentalist argument, rather than a  mere 
appeal to ignorance. 7 
Attfield attempts to show in this passage that it is a misrepresentation of the 
environmentalist argument if it is interpreted merely as an appeal to unknown possibility. 
For it may well be interpreted as based on probabilities as well, i.e., a probabilistic 
interpretation is at least an equally possible alternative. Attfield argues that the prospect 
(that might be higher or lower) of wild species having a medicinal value (which would 
have later turned out to be crucial for humanity) rationalizes the environmentalist 
argument as an argument from probabilities. Attfield seems quite right here in supposing 
so; for wild species have been the main source of a large number of medicines and 
chemicals since time immemorial. Thus, to say the least, the underlying character of 
Sober‘s arguments (using the examples of air-travel and a hydro-electric plant) and the 
environmentalist argument in a sense appear to be similar, i.e., they are arguments from 
probabilities.  
Seen in this light, the environmentalist argument might conclude that ‗each and 
every species [sc. in the forest]‘8 should be preserved, since otherwise there is a small risk 
of a currently unknown loss that might be large or small. Sober rejects this conclusion 
and argues that it might be better to replace a given species with a hydro-electric plant to 
satisfy basic human needs for energy, particularly if the human community would have to 
forgo that benefit otherwise.  Sober‘s rejection indeed seems plausible. For the 
conclusion that each and every species should be preserved since there is otherwise a 
                                                     
7 Attfield, R., ‗Sober, Environmentalists, Species and Ignorance‘, Environmental Ethics, 33.3 (2011), pp. 307-
316(p. 310).          
8 Ibid.   
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small risk of a currently unknown loss that might be large or small is surely 
counterintuitive and unpersuasive.  
The environmentalists‘ argument, understood as an argument for the conclusion 
that each and every species should be preserved in their habitats, thus appears to be a 
crucial problem for environmentalism. This challenge, following Attfield, can be 
addressed by reformulating the environmentalists‘ argument with an alternative 
conclusion. An environmentalist, for example, can construct an alternative probabilistic 
argument for preserving large clusters or systems of wild life habitats all the same, even if 
the only relevant kind of value is their possible medical value for humanity. And the 
alternative conclusion of the environmentalist argument from the very possibility of 
‗species being crucial to humanity into the future‘ is: ‗the forest ought to be preserved, 
perhaps apart from small tracts that would be selectively used to satisfy basic human 
needs‘9. Here, as we can observe, this alternative conclusion indicates a different appraisal 
of the environmentalist argument. While the conclusion that ‗each and every species 
should be preserved‘ makes the argument unpersuasive (as we have already observed in 
the previous paragraph), the alternative conclusion makes the environmentalists‘ 
argument much more cogent. For ‗the small probability that any given species will prove 
valuable translates into a significant probability that, given time for enough research, at 
least one of the species will turn out to be valuable, even though we do not know which 
this might be at present, but only if the habitat of them all, the forest, is preserved‘.10 
 Furthermore, Attfield remarks that the very probability of benefit, which it is 
hoped will be generated through the preservation of the habitat of species, is a 
motivational force for the actual practice of bioprospecting (in other words biodiversity 
                                                     
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid., pp. 310-11. 
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prospecting, which is a type of scientific research that searches for wild species from 
which medicinal drugs and other commercially valuable components can be obtained) 
where stability is endangered, as well as making the argument for species preservation a 
rational argument. It can also be argued that the probability of this benefit is also very 
likely to influence the inclination of defenders of biodiversity and of conservation 
biology to represent the potential value of species as ‗option value‘. 11 
As we can observe, the above mentioned formulation of the environmentalist 
argument with the alternative conclusion seems to avoid the problem which arises in its 
formulation with the conclusion the each and every species should be preserved. This 
seems to be a close counterpart of the one Sober criticizes and names ‗the argument 
from ignorance‘. In this formulation we observe that our attempt to construct a  
probabilistic argument for preserving components of biodiversity - the value of which is 
not known to us at present but might turn out to be considerable in future - supplies a 
justification for  the  preservation of biodiversity through preserving its habitat, such as a 
forest. This formulation on the one hand involves Attfield‘s agreement with Sober on the 
point that the risk of a mass extinction of species would not require preserving every 
single one. Also, more importantly, it seems to supply a plausible response to Sober‘s 
criticism of the environmentalist argument from the unknown value of species through 
suggesting a modified interpretation of the environmentalist argument, which is arguably 
both probabilistic and persuasive, not counterintuitive.  
Many biologists now seem to recognize option value as the core of the case for 
preserving biodiversity. For them, it captures both foreseeable future use and the value of 
                                                     
11  Option value is a kind of value, which reflects the significance of more uses being unveiled in the future. 
In other words, it is a value reflecting the availability of a biological item for use at some future date. This 
value does not depend on actual utilization in future, but rather on the option of its availability for future 
use. For example, the biodiversity component (such as a species) may never actually be utilized, but there is 
advantage associated with retaining the option of its utilization.                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
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the unknown. In other words, option value corresponds not just to the unknown future 
values of known species, but also to the unknown values of unknown species (or the 
‗unresearched‘ components of the forest). In biologist E. O. Wilson‘s words, biodiversity 
captures the idea of a ‗frontier of the future‘, presenting an appealing prospect of mostly 
unknown range, with unforeseen uses. Wilson mentions that the realization that 
biological diversity is disappearing and, unlike many other threatened things, irreversibly, 
has caused the change from a ‗bits and pieces approach‘ to a much more holistic 
approach to biodiversity.12 Echoing this, many conceptualize ‗biodiversity‘ as the 
representation of the idea of ‗biodiversity crises‘. But for many, although biodiversity is 
sometimes seen as a symbol for our lack of knowledge about life‘s components, it also 
opens up a calculus (a means ‗for measurement and comparison‘) for reasoning about 
possible benefits which we have reason to anticipate, or, in other words, ‗option value‘. 
  In consideration of biologists‘ recognition of biodiversity as option value (i.e., 
foreseeable future use and values of the unknown), the argument for the preservation of 
biodiversity is not an argument from ignorance at all. Granted this, it can be said that the 
environmentalist argument from the unknown value of endangered species is not in 
actual fact an argument from ignorance either. This indicates that Attfield‘s reformulation 
of the environmentalist argument, a representation backed up by biologists who appeal 
to option value (and vice versa), is based on firm ground, compared to the formulation 
given by Sober. And this also suggests that the basis of Sober‘s representation of the 
environmentalist argument is much less compatible with the findings of the researchers 
in the relevant field of science. Primarily this is due to the fact that Sober has not 
incorporated, presumably unintentionally, relevant scientists‘ (in particular, conservation 
                                                     
12 Wilson, E. O., ed. Biodiversity (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences/ Smithsonian Institution, 
1988).    
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biologists‘) latest reaffirmation of the relation between diversity and stability and different 
values of biodiversity (in particular, option value) into his representation of the 
environmentalist argument.  But this all means that Sober‘s argument is unsound. Thus 
through addressing the issues (the potential value of species as option value) that have 
been omitted by Sober in his representation of the environmentalist argument, and also 
through being backed up by biologists, Attfield seems right in asserting that the 
environmentalist argument is not merely an appeal to total ignorance. Hence Sober‘s 
representation of the environmentalist argument seems to be a misrepresentation. 
The above mentioned is not, however, the only type of value appealed to by 
environmentalists, which Sober attempts to problematize.  Another value that he tries to 
problematize is ‗wholes‘, ‗autonomous value‘ or ‗holistic value‘. To discuss and 
problematize environmentalists‘ appeal to holistic value, Sober draws our attention to the 
divergence of approaches of environmentalists and animal liberationists. He claims the 
philosophical problem for environmentalism becomes more complex when it assigns 
value to the holistic character of things and thereby prioritizes preserving the holistic 
characteristics of nature (such as whole species, communities and ecosystems), not the 
individuals of which they are composed. For many holistic environmentalists, the 
individual organism does not matter, so long as its species is preserved as a species. A 
number of holistic environmentalists (in this connection Sober cites the writings of Aldo 
Leopold, J. Baird Callicott, Edward Abbey and Garrett Hardin, treating them as holistic 
environmentalists) assert that environmental value cannot be based on values relating to 
individual welfare. In so doing, as Sober comments, they attempt to promote holistic 
value as the one and only value at risk in maintaining ecological balance and diversity.  
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Sober is impressed with the animal liberationists‘ view13, as opposed to the 
holistic environmentalists‘ view, which involves the idea that it is individual members 
who suffer, not collectives (i.e., species); thus, for animal liberationists, the suffering of 
sentient animals should be taken into consideration in our ethical deliberations about 
them because ‗suffering‘ carries meaning only when it is said of an individual organism. A 
species has experience of suffering only in virtue of this being true at the individual level. 
Sober affirms his support for animal liberationists‘ views by saying that:  
…the only sense in which species have experiences is that their member 
organisms do: the attribution at the population level, if true, is true 
simply in virtue of its being true at the individual level. 14 
 
Furthermore, Sober argues that the arguments from animal suffering succeed in being 
rational because such arguments are based on the utility or disutility of sentient animals 
(as previously mentioned, for him rational argument must be based on probabilities and 
utilities). By contrast, he argues, arguments from the autonomous value of collective or 
holistic systems are not rational because utility or disutility is not ascribable to collectives 
or holistic systems, due to the fact that these do not have the capacity to suffer or 
experience. Holistic value as appealed to by environmentalists, for him, thus turns into 
the source of a further philosophical problem for environmentalism.  
Based on the principle of capacity to suffer and/or experience, Sober attempts to 
distinguish sentient animals from non-sentient beings like trees as well as mountains and 
salt marshes. Sober argues that trees have no capacity to suffer and/or experience, and 
thus have no independent or intrinsic value.  Therefore, for Sober, non-sentient beings 
like trees do not merit moral consideration.  
                                                     
13 There is an elaboration of this view in Singer, P., Animal Liberation (New York: Random House, 1975) 
14  Sober, p. 174. 
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Overall it seems that as a negative part of his project, Sober argues against holistic 
value theories. Alternatively, as a constructive part of his project, he attempts to support 
the animal liberationist view and suggests that individual sufferings should be taken into 
consideration in ethical judgments about organisms. He seems to appeal to utilitarian 
considerations where the moral community includes sentient beings as opposed to just 
humans, but omits non-sentient beings like trees. And this consideration seems to him to 
turn on the appeal to aesthetic value of nature and natural entities (as opposed to holistic 
value), which depends on human or animal appreciation. The key reason for Sober‘s 
appealing to aesthetic value seems to be its potential use in the premise(s) of a rational 
argument. He refers to ‗principles related to aesthetic values as familiar principles‘.15 Then 
again, he rejects the value of holistic systems (which he refers to as one of the sources of 
unfamiliar ethical principles) because it lacks such potential, i.e., just for the reverse 
reasons.   
 Sober is so far right in saying that individual value is significant, but seems hardly 
right in blaming environmentalists as a whole for not involving regard for individual 
value in their theories. A number of environmentalists have expressed their concern for 
individual value as well as environmental value (although there is disagreement among 
environmentalists concerning the value of the environment), both playing a part in their 
theories. J. Baird Callicott‘s version of environmentalism can serve as an example in this 
context, in particular his understanding of the individualist bias of utilitarianism (Callicott 
here presents the US social policy which characterises reductive utilitarianism as an 
example of the individualist bias of utilitarianism) as being harmful in its impact on 
human perception of ecological values as well as in many other ways. As Callicott puts it: 
                                                     
15 Ibid. 
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...the United States seems to pursue uncritically a social policy of reductive 
utilitarianism, aimed at promoting the happiness of all its members severally. 
Each special interest accordingly clamors more loudly to be satisfied while the 
community as a whole becomes noticeably more and more infirm economically, 
environmentally, and politically. 16 
   
   The major claim of Callicott here is that ‗the emergence of individualism‘ and 
‗alienation from nature‘ are causally connected, and the former causes the later. The 
proposed connection appears to be the main strength of Callicott‘s criticism of the policy 
of reductive utilitarianism. Sober, himself, seems to recognize this possibility by stating 
that ‗Callicott is right that ‗‗strict academic detachment‘‘ is difficult here.‘ 17The use of the 
words ‗to pursue uncritically a social policy of reductive utilitarianism‘ in the passage 
quoted above from Callicott suggests that he is not against individual happiness. What he 
is opposing is the uncritical advocacy of a social policy of reductive utilitarianism, which 
ignores the link of people‘s interest at individual level to their interests at community 
level.  Callicott‘s subsequent recognition of regard for individual value in his chapter 
‗Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Back Together Again‘ supports Sober‘s 
objection to entirely holistic environmentalists but shows that it does not any more apply 
to Callicott, and in turn helps justify Attfield‘s assertion that ‗philosophers who disregard 
individual value probably deserve Sober‘s reproaches, but are probably rarer than Sober 
seems to suppose, and not typical of environmentalists.‘18  
Sober puts sentient beings, on the one hand, and trees, mountains and salt 
marshes, on the other, into quite distinct categories: able to suffer versus not able to 
suffer; and (therefore) having intrinsic moral value versus having no intrinsic moral value 
(or having at most non-intrinsic moral value).  The distinction between sentient beings 
                                                     
16 Callicott, J. B.,  ‗A Triangular Affair‘, Environmental Ethics, Vol. 2.4, 1980, p. 324. 
17 17. Sober, p. 187. 
18 Attfield, p. 13. 
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and non-sentient beings, based as it is on the principle of capacity to suffer and/or 
experience, seems to have the counter-intuitive implication - that all non-sentient lives 
including trees can safely be ignored. This is surely not a desirable implication. The 
bizarreness of Sober‘s assessment (which can be called a ‗category mistake‘), in my view, 
is implicit in the use of the criterion ‗able to suffer versus not able to suffer‘ for assessing 
the intrinsic value of living beings. Living beings such as trees are apparently distinct 
from non-living entities such as mountains and salt marshes. It is one thing to reject 
claims about the utility or intrinsic value of systems like mountains and salt marshes, and 
another to reject claims about the utility or the intrinsic value of the good of individual 
organisms like trees.19 The bizarreness of the assertion of Sober here speaks for itself.  
Sober seems beyond criticism so long as he states that non-sentient beings have 
no capacity to suffer and have no experiences. But he is mistaken when he assumes that 
the well-being of non-sentient organisms like trees has no independent or intrinsic value. 
A sentient being has a good in not suffering and being allowed to flourish. By the same 
token a tree has a good in receiving light and water (in other words, living entities have a 
goal or telos, and as such a ‗capacity to flourish‘), suggesting that irrespective of ‗capacity 
to suffer‘ all living beings have a good-of-their-own, and therefore all of them are bearers 
of intrinsic value.  
Now the question arises:  what is the more relevant as a criterion for moral 
standing of all living beings? While ‗capacity to suffer‘ is not a relevant (or necessary) 
criterion for moral status, capacity to flourish as explained here seems to be so. The 
implication of a combination of criteria for moral deliberation is immense. It receives an 
apparent expression in one of Marry Anne Warren‘s seven-point proposed combined 
criteria for moral status, which she names ‗the interspecific principle‘. Under the rubric of 
                                                     
19 Ibid., p. 14. 
113 | P a g e  
 
‗the interspecific principle‘, Warren argues that within the limits of her principles 1-4, 
non-human members of mixed social communities have a stronger moral status than 
could be based upon sentience alone.20  But this is where Sober seems to have made a 
mistake by maintaining that creatures lacking experiences have no utilities, which in turn, 
forecloses arguments from the intrinsic value of all non-sentient living entities.  
One might here argue that although Warren is saying that the value of sentient 
beings in some sort of community is not solely a matter of their intrinsic value as 
sentient, she has not clearly mentioned anything to indicate that her point is meant to 
extend to non-sentient beings. This indistinctness does not, however, weaken the 
aforementioned ground of arguments from the capacity to flourish of all non-sentient 
living creatures. For if sentient creatures have moral standing on grounds other than their 
sentience (let us say capacity to flourish), these grounds may well apply to non-sentient 
creatures too; consistency seems to imply this, whether or not Warren does. To be more 
precise, whether or not they are non-sentient beings, non-human living entities possess 
moral status, and thereby warrant being included in our moral deliberation, on account of 
their having the capacity to flourish.    
If we take the view that health is intrinsically good and disease is intrinsically bad 
for living creatures whether they are sentient or not, then a range of arguments from 
intrinsic value becomes available to environmentalists which Sober passes over. It should 
be noted that these arguments from the intrinsic value or disvalue of health, disease and 
injury  are clearly familiar, traditional and individualist. 21 
                                                     
20 Warren, M. A., ‗Moral Status‘, in Frey, R. G. and Wellman, C. H. (eds.), A Companion to Applied Ethics, 
Oxford: Blackwell 2005, p. 67. 
 
21 Attfield, p. 14. 
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A further philosophical problem for environmentalism, mentioned by Sober, 
stems from environmentalists giving priority to the preservation of the last remaining 
members of an endangered species over the same number of members of more populous 
species.  The animal liberationists see animal ethics in terms of the capacity to suffer of 
any individual, irrespective of their status – domesticated or wild. By contrast, as Sober 
argues, environmentalists see the main problem in terms of preventing the extinction of 
rare species, and give priority to the last remaining members of an endangered species 
over individual members of a species that is plentiful. According to Sober, this is a 
further source of a complex philosophical problem for environmentalism, since, as he 
says, ‗the fact that one organism is part of an endangered species while the other is not 
does not make the rare individual more intrinsically important‘.22 
 On a theoretical level, the above mentioned disagreements between animal 
liberationists and environmentalists, as Sober says, are an expression of a deep theoretical 
debate between reductionism and non-reductionism, and he characterises the animal 
liberationists‘ argument - taking nothing but the sufferings of individual sentient animals 
into our ethical deliberation - as a case ‗where reductionism is correct.‘ 23 
Attfield‘s reply to Sober‘s criticism of environmentalists‘ significance–based 
categorization of the value of wild and domesticated species seems worth mentioning 
here. As Attfield puts it:   
more is at stake…for individuals when a species becomes rare, because the lives 
that might have been lived by future members of the species are at risk in these 
circumstances. Whereas the existence of future populations of plentiful species 
is not in doubt, that of future populations across the whole of future time of 
species currently declining towards zero is now in question, and is usually 
dependent on the last surviving members in the present.24  
                                                     
22 Sober, p. 175. 
23 Ibid., p. 174. 
24 Attfield, p. 15.  
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At this point Attfield attempts to bring into the picture concern about the future 
population of species, which are presently declining towards complete extinction, and 
accordingly suggests that preserving individual members of an endangered species is 
more crucial (more valuable) than preserving individual members of a plentiful species.  
 Attfield‘s concern (for the last few members of rare species) as thus resolved 
(preserving the last few members of rare species on a priority basis as opposed to the 
members of species which are abundant so that the rare species could be protected from 
complete extinction) seems plausible. For his stance seems to be compatible with the 
view that ‗there is the same obligation to future generations as to the present‘,25 which 
has received widespread support from a range of philosophers,26 and which also most 
importantly could be extended to include all bearers of life within the set of those that 
merit moral consideration. There is a problem with this argument, which I am going to 
discuss shortly. But if we take this view then we can proceed to state that just as in the 
case of humanity, future members of all other species count, to speak ethically (which 
seems to be an appeal to biocentrism), as much as current ones. It implies that it is our 
obligation to protect the remaining members of rare species from their becoming 
completely extinct (through abstaining from activities that harm them and would bring 
them to complete extinction if continued). Thus failure to do so would be allowing rare 
species to become extinct completely, which would make us guilty of  a moral offence, 
                                                     
25 Routley, R. R. V., ‗Nuclear Energy and Obligations to the Future‘, Inquiry, 21 (1978), pp. 133-179 (p. 
161). 
26 See Barry, B.,  ‗Justice between Generations‘, in Law, Morality, and Society: Essays in Honour of H. L. A. 
Hart, ed. by Hacker, P. M. S. and Raz, J. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977); Barry, B., ‗Circumstances of 
Justice and Future Generations‘, in Obligations to Future Generations, ed. by Sikora, R. and Barry, B. 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978); Heyd, D., Genetics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Kim, T., and Harrison, R., eds, Self and Future Generations: 
An Intercultural Conversation (Cambridge: White Horse Press, 1999); Mulgan, T. P., ‗Teaching Future 
Generations‘, Teaching Philosophy, 22.3 (1999), 259-273. 
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and which also arguably justifies environmentalists‘ stance (in particular the aforesaid 
Attfield‘s stance):  priority ought to be given to individual members of rare species over 
the same number of individual members of species which are plentiful.     
The plausibility of the replies to Sober‘s arguments (that he formulated relating to 
philosophical problems for environmentalism) hitherto has gone satisfactorily.  But one 
problem relating to our obligation to future members of species seems to stem from the 
thought that future members of species are not identifiable like their present-day 
members, and suggests that the ethical treatment of the unidentifiable future members of 
species may be different from the ethical treatment of their identifiable present-day 
members. This problem appears to be significant, and thus requires discussion.   
Derek Parfit was one of the first to draw this problem, which he names ‗the 
Non-Identity Problem‘ to the attention of researchers. 27 Parfit‘s view is that although we 
have no duty to unidentifiable future members of human generations, we have duties to 
sustain the quality of life of whoever there will be, to the extent that this can be affected 
by ourselves. By maintaining this view, Parfit recognizes here an impersonal aspect of 
morality without this turning on wholes or collectives (of the type offered by Leopold or 
Callicott, who attempt to justify principles such as that the integrity, stability and beauty 
of the biosphere is the decisive factor in morality). Parfit appears here to offer a modified 
but familiar and traditional ethical argument (not as opposed to but over and above 
Sober‘s argument from the aesthetic value of nature) for protecting future human 
generations, which has won wide support from advocates of familiar traditional 
approaches.   
                                                     
27 The Non-Identity Problem (NIP) is also known as ‗The Paradox of the Future Individuals‘, See D. 
Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1984) ch.16. 
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Attfield argues that although Parfit writes about future human generations, what 
he says seems relevant to future non-human generations as well; and his view seems not 
to involve too significant an exit from ethically familiar thoughts. Maintaining Parfit‘s line 
of reflection, Attfield then goes on to argue that to secure the continuity of species it is 
crucial to preserve the intactness of suitable habitats with living members of the species 
inhabiting them. For continuation of species into the future essentially involves at least 
two issues: (1) a suitable habitat, and (2) living bearers of genetic materials of the species. 
As Attfield puts it:   
Admittedly, the establishment of seed banks means that this dependence 
is not total; but the continuation of species depends on the intactness of 
suitable habitats, as well as on bearers of genetic materials, and that is best 
guaranteed if suitable habitats are preserved with living members of the 
species inhabiting them and helping secure their continuing suitability.‘ 28 
Thus to help protect biodiversity, alongside approving our duties towards protecting 
known or unknown future individual members of species, Attfield has sought to focus 
on preserving the intactness of suitable habitats with living members of the species 
inhabiting them. In so doing, Attfield seems to have tackled, with Parfit‘s help, the 
infamous ‗Non-Identity Problem‘. This being so, a response to the problems Sober 
identified with arguments for species preservation could be prepared on a modified 
individualist basis, which involves prioritizing individual members of rare species over 
the members of plentiful ones.  
It now seems overall that at least the arguments that Sober has formulated with 
regards to philosophical problems for environmentalism are decisively flawed, and do 
not stand up against the counter-arguments that I have considered here. Also, as has 
been observed here, the argument from the unknown value of a species (e.g. an 
endangered species) is not ‗the argument from ignorance‘, and the idea of ‗option value‘ 
                                                     
28 Attfield, p. 15. 
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of components of biodiversity makes Sober‘s remark about them (as tantamount to   
‗nothing‘) quite misleading or contentious to say the least. It has also been observed that 
environmentalists can plausibly argue on a modified individualist basis for the 
preservation of species without endorsing holistic theories or criticizing Sober‘s appeals 
to aesthetic value either. 
Furthermore, it has been detected that Sober‘s rejection of the argument of 
environmentalists for the priority of an individual member of a rare species (with a few 
remaining members) over an individual member of a species which is plentiful, is 
implausible. Environmentalists can argue on a modified individualist basis for the 
preservation of species, and can also consistently give priority to the preservation of the 
last remaining members of an endangered species over the members of more populous 
species. This modified approach to environmentalism neither endorses holistic theories 
nor criticizes Sober‘s appeals to aesthetic value, but rather offers ethical guidance with 
regard to species preservation without destroying familiar principles of moral argument.  
More importantly, the modified environmentalists‘ argument can straightforwardly be 
adopted by animal liberationists without abandoning their individualist approach. Thus it 
seems apparent that Sober is right in appealing to the aesthetic value of nature as 
opposed to its holistic value, but misleading in maintaining that there is nothing to which 
environmentalists can appeal without disparaging principles of traditional moral 
reasoning. 
What is more, Sober has mistaken one branch of environmentalism (i.e., 
‗environmental holism‘) for ‗environmentalism‘ (which incorporates all possible branches 
of environmentalism). This confusion, or failure to distinguish one from another (i.e., 
‗environmentalism‘ from ‗environmental holism‘) may well be one of the reasons for 
Sober‘s being over-confident about his own approach.  
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Attfield‘s criticism of Sober, and his approach to species preservation, as has 
been presented here, is based on his normative ethical theory - biocentric 
consequentialism.29 As opposed to holistic environmentalism, Attfield, in his version of 
biocentric consequentialism, attempts to tackle the issue of the grounds of species 
preservation by appealing to a different understanding of the value of ecosystems and 
species (recognizing the inherent and instrumental value of ecosystems and species as 
opposed to their intrinsic value). Considering the support it gives here to defend the 
modified approach to environmentalism, Attfield‘s version of biocentric 
consequentialism appears to turn out to be a strong contender for a preferable normative 
ethical basis for an acceptable approach to environmentalism.  This thought leads to the 
next chapter, which comprises a rather theoretical inquiry into Attfield‘s version of 
biocentric consequentialism.  
                                                     
29 Biocentric consequentialism is the normative ethical theory that is based on two basic assumptions: (1) 
all living creatures have a good of their own, and have moral standing accordingly, and their flourishing or 
attaining their good is intrinsically valuable; (2) the morality of an action is dependent on its foreseeable 
outcomes. Combining one assumption with the other, this theory holds that the morality of an action or 
policy depends on its contribution to the fulfilment of the capacity to flourish of all affected creatures.  
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Chapter Three 
 
 
2:3   Biocentric Consequentialism:  A Contender for Preferable Normative 
Ethical Theory 
 
As a version of biocentric consequentialism1, Attfield‘s view (1) recognizes the moral 
standing of all living creatures as its core feature and (2) interprets moral rightness as a 
function of the foreseeable consequences either of individual actions or omissions or of 
general recognition of practices with which they conform. It maintains a distance from 
ecocentric positions that locate intrinsic value in ecosystems and in species over and 
above their component individual creatures - as well as the instrumental value of 
ecosystems. As opposed to intrinsic value, he recognizes the inherent value2 of 
ecosystems through their appearing to human observers as attractive, and their immense 
instrumental value through allowing individual bearers of moral standing to flourish.3 
Besides, a species, even though it does not possess intrinsic value, possesses an immense 
instrumental value through playing an indispensable role in an ecosystem.  
                                                     
1 Attfield‘s version is a corresponding type of biocentrism to Goodpaster (who provided a clearer rationale 
of moral considerability of living creatures; for more see Goodpaster, K. E., ‗On Being Morally 
Considerable‘, Journal of Philosophy, 75(1978), pp. 308-325). Among the major works, where Attfield 
developed this version, are: ‗The Good of Trees‘ (Journal of Value Inquiry, 15(1983) pp. 35-54), The Ethics of 
Environmental Concern first edn. (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, (1983)), 2nd edn. (Athens 
and London: University of Georgia Press, (1991)), and Value Obligation and Meta-Ethics (Amsterdam and 
Atlanta, GA: Editions Rodopi B.V., (1995)). 
2 Objects of appreciation such as objects of nature and works of art have this kind of value (extrinsic), and 
appreciators are benefited through appreciating them. For more see, Attfield, R., The Ethics of Environmental 
Concern, 2nd edn, pp. 151-153.  
3Ibid. p. 149.  
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Furthermore Attfield argues that a species is valuable because the existence of 
each possible future member of the species in question depends on its continuance. He 
envisages this point as one of the grounds of his support for the preservation of the 
greatest possible range of existing species or biodiversity.4  
Alan Carter‘s review in Mind of Attfield‘s The Ethics of the Global Environment5 
involves a profound critical exposition of Attfield‘s version of biocentric 
consequentialism. Analysing the core premises of Attfield‘s biocentric consequentialism, 
Alan Carter has been found to praise6 Attfield‘s normative theory for its ‗innovatory‘ (but 
‗relatively introductory‘) contribution to applied ethics (in particular to environmental 
ethics) and to the ‗real relevance of philosophy today‘ as well as to criticize it for its 
several alleged flaws or unwelcome ecological implications. As has been stated by Carter, 
Attfield‘s biocentric consequentialism is in the first place an inegalitarian normative 
theory, and one of the major (to him) unwelcome implications of this theory - what 
Carter labels the ‗Minimax Implication‘7 - stems from its supposedly disproportionate 
ascription of different moral significance (or in other words intrinsic value) to the good 
of different living creatures.  
In this context Carter quotes the following passage from Attfield‘s The Ethics of the  
 
                                                     
4 Ibid. p. 193.  
5 Carter, A., ‗Review of Robin Attfield: The Ethics of the Global Environment‘, in Mind, 110. (2001), pp. 
149-153. 
6 In his review of Attfield‘s The Ethics of the Global Environment, Carter has first recognized biocentric 
consequentialism as an ‗extremely impressive theory‘; and in his reply to Attfield‘s first reply to his review 
of Attfield‘s The Ethics of the Global Environment, Carter has further recognized Attfield‘s biocentric 
consequentialism by saying that ‗perhaps the most impressive environmental ethics developed to date in 
any detail is Robin Attfield‘s biocentric consequentialism.‘ Carter, A., ‗Inegalitarian Biocentric 
Consequentialism, the Minimax Implication and Multidimensional Value Theory‘, Utilitas, 17.1 (2005), pp. 
62-84.  
7 Ibid., p. 64. 
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Global Environment:  
 For biocentric consequentialism, intrinsic value lies in the good or the well-
being of bearers of moral standing. Following Aristotle, I take this good to 
consist in the development of the capacities essential to their kind…I also 
maintain that more complex and sophisticated capacities (such as that of 
autonomy) take preference over less complex and sophisticated ones, but 
only where both are at stake; no automatic priority belongs simply to 
membership of a sophisticated species, or simply to being human. 8  
Carter here attempts to show that by maintaining the reflection implicit in this passage 
Attfield in fact gives priority to the well-being of human beings over other living entities, 
and also encourages the extermination of ‗inessential species‘ in favour of human 
population. In developing one of his worries about Attfield‘s theory, Carter argues that 
this theory at some point enjoins us to maximize the good or well-being of all bearers of 
moral standing, but abruptly it goes on to support a different view that developing more 
complex and sophisticated capacities (such as autonomy) takes preference over simpler 
and less sophisticated ones (which means the supremacy of the bearers of sophisticated 
capacities i.e., human beings over non-bearers of such capacities). This is an allegation 
against Attfield of committing speciesism.   
Carter adds that by deploying the Aristotelian element (which involves that a 
minimally worthwhile life requires development in some degree of most essential 
capacities) within his ethical theory Attfield has managed to remove the repugnance from 
the well-known Repugnant Conclusion. But through being ‗committed to the view that 
more good flows from developing everyone‘s capacities to some degree than from 
maximally developing the same capacities of a minority at the expense of those of the 
                                                     
8 Attfield, R., The Ethics of the Global Environment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), p. 39. 
  
123 | P a g e  
 
majority‘9, as has been alleged by Carter, Attfield‘s theory suggests that ‗we ought, ceteris 
paribus, to bring about the lowest acceptable level for the greatest number of human 
beings‘.10 And this is the issue that Carter refers to as ‗the Minimax Implication‘, which in 
turn, as he maintains, leads to a bizarre conclusion for a supposedly environmental ethics. 
To provide further clarity on the meaning of his Minimax Implication, Carter writes:  
Strictly speaking, it would be preferable to construe ‗minimax‘ as ―the lowest 
level for the best off‖. However, with regard to any capacity whose 
development is constrained by a limited resource, bringing about the lowest 
acceptable level for the greatest number of humans would itself imply 
minimising the level of the best off. 11 
This seems to be a further allegation against Attfield of committing reverse 
discrimination. Furthermore Carter accuses Attfield of incorporating and highlighting the 
issue of ‗the moral considerability of possible persons along with actual ones‘12 in his 
theory, paving the way for the Minimax Implication.13  
Another decisive flaw of Attfield‘s biocentric consequentialism, according to 
Carter, is its being a monistic theory. For Carter monistic theories attempt to maximize 
one value, and, therefore, are not capable of providing determinate answers to moral 
questions; it is only value pluralism (or ‗moral-pluralist environmental ethics‘) that can 
answer such moral questions by taking into account various normative theoretical 
considerations (such as, anthropocentric, zoocentric, biocentric and ecocentric 
considerations) as well as by trading off those various values against one another. Carter 
                                                     
9 Carter, ‗Inegalitarian Biocentric Consequentialism, the Minimax Implication and Multidimensional Value 
Theory: A Brief Proposal for a New Direction in Environmental Ethics‘, p. 65.  
10 Ibid.  
11  Ibid.  Also see Carter, ‗Review of Robin Attfield, The Ethics of the Global Environment‘, p. 151. 
12 Attfield, The Ethics of the Global Environment, p. 152. 
13 Attfield, R., ‗Biocentric Consequentialism and Value Pluralism: A Response to Alan Carter‘, Utilitas, 17.1 
(2005) 85-92 (pp. 85-86). 
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concludes his review by arguing that as a monistic theory Attfield‘s brand of biocentric 
consequentialism is inadequate to cover the full range of ethical issues, and that the 
complexity of environmental considerations warrants rather a far more pluralist value 
system. Furthermore, Carter says that 
Attfield‘s particular brand of consequentialism appears, quite inadvertently, to 
have an implication that would reveal it to be less environmentalist then its 
proponent presumes, and yet which, simultaneously, is likely to repel those 
lacking sufficient environmental concern.14 
 The implication of Attfield‘s theory, as Carter reads it, is inadequate protection for 
‗inessential species‘, namely one of inadequate protection for ‗inessential species‘.    
Attfield has been found to mount a response to Carter‘s objection to his theory.  
Before we undertake discussion about Attfield‘s reply to Carter‘s criticism of his theory, 
it is worth mentioning that Carter‘s criticism about/of Attfield‘s biocentric 
consequentialism does not justify Sober‘s stance (or criticism) of environmentalism, or 
rescue it from various replies to him discussed in the previous chapter; but Carter‘s 
criticism attempts to problematize Attfield‘s particular brand of biocentric 
consequentialism. Carter‘s seemingly strong criticism of Attfield‘s ethical theory warrants 
a closer scrutiny of Attfield‘s reply to him, or else the theoretical grounds of Attfield‘s 
approach to environmentalism (as discussed in the previous chapter), and in particular to 
preserving species, would remain exposed to an open and unchecked challenge.   
Attfield‘s classification of living creatures in terms of their moral significance is 
rooted in their capacities and interests, not in their species memberships. It reveals that 
moral significance can differ not merely between members of different species, but also 
among the members of the same species (e.g., among the members of the human 
species) based on their capacity and interests, suggesting that Attfied‘s theory as thus 
                                                     
14  Ibid., p. 86. 
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presented by Carter (Carter assumes that Attfield emphasizes autonomy at the expense of 
other values,15 and supposes that in so doing Attfield commits himself to speciesism) is a 
misrepresentation or misunderstanding, to say the least.  
Attfield now replies to Carter‘s inference adduced against his theory that 
biocentric consequentialism may well enjoin us to bring into existence billions and 
billions of humans with their capacities developed ever so slightly in preference to 
preserving many non-human species. In his reply Attfield explicitly states that biocentric 
consequentialism involves obvious rationales against any large increase of the existing 
human population. Attfield argues that Carter‘s analysis of his theory, as being supportive 
of developing people‘s capacities ‗ever so slightly‘, is a misinterpretation because, for him, 
such a practice (i.e. developing people‘s capacities ‗ever so slightly‘) fails to satisfy basic 
human needs. As Attfield puts it:  
Nor does biocentric consequentialism advocate developing people‘s 
capacities ‗ever so slightly‘, or even ‗to a slight degree‘, since such a 
practice would standardly fail to satisfy basic human needs for the 
development of essential capacities. (Consider, for example, people 
whose capacity to communicate was restricted to pronouns and 
present-tense verbs only.)16 
 
Attfield here clarifies that biocentric consequentialism gives emphasis to satisfaction of 
basic needs, and thus, logically speaking, it cannot advocate developing people‘s 
capacities ‗ever so slightly‘ because the proposal of satisfying basic human needs and 
developing human capacities ‗ever so slightly‘ do not go together. As has been stated in 
the passage above, restricting some people‘s capacity to communicate to pronouns and 
present-tense verbs only certainly does not satisfy the basic needs of those people.   
                                                     
15 Attfield, The Ethics of the Global Environment, pp. 116-24. 
16 For more see World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1987, Chapter on ‗Population and Human Resources‘ in Part II, pp. 95-117                 
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Because it is based on such a misapprehension, Carter‘s diagnosis of the supposed 
‗Minimax Implication‘ of Attfield‘s theory seems to be erroneous. 
As opposed to directing us to bring billions and billions of people into existence, 
Attfield has been found to suggest stabilizing population at a much lower level than this.   
To be more precise, Attfield suggests a sustainable human planetary population of 
around 8 billion.17 This figure appears to be compatible with the lower end of the range 
of UN population scenarios (which is about 7.5 billion).18 Attfield‘s suggestion for 
stabilizing human population at a lower level of 8 billion (which is rather less then the 
possible ceiling of 10 billion) appears to contrast strongly with Carter‘s supposed 
inference or accusation about Attfield‘s theory that it may enjoin us to bring billions of 
humans into being at the cost of non-human species. This being so Carter‘s accusation 
against Attfield‘s theory in this regard seems again to be a misrepresentation. In addition, 
elsewhere Attfield adds that non-human interests, as recognized in biocentric 
consequentialism, can easily justify a crucial difference to human practice and policies as 
regards population size and distribution. To put it more clearly, Attfield writes that 
Biocentric consequentialism could advocate adding billions and billions of 
people only if the others could be supported on other planets, without 
damaging the creatures or the ecological systems of those planets, or if they 
were to live not simultaneously but spread out diachronically over the 
centuries, with a sustainable but limited human population on Earth 
continually replacing itself. 19 
 
This passage clearly implies that Attfield does not mandate overpopulation not only on 
Earth but also in any other possible habitat (other planets). Suggesting a sustainable but 
                                                     
17 Attfield, ‗Biocentric Consequentialism and Value Pluralism: A Response to Alan Carter‘, p. 87.                                                                                          
18 . Attfield, R., ‗Biocentric Consequentialism, Pluralism, and ‗The Minimax Implication‘: A Reply to Alan 
Carter‘, Utilitas, 15.1 (2003), 76-91, p. 78.  
19 Attfield, ‗Biocentric Consequentialism and Value Pluralism: A Response to Alan Carter‘, p. 87. 
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limited population on Earth he seems to further suggest that population can be increased 
by billions and billions if and only if the additional population could be placed on other 
planets without damaging the creatures or the ecological systems of those planets.  Thus 
Carter‘s accusations against Attfield‘s theory of advocating ‗a world full to the brim of 
people‘ at the cost of other living entities seem to be misleading.  
In responding to Carter‘s criticism of his stance for juxtaposing the moral 
considerability of possible persons along with actual ones, Attfield attempts to show that 
the moral considerability of possible human beings and non-human creatures implicit in 
the basic characteristic features of biocentric consequentialism comprises a contribution 
to pro-environmentalist thought, which arguably warrants appreciation from 
environmentalists, but, unfortunately, Carter has missed that.   Carter has not been found 
to give details of how this core premise generates the alleged Minimax Implication. As 
Carter recognizes that Attfield has been successful in removing the Repugnant 
Conclusion, presumably Carter‘s reasoning is that through suggesting the lowest 
acceptable level for the satisfaction of the needs of the greatest number of future human 
beings this same (core) premise generates the Minimax Implication.  But just as Carter‘s 
suggested implication of Attfield‘s theory for population is revealed to have been 
imaginary (as has been observed in previous paragraphs), Carter‘s accusation against 
Attfield‘s theory of generating unwelcome implications through upholding moral 
considerability possible persons (along with actual ones) turns out to be unfounded.  
From the above discussion, it seems apparent that Carter‘s alleged criticisms of 
Attfield‘s biocentric consequentialism are misleading, and fail thus far. Now the task is to 
tackle the question ‗do the proponents of biocentric consequentialism have satisfactory 
replies to the criticism of this theory as a monist theory suggested by Carter?‘ If the 
answer is ‗yes‘ then a further question arises and needs to be addressed: ‗Can biocentric 
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consequentialism be a strong contender among theories of normative ethics in tackling 
the full range of ethical issues including environmental ones?‘  
Let us first then see what plausible replies are available to serve against the 
criticisms of Attfield‘s biocentric consequentialism by Carter. As we have observed 
earlier, Carter rejects Attfield‘s biocentric consequentialism for its generic limitations as a 
monist theory. The major limitation of monism is its attempt to maximize one value. In 
reply to Carter‘s criticism of his theory as a promoter of a single value (i.e. monism), 
Attfield explicitly states that: 
In fact, biocentric consequentialism incorporates a rather elaborate account 
of priorities among values, and later relates ‗values‘ such as justice to the 
balance of value over disvalue that this theory of priorities seeks to optimize. 
Thus it embodies several features of value-pluralism (recognizing the value of 
health, the development of capacities, worthwhile life, justice, etc. as well as 
autonomy) while seeking to provide a value-based rationale for choices 
between recognized ‗values‘. It is pluralist in recognizing and relating a 
plurality of values, but monistic in relating them, consequentialist-wise, to the 
overall balance of value over disvalue, rather like the Total View version of 
utilitarianism, of which it is a variant with a richer axiology and a broader 
understanding of the range of bearers of moral standing. 20 
 
Attfield‘s reply to Carter‘s accusation here seems to hang on the claim that besides being 
a monistic theory, biocentric consequentialism embodies several features of value 
pluralism. In recognizing and relating a plurality of values (such as health, the 
development of capacities, worthwhile life, justice, etc. as well as autonomy), Attfield 
seems to have incorporated a certain feature of value pluralism into his theory. However, 
Attfield‘s theory is not a radical variety of pluralism, as he assumes that these values are 
commensurable ones. This variety of theory, following Elinor Mason‘s classification, can 
                                                     
20 Attfield, ‗Biocentric Consequentialism, Pluralism, and ‗The Minimax Implication‘: A Reply to Alan 
Carter‘, p. 91.   
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be called ‗normative pluralism‘.21 Thus Attfield, at this level, seems to be a normative 
pluralist. On the other hand, he appears also to be a foundational monist.22 For although 
he believes that there are multiple values, he has been found to endorse a value-based 
rationale for choices between recognized ‗values‘.  This being so, Carter‘s characterisation 
of Attfield‘s biocentric consequentialism just as a monistic theory, which gives undue 
prominence to a single value, appears to be misleading, and thus to fail.  Summarizing his 
reply to Carter, Attfield remarks that: 
…the objections which he [Carter] poses to this particular monistic 
normative theory [Attfield‘s biocentric consequentialism] are 
inconclusive…This leaves biocentric consequentialism as a serious 
contender among theories of normative ethics, with regard to… ethical 
issues in general.23 
 
Now it is worth asking: ‗does Carter‘s failure to refute Attfield‘s biocentric 
consequentialism qualify this theory to be the basis of an adequate environmental ethics; 
in other words, ‗does the failure lead us to accept biocentric consequentialism?‘. Indeed, 
it does not. But the high plausibility of biocentric consequentialism has been a typical 
feature of this theory. For example, firstly, as has been observed, it can cope well with 
some infamous problems, namely the Non–identity Problem and the Repugnant 
Conclusion. Secondly, through recognizing multiplicity of values, this theory seems to 
                                                     
21 .  Normative pluralism is the view that there is plurality of bearers of value but is monist fundamentally. 
It is different from radical pluralism, which maintains that there is a plurality of values, but the values are 
mutually irreducible. For more see, Mason, E., ‗Value Pluralism‘, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 
edn (2008) <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/value-pluralism/>[accessed November 
2010].  
22 Foundational monism is the view that there is only one value at the most basic level – that is to say, the 
basic level subsumes all other non-basic levels of values. The conceptualization of foundational monism 
has been done with the help of Elinor Mason‘s classification of different levels of pluralism (for more see, 
Ibid.).   
23 Attfield, ‗Biocentric Consequentialism, Pluralism, and ‗The Minimax Implication‘: A Reply to Alan 
Carter‘, p. 91. 
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have plausibly managed to overcome the excessive simplicity of a strictly monistic view. 
And thirdly, through endorsing a value-based rationale for choices between recognized 
‗values‘, this theory seems to enjoy the advantage of relative simplicity. 24 The third point 
is very significant as pluralistic moral systems usually do not embody any meta-principle 
and thus cannot adjudicate clashes between values, which, according to radical pluralism, 
are irreducible. Consequently radically pluralistic theories are hardly able to provide any 
clear-cut guidance for actions or policy decisions. Pluralists, however, can in principle 
avoid these problems through endorsing some meta-principles to resolve clashes 
between various values. But, as Attfield argues, ‗then this meta-principle would turn out 
to occupy a pivotal position within the theory, doing all the work and taking all the strain; 
and what started as a pluralistic theory would have turned into a monistic theory after 
all‘.25  
From the above discussion it has now become clearer that the supposed 
implications of biocentric consequentialism suggested by Carter are not implications of it 
as he supposed them to be, but rather biocentric consequentialism, as opposed to any 
straightforward monistic theory such as hedonism and any radical pluralistic value theory, 
seems to uphold the view that there are a range of values, and meta-principles are 
necessary to adjudicate conflicts between those values. Thus among the various available 
normative theories, biocentric consequentialism seems to be a serious contender not only 
for a preferable normative ethical basis for an acceptable approach to environmentalism 
but also for the discipline of ethics as a whole. 
                                                     
24 Attfield, R., Value, Obligation and Meta-Ethics, (Atlanta, Georgia and Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 1995) 
Ch. 6.   
25 Attfield, Attfield, R., ‗Biocentric Consequentialism, Pluralism, and ‗The Minimax Implication‘: A Reply 
to Alan Carter‘, p. 91. 
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Chapter One 
 
 
3.1 Human Security: Genesis and Contours  
 
The concept of ‗security‘ did not appear in the literatures of relevant policy fields until 
the 1940s. At the beginning of its use, the meaning of the concept of security was 
restricted to the military defence of a state‘s territory, which continued for a period of 
nearly three decades - from the 1940s until the 1960s. This stance is familiar as the 
conventional (or traditional, or classical, or orthodox) realists‘1approach to security.  
A change occurred in the scope and meaning of the concept of security for the 
first time in the 1960s. The understanding that economic power, diplomatic capability or 
ownership of a key economic resource (e.g. oil) is pertinent in conceptualising the 
concept of security has brought about this change. This stance is familiar in the discipline 
of International Relations as ‗Neo-realism‘ which:  
maintained the focus on states and the pursuit of power but accepted that 
not everything that happens in the world is determined by military might.2  
 
  
 A further transformation of the meaning of this concept occurred in the post-
Cold War world. This has been initiated and advanced by scholars who were not 
convinced that ‗Neo-realism‘ had evolved far enough from Realism to take account of 
the changes that had occurred in the world since the 1940s.‘3 This is recognised as the 
‗human security view‘ of security.  
                                                     
1 Realists are the traditionalists in International Relations and Security Studies who focus their enquiries on 
military security in inter–state relations, envisaging states as the main ‗actors‘ in security discourse. In 
philosophy, however, there are two schools of realism, namely metaphysical and epistemological; and 
philosophers who belong to relevant groups are recognised as realists in this sense. The word ‗realist‘ has 
been used here to mean entirely different people, i.e. scholars of International Relations, not philosophers. 
2 Hough, P., Understanding Global Security (London and New York: Rutledge, 2004), p.4. 
3 Ibid. 
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Criticising the Neo-realists‘ stance, the proponents of the human security view 
state that, although Neo-realists recognise issues, such as ‗economic power‘, ‗diplomatic 
capability‘ and ‗ownership of a key resource or resources‘ as important issues in 
conceptualising the concept of security, they have entirely omitted (or failed to address) a 
very crucial issue, i.e. humans‘ security. Another objection that could be put forward 
against Neo-realists is that they consider the concept of security as merely materialistic 
(as opposed to personal security, freedom from crime, oppression, violence etc., which 
concerns the access to materials to address purely military and economic capability). The 
same objection can be put against the conventional realist approach to security. These 
limitations with both conventional and Neo-realist definitions of security, as has been 
argued by Erdogan, justify a fresh conceptualisation of the concept of security.4 It is in 
this context that the ‗human security view‘ arose.     
 It is worth mentioning that the concept of human security, however, is not the 
one and only neologism that drives us to expand the focus of the concept of security 
beyond the level of the state. The list of neologisms, according to Paris, involves diverse 
security concepts, namely common security, global security, co-operative security, and 
comprehensive security; and ‗human security‘, according to him, is the latest 
accumulation in this list.5  
The 1994 Human Development Report of the UNDP focused on the ‗human 
security‘ issue for the first time as a major statement. To begin with this report, the 
author rejects the realists‘ approaches to security (both conventional and Neo-realist 
stances) on the ground that realists‘ approaches to security have omitted entirely ‗non- 
military aspects of security‘, especially ‗the legitimate concerns of the ordinary people 
                                                     
4 Erdogan, I., 'Migration: As a Threat to Security?' Journal of Turkish Weekly. 27 February 2009, p. 1.                                                     
5 Paris, R., ‗Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air‘, International Security, 26.2 (Fall 2001), pp. 87-102 (p. 
97). Paris borrows these terms from R. W. Jones (Jones, R. W., Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999). 
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who sought security in their daily lives‘,6 or in other words ‗the right to individual 
security‘. The author then goes on to suggest that human beings are the central analytic 
referent of security, directing the concept of security to a new, broader horizon. Scholars 
in the relevant filed of security now herald this as a paradigm shift, a journey from ‗state‘ 
towards ‗human‘ security. 
A fundamental question may well arise here, that of whether the human security 
view is a complete rejection of the state-centred view. Here the answer is ‗no‘, because 
the objection against the state-centred view (the realist‘s view) is not because of its 
advocacy for the territorial defence of states, but rather for its entire omission of non-
military security issues, particularly human security concerns. Thus, rather than declaring 
them redundant, the proponents of the human security view see state-centred views as an 
inadequate or narrow conception of the concept of security, and envisage their own view 
- the human security view - as the more adequate approach, which is also known as the 
broader conception of security.    
As laid out in the 1994 UNDP report, there are seven interrelated significant 
components of human security, as such, namely: economic security (assured basic 
income), food security (physical and economic access to food), health security (relative 
freedom from disease and infection), environmental security (access to sanitary water 
supply, clean air and a non-degraded land system), personal security (security from 
physical violence and threats), community security (security of cultural identity) and 
political security (protection of basic human rights and freedoms).7 According to this 
report, these seven categories of security generate two types of safeguard concerns from 
security threats. Firstly, safeguards from persistent threats such as hunger, disease and 
                                                     
6 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, 1994 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), p. 2 
 
7 Ibid., p. 22. 
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repression. And secondly, safeguards from sudden and hurtful disruptions in daily life – 
whether in homes, communities or jobs. The report maintains that all categories of 
security are crucial for human existence and wellbeing both at individual and collective 
levels. 
Some works in the literature, however, amount to modification of the UNDP‘s 
lists of security concerns. Nef, for example, modifies the UNDP‘s list by arguing that 
human security should be addressed under five different categories of security concerns, 
namely ‗(1) environmental, personal, and physical security, (2) economic security, (3) 
social security, including freedom from discrimination based on age, gender, ethnicity, or 
social status, (4) political security, and (5) cultural security, or ‗the set of psychological 
orientations of society geared to preserving and enhancing the ability to control 
uncertainty and fear‘.8 The view of Reed and Tehranian adds two more aspects to the 
above list. They are psychological security (a situation which establishes interpersonal 
relationships that will be based on mutual love and respect) and communication security 
(a state where freedom and flow of information are unrestricted).9 
Some proponents of the human security view, however, avoid providing a 
laundry list of kinds of security. Thomas is an instance in this connection and avoids 
providing a laundry list by maintaining that major concerns of the human security issue 
are the fulfilment of basic human needs, realisation of human dignity, and freedom from 
oppressive power structures.10  
Wyn Jones introduces two terms, namely ‗broadening‘ and ‗deepening‘, with a 
view to analysing ‗human security‘. By ‗broadening‘ he means the incorporation of non-
                                                     
8 Nef, J. Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability: (Ottawa: The International Development Research Centre, 
1999), p. 25. 
9 Reed, L.  and Tehranian, M., ‗Evolving Security Regimes‘, in    Worlds Apart: Human Security and Global 
Governance, ed. by Tehranian, M., (London: Taurus, 1999), pp. 54-78 (p. 39 and p. 47).                                                                                               
10 Thomas, C. ‗Introduction‘, in Globalization, Human Security, and The African Experience, ed. by Thomas, C., 
and Wilkin, P. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publications, 1999), pp. 1-19 (p. 3).                                                 
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military issues within the scope of security (such as environmental security and freedom 
from degradation, the spread of disease, overpopulation, mass refugee movements, 
nationalism, terrorism, and nuclear catastrophe), while by ‗deepening‘ he means the 
consideration of the security of the individuals and groups as referents of security (rather 
than focusing narrowly on territorial securities).11  
Based on Jones‘ concepts of ‗broadening and deepening‘, Paris constructs a 
matrix of the field of security studies, categorising four alternative sources of security 
threats. They are: (1) National Security (Conventional Realist approach to security 
studies), (2) Redefined Security (e.g. environmental and economic security), (3) Intrastate 
Security (e.g., security from civil war, ethnic conflict, and democide), (4) Human Security 
(e.g., security from environmental and economic threats to the survival of societies, 
groups and individuals).12  
Of the four alternatives, Paris recommends ‗human security‘ as the more 
plausible option. He lists five specific advantages of the use of the concept ‗human 
security‘:  
First, the contents of cell 4 [human security] echo many of the concerns of 
the human security coalition, so it makes intuitive sense to use this 
terminology. Second, employing human security as a label for a broad 
category of research eliminates the problem of deriving clear hypotheses 
from the human security concept itself… Third, and relatedly, although many 
scholars in this branch of security studies may be interested in normative 
questions as well as empirical ones, the advantage of using human security as 
a descriptive label for a class of research is that the level would not 
presuppose any particular normative agenda. Fourth, mapping the field in 
this manner - with human security as one branch - helps to differentiate the 
principal non-traditional approaches to security studies from one 
another…Finally, the very fashionability of the label ―human security‘‘ could 
benefit scholars by drawing attention to existing works within cell 4 [human 
security] and opening up new areas of research in this branch of the field.13 
 
                                                     
11 Paris, p. 97. 
12 Ibid, pp. 97-100. 
13 Ibid, p. 101.                                                                                                                                                                                                                
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Paris, however, most notably, claims that there is no use to be made of the classification 
of the issues of security based on the dualistic terms ‗broadening and deepening‘, 
because, for him, this classification could be made redundant by a more refined and 
purposive classification.  
Given this, one may well argue that ‗human security‘ is an ambiguous, blurry, and 
non-operational concept. Some proponents of the human security view, however, 
strongly disagree with this judgment. Presumably the author of the 1994 UNDP report 
suggested a list of seven concrete elements of the human security, anticipating this sort of 
criticism against it. Opposing their critics, some proponents of the human security view 
hold that the absence of the definitional boundaries, or in other words the ‗wideness‘ of 
the concept of human security implies its ‗all encompassing‘ and ‗integrative‘ qualities, 
which they see as among the concept‘s major strengths. As Paris puts it:  
Human security may serve as a label for a broad category of research in the 
field of security studies that is primarily concerned with non-military threats 
to the safety of societies, groups, and individuals, in contrast to more 
traditional approaches to security studies that focus on protecting states from 
external threats.14  
 
Paris envisages ‗diverseness of categories of the concept of security‘ as an opportunity for 
re-conceptualising the concept of security, not as a difficulty. 
Furthermore, Paris suggests that, being holistic and inclusive in nature, human 
security offers little analytical leverage. Nevertheless, for him, it plays a useful 
taxonomical role through categorising a range of contributions to scholarship, 
undertaken on the concept of security by various disciplines and discourses. This could 
also provide a handy label for broad categories of research, which ‗explore the particular 
conditions that affect the survival of individuals, groups, and societies…‘15 
                                                     
14 Ibid, p. 96.     
15 Ibid, p. 102.                                                                                                                                                                 
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It thus appears that there are at least two stages of disagreement about the 
concept of security. In stage one, disagreements prevail between proponents of the 
conventional approach to security and the proponents of the human security approach, 
while in stage two they prevail between the proponents of the human security approach 
themselves. Thus disagreements about security take place as much within approaches to 
security as between them.  
Disagreements, at stage one, polarise related scholars into two opposing groups, 
involving two competing definitions of the concept of security, namely the narrow 
conception and the wider conception of security. As mentioned earlier, conceptions 
given by ‗traditional‘ or ‗orthodox‘ or ‗classical‘ realists, or Neo-realists, belong to the first 
kind, while conceptions given by the proponents of the human security view belong to 
the second kind, e.g. the UNDP‘s 1994 definition of human security.  
Disagreements of the stage two kind are subtler than disagreements of the stage 
one kind, and thus more difficult to dissolve or reconcile. The proponents of the human 
security view are divided into two groups, and their disagreements mainly concern the 
source of security threats. Some focus on ‗want‘ as the source of security threats while 
others focus on ‗fear‘. Thus, although the 1994 UNDP‘s human security                                  
definition is more fashionable and often cited, and although some scholars (such as Paris) 
believe that ‗human security‘ is a flawless and adequate option for conceptualising the 
concept of security, there are still other conceptions about it. There are also a number of 
unresolved issues as to its conceptualisation and operationalisation. These disagreements 
about the human security view are said to be rooted, to a large extent, (1) in its vagueness 
and incapability of offering practical guidance to academics (particularly those who are 
interested in applying it to their policy decisions), and (2) in the persistent disagreement 
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(between the Western or developed world and the developing or the underdeveloped 
world) on ‗how to secure security‘.  
  As mentioned earlier, disagreements between the proponents of the conventional 
approach to security and proponents of the human security view are not entirely 
contrasting. Acharya, the co-author of the UNDP‘s 2003 Commission on Human 
Security report, observes that our response to human security does not always require 
intrusion against a sovereign state. Collective action becomes satisfactory when it is 
envisaged as a case of pooling sovereignty rather than weakening it. People, as he says, 
find a solution to overcome the traditional concept of sovereignty by a more 
collaborative and consensual means.16  
Axworthy, writing on the relation between human security and the state, asserts 
that:  
…the concept of peace and security -- national, regional, and global – makes 
sense only if it is derived from people‘s security.17  
 
Although the measure of security, according to Axworthy, is the ‗individual‘s 
position‘ rather than that of the ‗state with its hold on power‘, it does not hamper 
interdependency between the two. Acharya‘s and Axworthy‘s stances on the relationship 
between human security and state seem mutually supportive, and also both plausible in a 
sense. It is because there are security issues that are theoretically balancing and require a 
joined up approach. For instance, protection of individuals in times of conflict and the 
improvement of opportunities for advancement are theoretically balancing themes and 
form a joined up solution for the resolution of those security issues.   
                                                     
16 Acharya, A., ‗Human Security: East verses West‘, International Journal, 56 (2001), pp. 442-460 (pp. 442 and 
444). Also available at <http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1994/en/> [accessed 2 December, 2010].      
17 Axworthy, L., ‗Introduction‘, in Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace, ed. 
by McRae, R. and Hubert, D. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), pp. 3-13 (p. 13). 
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  As has been mentioned earlier, there are two major security concerns of the 
human security view: security from ‗want‘ and security from ‗fear‘. Based on this, 
proponents are divided into two different groups. While Canada and a range of 
European countries focus much on security from ‗fear‘, the broader Japanese and Thai 
views focus greatly on security from ‗want‘. For some this gap is irremovable, but there 
are other people who disagree with them. Levine cites Lizée, who states that, despite 
various other disagreements, proponents of human security views share one point in 
common. This common point of agreement is individual security. As Lizée puts it: 
Definitions of human security vary greatly, though they all coalesce on one      
central element: the emphasis on the need to protect the individual because it 
is only when individuals are secure that broader national and international               
institutions can themselves be legitimate and secure.18  
 
According to Acharya, these competing approaches are not essentially mutually 
exclusive but rather they form a:  
complementary and evolving understanding of a complex and larger 
paradigm of human security in response to emerging challenges.19 
 
Furthermore, Acharya claims that human security is not so called ‗Western‘. To 
defend his position he notes that: 
In the early 1990s, in response to a perceived Western onslaught on human 
rights and democratization, some Asian governments argued that the 
definition and promotion of human rights should be subjected to the 
different cultural contexts and historical experiences of Asia.20 
 
In light of this guidance, Acharya asserts that human security does not undermine 
‗communitarian ethics‘. As he puts it: 
Neither is human security ―Western‖ in the sense that it ignores the issue of 
economic rights, or the ―right to development‖.21 
 
                                                     
18 Lizée, P. P., ‗Human Security in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia‘, Contemporary Southeast Asia, quoted in 
Levine, S., ‗Human Security and ‗Asian Values‘‘, Kobe, Japan, 27 December, 2005, in Annual Report 2005-
2006: Human Security (Kobe: Asia Pacific Research Centre, 2006), pp. 347-374 (p. 368). 
19 Acharya, pp. 450-451.   
20 Ibid, p. 449.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
21 Ibid, pp. 449-450.                                                                                                                                                                                                                
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Levine condemns Acharya‘s views as a subjective expression and argues that as 
an Asian he tries to find a conflict-avoidance mechanism in addressing human security 
 (that is perhaps more characteristic of Asians than non-Asians, he adds) and 
consequently Acharya sees little reason for there to be a conflict between the two 
competing stands on human security approaches (i.e. security from ‗want‘ and security 
from ‗fear‘).22 
 It thus appears overall that as a relatively new and developing view, the human 
security view, is conceptualised in ways that involve contested conceptions, although the 
divides among the conceptions are not as clear as they might seem. For, despite its 
flexibility, the concept of human security has a common core, i.e. the issue of individual 
security, and various conceptions of human security share this core in common. This 
core has been accorded greater importance in international governance as well as in 
codes of conduct. In addition, it has turned into an academic trend and a fledgling policy 
movement in recent times. 
Furthermore, most importantly, disagreements among the contesting conceptions 
or views do not merely concern the conceptualisation of human security; they are to a 
large part about its operationalisation as well. Among disagreements as to its 
operationalisation, some are more complex and stronger, and involve the issue of its 
analytical utility, political viability and ethical justification.23 Thus, further studies are 
needed to grapple more with the question of how to operationalise the concept of 
human security, and which conception or view of human security would be ethically 
more convincing and compatible, if not conclusive. The next chapter is an attempt to 
move towards that end.  
                                                     
22 Levine, p. 367. 
23 Svensson, K., ‗Human Security as Inclusive Security--Gender, Epistemology and Equality‘, African 
Security Review, 6.2 (2007), pp. 2-13 (pp. 3-10).                             
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Chapter Two 
3.2 Revisiting the Concept of Human Security  
 A thorough study of the concept of human security, involving its conceptual and 
operational aspects, would involve at least three questions and require clear replies to 
those questions in order to address security challenges that are discussed under various 
security conceptions in the vibrant field of security studies. The questions are: 
       i) Security for whom?                                    
       ii) Security from whom [or what]? 
       iii) Security by whom?1  
Those who believe in realist approaches to security (both the conventional and the Neo-
realist approach) have an immediate answer to the first question: Security for whom? For 
them, security is concerned with states, i.e. securing states from external attacks. External 
attacks may come through military intervention by another country or through economic 
sanctions on essential survival goods or foods, or blocking of sea routes etc. Here the 
realist‘s conceptions of security are restricted to mean protection for sovereign states and 
individuals within the national boundaries of the nation states. This sense of security 
hardly recognises any responsibility of the state to the people who live within its territory 
for whatever reason, but are not citizens.  
                               Nigel Dower, a prolific writer on this issue, considers this realist 
characterization and understanding of security as too narrow, and summarized their 
views on security as follows:  
(i) It [security] is about being free from arbitrary attack on one‘s person or 
property (from individuals in one‘s society, one‘s state, foreign states or 
international terrorists)…Its emphasis is upon the negative goal of reducing or 
eliminating the risk that bad things will happen to people.  
                                                     
1 Jain, P., ‗Asian Values and Human Security: Some Definitional and Conceptual Concerns‘, Kobe, Japan, 
27 December, 2005, in Annual Report 2005-2006: Human Security (Kobe: Asia Pacific Research Centre, 
2006), pp. 338-346 (p. 341). 
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(ii) In political terms its pursuit is on limited groups of people, namely the 
citizens of a state whose government pursues security. The focus of policies 
pursued by governments tends to be nationalist… 
 (iii) The chief guarantor is an effective state which protects its citizens 
through law and order, through effective external defence, and increasingly in 
the modern world by a range of measures to reduce the risk of terrorist attack. 
(iv) Its focus is on the present and medium-term future. 
(v) Its success depends on the general tendency of human agents not to 
violate the rights of other people – whether through moral persuasion, the 
threat of sanctions or prevention.2 
  
This very sense of ‗security‘ is centred on the ‗territorial sovereignty‘ of a state. Here the 
focus is on military aspects of security, and the idea is that the state is the chief guarantor 
of protection; and armaments, threat of sanctions or prevention are the best strategic 
measures for security.  Humans are treated here as citizens of the state, not as members 
of the human species, suggesting that the state has no responsibility to the people who 
are not citizens (e.g. overseas non-residents, foreign visitors and so forth) but live within 
the boundary of the state in question. 
Among the ethical issues arising here, some arise from the security concept, as 
thus defined or conceptualized by the conventional realists and the neo-realists. The 
problems here are (1) whether states, not human beings, are the only eligible candidates 
for being selected as referents of security; if protection from security threats is a 
fundamental human right then the subsequent concern arises (2) whether ‗it is more 
important morally that we stop other people doing wrong to other people than that we 
prevent or stop suffering which is caused by many other causes, such as natural causes, 
social injustice and other human causes‘3.  
Here the important concern relating to the above mentioned ethical queries is 
‗human well-being‘, and both the realist approaches to security appear to be 
counterintuitive from the view point of well-being. In one sense, in terms of their being 
                                                     
2 Dower, N., ‗Security and Sustainability‘, unpublished paper delivered at Reykjavic University, 21 October 
2005, 1-7(p. 1). 
 
3 Dower, N. ‗Security in the Modern World‘, (Aberdeen University: SDHP, Philosophy Section, 
(unpublished)). 
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suitable as a subject matter for moral discussion, both the realist approaches are entirely 
unsuitable or amoral. In another sense, even if realist approaches are counted as a subject 
matter of moral judgment, they often fail to merit a positive verdict. The reason for this 
failure is the fact that the fulfillment of the realist project is often in conflict with human 
well-being, and being antithetical or neutral to human well-being, realist approaches to 
security warrant being envisaged as morally defective by any normative ethical theory, in 
the full range from egoism to altruism, and from consequentialism and virtue ethics to 
deontology.  
Realist approaches themselves justify Nigel Dower‘s criticism through 
maintaining that the only referent of security is the state, and the source of the threat to 
security is merely external. Of observations against realist approaches, at least two are 
obvious: firstly, a much greater security threat comes from disease, poverty, hunger, 
environmental disasters and so forth, and secondly a greater threat may come from a 
state‘s own territory rather than from external countries.  
Purnendra Jain elaborates on this understanding. Security threats, as he observes, 
can come from another state in the form of a war in which civilians are affected and 
relentlessly suffer. They may also come internally through political repression, a failing 
government, and bad governance, or through natural disasters, such as a tsunami or an 
earthquake. Security, therefore, involves individuals as its major concern, and the central 
purpose of security is protecting individuals from all attacks, both internal and external.4 
 Jain‘s interpretation is penetrating, but not adequate. Anything that creates 
security threats justifies being tackled in the conceptualization of human security. Every 
species, as ecologists inform us, has a certain role in the ecosystem if it is to run properly. 
Human life being part of nature depends on the proper functioning of the biosphere 
                                                     
4 Jain, p. 342. 
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(which can, in other words, be assumed to be our life support system). Therefore a 
secured human life and its continued or sustainable existence is not possible with policy 
initiatives which do not appropriately focus on ecosystems and biodiversity (i.e. species) 
in their policy decisions. Given this, Jain‘s conceptualization of human security seems to 
be inadequate. Another assumption that makes Jain‘s interpretation of human security 
vulnerable is the view that ‗nonhuman life plausibly has intrinsic value as well as human 
life‘5. For Jain‘s interpretation does not involve concern for non-human creatures, the 
bearers of intrinsic value. 
In light of this understanding, the answer to the first question: ‗security for 
whom?‘ is thus to be the bearers of intrinsic value i.e., members of the human 
community and the community of non-human creatures (for more see Chapter Three of 
Part Two and Chapter Two of Part Four). Furthermore, ecosystems and biodiversity 
warrant consideration for their role in supporting the survival of living creatures. For 
some6, ‗nonliving parts of nature‘, for example, the systemic value of nature also have 
intrinsic value and thus can be candidates for the same (in some views such as that of 
Holmes Rolston7). And this implies that referring security just to human beings, let alone 
to the state, is a narrow use of the concept of human security.  
The second question is ‗security from whom [or what]?‘ According to the realist 
view, the answer is: security from attack by other countries or other groups such as 
terrorists, or attacks by lawless individuals. As has been briefly noted earlier, proponents 
of the human security view provide their answer by dividing the sources of security 
threats into two categories, namely ‗security from want‘ and ‗security from fear‘.8 The 
                                                     
5 Attfield, R. ‗The Concept of Sustainable Development Revisited‘, Yeditepe ’de Felsefe, 1.3 (2004), 300-309 
(p. 303). 
6 Aldo Leopold is the pioneer of this concept. 
7 Rolston, H. III, Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values for Natural World (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1998), pp. 160-91.                                                                                                                                  
8 Jain, p. 341. 
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first concern involves issues such as hunger, poverty, disease and natural disasters and 
the like. The latter concern involves issues such as security against violence, human rights 
abuse, civil war and ethnic conflicts and so forth. 
While most of the leaders of the West and East, and international institutions 
such as the United Nations, all agree on the first kind, there is a difference of emphasis 
among proponents of the latter concern. The Andrew Mack report (supported by the 
Government of Canada and a range of other European countries) and the Ogata-Sen 
report (funded by the Japanese Government) could be mentioned here as testimony of 
the disagreement on the range of human security issues. The Mack report focuses much 
on the ‗freedom from fear‘ aspect of the security issue, while the Ogata-Sen report puts 
less emphasis on it and much more on the ‗security from want‘ aspect.  
Here one thing is very clear, that, while the realist view of security entirely omits 
issues of security from ‗want‘ and ‗fear‘, proponents of the human security view (the 
wider conception of security) set them at the centre of security discourse. Now an ethical 
question arises whether human beings have a right to life and whether human beings 
have a right to improve the quality of their lives or, in other words, the right to 
development. Although the latter question needs interpretation, philosophers agree on 
the issue that human beings have a right to life. The cogency of humans‘ right to life 
speaks for itself. On the human right to development, there is apparent guidance from 
the United Nations. The UN ‗Declaration on the Right to Development‘ of 1986 is an 
official recognition of development as a human right.9 Thus, in terms of the human right 
to life and development, and also from the point of view of ethical justification, the 
human security view merits recognition.  
                                                     
9 United Nations, Declaration on the Right to Development, (New York: United Nations, 1986), Preamble, 
Paragraph 2. 
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We can now turn to Mill's essay on Utilitarianism for further clarification on the 
concept of security, which is supportive of the human security view, but adverse to the 
realist approach to security. Mill regards security and liberty as the permanent or vital 
interests of a person. And about security he says it is a pre-condition of a valuable life. 
Human security and liberty ground people‘s moral rights. Thus, for Mill, actions that 
damage human security interests are not only harmful, but also promote injustice. As a 
general rule, Mill therefore suggests that moral requirements should be restricted to a 
prohibition of aggression and of injury to individual security and liberty.10 Thus in light of 
Mill‘s analysis, the human security view seems to be the more plausible and morally 
sound view, and by contrast the realist approaches to security appear to be morally 
threadbare.  
‗Security by whom?‘ is the third and most debatable question concerning security. 
The realist answer to this question is ‗the state‘. Hobbes might have an influence on the 
realists in this context. Hobbes, writing on the necessity of a Leviathan (a strong state), 
maintains that strong support from states is obviously needed in order to protect 
individual interests from the danger of anarchy that results from the general tendency of 
the individual‘s selfish interest. 11 
Hobbes‘ argument, however, does not seem to be strong enough because, when 
owing to economic adversity, some states are overrun through globalization and bad 
governance, the capability to provide protection has come into question. War-torn 
societies are the hot spots of state failure. One major concern here is the view that states 
themselves can be agents of human security violations. As Lloyd Axworthy puts it: 
                                                     
10 Gray, J. N., ‗John Stuart Mill: Traditional and Revisionist Interpretations‘ Literature of Liberty, 2.2(1979< 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/LtrLbrty/gryMTR1.html>) [accessed 20 January 2010] 
11 Hough, pp. 2-3.                                               
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The state has, at times, come to be a major threat to its population‘s rights and 
welfare -- or has been incapable of restraining the warlords or paramilitaries -- 
rather than serving as the protector of its people. 12  
 
Another major concern here is the fact that irrespective of political ideals and 
practices (whether democratic or non-democratic) states could function as agents of 
security threats. For example, as has been stated by Jain, there are abuses of human rights 
in China and Myanmar, both authoritarian states. The same situation prevails in 
democratic and advanced states as well. Examples include a law of Australia under which 
police may indiscriminately search premises and facilities run by Muslim communities. 
Police are also authorized to interrogate and deport organizations/individuals suspected 
of preaching violence.13 These issues are said to have pervasively influenced the 
broadening of the focus of security discourse beyond the level of the state and towards 
individuals. Also these issues have accelerated the advent of global organizations (in the 
context of global security) for rescuing that part of humanity who are at risk of severe 
security threats.  
Despite their disagreement on many other aspects, the Mack report and the 
Ogata-Sen report notably agree on the aptness of the United Nations as an appropriate 
(and incomparable) international institution for the protection of the security in question. 
Now the question is: Who and which agencies have the capacity and legitimacy to 
provide security from ‗want‘ and ‗fear‘? Is the UN a legitimate body and capable of 
providing security in this regard? If so, which, among the United Nations Organizations 
and its agencies or other international organizations (such as the World Bank and the 
IMF), or international NGOs, or other organizations (such as NATO, OSCE etc.), is the 
                                                     
12 Axworthy, L. ‗Human Security and Global Governance : Putting People First‘, Global Insight , 7 (2001), 
19-23 ( p. 19).  
13 Jain, p. 343. 
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best alternative to protect security (in its broad sense) in terms of legitimacy, capability 
and effect?  
The international organizations which have a clearer mandate than most to 
prevent conflicts, in order to guarantee security and peace, are ‗the UN and, within 
Europe, OSCE and NATO‘14. NATO (a military organization) and OSCE (the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), however, act more like regional 
bodies, which do not represent one hundred per cent of the nation states across the 
world, as does the UN. As regional organizations (or international in the more limited 
sense) NATO and OSCE:  
…may support global goals [of security]…but equally they may assert their 
collective interests against the interests of other countries of the world. 15 
 
Therefore, organizations such as NATO and OSCE cannot be treated as the legitimate 
actors to deal with global conflicts and security, though regional organizations, especially 
NATO, play a vital role in the present international security crisis, and have a 
considerable bearing on the present volatile global state of security, through employing 
strategic (military) solutions to all security challenges (in the traditional sense) irrespective 
of their nature, and, in turn, act more like a higher version of a mighty nation-state actor.  
International multilateral financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, also 
have a major influence on economic development and security across the world. Their 
roles, in any case, are not beyond criticism. For example, the financial prescriptions of 
the IMF at the time of the Asian economic crisis in the 1990s have been highly 
controversial.  
International NGOs are also concerned with global security issues and: 
                                                     
14 Smith, K. E., European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), p. 17.  
 
15 Dower, N., World Ethics: the New Agenda (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), p. 181.  
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Increasingly act as lobby groups and as providers of expert information and 
advice, not merely to individual governments but also at international 
conferences and in international institutions. 16 
The effectiveness and legitimacy of international NGOs as global security actors, 
however, have come under attack. Cecilia Albin, one of the critics, argues that:   
Despite the increased presence and activism of NGOs on the international 
stage, however, their participation in negotiating fora remains largely 
unofficial, ad hoc, or subjected to the preferences of national governments. A 
principled and cautious expansion of the opportunities for NGOs to 
participate in international negotiations could enhance the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of their outcomes. 17 
 
Criticizing the legitimacy and effectiveness of NGOs as global security actors, 
 
Mohamed Jawhar Hassan argues that: 
 
International NGO work driven by Western interests, values and world views   
sometimes do[sic] not jive with the more pressing and relevant needs of 
developing societies, e.g. emphasis on democracy and civil and political rights 
over stability, poverty eradication and good governance. 18 
 
 As can be observed here, Albin and Hassan plausibly claim that international 
NGOs, through being more unofficial in negotiating global security issues, and 
sometimes being more focused on world issues (such as democracy and civil and political 
rights), and also sometimes being less focused on the relevant needs of developing 
societies (e.g. poverty eradication and good governance), thus fail to emerge as effective 
and legitimate actors so as to tackle global security issues.  
                                                     
16 Ibid., p. 184. 
17 Albin, C., ‗Can NGOs Enhance Effectiveness of International Negotiation?‘, International Negotiation, 
4.3(1999), 371–387 (p. 371). 
18 Hassan, M. J.,  Role of Non-state Actors in International Security and on Humanitarian Issues in Conflict Areas 
(Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (IDFR) and the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC), 2008) <http://www.isis.org.my/attachments/397_MJH_RoleOfNon-
StateActors.pdf.> [accessed 6 March 2010]. 
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The UN, compared to other organizations mentioned above, can arguably be 
ranked as a global organization, in the true sense: 
  … whose stated aims are to facilitate cooperation in international law, 
international security, economic development, social progress and human 
rights issues.19               
As the representative of the nation states (nearly all independent states throughout the 
world), the UN assumes the legitimacy of action to deal with international security issues. 
As Nigel Dower traces it:  
The United Nations was set up at the end of the Second World War [in 
1945]. Its primary purpose was to provide a realistic framework for 
maintaining international security.20 
 
The rationale of the UN for managing human security and/or global security concerns is 
in any case at least implicit in the analysis of the two following issues: (1) the meaning of  
the concept of human security, and (2) the membership policy of the UN (open to all 
nation states subject to the fulfillment of its requirements).  
As has been mentioned earlier, threats to security are not only ‗military‘ in nature 
(where solutions depend on the use of force). The human security view implies that 
threats to security can come from other areas as well, such as hunger, poverty, disease 
and natural disaster, human rights abuse, civil war and ethnic conflicts etc. Furthermore, 
the security threats that come from these sources cannot be faced by using military force, 
for there is no military solution to such insecurities. On several occasions, I have also 
mentioned and defended the view that in addition to human beings, nonhuman life and 
human life support systems (ecosystems) are also vital issues in current security debates. 
                                                     
19 XTimeline, United Nations: Its History and Milestones (XTimeline.com, 2008).                                                     
< http://www.xtimeline.com/timeline/United-Nations--Its-History-and-Milestones >[accessed 11 
February 2010]. 
 
20 Dower, p. 116.  
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For a loss of any species or any disorder in natural systems causes damage to all life 
forms including humans.              
These wide ranging security elements are also included in the subject matter of 
state sovereignty. Being global in nature they are a subject matter of inter-state policy 
initiatives, and therefore require global initiatives (legitimate and effective) in order to 
protect the biosphere, the only habitat of all lives on earth. Hence, security can be 
assumed, in its broad sense, to be addressed and achieved by a global international 
organization through balancing all the instruments of foreign policies of nation states and 
fostering the well-being of lives on earth, based on common policies, inter-state 
cooperation and agreements. The United Nations Organization, in this connection, is 
intended to be the exclusive legitimate actor, which can arguably address all aspects of 
diversified human security challenges, with a view to protecting human and other lives 
from all security threats all over the world.   
The Brundtland Report of 1987, entitled Our Common Future, ascribes great 
importance to this matter, and a relevant passage reads as follows: 
National boundaries have become so porous that traditional distinctions 
between local, national, and international issues have become blurred. 
Policies formerly considered to be exclusively matters of ‗national concern‘ 
now have an impact on the ecological basis of other nations‘ development 
and survival. Conversely the growing reach of some nations‘ policies-- 
economic trade, monetary, and most sectoral policies –into the ‗sovereign‘ 
territory of other nations limits the affected nations‘ options in devising 
national solutions to their own problems. This fast-changing context for 
national action has introduced new imperatives and new opportunities for 
international cooperation. 21 
 
The Brundtland Report in this passage expressively divulges the necessity of increasing 
cooperation among the nation states in order to support secure and peaceful continued 
                                                     
21 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), p. 312. 
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human existence throughout the world, for separate policies and institutions can no 
longer cope with the changing inter-state security issues in question.  
The report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, 
particularly its definition of sustainable development, also provides persuasive support 
for the UN‘s justifiability as a security actor. As I discussed and revised in Chapter Three 
in Part One, the Brundtland definition of sustainable development is grounded on socio-
economic and environmental (notably non-anthropocentric) value concerns. Given this, 
the UN seems to hold a wider view concerning the value of the environment, which in 
turn seems to be supportive of issues of human security.  
Two other conventions, which were agreed in Rio in 1992, and which arguably 
further justify the role of the UN as equally legitimate and crucial, are the United Nations 
‗Convention on Biodiversity‘ and the ‗Framework Convention on Climate Change‘. The 
agreement embodying the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) was adopted for the 
preservation of biodiversity all over the world, whilst another key agreement, the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), was adopted for the 
stabilization of greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere.  
Current environmental challenges and humans‘ diversified security concerns 
justify the urgency and aptness of the agreements of the UNFCCC and the CBD. The 
need for those agreements has been reaffirmed in the United Nations‘ Copenhagen 
Climate Change Conference 2009 by participant countries signing the ‗Copenhagen 
Accord‘ (although some people believe that by signing the Accord, poor and affected 
countries ‗risk displacing the legitimate negotiation process taking place under the 
auspices of the UN‘22), and in the United Nations‘ 2002 Strategic Plan for the 
                                                     
22 Friends of the Earth International, UN Climate Conference Closes without Adopting 'Copenhagen Accord’ 
(Amsterdam: Friends of the Earth International, 2009) <http://www.foe.org/un-climate-conference-
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Convention on Biological Diversity (a strategic plan was adopted in an attempt to stop 
the loss of biodiversity and to secure the continuity of benefits that it provides through 
conservation and sustainable use of its elements, particularly genetic resources and a fair 
and equitable share of the benefits resulting therefrom). 23 Some scholars, however, argue 
that the result of implementation of the UNFCCC under the rules adopted in the Kyoto 
Protocol is incompatible with the objectives of CBD, because they involve threats to the 
lives of many other species. 24  
The other factor that vindicates the UN as the most distinctive international 
organization in protecting world humanity from security threats is its membership policy. 
As the UN charter outlines it: 
Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states [sc. other 
than the five permanent members of the Security Council] which accept the 
obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the 
Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations. 25 
                                                                                                                                                        
closes-without-adopting-copenhagen-accord >[accessed 3 February 2010]. Full text of the ‗Copenhagen 
Accord‘ can be accessed at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/21/copenhagen-accord-
climate-change. 
23 Convention on Biological Diversity, The Strategic Plan for the Convention on Biological Diversity 2011-2020, 
Including Aichi Biodiversity Targets (Brasilia: UNEP, 2012)< http://www.cbd.int/sp/  > [accessed 5 May 
2012].  
24 For instance, Fréderic Jacquemont and Alejandro Caparros argue that cooperative impact of UNFCCC 
and the CBD appears to be complementary although in effect they are not. This conflicting situation arises 
particularly whilst agreements to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are 
implemented in accordance with the policy guidelines set by the Kyoto Protocol. It is because, as regards 
forestry, the Kyoto Protocol promotes the use of forests as sinks in order to reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions to 5% below 1990 levels. According to Fréderic Jacquemont and Alejandro Caparros, 
co-operative efforts (which have recently begun) between the UNFCCC and the CBD are in place in order 
to attain the specified target of GHG reduction, but co-operative efforts tend to convert an old forest into 
a single species forest, which have potential negative impacts on biological diversity. For Fréderic 
Jacquemont and Alejandro Caparros, an integrated harmonized ecosystem approach is needed that makes a 
balance between harmonized and coordinated biodiversity concerns and GHG mitigation.  For details see 
Jacquemont F., and Caparrós, A., ‗The Convention on Biological Diversity and the Climate Change 
Convention 10 Years After Rio: Towards a Synergy of the Two Regimes?‘, Review of European Community & 
International Environmental Law (RECIEL), 11.2 (2002), 169-180. This article is also available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9388.00315 
25 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Chapter 2, Article 4. 
<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/Kutuphane/MultilateralConventions/CharteroftheUnitedNations.pdf> 
[accessed 5 May 2012].     
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In terms of the number of member states, the UN is the largest international 
organization: 
With the addition of Montenegro on 28 June 2006, there are 192 United 
Nations member states, including virtually all internationally-recognized 
independent states. 26 
The large membership of the UN, undoubtedly, proves its role to be truly global.  
But a question arises here: has the UN been successful in achieving its professed 
goal? Indeed, the achievement of the UN is mixed. Not all its aims have been fully 
realized. It has had both success and failure in world security issues. Remarkable 
successes following the end of the Cold War include:  
 a 40% drop in violent conflict[ since the early 1990s];   
 an 80% drop in the most deadly conflicts [since roughly the 
middle of the 1990s] and                                                                                           
an 80% drop in genocide and politicide [between 1998 and 
2001]. 27 
On the other hand, some notable failures of the UN in security issues include: 
 Failure to prevent the 1994 Rwandan genocide, which resulted in the   
killings of nearly a million people, due to the refusal of Security Council 
members to approve any military action. 
 Failure by MONUC (UNSC Resolution 1291) to effectively intervene 
during the Second Congo War, which claimed nearly five million people in 
the Democratic Congo (DRC), 1998-2002, and in carrying out and 
distributing humanitarian aid there.                                                                                              
 Failure to intervene in the 1995 Srebrenica massacre: despite the fact 
that the UN designated Srebrenica a ‗safe haven‘ for refugees and assigned 
600 Dutch peacekeepers to protect it, the peacekeeping force was not 
authorised to use force.  
                                                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                                                                       
26 Ibid.                                                                                                                                                        
27 Human Security Centre, Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), p. 3. This report is available at 
<http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=rSIrNeFWIfcC&lpg=PR1&pg=PR1#v=onepage&q=&f=>[acces
sed 3 February 2010]. 
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 Failure to successfully deliver food to starving people in Somalia; the 
food was instead usually seized by local warlords. A US/UN attempt to 
apprehend the warlords seizing these shipments resulted in the 1993 Battle of 
Mogadishu. 
 Failure to implement the provisions of UN Security Council 
Resolutions 1559 and 1701 calling for disarmament of Lebanese paramilitary 
groups such as Fatah and Hezbollah.  
 Allegations of sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers during UN 
peacekeeping missions in Congo, Haiti, Liberia and Sudan.28                                                                      
These failures of the UN have been mainly in human rights and security issues and are 
generally ascribed to these failures coming from the UN's intergovernmental nature. As 
an association of 192 member states, it is, in fact, under an obligation to reach consensual 
decisions. It is a global international organization, but not an independent organization. 
Even when it reaches a decision, mandated by the 15-member Security Council, the 
Secretariat does not provide necessary resources to implement the decision. Inability of 
the Security Council to act in a clear and decisive way in a crisis and the veto power of 
permanent members (USA, UK, Russia, France and China) of the Security Council could 
also be listed as a reason for this failure. 
Despite failures in some cases, the UN has some commendable success in 
various issues and still remains the last resort for humanity in protecting themselves from 
global security threats in a peaceful manner. The UN Charter envisages such a policy, 
which represents peaceful measures (developing UN Peacekeeping forces) to be the best 
device for maintaining international peace and security in a cost effective manner. 
According to the US Government Accountability Office: 
The UN Peacekeeping is eight times less expensive than funding a US 
force.29 
                                                     
28 Ibid. [accessed 4 February 2010].                                                                                                                                                       
29 Shapiro, A. J., The Global Peace Operations Initiative (Washington, DC, The U.S. Institute of Peace, 2012)                    
<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/184845.htm>[accessed 10 July 2012].                                                     
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The main motto of the UN is ‗win-win interventions‘ in which the intervention is 
based on co-operation and consent. The underlying aim of peace-keeping suggests that 
war is always a failure. Hence the UN being committed to peace and an enemy to war is 
at least a road to hope if not fully a success. Being the last resort, our present and future 
security depends on the UN‘s necessary initiatives and its continuation, for there is no 
legitimate alternative available to human beings other than the UN in initiating     
necessary global policies for ensuring humanity‘s present security and its continuation 
into the future.  
As can be observed, the crucial message of the human security view is a call for a 
major shift in governments‘ and individuals‘ traditional attitudes towards the issues of 
development and environment,  for these are the issues that address essential aspects of 
the security issues mentioned earlier under the two heads: security from ‗want‘ and ‗fear‘. 
The 1994 UNDP report explicitly recognizes the interdependence of security and 
development as the two major components of human life and dignity. This is even more 
apparent in the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan‘s speech in 2005:  
We will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security 
without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for 
human rights. Unless all these causes are advanced, none will 
succeed.30         
The relationship between security and development has a certain implication for 
their satisfactory conceptualization. This relation provides the grounds for seeing 
‗security‘ as ‗human security‘ and ‗development‘ as ‗sustainable development‘. Human 
security offers much to the field of sustainable development. Most importantly human 
security underlines the ‗three pillars‘ of sustainable development: economic sustainability, 
social sustainability and environmental sustainability.  The urgency of the elimination of 
                                                     
30 Annan, K., Introduction: A Historic Opportunity in 2005 (United Nations, 2005). 
<http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/chap1.htm#> (accessed 1 February 2010].  
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intra-generational poverty and deprivation over the short term (in addition to long term 
measures for eliminating inter-generational poverty) is a major reminder from human 
security to the proponents of sustainable development. Thus human security, for some, 
can be re-expressed as a comprehensive concept of ‗sustainable security‘, which parallels 
the vibrant field of sustainable development. In this context Khagram, Clark and Raad 
write:  
This more expanded field facilitates critical integrations of state, human and 
environment security, and parallels the three linked pillars of society, 
economy and nature central to the field of sustainable development.31    
 
In practice there is hardly any genuine reflection of this new understanding about 
human security and sustainable development. Although interrelated and interdependent, 
they are often considered as distinct concepts – development as a ‗soft‘ issue and security 
as a ‗hard‘ issue.32 And this shows how deeply the traditional conception of security is 
favoured by state governments, and also by the majority of academia. As can be 
observed, my analysis suggests that a satisfactory response to security threats, particularly 
ones that stem from ‗want‘ and ‗fear‘, must involve both individuals and the state as the 
referents for security, and the human security view is arguably said to have developed as 
an enterprise directed to that end.   
Recognizing the human security view as a building block of human survival, the 
Commission on Human Security Report 2003 maintains that: 
Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms—freedoms that are 
the essences of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and 
pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that 
build on people‘s strengths and appreciations. It means creating political, 
                                                     
31Khagram, S., Clark W. C., and Raad, D. F., ‗From the Environment and Human Security to Sustainable 
Development‘, Journal of Human Development, 4.2 (2003), 289-313 (p. 290).                                                                    
  
32 Svensson, K., ‗Human Security as Inclusive Security--Gender, Epistemology and Equality‘, African 
Security Review, 6. 2(2007), 2-13 (p. 5).                                                                                                                
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social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together 
give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.33 
 
The UN, by virtue of its position, is in the role of the key actor, undertaking 
security through reducing root causes by implementing effective measures. As it is a 
global international organization, not a world government, it therefore is not in a position 
to enforce necessary measures on nation states all over the world like those that a state 
government implements on its citizens. Nevertheless, making use of its position, it 
endeavours to guarantee the security (in the wider sense of the concept) of world 
humanity to a considerable extent, through planning, declaring and implementing 
initiatives to the best of its capacity. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are 
one of the major attempts of the UN to that end. All 192 United Nations member states 
have agreed to try to achieve these Goals by the year 2015. The declaration (signed in 
September 2000) commits the states to: 
1. halve extreme poverty and hunger;  
2. achieve universal primary education;  
3. promote gender equality and empower women;  
4. reduce child mortality;  
5. improve maternal health;  
6. combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases;  
7. ensure environmental sustainability; and  
8. develop a global partnership for development. 34 
Upon closer analysis the MDGs appear to be a practical initiative in addressing a range of 
diseases, promoting education, health and gender equality, and facilitating development 
and environmental sustainability.    
                                                     
33 Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now (New York:  Commission on Human Security 
2003), p. 4. 
 
34  United Nations Development Programme, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Available at:  
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ [accessed 2 February, 2010). 
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As the Borgen Project estimates, $40 to 60 billion each year is needed to achieve 
all eight goals.35 It seems that the success of the elimination of the root causes of human 
security threats all over the world, particularly those that come from ‗want‘ and ‗fear‘, is 
largely related to the success of the UN‘s initiatives, namely the current MDGs, since the 
UN is the only actor working for this. Now the question is whether it will be able to 
reach its goals by the stipulated time. This attempt has been considerably successful. The 
progress towards the MDGs has been jeopardized largely by the 2008 economic 
downturn, particularly owing to diminishing resources, fewer trade opportunities and 
sluggish aid assistance to the developing world. Despite this barrier the story of 
achievements of the MDGs is not all bleak. According to the MDGs Report 2009: 
•Those living in extreme poverty in the developing regions accounted for 
slightly more than a quarter of the developing world‘s population in 2005, 
compared to almost half in 1990. 
•Major accomplishments were also made in education. In the developing 
world as a whole, enrolment in primary education reached 88 per cent in 
2007, up from 83 per cent in 2000. And most of the progress was in regions 
lagging the furthest behind. In sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia, 
enrolment increased by 15 percentage points and 11 percentage points, 
respectively, from 2000 to 2007. 
•Deaths of children under five declined steadily worldwide - to around 9 
million in 2007, down from 12.6 million in 1990, despite population growth. 
Although child mortality rates remain highest in sub-Saharan Africa, recent 
survey data show remarkable improvements in key interventions that could 
yield major breakthroughs for children in that region in the years ahead. 
Among these interventions is the distribution of insecticide-treated bed nets 
to reduce the toll of malaria - a major killer of children. As a result of ‗second 
chance‘ immunizations, dramatic progress is also being made in the fight 
against measles. 
•At the global level, the world came together to achieve a 97 per cent 
reduction in the consumption of substances that deplete the Earth‘s 
                                                     
35
  The Borgen Project, UN Millennium Development Goals (Dutch Harbor , Alaska: The Borgen Project, 
2003)<http://borgenproject.org/un-millennium-development-goals/>[accessed 3 February 2010] 
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protective ozone layer, setting a new precedent for international 
cooperation.36 
 
This gives an account of successes that are realized towards some selected  
targets. Achievements towards some other targets of the MDGs are not mentioned here, 
suggesting that accomplishments on those targets are significantly low, and thus 
accelerated progress is needed in those areas. These successes, however, show that the 
goals are within reach at the global level, and even in much marginalized places. Thus the 
MDGs focus on our efforts and its vision of a world ‗without overwhelming human 
security threats‘ is not a nonoperational ideal standard, but an essential and viable project, 
which as such merits recognition. Humans‘ rights to freedom from security threats 
(especially from ‗want‘ and ‗fear‘) ground their moral rights, which in turn provide 
persuasive support for the human security view (the wider conception of security) and 
the justification for the UN as the legitimate and effective security actor at the global 
level.   
Various local and regional initiatives and activities, however, can be of significant 
support to the UN in reaching its MDGs and other urgent pro-poor policy initiatives. 
Initiatives at national and regional level are needed where the nature and scope of 
security threats and their remedies are local and/or regional in nature. Thus, these 
security threats cannot be addressed without state government and regional bodies‘ active 
initiatives and participation. For example, a local and/or regional security issue may well 
involve a range of local security actors and systems, namely nation states‘ defence, police, 
justice, parliamentary and public security oversight, transparency in defence budgets, and 
                                                     
36 United Nations, The Millennium Development Goals Report 2009 (New York: United Nations, 2009) 
<http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/MDG_Report_2009_ENG.pdf > [accessed 2 February 2010]. 
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respect for human rights in the exercise of their functions.37 A range of academics, think 
tanks, and representatives of international organizations, governments, advocacy groups 
and NGOs are found to have agreed upon this issue. They have converged to reflect on 
the role of security forces and suggested that a people-centred human security 
perspective is needed which: 
links between the security system and society-at-large, focusing on threats to 
individuals‘ socio-economic and political conditions, and on communal and 
personal safety.38  
 
This new move suggests a comprehensive and coordinated approach to various  
sectors of security systems and also envisages both human security and security of states 
as a matter of important concern. In view of that goal, Security Sector Reform (SSR) has 
emerged for protecting security in a comprehensive and coordinated manner. The  
purpose of SSR includes:  
 enforcing both state and human security 
 improving armed and security forces‘ efficiency by reforming 
their professionalism and ethics 
 promoting democratic  governance of the security sector, by 
supporting the institutions responsible for supervising security 
institutions (including parliaments, independent institutions such 
as  ombudsmen, the media, auditors and civil society) 
 developing  holistic, comprehensive approaches to SSR by 
coordinating  reforms at national  and international levels 
 encouraging partner country ownership39 
 
SSR appears here to involve a reconciliation between the traditional states-centred 
approach and the human security approach. The UK has played a crucial role in 
formalizing the concept of SSR, and this was also endorsed by the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) in 1997.  
                                                     
37 Bagayoko-Penone, N., ‗Promoting Peace and Democracy through Security Sector Reform‘, Insight, 
79(2009), 1-3 (p. 1).  
38 Ibid.                                                                                                                                                               
39 Kraft, H. J. S., ‗Democratisation and Reform in South-East Asia‘, Insight, 79(2009), p. 8. 
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SSR has however been criticized as a non-operational concept, an ideal standard. 
The financial cost of reform, lack of donor coordination and coherence (with the view to 
reducing conflict, SSR involves donor agencies in governance), difficulties in evaluating 
SSR, and lack of capacities and expertise are considered as the potential challenges for 
the relevant states, and these are some of the main limitations of this proposed 
governance. Nevertheless, some proponents of SSR believe that SSR governance can 
bring about a significant change where commitment to democracy and human rights has 
become a regional aspiration. 40 
The prospects of this proposal, as I believe, depend on how nation states will line 
up their domestic political conditions with the democratization anticipated at national 
and regional level. Seemingly it is not an easy task because a state government 
(presumably a corrupt or a weak one) can sever their link with the regional body setting 
‗state sovereignty‘ as an excuse. Contrariwise a powerful state government can spoil the 
underpinning purpose of the proposed regional governance through prioritizing its own 
interest, ignoring the mutual interest of humankind as a whole. Thus the prospect of SSR 
depends on the viability of introducing governance at regional level. This, however, 
needs separate study on the problems and prospects of governance, particularly regional 
and global governance, but there is no scope here to discuss this further.  
                                                     
40 Ibid. 
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Chapter Three 
 
3.3 Environmental Impacts of Development Activities: A Human Security 
Dimension 
 
Human beings depend on nature and its systems for food, clothing, shelter, water supply, 
the air they breathe and so forth. Many of the effects of humans‘ environmental 
interventions undertaken for their survival are unintended although they have multiple 
impacts. The level of impact started mounting soon after humans began seeking comfort, 
rather than being satisfied with the sheer realisation of their survival needs.  
Analysing evidence from a range of discourses on human history, evolutionary 
biologist Jared Diamond in his award-winning science book, Gun, Germs, and Steel: The 
Fates of Human Societies, argues that the gaps between the scope of human environmental 
interventions and the economic outcomes of such interventions were not identical in all 
societies. For him, history‘s widest disparities (particularly inequalities in power and 
technology between human societies) originated in environmental and geographical 
differences (such as the most productive crops and domesticable animals), and such 
inequalities do not reflect cultural, racial or genetic differences. To exemplify this, he 
refers to Eurasian societies, which, being placed in a geographical situation with a good 
climate and landmass as well as plenty of domesticable animals, achieved an early head 
start in developing various skills and strategies, such as writing, technology, government, 
weapons of war, and immunity to deadly germs, and established dominance over other 
continents.1  
                                                     
1 Diamond, J., Guns, Germs, and Steel: the Fates of Human Societies (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 
1999), pp. 1-13        
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In light of Diamond‘s view, Eurasian societies (or civilisations), as opposed to the 
societies on other continents like America and Australia, have therefore a greater 
responsibility for environmental changes and/or damage for a certain period of time 
(during the period between the Ice Age and the pre-colonial period). Diamond‘s view 
appears to have dismantled ethnically-based theories of human history, but some 
scholars condemn his view as dogmatic as well as inadequate, and argue that, like 
environmental and geographical differences, genetic diversity helps explain economic 
outcomes.2 
Irrespective of environmental or genetic differences, the process of human 
environmental interventions has reached a tragic stage, when reliance on a thrust towards 
science and technology has become the common belief of humans, and everyone appears 
to be convinced and contented with new technological inventions, of which many are 
now often envisaged as the main causes of the current environmental degradation, 
ecological problems and human insecurity. 
The level of human environmental interventions and their impacts, however, has 
not been the same at all times in every society. One of the main reasons is that progress 
in science and technology has been far from uniform. Under-developed or developing 
countries are far behind the developed countries in this regard, and hence their 
contribution to environmental pollution compared to the developed countries is lesser. 
Developed countries, having been well equipped with scientific equipment and devices, 
have greatly polluted the environment. For instance, the rate of the emission of carbon 
                                                     
2 For more see Ashraf, Q., and Galor, O., ‗Human Genetic Diversity and Comparative Economic 
Development‘, Series Working Papers 2008 
<http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2008/2008-3_paper.pdf> [accessed  3 
August 2010]                                                                                                       
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equivalent gases by developed countries is many times more than that of the 
underdeveloped countries. According to statistics,  
the per capita green house gas emission by developed countries is six times 
the world average emissions…USA alone emits 20% of the entire global 
emission.3  
 
Just to refer to the gap in emissions at an individual level, 
per capita carbon emission of a Bangladeshi is just 0.3MT compared to 20MT 
emission by a USA citizen. 4 
 
The above documentation implies that the rich are largely culpable for the 
climate change that is due to global warming, and also culpable for human security 
threats resulting therefrom. Ironically, the poor suffer more due to climate change, but 
are hardly culpable for that. Indeed, being exposed to the adverse effects of climate 
change, the poor (particularly in the underdeveloped countries) suffer more. The most 
distressing phenomenon humans experience due to climate change is extreme weather 
events, such as floods, droughts, heat waves, tropical storms and the gradual rise in 
average temperatures and sea levels. As New Internationalist reports on the effects of global 
warming in Bangladesh: 
By 2050, a 30-centimetre sea-level rise may displace 10 per cent of the country 
(currently the equivalent of the population of the Netherlands). A one-metre 
rise will submerge up to a fifth of the country – permanently. 5 
 
                                                     
3 Khan. M. R., ‗Environment‘, Banglapedia: National Encyclopaedia of Bangladesh, 2006 
<http://www.banglapedia.org/> [accessed 3 August 2010] 
4 Chowdhury, J. A., Essays on Environment (Dhaka: Botomul, 2007), p.73                           
                                                                                                                                                                               
5  Healy, H., ‗Adaptable by Nature‘, New Internationalist, 451(2012), 23-30 (p.18).  
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Climate change thus has a vital security implication for the bulk of the population, 
particularly for the people who live in and around the coastal areas of underdeveloped or 
developing countries, and particularly for the Small Islands Developing States (SIDS).  
This does not, however, mean that the poor do not make any contribution to the 
degradation of the environment, and also it does not imply that environmental problems 
begin only after a country has become rich; but rather the truth is that scientifically 
uninformed, technologically unequipped and poverty-stricken poor people of the 
underdeveloped countries also pollute the environment through unskilled utilisation of 
biomass as a source of energy. For example, due to the unavailability of energy 
(particularly gas) in the underdeveloped countries (in the countryside, suburbs and some 
parts of the cities, especially where poor people live), the poor have to depend on 
biomass sources as sources of energy (such as, in South Asian countries, rice straws, 
husks, dung, twigs, leaves, bags, jute sticks, fuel wood and so on). The open air burning 
of such biomass releases various carbon equivalent gases in the atmosphere, such as 
Carbon Dioxide (CO2), Methane (CH4), Nitrous Oxide (N2O) and Nitrogen Oxide 
(NOx), and pollutes the environment. The unreflective use of biomass is not reducing at 
all, due to there being no progress in the rural energy supply situation, plus due to there 
being an unchanging state of stark poverty in the poor communities. Furthermore, the 
rate of the combustion of biomass is rather increasing steadily in line with the growth of 
population in such communities.  
The poor and the rural people can and should not, however, be blamed in the 
first place for using biomass, as they have no other choice, and secondly they can and 
should also not be blamed for the unmitigated use of biomass unless they are supplied 
with an environmentally more friendly and economically affordable source of energy. 
This suggests that the poor act willy-nilly to confront the environmental (ecological) 
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limits (carrying capacity) and thresholds of nature, and both the rich and the poor make 
contributions to the current imperilled condition of the environment, even though in 
many cases for contrasting reasons: for instance while the poverty-stricken, scientifically 
uninformed poor people pollute the environment through unmodified use of biomass 
(owing  to the unavailability of an alternative energy supply) for the sake of survival, the 
rich pollute the environment through misuse and/or overuse of energy with a view to 
increasing their lavish standard of living. 
This chapter will now concentrate on major sectors and forms of human 
development activities. Human development activities are diverse, and hence impose 
multiple impacts on the environment. There is no universally accepted list of sectors and 
forms of human development activities that affect the environment. Nevertheless, a 
widely agreed list of sectors and forms of development activities is not impossible to 
produce.  The following is a list of some such major sectors and forms of human 
development activities that affect the environment greatly 6:  
 Energy—development, distribution, processing, management, and/or 
consumption/use (oil, gas, nuclear, other)  
 Natural resources—development, management, and/or harvesting, use 
(e.g., fisheries, aquaculture, forestry, hunting/trapping, mining)  
 Agriculture/food production—land cultivation, animal husbandry, food 
processing (waste handling, treatment, and disposal)  
 Physical infrastructure—creation or use of infrastructure, such as roads, 
housing, bridges, ports, storage facilities, railways, sewage, or waterworks  
 Transportation—road, marine, rail or air transportation, and all related 
activities and infrastructure  
 Toxic/hazardous substances and materials—generation/manufacture, 
use, management, regulation, transportation, or disposal (e.g., toxics and 
pesticides)  
 New substances and organisms—development, deployment, and 
regulation (e.g., new chemicals, genetically modified organisms)  
 New products and technologies—development and deployment  
 Industrial activity—e.g., resource processing and manufacturing  
                                                     
6 Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Appendix 1—Human Activities and their Potential Impact on the 
Environment, (Ontario: Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2007) 
<http://www.oagbvg.gc.ca/internet/English/meth_gde_e_19283.html >[accessed 14 July 2010] 
 
169 | P a g e  
 
 Urban development (e.g., conversion of wetland into human habitat, 
destruction of bio-diversity through physical infrastructure and related 
activities)   
 Military activities—training, equipment, materials, natural disasters and 
other emergencies (e.g., preparation and response)  
 Waste generation or management (including hazardous waste)  
 Movement of goods and services (local, regional, national, international)  
 International trade (export and import)  
 Occupational/workplace hazards  
 Cleanup/rehabilitation of contaminated sites  
 Procurement and consumption of goods.  
 
 
Although this is not a complete list, it supplies a number of instances that attest human 
intervention with the environment is wide-ranging. Also, it is apparent from the list that 
involvement or intervention with the environment on the part of scientifically informed 
and technologically advanced people is far greater than that of people who are 
scientifically uninformed and technologically backward, which in actual fact means that 
the interactions of the rich (or developed countries) with the environment are far wider 
than that of the poor (or again underdeveloped or developing countries). According to 
documentation: 
Developed countries, which have 20 per cent of the world population, use up 
80 per cent of the world resources…The gap between rich and poor 
countries was widening annually [that is, during the 1980s and 1990s]. 7 
 
A separate list for the environmental impact of development activities is now 
required. Human development activities have a range of impact on the environment, but 
much variance is found in scholars‘ assumptions about what makes impact of 
development activities problematic. While many consider the impact on local people for 
the near future as important (anthropocentrists), others take into consideration impact on 
                                                     
7 Khor,  M., ‗ Some Principles for an Alternative Lifestyle and Development‘, in Environmental Crisis in Asia-
Pacific : Declaration and Resolutions of the SAM Seminar on Problems of Development, Environment, and the Natural 
Resource Crisis in Asia-Pacific 1983, ed. by Alam, S.,  (Penang, Malaysia: SAM, 1984), p.56. 
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the whole of humanity and on other species for the distant future (biocentrists). In 
addition, there is an alternative stance (ecocentrism) that allows for not only present and 
future humans and other species but also the planetary natural systems themselves. The 
size and extent of the list now depend on which stance we are going to adopt. If we were 
to agree to the latter stance, making a comprehensive list of the environmental impacts 
of human development activities would be quite a cumbersome task, if not impossible. 
Present purposes do not require such a list. We can therefore go on to supply a list that 
may well not be comprehensive but may be considered a widely agreed list of some 
major environmental impacts on the major components of Earth (such as water, air, 
coastal or marine areas and land)8: 
[Some impacts on water:]  
 reduction in quality of habitat for fish and other aquatic organisms; 
increased runoff and erosion;  
 depletion of fish populations;  
 impairment of water quality (pollutants, pathogens, bacteria, nutrients);  
 need for increased water treatment;  
 increased algal growth/blooms; 
 decreased biodiversity; and  
 encroachment of exotic, invasive species (e.g., zebra mussels).      
[Some impacts on groundwater:]                          
 reduced groundwater quality (e.g., pollutants/toxins, hydrocarbons 
pathogens, bacteria;  
 impairment of drinking water quality;  
 need for increased water treatment;  
 reduced groundwater quantity;  
 surface water effects (quality and quantity); and 
 explosions (from petroleum products, fuels).  
[Some potential impacts on air:] 
 release of carbon dioxide  and other greenhouse gases (contributing to 
global warming); 
 depletion of the ozone layer; 
 impairment of air quality; 
 smog (including particulates, ground-level ozone); 
                                                     
8 Ibid, pp.56-57                                                                                                                                                                      
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 effects on human and wild life health (e.g., upper respiratory problems 
and higher rates of hospitalization); 
 acidification of lakes and rivers (acid rain); and 
 deposition of air pollutants on land and surface water body;  
 
[Some impacts on coastal/marine areas] 
 alteration/degradation of quality of fish and other marine habitat;  
 depletion of fish populations;  
 increased disease and pathogens affecting fish;  
 impairment of water quality—e.g., pollutants (including petroleum 
products), pathogens, bacteria, nutrients;  
 exotic, invasive species;  
 socio-economic effects; and 
 reduction of tourism activity.  
[Some impacts on land:] 
 depletion of renewable and non-renewable resources;  
 soil and groundwater contamination;  
 erosion/desertification;  
 reduction/removal of wildlife habitat;  
 removal/reduction of wetlands;  
 reduction in biodiversity (soil organisms, plants, wildlife);  
 increased surface water runoff/storm water runoff;  
 mining waste (tailings); and  
 opening of remote areas.  
 
The impacts in the list above can be classified into local and global environmental 
problems. Examples of local environmental problems (from the list above) involve all 
types of pollution from a local industry including smog and litter, impairment of drinking 
water quality, reduced ground water quality and loss of a rare species from a locality.  On 
the other hand, global environmental problems comprise two types of problems: 
systemic or repetitive.9Global problems of the systemic kind involve global warming 
(which is at least partly due to releases of CO2 and greenhouse gases, and which causes 
floods, drought, wildfires and so on), depletion of the ozone layer, and desertification 
including all sorts of impairment of the quality of air and water. These are global 
                                                     
9 For details, see Attfield, Environmental Ethics: An Overview for the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2003), pp. 5-6.                                                                                                                                                                          
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problems since they are determined by the ecological systems of the planet. On the other 
hand, deforestation, reduction in bio-diversity, and reduction or removal of wetland can 
be labelled global environmental problems of the repetitive kind, productive in different 
localities by parallel sets of local causes. These problems are global in the sense that they 
occur worldwide and have impacts on global economic and financial systems.10 Although 
this appears to be a long list, it is actually incomplete, since there are many other 
environmental impacts of human development activities (such as wildfires, oil slicks and 
radioactive strontium) that have not been included. This is also incomplete in the sense 
that some impacts may well have gone unnoticed through our ignorance.11 
Nevertheless, the above list is adequate enough to clarify and justify the assertion 
that environmental impacts of development activities are widespread and alarming. It 
reinforces the idea that the more humans advance in science and technology with a view 
to improving their quality of life and comfort, the more they have made themselves 
insecure. Most significantly, the above mentioned impact list justifies the assertion that 
the current and the potential environmental degradation, ecological problems and human 
security threats are all anthropogenic, and deeply motivated by human self-interest, 
suggesting such  challenges are to be seen as social and moral issues, not merely scientific 
ones. Thus addressing an environmental problem without recognising its moral and 
social aspects is inadequate, if not entirely futile, and presumably here lies the secret of 
the failure and or ineptness of many existing discussions and discourses on the 
environment. 
                                                     
10 See Brown, L. R.,  ‗Challenges of the New Century‘ in State of the World 2000, ed. by Starke, L., (New 
York and London: W W Norton & Company , 2000), pp. 3-26                                                                                                                     
11   For example, toxic effects of asbestos on healthy air and of lead pipes on drinking water went 
unremarked for many years and centuries (from Roman times) respectively. 
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 John Passmore‘s understanding of the concept of ‗ecological problems‘ seems 
supportive of the above-mentioned interpretation. By ‗ecological‘ he means a problem 
that arises as a practical consequence of human dealings with nature; and ‗problem‘ 
means an issue that involves cost which we are unable to live with and can cure or 
alleviate.12 Passmore‘s view entails that ‗ecological problems‘ are always amenable to 
human action, and hence frequently anthropogenic. This attests the view  that ‗ecological 
problems‘ are not merely issues suited to a scientific or technical fix. 
 Although scholars share a common belief that the current environmental 
problems and human security threats are anthropogenic, they are found to maintain 
diverse views about the specific origin of such problems.  There are as many as eight 
seemingly opposing views about the origin of such problems. They are: (1) the 
population theory, (2) the affluence theory, (3) the economic activity and growth theory, 
(4) the technology theory, (5) the capitalism theory, (6) the absence of markets theory, (7) 
the patriarchy theory, and (8) the religion theory.13 It is worth noting here that although 
every alternative view undeniably addresses some important aspects of the origin of 
ecological problems, none can address the case in point comprehensively. It means that 
such problems are not explained by any single factor (neither population, nor affluence, 
nor technology, nor capitalism, nor lack of markets, nor patriarchy, nor growth, nor 
religion). 
The above-mentioned list, as we can comprehend, attests the view that human 
development activities are mainly concerned with the satisfaction of humans‘ own needs. 
Also, these instances supply us with the idea that unfortunately and ironically impacts of 
                                                     
12 Passmore, J., Man’s Responsibility for Nature (London, Duckworth, 1974), p. 43.   
13 Attfield, R., The Ethics of Environmental Concern, 2nd edn (Athens and London: University of Georgia Press 
1991), pp. 9-17                                                                                                                                    
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development activities are the major stumbling block that hinder humans from reaching 
their key objective of development, or at any rate from attaining sustainable 
development.  The list also entails that the amount of risk is so high and widespread, that 
not only humans but also all non-human life on earth would be at stake, if humans 
continued to follow the traditional theory/model of development (involving economic 
growth14). 
Given this, the widely agreed list of opportunities to avoid or minimise 
negative environmental effects is explored below15:   
 consideration of environmental factors/concerns in the early stages of 
decision making (e.g., for projects, product development);  
 reducing energy consumption and increasing use of renewable energy 
sources through;  
 increased efficiency (e.g., enhanced fuel efficiency for vehicles, reduced 
electricity consumption by household appliances); and  
 building design (new buildings) or retrofitting; 
 advancing, developing, and employing green technologies;  
 reducing consumption of resources;  
 increased reuse and recycling, thus decreasing resource consumption, 
and waste production and disposal;  
 eco-efficiency;  
 green procurement—purchasing more environmentally friendly goods 
and services;  
 pollution prevention by  
o avoiding the use of hazardous/toxic materials;  
o using cleaner fuels;  
o using clean emissions technologies for engines; and  
o using cleaner energy sources (e.g., solar, wind power); and  
 improved emergency response and preparation.  
The above list suggests that success in avoiding or minimising a range of 
environmental problems partly depends on the success of science, particularly on its 
                                                     
14 The traditional theory of development is that a nation‘s progress is measured in terms of economic 
growth, which is therefore its primary goal. 
15 Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Appendix 1—Human Activities and their Potential Impact on the 
Environment <http://www.oagbvg.gc.ca/internet/English/meth_gde_e_19283.html >[accessed 2 August 
2010] 
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capacity of developing and advancing necessary devices that can foster employing green 
technologies, increasing reuse and recycling, and using clean emissions technologies for 
engines. There is, in any case, no problem with the view that solutions to environmental 
problems are partly scientific, but the problem arises when the relation of these problems 
to science is understood otherwise e.g., when scientists see environmental problems as 
merely scientific and endeavour to resolve environmental challenges scientifically, 
through new inventions, as if moral dimension of environmental problems was ignorable 
and social changes were unnecessary.  
A number of researchers, including environmental ethicists, have been found to 
oppose this, and argue that problems arise when we take environmental problems merely 
as technical problems, and anticipate solutions from particular specialist disciplines. 
Rachel Carson, in Silent Spring in 1962, argued that we take risks when we envisage 
environmental problems merely as technical problems, and hope to find a quick scientific 
or technological fix. Use of pesticides, according to her, is an example of taking such a 
risk, which offers an effective, albeit short-term, solution to some questions (agricultural 
and health questions, for example) leaving many other questions untouched.16 Among 
the unaddressed or unasked important questions are ecological, socio-political and ethical 
ones. These unaddressed or omitted questions are equally significant and quite relevant 
                                                     
16 As Rachel Carson points out, pesticides (e.g., insecticides, herbicides, fungicides, and so forth) were quite 
effective for a certain period of time (evidence shows, as she mentions, that the benefit from pesticides was 
short-term because the original pesticides had become ineffective against pests since a genetic resistance 
was developed in them over a short period of time) in limiting crop loss from all kinds of undesirable 
forms of life such as insects, some targeted plants and fungi, and in fulfilling the requirement or satisfying 
the pressure of increased agricultural productivity to meet the need of increasing population, without 
raising prices. She also mentions that insecticides such as DDT and other chlorinated hydrocarbons were 
also very effectual in killing mosquitoes and other insects which spread diseases such as malaria, typhus, 
and plague. Given this, according to Carson, pesticides can be distinguished as a feasible temporary 
solution to some health and agricultural questions, but simultaneously warrant criticism for being an 
unsustainable solution to the problem in question, and also being silent in addressing some important 
questions, such as ecological, socio-political, and ethical. 
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to the issue of pesticides. Among the important omitted questions are:  What effects are 
pesticides having on other things throughout the food chain? Who should decide levels 
of safety and risk? Are the benefits worth the risk?17 
Granted that such questions are significant, the issue of pesticides use requires an 
interdisciplinary approach that combines a diverse group of disciplines such as  
agriculture, chemistry and various branches of biology, medicine, economics, politics, and 
law, including questions of value, but in fact scientists are often found to assess and offer 
solutions to environmental problems merely in a scientific manner. Joseph R. Des Jardins 
characterises this sort of bounded scientific approach as being concerned with the 
interest of government and private industry. Being funded typically by government and 
industry, Des Jardins argues, such scientific approaches deal with the questions being 
asked by government and industry, and no others, which is why he maintains that science 
has created as many problems as it has solved. 18  
A similar criticism can be brought about against the traditional economic theory 
of development in which Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is envisaged as the unique 
determining factor of development. Human wellbeing, arguably, does not depend on 
higher rates of economic growth; rather it depends on how, among humanity, the 
benefits of economic growth resulting from development activities are distributed. The 
evidence shows that despite good economic growth in several countries, the poor remain 
poor, or in many cases become poorer day by day:  
The benefits of economic growth do not always reach the majority of the 
people … Although several developing countries managed to achieve good 
                                                     
17 Des Jardins, R. J., Environmental Ethics: an Introduction to Environmental Ethics (, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 
2001) p. 4 
 
18 Ibid, pp. 2-13 
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rates of economic growth, they could not solve problems of poverty, 
unemployment and inequalities … There are more starving, homeless and 
sick people in the world today than five or ten years ago … In developing 
countries, too, there are serious inequalities in income.19 
 
This illustration calls attention to the fact that ‗higher economic growth‘ has nothing to 
do with remedying inequalities, particularly economic inequalities in a society; but 
rather as economic growth accelerates so does the gap between the rich and the poor. 
Thus higher economic growth alone is not the kind of policy to bring about socio-
economic equality or progress in society, let alone environmental protection. This gap, 
as has been mentioned earlier, results in turn in increased environmental damage 
through increasing the poor‘s contribution to environmental damage, forcing them to 
burn available local sources of energy like biomass at an increasing rate.  
So the key points on which the conceptualisation of environmental problems 
rests are that (1) although the environmental footprint of affluence is enormous, poverty 
is also linked to environmental problems of development (for some, both affluence and 
poverty are terminal diseases20), and (2) environmental problems are not addressed by 
any single discipline, neither science nor economics, but rather constitute an issue that 
combines a variety of disciplines including moral discourse. The reason behind the link 
of current environmental problems to moral discourse is the fact that ‗tackling ecological 
footprints in the North is an issue of global justice, and essential to a transition to 
sustainability‘21. Granted, the impossibility of addressing environmental problems by any 
                                                     
19 Khor, M., ‗Some Principles for an Alternative Lifestyle and Development‘ (see note 7), p.56    
20 De Graaf, J., Wann, D. and Naylor, T.H., Affluenza: The All-Consuming Epidemic, 2nd edn (San Francisco: 
Berrett-Koehler, 2001), p. xiii.  
21Adams, W. and Jeanrenaud, S. J., Transition to Sustainability (Gland: IUCN, 2008), p.48  
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single discipline, and also granted the inequalities between the rich and the poor and in 
conjunction with the contribution of the rich the increasing contribution of poverty-
stricken people to the degradation of the environment, development policy guidelines 
have long been needed that were ecologically sound, and provided enough basic goods 
for the common man. Unfortunately there is hitherto little or no apparent reflection 
about such guidelines in the development policies and activities of any society – 
developed or underdeveloped.  
Thus implementing a policy of development that will guarantee rational and 
skilful use of resources and also that is more in harmony with a satisfactory quality of life 
for humans and the stability of the environment is now a pressing need. From the 
foregoing discussion it is clear that among the major sources of human security threats 
are humans‘ overuse and unskilful use of resources.  These types of uses of resources for 
development purposes are in effect a major enemy to sustainable development, which 
suggests that success in formulating an attractive variety of sustainable development 
significantly relies on its capability for addressing the significance of human security for 
sustainable development. The next chapter presents some human security impacts of 
environmental problems caused through development activities in Bangladesh. 
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Chapter Four 
 
3.4 Bangladesh: A Case Study 
Located in the low-lying flood plains of the largest South Asian Rivers – the Ganges, 
Brahmaputra, Padma, Jumana and Meghna – Bangladesh occupies one of the world‘s 
largest deltas. Surrounded by India to the west, north and east, by Myanmar to the south 
east and by the Bay of Bengal to the south this country comprises four distinct physical 
regions: the central alluvial plains, the Sundarbans mangrove forests, the slightly higher 
plains in the north east and north west, and the Chittagong Hill Tracts (the only upland 
area, in the south east along the Myanmar border). As the biggest segment of the country 
comprises flood plains, it is quite fertile and vegetated, and thus called The Green Delta 
(which is also a nick name for Bangladesh).1 This fertile and vegetated green delta, 
however, has now become one of the most ecologically vulnerable places in the world.   
Being an active delta, Bangladesh is naturally a disaster-prone country. Floods 
and cyclones were in existence right from the beginning of the formation of this alluvial 
plane, but afterwards, particularly over the last half century, the frequency of such 
occurrences and their devastating impacts (on human and non-human lives) has mounted 
significantly. As various forms of evidence show, these occurrences are partly due to 
human intervention (excessive or unskilful) with the environment both at local and 
global levels. The population explosion2 has imposed further pressure, resulting in 
                                                     
1 The Golden Fibre Trade Centre Limited (GFTCL), Ganges Delta: Most Fertile Land for Growing Jute, Kenaf, 
& Roselle Hemp Fibers, (Dhaka: GFTCL, 2009) <http://www.jutexporterbangladesh.ne1.net/ > [accessed 6 
August 2010] 
2 The greatest problem that Bangladesh faces is an unusually large population in a small land area. It has a 
population density that is the highest in the world, except for a few city-states like Singapore. The 
population grew from 42 million in 1951 to about 147 million in 2005. It is projected to reach 166 million 
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overwhelming environmental disasters and a terrifying human security threat due to such 
disasters. For example, deforestation is one of the major human-caused environmental 
problems that contribute to reduction of the water-carrying capacity of the rivers, 
resulting in more floods and suffering. A thorough enquiry would reveal that a number 
of anthropogenic environmental changes have become the main impediment to 
achieving sustainable socio-economic development in Bangladesh, and human security 
has also become gravely vulnerable to such natural disasters and environmental hazards. 
Like many other severely affected areas in the world, environmental problems in 
Bangladesh have a two-fold dimension: local and global. The main local environmental 
problems in Bangladesh involve various types of pollution by pollutants from: internal 
factories; open and untreated excreta disposal; uncontrolled motor vehicles; open waste-
burning and various development works including building construction and road 
digging, and cooking with biomass fuels; rapid change in morphological features through 
erosion and siltation; and destruction of coastal ecosystems, particularly of the vulnerable 
ecosystems of the Sundharbans mangrove forest, and of their salinity. These are classified 
here as local environmental problems, as they are related to locality. Some problems like 
erosion and siltation are, however, paralleled elsewhere, and thus may have a global 
dimension. By contrast the major global environmental problems involve global 
warming, reduction of bio-diversity and wetland.   
Bangladesh does not hold the status of an industrialised country. Nevertheless 
whatever industrialisation has occurred in Bangladesh has occurred mainly in its urban 
areas (particularly in and around the divisional and district towns including the capital 
                                                                                                                                                        
in 2015. The unabated population growth has already overburdened the human service and physical 
structures in urban areas, and has largely polluted air, water and land in urban areas together with such 
areas as wetlands and forests all over the country.   
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Dhaka), but without following any zoning code. Very few industries have regulation and 
facilities to control or deal with the disposal of toxic waste (solid or liquid), which has 
resulted in the severe imperilment of the ground water and air quality of major cities, 
particularly the capital Dhaka. The river and lakes in Dhaka (particularly the Burigonga 
and the Turag) have become large open sewers; the organic waste from industries, drains, 
sewers and the capital‘s runoff run into these bodies of water, hardly receiving any 
treatment, which has depleted the dissolved oxygen in the water, and has contaminated it 
with different kinds of noxious pollution. A lack of sewers, drains or services to collect 
solid and liquid waste and safely dispose of them has added to the water situation, which 
has resulted in a crisis in the availability of safe and sufficient water supplies to city 
dwellers. Besides emissions from the old technology, brick kilns and low-technology 
diesel transformation are the crucial sources of air pollution in major cities, particularly 
Dhaka. The water and air situation is fairly similar in all other major cities in Bangladesh.  
A huge inflow of population from the countryside to the urban areas, particularly 
to the capital Dhaka and the second largest city, Chittagong, has caused rapid growth of 
not only unplanned industries but also residential and commercial establishments. The 
unplanned city expansion has serious social and environmental impacts, which include 
rapid loss of wetland and agricultural land, segregation of the poor in the most dangerous 
and worst located areas, and a greatly increased cost of providing basic infrastructure, 
public transport and social services. This has added to the already poor environmental 
health of the major cities, and consequently over 50 percent of the urban citizens in 
Dhaka live in what the World Health Organization has termed ‗life and health 
threatening‘ conditions. The leading causes of death and illness in major cities, 
particularly in Dhaka and Chittagong, now are mostly environment-related diseases. 
Among the most serious are:  
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Diarrhoea, cholera, typhoid and food poisoning (caused by contaminated 
food and/or water); 
Airborne respiratory infections (e.g. pneumonia and tuberculosis – linked to 
over-crowding); 
Vector-born diseases (e.g. malaria, dengue fever and filariasis); and 
Scabies, trachoma, typhus and other diseases linked to a lack of water for 
washing.3 
 
The health cost of environmental pollution is quite significant. A country 
Environmental Analysis workshop (held in Dhaka in 2005, and jointly organised by the 
Ministry of Environment and Forest and the World Bank) estimated that:  
Reduction of PM10 concentration in Dhaka by 20% would result in avoiding 
1200 deaths, 80 million cases of sickness and a health cost saving of US$ 169 
million. If PM10 concentration could be further reduced by 80%, it would 
result in avoiding 3500 deaths, millions of cases of sickness and a health cost 
saving of US$ 492 million.4 
PM10 (Particulate Matter) is used here to mean particles of 10 micrometers (usually 
particles range from less than 10 nanometers to more than 10 micrometers, and being 
non-spherical they are widely defined by their aerodynamic diameter) in air. Two-stroke 
three-wheeler diesel vehicles are known for discharging PM into the air of Dhaka at an 
alarming rate. It can easily be presumed from the documentation above that savings 
would be quite massive if reduction in the rate of pollution from the local sources of 
pollution were made possible. Considering this, the Bangladesh government banned two-
stroke three-wheeler diesel vehicles in 2003, and has managed to minimise air pollution 
to some extent in major cities including the capital Dhaka. Another major form of 
environmental pollution related to motor vehicles in urban areas is noise pollution, 
which, due to the absence of traffic rules, is increasing gradually in proportion to the 
increased number of vehicles on the road.   
                                                     
3 Hardoy, J.E., Environmental Problems in the Third World Cities: an Agenda for the Poor and the Planet (London: 
IIED, 1992), p. iii 
4 Chowdhury, A.J., Essays on Environment (Dhaka: Botomul, 2007), p.36   
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The municipal governments are responsible for guaranteeing environmental 
health, pollution control and land use management for city dwellers, but, as is often 
observed, such governments are too weak, inefficient and unrepresentative, and thus 
incompetent to carry out their assigned duties. One person might say that one of the 
main constraints in fulfilling their assigned duties is the big gap between the power and 
resources available to them and the amount they require.5 Guaranteed that power and 
resources available to the city or municipal governments are far behind the required 
levels of power and resources; another might argue that the level of service from the city 
governments would be improved significantly if initiatives were taken that are both 
hygienic and cost effective. The latter claim seems plausible because, for instance, pipe 
water can often be installed to provide a safer supply for the same price that sufferers pay 
to doctors and for medicine to cure them of water-borne or water-based diseases. Also, 
city authorities could have installed a treatment plant for excreta disposal, of a kind far 
more effective and cheaper than conventional sewers and sewage treatment plants.  
Another major environmental problem is river bank erosion and siltation. 
Bangladesh is a riverine country. According to a record of the Bangladesh Water 
Development Board, about 254 places along 16 major rivers come under erosion during 
the flood season (July-September), severely endangering thousands of river bank 
dwellers‘ lives, and threatening the existence of a number of old towns and cities. 
Located at the crossing point of the rivers Padma and Meghna, the gradually 
disappearing old and famous town of Chandpur can be supplied here as an example. 
Although riverbank erosion is destroying lives and resources in all areas in Bangladesh, 
the effect is most obvious in the rivers Padma and Jamuna. An estimate suggests that at 
least one million people have already been affected by this phenomenon either directly or 
                                                     
5Ibid, p. xi  
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indirectly, leading to an economic loss of more than US $40 million annually.6 On the 
other hand, in an average year at least two major rivers change course due to siltation, 
leaving many rivers unnavigable and dislocating navigation routes. The poor are usually 
the victims of this process, as the people who live by the banks of rivers are mostly the 
hardcore poor. 
The coastal zone of Bangladesh is also under terrific attrition due to erosion, 
which is mainly caused by severe tidal activity at the head of the Bay of Bengal, high 
upland discharge with a heavy sediment load, piling up of water at the coast during the 
monsoon, strong summer winds and powerful waves.7 Landslides in inland countries are 
identified as another major source of siltation problems in Bangladesh. A relatively rapid 
change in morphological features occurs as a result of such erosion, resulting in 
transformations in biodiversity and biochemical cycles leading to change in the weather 
patterns of Bangladesh. The Sunderbans mangrove forest, which extends a little over 1.5 
million acres all along the coastline, touching up to at least five districts – namely Cox‘s 
Bazaar, Chittagong, Patuakhali, Satkhira and Khulna – and which is declared the home of 
the world‘s largest natural heritage by UNESCO, has been severely affected due to 
morphological change. Other sources of pollution in the coastal area are the use of 
chemical fertilizers and insecticides, leakage of oil from sea and river transport, and oil 
from ship-breaking activities in river ports and coastal areas. 
Although the process of erosion, siltation and change in morphological features 
has long been recognised as a natural phenomenon in the rivers of Bangladesh, in recent 
years it has been identified that the building of many dams in India and (recently) China, 
                                                     
6 Khan. M. R., ‗Environment‘, Banglapedia: National Encyclopaedia of Bangladesh, 2006 
<http://www.banglapedia.org/> [accessed 4 September 2010] 
7 . Ibid 
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and deforestation in the Himalayan Mountain slopes in Nepal have added to the siltation 
and flood situation in Bangladesh. Soil loses water-withholding capacity owing to 
deforestation, which results in increased surface run-off and severe soil erosion.8 
The salinity problem in its south-western part is another crucial environmental 
concern for Bangladesh. Lying as it does at the mouth of the Bay of Bengal, this area has 
always naturally been under threat of prospective intrusion of saline water from the Bay. 
The ordinary state of salinity and potential inland saline intrusion were naturally governed 
by the natural sweet water flow of the River Ganges through the river Padma, the Gorai 
and its distributary, the Madhumati. But the flow and level of sweet water in the Gorai-
Madhumati estuaries has been drastically reduced since India commissioned the Farakka 
Barrage on the River Ganges to withdraw water at that point (for more see chapter one 
in Part One). The severe shortage of water flow in the Gorai-Madhumati estuaries has 
facilitated inland saline intrusion from the Bay of Bengal, making the entire south-
western region saline-affected. A number of rivers and distributaries have dried up over 
the last three decades as a result of water withdrawal at the Farraka Barrage point. 
According to statistics, more than 500 micromhos/cm (micromho is a measuring unit of 
salt concentration in water) are found to have intruded nearly 160km inland, which has 
distorted the entire Gorai-Madhumati estuarine ecosystem. A vast area – namely 
Satkharia, Khulna, Jessore, Naril, Bagerhat and Gopalgonj districts – has been gravely 
affected through saline intrusion. Among the severely affected areas are rivers, 
agriculture, fishery, forestry, power generation and industry, as well as human and non-
human animal health and life.  
                                                     
8 Ibid  
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Given this, shrimp cultivation has emerged as a unique alternative to subsistence 
agriculture in the affected area, particularly in Satkhira and Khulna districts. This 
cultivation requires saline water to be held stagnant for 8-9 months every year, and this in 
turn has been adding to the already unbalanced salinity situation of the land. The 
engagement with this new dimension of land use has been on the rise for at least two 
reasons: (1) it is the only alternative to subsistence agriculture, and (2) it is a major source 
of overseas export earnings for Bangladesh. Consequently agricultural land has rapidly 
been lost to shrimp ponds; but the irony is that although from an economic point of 
view this practice seems temporarily supportive of the local people, its long-term 
environmental and economic impacts are catastrophic. The big concern is that the 
practice of this new dimension of land use has already crossed the crucial threshold 
inland of 80km, and is still on the rise. Thus shrimp cultivation has added to the saline 
condition of the south-western region of Bangladesh. 
Half of Bangladesh can be delineated as seasonal wetland. Wetland provides the 
habitat of a large number of fauna and flora, and it has always been a matter of great 
economic importance, particularly for retaining fish, wildlife and various other vegetative 
covers. The polder projects are one of the major sources of pollution in wetland areas. 
Poldering is the construction of waterlogged structures within project areas, which 
obstructs the natural drainage system through accumulation of silt in drainage channels, 
and turns the wetland area into a progressive and permanently flooded area. Among the 
major problems of such activities are: lack of drinking water, reduction of fish resources 
and irreversible changes in wetland areas. Many people have left the wetland areas (for 
example the areas of Chalan Beel and Beel Dakatia) due to these unfavourable changes.  
Deforestation is a global environmental problem of the repetitive kind. 
According to statistics, forest cover has been reduced by 50% since the 1970s, and 
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according to another estimate in 1990, per person forestland was less than 0.02 ha, which 
is one of the lowest forest ratios per person in the world. In the last decade of the 19th 
century, the south-eastern part of the Sunderbans coastal zone, including the vicinity of 
the river Naf in the Chittagong area, was cleared for human habitation and other 
activities, and has by now been entirely cleared and occupied for shrimp cultivation, salt 
production and agriculture. Coupled with these activities, the conversion of rich tropical 
forest with unique bio-diversity into plantations, improper land use and the prevalent 
mode of farming (Jhum cultivation that leads to massive loss of top soil) in the 
Sunderbans in the Chittagong area have made this area vulnerable to cyclonic winds, 
exacerbating soil erosion and diminution of bio-diversity.  
The south-western part of the Sunderbans has also been ill-treated by undue 
human intervention. Among the major human activities that are discerned as severely 
detrimental to the Sunderbans in the south-western part of Bangladesh and to the 
environmental condition of its entire south-western region including the coastal area are: 
shrimp cultivation, salt production, subsistence agriculture and developing habitation 
within the forest area, harvesting of timber, fishing in and around the Sunderbans, and 
collection of honey, beeswax, oysters and shells from the same forest.9 Besides, 
Bangladesh has a rich bio-diversity, but some species are found to be threatened. These 
include 54 inland fish species, eight amphibians, 54 inland reptiles, 41 resident birds and 
40 inland mammals, plus 100 vascular plants.10  
Bangladesh is, as has been mentioned, a riverine country. Out of 57 international 
rivers the country of origin (or transit) of 54 rivers is India, and three other rivers 
originate in Myanmar. Thus an important source of looming environmental problems in 
                                                     
9 Ibid 
10 Ibid 
188 | P a g e  
 
Bangladesh is the taking of water for irrigation and other uses upstream on the other side 
of the border. India‘s Giant River-Link Project11 is a case in point since the construction 
of the Farraka Barrage. In this project the Indian government has come up with a plan to 
supply water to those states (e.g. Haryana, Gujarat and Rajasthan) that are drought-
affected. In view of this goal, the government has identified 30 connecting points in 
different rivers which have been connected by digging canals. Bangladesh has directly 
been affected due to India‘s water withdrawal at the connecting points of the river 
Brahmaputra and the Teesta.  
Environmental experts and activists from both Bangladesh and India have 
repeatedly expressed their deep concern about this devastating project, and urged India 
to restrain from implementing this anti-environmental agenda. Some scholars have 
expressed their deep concern because of the Indian government‘s breaching of 
international treaties on the use of international rivers12 by not consulting Bangladesh 
before coming up with such a project, which has devastating environmental impacts on 
Bangladesh. Focusing on the adverse effects of this project on Bangladesh, the 
Washington Times published a report on 20 September 2003, stating that the impacts of 
the Indian River-Link Project would be severe flooding during the monsoon rains and 
worse drought during the dry season in Bangladesh. The report cites Jayanta 
Bandyopadhyay (an executive of the Centre for Development and Environment Policy at 
the Indian Institute of Management in Kolkata, India) who asserts that once the Indian 
plan is implemented, the world could lose the richest fisheries in South Asia; salinity 
                                                     
11 The River-Link Project seeks to connect the Ganges in the north and the Brahmaputra in the east, and 
then join it to the Kaberi and Mahanadi in the south and then the Mahanadi to the Beas in the west. Again, 
the Brahmaputra and the Teesta would be connected to take waters from the former to the latter. 
12 International treaties prohibit an upper riparian country from unilaterally diverting and altering the 
natural course of international rivers. 
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would also make inroads into the region, affecting thousands of hectares of arable land 
and the lives of millions of people subsisting on agriculture in Bangladesh. Mangrove 
forests, he says, will be disastrously affected, as they depend on the steady rise and fall of 
tides for their roots to breathe. Arresting the natural flow of rivers could be a death knell 
for the Sunderbans, the world‘s largest remaining coastal forest and a world heritage site 
shared by the delta regions of India and Bangladesh. Jayanta Bandyopadhyay‘s prediction 
of 2003 is now a reality for Bangladesh. This is evident in the current condition of the 
entire drought- and salinity-affected south-western region, and in changes to the weather 
and to the vulnerable ecosystem of the Sunderbans forest.  
The Bangladesh media and environmental activists have waged a campaign 
against this Giant River-Link Project, raising public awareness of the adverse effects of 
this plan and forcing the Government of Bangladesh to take up the issue. On 13 August 
2003 the Foreign Ministry summoned the Ambassador of India, Dilip Sinha, and handed 
him a diplomatic protest note, which expressed the concern that the Giant River-Link 
Project would threaten Bangladesh‘s ecology and economy.13 
The Tipaimukh Dam construction (it is now just a matter of time before 
construction can start because final agreement has already been signed by the relevant 
parties pertaining to it) on the River Barak in the Indian state of Manipur – about 200km 
upstream of the Bangladesh border – is another major environmental concern for 
Bangladesh, which the Indian government has decided to commission as part of its 
multi-purpose hydroelectric project, and a treaty was signed for it by relevant parties in 
Delhi in April 2010. Despite criticism from experts and strong protests from 
                                                     
13 Choudhury, S., Alternative Views of Environmental Security in a Less Developed Country: the Case of Bangladesh 
(Fullerton: The Free Library, 2008) 
<http://www.thefreelibrary.com/_/search/Search.aspx?SearchBy=0&Word=year+of+publication&Searc
h=Search&By=0>[accessed 10 May 2012]  
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environmental activists and various organisations and political parties14 from both 
Bangladesh and Manipur State, the Indian government has launched this project, and 
Bangladesh and part of Manipur will be hugely affected by it, both ecologically and 
economically.   
While a large number of natural and human resources of the south-western part 
of Bangladesh are severely affected by the Farakka Barrage, the Tipaimukh Dam Project 
will damage the entire north-eastern region of Bangladesh, causing widespread flooding 
due to changes in the natural flow of the rivers Surma and Kushiara during the rainy 
season, and causing river transportation problems due to desertification (a process which 
renders the land increasingly dry until almost no vegetation grows on it, making it a 
desert) during the dry season. The list of other problems includes a gradual snatching 
away of the means of local people‘s livelihoods and of nonhuman  life, insufficiency of 
drinking water and a decrease in industrial activities towards a complete discontinuation, 
involving decline in agricultural products and increased risk of earthquakes in the Sylhet 
area. According to statistics, a large number of tribal people (approximately 40,000) in 
Manipur will be forced to relocate from their homeland and innumerable fauna and flora 
will disappear.15  
In face of protests by different environmental activists, NGOs and political 
parties from the Bangladesh side and the Indian state of Manipur, the Indian government 
has defended its position in relation to this project by saying that nothing will be done 
                                                     
14 . Such as the then opposition party of Bangladesh, Citizens‘ Concern on Dam and Development 
(CCDD) and Hmar Students‘ Union (Manipur). 
 
15 Rezwan, M., Bangladesh, India: No to Tipaimukh Dam (Aymara, Indonesia: Global Voice, 2009) 
<http://globalvoicesonline.org/2009/05/27/bangladesh-india-no-to-tipaimukh-dam/>[accessed 23 
February 2012]  
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that can harm Bangladesh. It is indeed hard to rely on the rhetoric of the Indian 
government, as the said government similarly expressed its commitment to give 
Bangladesh its fair share of water from the River Ganges, but this commitment has not 
yet been realised.16 One can envisage the severely affected south-western region of 
Bangladesh around the Farraka Barrage as an example to suggest how detrimental the 
Tipaimukh Dam on a river in an upstream country would be for the downstream 
country, Bangladesh. Even if the water sharing issue of the River Ganges is left unsettled, 
commissioning a new dam like the Tipaimukh Dam can do nothing but damage the 
bilateral ties and mutual trust between India and Bangladesh. A source in the recent past 
confirmed that while 40,000,000 people of Bangladesh, and its crippled agriculture, 
fisheries, navigation, manufacturing industry, forestry, poultry and other relevant sectors 
have been badly affected by the Farakka Barrage alone, India has not left the water of 
many other major rivers unregulated.17 Among other major rivers where India has 
commissioned barrages and thus generated disputes on water sharing are: the Teesta, 
Feni, Mahananda, Monu, Khowai, Muhuri, Gumti and Kodla. What is more, negligence 
in resolving barriers to signing the much-hyped agreement on fairly sharing the water of 
                                                     
16 The Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) has met many times on the sharing of Ganges 
water, but without any success. In April 1975, India assured that it would not operate feeder canals until a 
final agreement was reached between Delhi and Dhaka on the sharing of Ganges water. Bangladesh was 
assured of getting 40,000 cusecs of water. But India violated the agreement (MOU) by diverting the full 
capacity of 40,000 cusecs of water. The matter was brought to the attention of the UN General Assembly, 
which, on 26 November 1976, adopted a consensus, directing the parties to arrive at a fair and expeditious 
settlement. On 5 November 1977 the Ganges Waters Agreement was signed, assuring 34,500 cusecs for 
Bangladesh. But the JRC statistics show very clearly that Bangladesh did not get her due share during the 
subsequent years. The then Prime Minister of Bangladesh visited India and signed a treaty with the then 
Prime Minister of India on 12 December 1996. The treaty stipulated that below a certain flow rate, India 
and Bangladesh will each share half of the water. But New Delhi has continued violating the treaty by using 
more water of the river at the cost of Bangladesh. The JRC report of 9 March 2009 revealed that from 
1999 to 2009, India intermittently reduced the water flow to Bangladesh.  
 
17 SOS-arsenic.net, India-Bangladesh: 21st Century Battle for Water Sharing (Dhaka: SOS-arsenic.net, 2004) 
<http://sos-arsenic.net/english/groundwater/waterbattle.html#5> [accessed 27 February 2012] 
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the river Teesta is another major source of mistrust and water-related human insecurity 
and environmental crisis.  
In the recent past China has begun a similar type of project known as the 
‗Greater Western Water Diversion Project‘ to actively pursue the possibility of 
interlinking and damming major rivers in order to divert water from the Brahmaputra to 
the Yangtze and from the Yangtze River Basin to other parts of the country, particularly 
the Shaanxi, Hebei, Beijing and Tianjin areas. Three big dams have been commissioned 
under this project.18 By doing this, China will have strangled one of the major sources of 
water of India, and for Bangladesh it has been a double-barrelled problem, i.e. the natural 
water flow of the River Brahmaputra has now gone under the control of two powerful 
neighbouring countries instead of one. The implications of sharing the water of the River 
Brahmaputra are huge. For some this may well turn into a major source of conflict in 
Asia in future. Indian officials have started detailed discussions with their Chinese 
counterparts, just as Bangladesh has been trying to negotiate the river water sharing 
problem with India for the last three and a half decades, although without any notable 
success.  
A more recent threat is ‗Arsenic Contamination in Groundwater‘. A growing 
trend of using underground water for drinking purposes is causing a global epidemic of 
arsenic poisoning. A worrying matter is that about 30 million people (more than one fifth 
of the total population of the country) have to drink water with a high arsenic 
contamination level. In terms of the number of people exposed to arsenic contamination, 
Bangladesh is the worst among the 17 affected countries. A recent study has identified 
                                                     
18 The structures are: 607 ft (185 m) high and 7,575 ft (2,309 m) long on the Chang (Yangtze) River, central 
Hubei prov., China, 30 miles (48 km) W of Yichang. This is the largest concrete structure in the world; the 
dam was constructed from 1994 to 2006. 
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the Farakka Barrage as the root cause of arsenic poisoning in Bangladesh.19 This 
suggestion seems plausible as the arsenic victims live mostly in the south-western region 
of Bangladesh, and they have had to depend on deeper levels of groundwater, which 
holds a high concentration of arsenic, because of the Gorai-Madhumati estuaries being 
dried up as a result of water withdrawal at the Farraka point. 
Humans‘ development activities (such as use of fossil fuel, energy and the like) 
cause emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) into the atmosphere, and make the planet 
warmer, which has resulted in climate change. As a heavily populated (about 150 million) 
developing country, Bangladesh makes a contribution to the GHG load in the 
atmosphere, but compared to that of developed countries it is much less. According to 
an estimate: 
USA accounts for around a quarter of greenhouse gas emission. Bangladesh 
accounts for less than one-half of one percent. This is because Bangladesh 
consumes only a little energy compared to other countries, only 0.15 tons of 
oil equivalents (TOE). Of the world‘s total emission of carbon dioxide she 
accounts for one-seventh of one percent.20 
This clearly reveals how insignificant Bangladesh‘s contribution to global warming and 
thereby climate change is; but the fact of the matter is that the implication of climate 
change (for which Bangladesh is hardly culpable) for Bangladesh is nothing short of 
enormous. One of the alarming impacts of global warming on Bangladesh is the threat of 
permanently submerging 10 to 20 percent of the country‘s landscape, including the 
Sundarbans, due to the rising of water in the Bay of Bengal.  
                                                     
19 Siddique, H., Farakka to Tipaimukh, (Dhaka: Bangla Praxis, 2009) 
<http://banglapraxis.wordpress.com/category/trends-and-analysis/page/2/> [accessed 30 April 2010]   
 
20 Chowdhury, p.41. The report concerns here per person per year. 
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In terms of the emission of chemicals such as CFCs into the atmosphere, 
Bangladesh has made a contribution but to a lesser extent, as in the case of GHGs. The 
reasons remain the same as in the GHGs case. Excessive uses of fertilizer and pesticides 
to secure a higher yield of crops to meet the need of a constantly growing population 
have been another two causes of global environmental problems.   
From the above discussion it seems that in regard to the causes of environmental 
problems in Bangladesh, there are two dimensions: local and global. The local type 
represents environmental problems related to and caused by the activities of local people, 
while global types represent environmental problems related to people worldwide and 
caused by individuals or governments across all countries. The origin of most of the 
environmental problems both local and global, as has been observed, is anthropogenic 
(i.e. these problems are caused by actions and/or inactions of individuals or 
governments), which affects the whole range of fauna and flora as well as water, air and 
land (and both farming and forest-related activities). 
The more visible local environmental problems in Bangladesh are mostly 
associated with renewable resources, which are in danger of exhaustion from excessive 
and inefficient uses, by the rapidly growing population. Some local environmental 
problems, as has been observed, increase due to the lack of appropriate policies as well as 
inefficiency and negligence of the designated governmental bodies in executing existing 
policies and regulations. The municipal governments, for instance, are quite capable of 
tackling problems like excreta-disposal by installing cheaper treatment plants (which are 
both result-oriented and cost-effective), but no initiatives have yet been taken by them. 
The conditions and concerns remain the same as in the case of local industrial pollutions. 
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 A huge inflow of population from countryside to the capital Dhaka, Chittagong 
and other major cities could be reduced to a considerable extent by implementing 
decongestion policies (one of the main objectives of these policies is to shift government 
offices and industries from the central areas of the capital Dhaka and other major cities 
towards their edges following environmental rules and regulations, e.g. a zoning code), 
but no policy initiatives have yet been taken by the concerned governmental bodies in 
regard to this either. Thus the current environmental situation in the major cities is in 
part due to the negligence of the municipal governments, suggesting that appropriate 
initiatives (within the capacities of governmental bodies) could have made a big 
difference in the environmental situation. The Bangladesh government‘s decision to ban 
the two-stroke three-wheeler diesel vehicles is a case in point. 
Tackling all local environmental problems on the part of the governments of 
Bangladesh (the municipal governments and national government), however, is 
impossible because of scarcity of resources and environmentally friendly (green) 
technologies. This shows that Bangladesh needs support (such as financial aid, transfer of 
green technology and the like) from the developed world to address local environmental 
problems. It is worth noting here that assistance to Bangladesh on the part of the 
developed world is not obligatory at this level, but rather voluntary and supererogatory 
since the developed world is not the main cause of local environmental problems.  
Another source of environmental problems, as has been observed here, is the 
Indian government‘s policy of interrupting the natural flow of water by commissioning 
barrages/dams on common rivers (which flow across the country‘s international 
borders). The major sources of obstruction in natural flow of water are: the Farraka 
Barrage, the Tipaimukh Dam and the Indian Giant River-Link Project. The future of 
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Bangladesh is thus, for the most part, dependent on a successful negotiation with India 
on the sharing of water of common rivers.  
To safeguard its south-western region, including the coastal zone, from further 
deterioration (due to water withdrawal at the Farraka point), and to safeguard its north-
eastern region from the impending danger caused by the Tipaimukh Dam, and also to 
safeguard it from the looming environmental disaster on account of the Indian Giant 
River-Link Project, Bangladesh thus must act towards a successful negotiation with India 
on the water sharing issue, because Bangladesh has no alternative to a mutual but fair 
solution to the water sharing problems of the common rivers.  
What is more, as has been observed here, environmental problems that are 
distinguished as global  are mainly caused by the policies and activities of foreign 
governments and/or people of the developed world(this has its clearest reflection in 
climate change due to global warming). Since Bangladesh is hardly culpable for global 
environmental problems, and since the governments or citizens of the developed world 
are responsible, it is rather an ethical obligation, not just a supererogatory task, for the 
governments and/or people of the developed world to provide Bangladesh with 
necessary assistance. Bangladesh has to be successful in motivating the developed world 
so that it performs its duty to help minimise the suffering of the people of Bangladesh, 
which is caused by its development policies and practices. The future of Bangladesh is 
considerably dependent on her success in so doing.  
  
 
Chapter Five 
 
3.5 Human Security Implication of Environmental Problems in Bangladesh: 
Rethinking Dominant Policies for Environmental Protection 
 
The human security implications of the current environmental problems in Bangladesh 
are enormous, and gradually intensifying.  It is apparent from the discussion in the 
previous chapter that the human security situation is extremely vulnerable in Bangladesh 
from both a sense of ‗want‘ and a sense of ‗fear‘ (which I introduced in Chapter Two of 
this Part). The first type involves loss of income and employment; decreased food 
production and lack of economic access to food; increased incidence of diseases and 
reduced access to health facilities; climate change and loss of biodiversity.  On the other 
hand, security from a sense of ‗fear‘ involves personal insecurity due to many other 
reasons, including: exposure to violence from fighting and increased crime rates; conflict 
and violence between different groups within societies; existing conflict and possible 
future wars about water between South Asian countries; violations of basic human rights 
and so forth. Almost all these human insecurities mentioned above have roots in the 
current environmental problems in Bangladesh.   
Although security from ‗fear‘ is no less important than security from ‗want‘ in the 
context of Bangladesh, it is a less asked question. As has been concluded from the 
discussion in Chapter Two of this Part, the dimensions of security in the ‗security-from-
fear‘ sense are two-fold: local and regional. The local dimension involves potential civil 
violence, ethnic conflicts, insurgencies and coups d‘état due to environmental scarcity 
198 | P a g e  
(dangers which are caused by degradation and depletion of renewable resources)1. 
Besides, the regional dimension involves a bloodless war with India over water that will 
sooner or later turn out to be the main source of conflict in South Asia. China‘s Greater 
Western Water Diversion Project has added to the conflict situation. International 
support in negotiating fair water rights is a pressing need.  
Given this, even though the UN Millennium Declaration does not explicitly 
specify any goal related to these issues, the Government of Bangladesh has adopted 
several measures to improve and protect both humans and the environment. Among the 
key measures are:  the formulation of a national water management plan, a land use 
policy,  policies for controlling water, air and noise pollution, and a comprehensive 
coastal zone management plan.  In terms of achievement, Bangladesh seems to be on 
track to attain some of the UN Millennium Development Goals such as universal primary 
school enrolment and gender parity. A recent UNDP report says that ‗Bangladesh 
demonstrates that it is possible to sustain strong human development progress across a 
broad front even at relatively modest levels of income growth‘ 2. (For more see chapter 
three of Part Four). 
Independent assessment, however, casts doubt about the prospect of achieving 
the MDGs in their totality in the country. At least two impediments are obvious. One is 
the country‘s institutional inability to effectively implement policies and programmes, 
given the abysmal record of poor governance in terms of inefficiency and corruption, lack 
of transparency and accountability, and, above all, poor law and order conditions. The 
other constraint is that of limited domestic resources that will fall far short of the 
requirement to implement programmes to achieve the MDGs. Moreover, the country will 
                                                     
1 Homer-Dixon, T.F., and Blitt, J., (eds.), Ecoviolence: Links among Environment, Population, and Security, 
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), pp. 223-228. 
2 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, (New York: UNDP, 2005), p.23. 
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need a lot more resources to achieve some non-MDG targets such as the development of 
infrastructure, improved management of power ports, and achievement of a better 
investment climate, without which sustaining economic progression and consequently 
poverty alleviation efforts will suffer. 
Now the question remains what policy or method of development is both capable 
of addressing the crucial situation of the Bangladesh environment and related issues of 
security? As this study shows, the bulk of the population of Bangladesh is insecure both 
from a sense of ‗want‘ as well as from a sense of ‗fear‘. People are concurrently vulnerable 
to environmental and economic insecurities, and paradoxically each reinforces the other. 
This study also reveals that the more the people are vulnerable to economic insecurity, 
the more their activities become damaging to the environment and vice versa.  
Given this, the pressing need for Bangladesh is a policy proposal which involves a 
balanced relationship between urgent development needs and concern for the 
environment, but unfortunately, no such policy has yet been collectively recognized. 
While some scholars place more emphasis on environmental protection than economic 
development, many others argue that it will be foolish to give environmental protection 
priority over the need for economic development for those who are in need of supply of 
food for their daily survival. For example, according to Ramachandra Guha, focusing on 
environmental protection over pressing human economic need is the trend of radical 
American environmentalism or its wilderness agenda, which causes serious deprivation, 
and is thus inappropriate and unjust when it is applied to the developing world.3  
Going one step further, Susan George asserts that concern over pesticide use may 
be appropriate in the developed world, but entirely inapposite in a developing world 
                                                     
3 Guha, R., ‗Radical American Environmentalism and Wilderness Preservation: A Third World Critique‘, 
Environmental Ethics, 11.1 (1989), 71-83.  
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country which could feed its starving people if it had the food protection that the 
developed world already has.4 One might argue in reply that if the starving poor are fed at 
a huge cost to environmental security then the poor are protected for the time being, but 
not from the long term harm of such environmentally unacceptable activities. A balanced 
and appropriate development policy should, then, be conceptualized not only in terms of 
economic development but also in terms of environmental limits in order to sustain it. It 
seems relatively less problematic to practice such a balanced development policy in a 
developed country than a developing country. For while in a developed country the 
concerned party (i.e., government) can attain the objective of the policy in question 
through reducing economic growth in order to strike a balance between the two 
(economic development and environmental limits), the concerned party in a developing 
country (where among the main barriers are: resource scarcity, unavailability of green 
technology and lack of skill) has to increase economic development to attain the same 
policy objective.  However, for some, articulating such a development policy on the part 
of a developing country (even under the above mentioned barriers) is not impossible.  
The policy of redistributive development of the Indian state of Kerala is a case in point. 
As Govindan Parayil puts it:  
 …Kerala has made remarkable progress in lowering infant mortality, 
decreasing population growth, increasing life expectancy at birth, achieving full 
literacy, and eliminating extreme poverty and deprivation, all despite very low 
per capita income.5 
                                                                    
                                                     
4 George, S., Feeding the Few: Corporate Control of Food (Washington DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1981), p. 
21. For more see van den Bosch, R., The Pesticide Conspiracy (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 
1978).   
5 Parayil, G., ‗Sustainable Development: The Fallacy of a Normatively Neutral Development Paradigm‘, 
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 15.2 (1998), 179-194 (p. 190).  
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 This seems to be applicable to developing countries, particularly in the case of 
Bangladesh, but as a matter of fact, it is still not adequate since Bangladesh has many 
other distinct (environmental) problems (such as sharing the water of international rivers) 
which need to be covered in the policy.   
A sizeable population growth and a scarcity of economic opportunity due to 
environmental degradation as well as climate change seem to generate migration or 
resettlement within and outside the country. In Bangladesh the climate victims (now 
widely called ‗environmental refugees‘) move to the capital Dhaka for shelter.  But as the 
newcomers have to struggle greatly to adjust to life in the world‘s fastest-growing 
megacity, Dhaka, there should be other places in other countries, especially in those 
countries whose inhabitants are chiefly culpable for climate change, where they can move.   
The climate-induced displacement of refugees to the neighbouring country, India, will 
introduce a new dimension to the regional conflict, and accelerate progress towards 
regional security and cooperation. The relocation of environmental refugees from 
Bangladesh to India has serious implications for the relationship between the two 
countries; particularly, this will impose an adverse effect on the fair sharing of water from 
the common river.   
Tackling human security challenges rooted in environmental problems (caused by 
the activities of governments and people at regional level) thus largely depend on the 
possibility of a shared policy initiative proposed and implemented, and also monitored by 
a regional forum. Thus, in addition to a local policy plan, which would obviously involve 
developmental needs and environmental limits for the people of Bangladesh, Bangladesh 
should focus on the need of strengthening its existing regional forum the ‗South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation‘ (SAARC). This is not less than a must for 
Bangladesh, as without strong assistance or governance on the part of a regional forum 
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like this, no national level policy plan alone can be effective in addressing the security 
challenges in question.  
Taking into account her own as well as the regional security and cooperation, 
Bangladesh should also try developing a connection with China; a new regional forum 
can be developed (and/or membership of SAARC can be expanded) to achieve this goal. 
The participation of China as a member can be a strong basis for regional cooperation 
between countries in the South Asian region to resolve environmentally sensitive regional 
issues, in particular the river water dispute. Granted this, Bangladesh should try 
strengthening the SAARC.  
One further finding is in place. The unstable human security condition in 
Bangladesh, as has been observed, is partly due to unskilful environmental interventions 
of the local inhabitants and the lack of integrity in managing problems emerges 
therefrom. Thus, besides a suitable policy plan, issues such as efficiency and reliability of 
the staff of governmental bodies are vital for success in this regard. A policy appropriate 
for Bangladesh has to have the scope and capacity of motivating people towards 
efficiency and commitment in addition to its capacity for addressing Bangladesh‘s 
developmental needs; environmental limits; the need for regional governance in the South 
Asian region; and the need for assistance from the developed world. 
Various forms of assistance, such as greater aid flows and trade liberalization to 
smooth the progress of greater access for exports, on the part of rich countries and 
international organizations, including the UN, are also vital in tackling or at least 
minimizing current environmental problems in Bangladesh. A policy plan, therefore, has 
to have the scope and capacity to offer guidelines in understanding the need for 
enthusiasm and integrity on the part of the individuals working for government bodies 
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and also has to have the capacity for explaining the need for a regional forum as well as 
the need for involvement on the part of international organizations and governments 
across the world. All the above mentioned policy aspects, taken together, are 
characteristic of every issue of environmental concern in Bangladesh and may well be 
considered to offer material from which a tenable and ethically sound environmental 
policy vision can be elicited. The next Part looks into the challenges to and limitation of 
the currently dominant economic practice. In particular it explores advantages as well as 
limitations of the practices of ‗ecological modernization‘ and ‗economic democracy‘ under 
an untrammelled capitalistic political economy.  The main thrust of this part will be to 
offer a fuller version of a plausible policy framework for sustainable development and 
defend its applicability to Bangladesh and other developing countries like her.   
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Chapter One 
 
 
4.1: The Untrammelled Capitalist Political Economy:  Revealing the Potential of 
Ecological Modernization and Economic Democracy in Delivering Sustainable 
Development 
 
In the preceding Part, I concluded that the traditional economic practice is not the 
appropriate paradigm to use to address existing economic inequality (or insecurity) and 
environmental degradation. Instead, development activities that are oriented to ever 
higher economic growth have been held to be the main reasons for this inequality and 
degradation across the world. The paradigm of such economic practices is widely known 
as the capitalistic political economy. It has also been noted that the economic gap 
between the poor and the rich is unremittingly increasing due to the inequality in the 
distribution of benefits resulting from economic growth.1  
The capitalistic political economy has two hands: invisible and visible. The 
invisible hand is the one ‗that is implicit in the pricing mechanism‘ while the visible hand 
is the one ‗that is explicitly managed by government through a legislature and a 
bureaucracy‘.2 Therefore, an understanding about the actual functioning and evaluation 
of the capitalistic political economy requires a clear understanding about the functioning 
of its hands, i.e., markets and governments. While states set the rules that individual 
entrepreneurs and multinational enterprises must follow, markets (particularly, their 
                                                     
1 In Part Three, it was argued that human economic security depends on how, among humanity, the 
benefits of economic growth resulting from development activities are distributed, not on higher rates of 
economic growth. The current poverty situations in Brazil and India have been referred to as examples of 
the case in point; despite managing good progress in economic growth, countries like Brazil and India have 
not managed to solve their problems of poverty, unemployment and inequalities to any considerable 
extent.                                                                                                                                                                
2 Scott, B.  R, The Political Economy of Capitalism (Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 07-037, 
2006) < http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/07-037.pdf > [accessed 20 June 2011] (p.1). 
 
206 | P a g e  
economic and technological forces) work as a definitive force in determination of 
economic and political affairs. In other words, markets shape the policies and interests of 
individual states and the political relations among states.3                                                                                                                                                                                             
The capitalistic political economy measures a nation‘s development in terms of 
economic growth, based on Gross National Product (GNP) and Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP).4 Defenders of the capitalistic political economy essentially focus on 
growth in output, putting profitability at the centre of this economic practice. The threat 
to capitalist profitability comes from competitors in the marketplace. However, 
competitiveness in the marketplace, both within the country‘s domestic market and 
internationally, assists individual owners and capitalist firms with the growing 
concentration of wealth and private ownership of resources, alongside their control of 
the means of production, through stimulating them for more investment and 
technological innovation. The legislature and bureaucracy of the state governments are 
found to be supportive of the current economic practice. The state-backed consolidation 
of private ownership is the driving force in the the global economy. Instead of being 
operated by the visible and invisible hands (states and markets), such extensive private 
ownership gives the aforementioned hands extensive influence and manipulates their 
course towards ever greater private accumulation of wealth and resources, creating 
enduring sets of barriers to poverty alleviation and environmental protection.   Further 
upshots of this practice include: ever-growing environmental degradation and imbalance 
of (economic) power between the poor and the rich, between corporations and small 
business, and between developed and underdeveloped countries.   
                                                     
3 Ibid 
4 GDP measures all production within a state by whoever happens to be working there while GNP 
measures the production of all citizens, wherever they happen to be working. Although the two measures 
are fairly close numerically, GDP is definitely the preferred measure among economists and is gaining 
popularity in general conversation as well. For more information see Moneychimp, Gross National Product 
(GNP) <http://www.moneychimp.com/glossary/gnp.htm>[accessed 21 June 2011]                                                               
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All these elements suggest that profitability or commitment to higher economic 
growth and competitiveness are characteristic traits of the current economic system and 
are thus inseparable from the economic practice in question. These elements suggest that 
the current economic practice is not only far from being conducive to human well-being 
(let alone that of non-human living entities), but also a journey towards the human 
suffering of an untold proportion. Furthermore, the capitalistic political economy, which 
humans appear to be committed to, is posing ever-growing challenges to communities 
and nations (who are keen to secure sustainable development as well as preferring to 
secure broadly distributed benefits coming therefrom to their population), defining and 
restricting the economic and environmental choices of people all over the world.       
It is worth mentioning here that no private owners of wealth and resources, 
neither individuals nor capitalist firms, either are secure from the self-inflicted harm of 
the current economic practice. Therefore it is plausible to state that if humans wish to 
secure themselves against the ever-growing economic and social inequality and 
environmental destruction, an alternative form of economic paradigm needs to be made 
available to them.  
Brain Baxter argues that the capitalistic political economy is defective for being 
unable to tackle two important issues involved in this area: (1) the material viability of 
current economic practice; and (2) the human significance of our economic activity.5 In 
Baxter‘s formulation, the question of the material viability of the capitalistic political 
economy includes two problems: (A) the resource problem and (B) the sink problem.6 
While the former problem concerns the availability of natural materials (e.g., land, water, 
fuels, ores and so on) to sustain the economic activities of a rapidly growing population, 
                                                     
5 Baxter, B., Ecologism: an Introduction ( Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), p.188.                
6 Ibid 
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the latter concerns the human ability to dispose of the waste products of their economic 
production in a way which does not poison or destroy their sources of clean water, land 
and air.7 
The second issue concerns the human implications of the current economic 
practice. As Baxter argues, humans do not produce merely to fulfil material needs. 
Instead they transform their lives through the course of production in many significant 
ways. Over and above the fulfilment of material needs, humans exercise their 
imagination, emotions, moral sense, and religious beliefs.8 There is no indication of 
recognition of the significance of issues 1 and 2 in the practice of the capitalistic political 
economy.  
Baxter is correct in criticising the capitalistic political economy for not 
recognizing issues 1 and 2. Environmentalists clearly agree with Baxter on this issue and 
add another point to this list of issues. They9 argue that even if we succeed in finding a 
particular form of economy which avoids or minimizes the resource and sink problems, 
e.g. efficiently deals with the problem of human poverty, it might still not be able to 
satisfy the requirements of ecological health and justice. These are issues of different 
categories. Environmentalists were among the first to recognize the issue of 
environmental justice over and above the problem of human poverty. In different 
environmentalists‘ formulations, environmental justice is the equal or alternatively 
appropriate10 treatment of all living entities that have a good of their own, i.e. all bearers 
                                                     
7 Ibid 
8 Ibid, pp. 188-89 
9 Examples include the proponents of different branches of biocentrism such as deontological and 
consequentialist biocentrism.  As we observed in Part Two, biocentric consequentialists extend concern for 
individual well-being further arguing that by having a good of their own, all living entities are bearers of 
intrinsic value; therefore they ought to be taken into account.                                                                                                             
10 Some biocentrists are utterly egalitarian, such as Paul Taylor (1981 and 1986), while others follow the 
principle of equal consideration of equal interest, such as Robin Attfield (1987).  Taylor‘s version of 
biocentrism is an example of what we can call biocentric deontologism. This version maintains that each 
individual living entity in nature (an animal, a plant, or a micro-organism) is a ‗teleological-center-of-life‘ 
that has a good or well-being of its own which can be enhanced or damaged. In addition, as a ‗teleological-
209 | P a g e  
of intrinsic value, and involves the meaningful involvement of all people irrespective of 
their race, sex, colour, origin or economic strength with regard to the development, 
implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies.11 
Therefore, the issue of environmental justice is not possible to tackle at all on the part of 
a form of economy that does not even manage to deal with the problem of human 
poverty. 
Having argued that we are correct to be concerned about the economic and 
environmental implications of unrestricted economic activities, we need to contemplate a 
new form and level of economic activity that, unlike the current economic practice, 
satisfies the requirements of environmental justice while also satisfying the development 
needs of both present and future generations of humans without destroying the 
biological basis of life, as well as guaranteeing their security from various ‗wants‘ and 
‗fears‘, particularly economic and environmental ones. This consideration immediately 
directs us to the concept of sustainable development which we discussed in Part One.   
Let us recall the general outline of the Brundtland definition of sustainable 
development. This definition, as explored and adjusted in Part One, suggests a change in 
capitalist political economic practice. In order to deal with the wide-ranging problem of 
human poverty, this definition of sustainable development allows developing countries to 
                                                                                                                                                        
center-of-life‘ all living entities have equal intrinsic value which qualifies them for equal moral respect. On 
the other hand, Attfield‘s version of biocentrism (i.e.,  biocentric consequentialism), which we defended in 
Part Two, maintains that although all living entities have intrinsic value by virtue of having a good of their 
own, the moral significance of those entities can differ based on their capacities and interests (it is worth 
recalling here the example of the humans‘ capacity to vote and its relation to their interests). And this 
capacity and interest-led valuation process is run through guidance of the principle of equal consideration 
of equal interest. To be specific, defenders of this version prioritize different interests differently. Attfield‘s 
version of biocentrism has been found to endorse a form of consequentialism to take account of priorities 
between the many (and possibly conflicting) recognized values.                                                                                                        
11 Miller, Jr. G. T., ed., Environmental Science: Working with the Earth, 9th edn. (Pacific Grove, California: 
Brooks/Cole, 2003), p.5;  Schlosberg, D., Defining Environmental Justice: Theories, Movements, and Nature 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 
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have economic growth to a certain extent. The parameter of the relevant level of 
development is basic human basic needs, which are viewed as a precondition for 
sustainable lifestyles, and which are also compatible with the aim of protecting  the 
habitat or ecosystems upon which all the bearers of intrinsic value (i.e., all living creatures 
including human beings)  depend.  
Another significant characteristic trait of the adjusted definition of sustainable 
development is implicit in the assumption that it is the responsibility of present 
generations to establish a process to attain a certain level of development which ensures a 
satisfactory quality of life in perpetuity, and which also involves acting so that they can 
bestow a world to their successors that is as good as the one they have inherited from 
their predecessors. This version of sustainable development tackles the issue of both 
intra-generational and inter-generational justice for all living entities, irrespective of 
species, and is committed to a moderate version of strong sustainability, but not to the 
extremely strong version of strong sustainability (for more on this see chapter three of 
Part One). Accordingly, as I concluded, the moderate version of the strong sustainability 
model warrants acceptance and needs to be practised if humans want to make their 
development more sustainable. Supporting this stance, Giuseppe Munda asserts that 
sustainable development must employ the criterion of strong sustainability; we just need 
to develop non-monetary indicators of ecological sustainability to measure sustainable 
development.12  
Criticising the concept of sustainable development, Baxter states13 that, even 
though it is of significant interest to environmentalism, it remains at a high degree of 
abstraction unless important qualifications are made.  Therefore, for him it is inherently a 
                                                     
12 Munda, G., ‗Environmental Economics, Ecological Economics and the Concept of Sustainable 
Development‘, Environmental Values, 6 (1997), 213-233 (p.18).  
13  Baxter, p.200 
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problematic task to measure this concept precisely. He goes on to say that the 
measurement of sustainable development is subject to scientific uncertainty (as we do not 
possess full scientific knowledge about how the biosphere functions nor even about its 
precise role in enhancing our economic method) and political negotiation (as different 
actors attempt to persuade decision-makers to adopt their preferred version). According 
to Baxter, sustainable development thus requires the development of democratic 
processes for the expression and negotiation of incommensurable values and 
considerations. Robin Archer labels this undertaking ‗economic democracy‘14, in that it 
democratises the internal structure of capitalist firms. Furthermore, Archer says that 
‗ecological modernization‘ can serve as a precise strategy for greening the capitalist 
political economy.  
Let us now first embark upon analysis of the concept of ecological modernization 
and the concept of economic democracy before we begin to envisage whether or not the 
supplemented version of sustainable development, which I offered and defended in 
chapter three of Part One, is free from Baxter‘s criticism of sustainable development as 
being too abstract a concept. In Dryzek‘s formulation, ecological modernization signifies 
the restructuring of the capitalist political economy along more environmentally sound 
lines.15 According to this view, no inherent environmental difficulties stem from the 
capitalist political economy itself.  The productive and organizational process developed 
within the capitalist form during the late twentieth century is responsible for the current 
economic inequality and environmental problems. Therefore, the trick here is to induce 
the appropriate form of economic reorganization within this capitalist form in a way that 
                                                     
14 Archer, R., Economic Democracy: The Politics of Feasible Socialism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
pp. 27-63 
15 Dryzek, J. S., The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses (Oxford, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), p. 141   
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protects profitability as well as the environment by reducing or minimizing the adverse 
environmental effects of the activities of capitalist firms.  
Dryzek argues that ecological modernization is a viable and effective alternative.  
To justify this claim he refers to those capitalist economies, namely Germany, the 
Netherlands, Japan, Sweden and Norway, which have been successful in increasing the 
energy efficiency of national income by reducing the harmful emissions and waste 
products from economic activities.16 He adds that the aforementioned states have 
developed a corporatist political culture together with a settlement and collaboration 
between government and the capitalist firms on suitable measures. To specify two 
obvious achievements, Dryzek refers to the creation of the Dutch National Environment 
Policy Plan (which was adopted in 1989) and the relative willingness of enterprises in 
Germany in taking a longer view, in other words bringing about a widespread acceptance 
of the ‗precautionary principle‘ 17 among nationals and corporations. 
Dryzek lists five advantages of the restructuring of the current political economy 
through ecological modernization; these are18:  
 less environmentally harmful forms of production are less inefficient; 
 tackling problems at an early stage obviates higher costs later; 
 employees are happier and work better in good environments; 
 there is money to be made in selling goods and services with ‗Green‘ credentials to 
an increasingly environment-conscious market; 
 profits can be made from producing and selling products designed to reduce or 
prevent pollution.   
 
 The advantages listed in this passage suggest that capitalist firms seem willing to 
recognize the authority of governments to intervene in altering the existing production 
and distributional process for the sake of the wider public benefit, and that 
                                                     
16 Dryzek, p. 137 
17 The gist of this principle is that the absence of scientific certainty about the nature and degree of an 
environmental threat does not justify doing nothing to tackle it. For more see Raffensperger, C. and 
Tickner, J. (eds), Protecting Public Health and the Environment: Implementing the Precautionary Principle (Washington 
DC: Island Press, 1999) 
 
18 Dryzek, p.142 
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environmentalism, which could without loss be understood as biocentric 
consequentialism, can be recognized by both government and capitalist firms. In 
addition, Baxter claims that this appears to suggest that ‗ecological modernization is 
something which at least reveals the potential for a form of political economy within 
which ecological justice can be found a place – although, of course, this is still a long way 
off.‘ 19 
This is unquestionably a matter of great hope if it is, in effect, possible to tackle, 
considerably reduce or minimize the adverse effects of the current political economy 
through restructuring the capitalistic political economy as suggested above (i.e., through 
ecological modernization). What does reality say? One of the most significant concerns 
here is that the main goal of the capitalist firms is to make a profit. Therefore, whatever 
changes take place with regard to productive and distributional processes within these 
firms, in other words whatever environmental improvement capitalist firms achieve, they 
must make them without compromising their main goal of making a profit; this goal does 
not disappear from the central position in the lists of capitalist goals.  
Tom Jackson has shown how a capitalist political economy (which he refers to 
simply as capitalism) and profit are inseparable. These two phenomena are deeply 
connected through the capitalist financial markets. In this regard he refers to the 
inevitable regulation of the charging of interest on loans for capital investment. 
Generally, he asserts, there can be no investment without loans, no loans without interest 
being charged, no payment of interest without an income being made, and so no 
continuation of production (and thus protecting of a trade) without further investment 
                                                     
19 Baxter, p.202 
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being paid for by additional loans, more interest and greater productivity and/or lower 
costs to pay them back, all of which contributes to economic growth. 20 
The implication of the above mentioned argument is that its criticism does not 
rely on the common analysis of capitalists as greedy or avaricious. Instead it points to 
forces within the structure of capitalism which explain why growth is inevitable for the 
continuation of the capitalist system. It also implies that any endeavour to remedy or 
reverse the growth trend in a capitalist political economy is nothing but a futile exercise, 
signifying that Dryzek‘s conceptualization of the currently dominating economic system 
and his idea of the restructuring of the current political economy are misrepresentations.  
In Baxter‘s words, ‗the cure for growth fixation will not come about as the result of 
making sure that capitalists are not subject to such vice‘.21 
Given this, ecological modernization appears to be a trick of the capitalist actors 
(or the rich), in an attempt to achieve some specific, albeit limited, environmental 
improvements within their sphere of operation. Two issues of concern are raised by this: 
(1) the essential driving force behind such environmental improvement is profit (through 
economic growth), and (2) such ecological modernization activities may well not be 
affordable for developing countries. Concerns such as these obviously turn the capitalist 
efforts of environmental improvement into ‗window dressing‘. Activities, such as 
exporting of toxic wastes to poor countries and conducting testing of raw materials at a 
low rate of remuneration within these countries, justify these concerns.  Therefore the 
attempt to reduce the environmental impacts of corporate activities to a minimally 
required level under the impulse of the capitalist political economy remains an 
unattainable hope, arguably suggesting that there is no alternative except to seek a new 
                                                     
20  Jackson, T., Material Concerns: Pollution, Profit and Quality of Life (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 167-168   
21 Baxter, p.204 
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political economy that is able to tackle world poverty (i.e., able to meet human 
development needs or basic needs) and environmental limits (and thus limits effects on 
the human habitat).         
The question now arises: should we remain silent in anticipation of the 
emergence of an appropriate new political economy in the future? The fact of the matter 
is that the capitalist society is spreading to new areas of the world with, as yet, no serious 
obstacles, making the current economic inequalities and environmental hazards the main 
source of life threatening troubles for the vast majority of the world‘s human population, 
as well as creating lots of life-threatening troubles for non-human living entities. Doing 
nothing to tackle the current economic and social inequalities and environmental crisis 
(in other words a strategy of inaction) in anticipation of the emergence of an appropriate 
paradigm of economic practice, seems therefore to involve taking a high risk, and thus is 
implausible.  
Given this, it seems there is a pressing need to take the initiative to tackle such 
problems without delay.  By the same token it can be said that the citizens of Germany, 
the Netherlands, Japan, Sweden and Norway, who have given rise to widespread 
recognition of the precautionary principle, and who have also been successful to some 
extent in reflecting this principle in their economic activities, merit appreciation. As 
mentioned earlier, examples of this include some countries‘ successes in increasing the 
energy efficiency of national production, and reducing harmful emissions and the amount 
of waste products created during economic activities. Whatever degree of success these 
countries have achieved up to now has mainly been possible through pressure from 
citizens/consumers. Citizen pressure has also been found to compel the governments of 
the aforementioned countries into changing their governmental regulations and 
regulating market activity. As was observed earlier, the capitalistic political economy is 
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committed merely to profitability, not to economic equality or environmental 
sustainability. Therefore, the very system of the capitalistic political economy has nothing 
to do with resolving the problems in question, but instead functions as the main source 
of such problems. Therefore, the main forces of consumer pressure, governmental 
regulations and market activity of a sustainable kind that can keep the current economic 
practice pointing in a greenish direction naturally have to come from outside.22 
One might now reasonably argue that there is still a need for economic growth to 
continue for a certain period of time under the present form of economy to generate 
improvements in human wellbeing in the poorest countries. However, here the problem 
is that the poor countries cannot afford the costs related to ecological modernization so 
they have no option but to follow the current dominant economic practice unless an 
affordable method of ecological modernization can be made available to them. Given 
this, one might further argue that as nothing of this kind is available at the moment, a 
certain amount of environmental degradation has to be allowed to let the poor meet their 
basic needs. This sounds quite plausible from the point of view of environmental justice. 
Considering the nature of environmental justice, it seems that at this stage there is no 
alternative to the pursuit of growth-based economic practice until and unless an 
acceptable alternative method of ecological modernization becomes available to the poor.  
Nevertheless it is also reasonable to say that this does not remove the need to seek a 
method of ecological modernization that is both effective and affordable to the poor. 
Control of the current growing environmental pollution depends to a considerable extent 
on success in discovering and transferring forms of affordable ecological modernization 
technology for the poor countries (we can think of environmental impacts of economic 
growth activities in a range of developing economies such as China, India, Brazil, South 
                                                     
22 Ibid. p.205 
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Africa and Mexico) in order to address the environmental degradations that occur during 
economic activities. 
The points I have hitherto considered imply that the poor countries are allowed 
to begin practising ecological modernization once their basic needs are fulfilled; in other 
words, once they can afford to. In addition, they are allowed to continue with this like 
the developed countries unless an acceptable alternative to the current capitalist political 
economy becomes available to practise.  It is argued that ecological modernization, under 
the currently dominant economic practice, can even help reduce the adverse effects of 
human economic activities. As has been shown, there are examples to support of this 
claim, but concerns come from the thought that although ecological modernization can 
reduce the environmental impacts of current economic practice, in the long run it cannot 
sustain its achievement (in terms of environmental improvement) at whatever level it 
brings this about because the vital commitment of the current economic practice is 
profitability (through economic growth). This whole process ultimately leads to the 
growing use of natural capital and the accumulation of wealth, making it materially more 
intensive and environmentally more deleterious.  
As Baxter mentions, with the intention of overcoming this difficulty, some might 
argue that 
the material needs of a stable human population would be met in a manner 
which minimised material throughput and human beings‘ primary concern 
would switch from the accumulation of material wealth to non-material 
needs, such as affection, creativity, the contemplation of beauty and the 
pleasures of human intercourse (presumably themselves satisfied on a 
predominantly non-material basis).23 
 
 What the proponents of this view are highlighting is that the justification of an 
acceptable alternative paradigm of economic practice depends largely on its capacity to 
                                                     
23 Ibid 
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switch humans‘ focus from the mere realization of their material needs to non-material 
needs.  However, from the point of view of biocentric consequentialism, as I outlined it 
in chapter three of Part Two, it is not possible to satisfy the requirements of 
environmental justice just by shifting humans‘ focus from material needs to non-material 
needs. The actions of an agent, to be moral, have to include the good of affected non-
human living entities in the agent‘s moral deliberations. This in turn suggests that by 
omitting the issue of the good of non-human living entities, the proponents of the 
abovementioned view fail to achieve a green and sustainable solution for economic 
practice as compared to the currently dominant one.      
Let us now go on to discuss the concept of economic democracy. In 
conceptualizing the concept of economic democracy, Robin Archer recently wrote that it 
is all about democratizing the internal structure of capitalist firms. The case for such a 
democratic process, according to him, derives from the case for autonomy, which is the 
basic value of individual human beings that permits individuals to make their own 
choices about what to do, how to act and the like. In the case of collective decision-
making, this basic value leads humans towards the case for democracy. In addition, for 
him, this human value leads to two specific principles: (1) the ‗all affected principle‘, and 
(2) the ‗all subjected principle‘. The ‗all affected principle‘ is the understanding that 
individuals whose ability to make decisions and act upon them that are affected by 
decisions of an association (e.g. a capitalist firm) should share in control over the process 
through which such decisions are made.24 On the other hand, the ‗all subjected principle‘ 
is the observation that individuals who are subjected to the authority of an association, 
                                                     
24 Archer, p. 29 
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such as its employees, should have direct control over the decisions of the association in 
question.25    
  Principle one implies that stakeholders (a class which comprises employees, 
consumers, shareholders, suppliers of raw material, financial institutions and local/non-
local residents whose lives are affected by the firm‘s externalities), by virtue of being 
bearers of autonomy, warrant two indirect methods of control: (1) the power to exit, or 
to remove themselves from their relationship with firms, and (2) government regulation, 
particularly where option one cannot be put into practice.  Principle two, on the other 
hand, involves an appeal to the creation of direct decision-making opportunities within 
the enterprise for the employees. In formulating the basis of principle two, Archer argues 
that while employees are entitled to be involved with firms‘ decision making by virtue of 
them being bearers of the value of autonomy, they are in fact governed by the choices of 
the manager(s) of their firms, not by their own choices. 
 The concern arises of whether or not the two abovementioned human-
autonomy-oriented principles have any adverse effect on the economic efficiency of an 
enterprise. In replying to this concern, Archer argues that it is intuitively clear that an 
enterprise that is running inefficiently would itself be harmful  through depriving the 
affected people of the ability to make some of their choices to the practice of humans‘ 
own choices. This implies that it is less likely that a firm will become economically 
inefficient when the decision-making process of the firm is run by the two 
abovementioned principles.  
  Archer also goes on to say that there is no major difficulty even if acceptance of 
these principles does result in economic inefficiency for a firm. For him the validity of 
any economic system is value-laden. He argues that if we agree that economic efficiency 
                                                     
25 Ibid .p, 32     
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is not the sole goal of human (development) activities, and if we also agree that over and 
above economic efficiency there are other goals which are significant and need to be 
realized, then we can plausibly accept a less efficient economic paradigm for the sake of 
the realization of other important goals. A range of human social and environmental 
goals (namely literacy, health, equal distribution of economic benefits and pollution free 
air, water and land) may well be envisaged here as examples of other important goals.  
  There are two significant recognitions in Archer‘s assumption which warrant 
appreciation: (1) he recognizes human autonomy as the central issue to the case for 
collective decision making (i.e., democracy). In Part One we have already defended the 
significance of the practice of human autonomy for sustainable development. (2) He also 
recognizes the non-material goals of human economic activities, which justify the 
obligation and entitlement of humans to reduce current economic inequality and 
environmental problems by ordering their preferences appropriately by focusing on their 
various non-material needs.  More importantly, Archer‘s abovementioned principles 
seem to address human development needs plausibly, which is one of the key requisite 
conditions for sustainable development.  
  However, the question remains of whether these principles satisfy the other 
requisite conditions for sustainable development?  The answer is partly implicit in the 
formulation of biocentric consequentialism. As observed earlier in chapter three of Part 
Two, biocentric consequentialism holds the view that each living creature has a good in 
itself which amounts to its intrinsic value and that, as a bearer of intrinsic value, each 
creature is subject to moral consideration, but there is no recognition of this (i.e., the 
good of non-human entities) in the formulation of the two abovementioned principles of 
Archer. The indirect controls that Archer adduced in the two principles, namely exit and 
government regulation, are not applicable or available to non-human living creatures; 
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non-human creatures, unlike human stakeholders, cannot usually gain exit from their 
relationship with a firm which adversely affects them through its activities. Also, being 
non-participants in politics, non-human creatures are unable to achieve direct 
government regulation.  
As can be observed, there is nothing inbuilt in the idea of any kind of democracy 
that guarantees environmental justice. For example, none of its forms recognize the 
wellbeing of non-human living creatures, and all fail to address the long-term values of 
biological and genetic diversity. Therefore, Archer‘s analysis of economic democracy, as 
one kind of democracy, remains open to criticism on account of leaving the issue of 
environmental justice unaddressed. 
It could be argued that the claim that there is nothing inbuilt in the idea of any 
kind of democracy that guarantees environmental justice is an exaggeration because, in a 
sense, democracy is a system that is highly dependent on how people actually think. 
Therefore, if people decide that they will not make economic profit at the cost of the 
values and interests of nonhuman creatures and the value of ecosystems then democracy 
could be supportive of environmentalism and so the two can go hand in hand. This 
argument is quite plausible. However, here the concern is that such pro-environmental 
aspiration, as has been mentioned earlier, cannot substantially be realised under the 
dominant capitalistic political economy which primarily relies on uninterrupted 
profitability.  A radical change in the currently dominant economic and political system is 
needed to achieve such a transition.    
Having studied the reason why environmentalists, in particular the proponents of 
biocentric consequentialism, should disapprove of the capitalistic political economy, and 
having also studied the problems and prospects for the concept of ecological 
modernization and the concept of economic democracy concerning the possibility of  
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transforming the currently dominant paradigm of political economy in an 
environmentally-friendly direction, we must now return to the concept of sustainable 
development that I argued for in Part One, a concept which has the capacity to produce 
a policy framework for sustainable development  that satisfies the requirements of 
environmental justice or which  is, to say the least,  able to reduce the current degree of 
economic inequalities and environmental degradation.  
 However, I have one more issue to discuss; that is, Baxter‘s criticism of 
sustainable development as being too abstract a concept; he is understandably critical of 
any version of sustainable development which is unqualified. The history of the debates 
on the meaning of sustainable development (as discussed in Part One) suggests that 
measuring sustainable development is not an easy task. However, this difficulty should 
not distract from recognizing the positive advances that I attempted to make in Part One 
by rectifying and reformulating the two central definitions of sustainable development 
(the Brundtland definition and the definition of Caring for the Earth), and by introducing 
the concept of basic needs as centrally relevant.  
As we concluded, in order to improve human wellbeing, human development 
activities can be continued in perpetuity if individual basic needs can be set as the central 
objective of the the human activities in question.  The implication of employing the 
concept of basic needs in conceptualizing the concept of sustainable development is clear 
as it functions as a limit to the ever-expanding economic growth-oriented human 
development process. In so doing, it not only opens a tangible, clear-cut and durable 
development path, but also helps develop a process for improving various opportunities, 
which in turn allows individuals, particularly those in poor communities, to achieve their 
aspirations and potential for a continued period of time whilst maintaining the resilience 
of the environmental systems.  
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This raises further questions, such as what would be the framework and contours 
of an appropriate policy of sustainable development? More importantly, how would such 
a policy vision tackle the challenging task of incorporating and implementing seemingly 
competing policy objectives into its contours? Examples of this include how such a 
policy would tackle combining seemingly competing policy objectives, such as the need 
to practice growth-oriented economic policy in the poorest countries for a certain period 
of time to protect their people‘s lives and improve their wellbeing, alongside the moral 
obligations of protecting non-human creatures as bearers of intrinsic value and the moral 
duty of protecting the environment as the habitat for all living entities, including humans.  
Therefore, the most important task now is to outline a framework for a policy vision 
along the lines of the version of sustainable development I have defended, which is based 
on biocentric consequentialism. An investigation of such a policy framework with 
sustainable development as its target comprises the theme of the next chapter.     
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Chapter Two 
 
4.2: Ethical Dimensions of Environmental Problems: Planning a Policy 
Framework for Sustainable Development 
 
In the previous chapter I argued that, neither ‗ecological modernisation‘ nor ‗economic 
democracy‘ is able to advance the cause of substantial improvement in the current 
environmental crisis under the currently dominant economic practice.  One of the major 
sources of problems with the practice of ecological modernisation under the currently 
dominant economic practice, as I explained, is the inseparable attachment of the 
currently dominant economic practice to profitability, which implies that if economic 
practice is to reduce the rapidly growing environmental degradations and economic 
inequalities (which are caused by the currently dominant high-growth-seeking economic 
practice), there is no alternative except for a new policy paradigm. The problem with the 
concept of economic democracy, as has been identified in the previous chapter, is its 
incapacity to address the issue of environmental justice. This charge of incapacity is 
grounded on the thought that (1) there is nothing inbuilt in the concept of economic 
democracy (a charge which is also applicable to every other standard form of democratic 
practice) which ensures that environmental justice is taken seriously and (2) even though 
people want democratically to uphold environment-friendly policies, they can hardly 
realise substantially such policies under the currently dominant economic practice.  
The concern of the current chapter is to outline a policy framework, with the 
focus on the ethical dimension of environmental problems. The policy issues considered 
in this chapter are those affecting entire societies and increasingly encompassing all 
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humanity as well as nonhuman living creatures in their entirety. In so doing, I will first 
explore and extract ethical principles that stem from a wider understanding of the notion 
of environmental problems and sustainable development, and then will consider how 
problems with the framework of the dominant economic practice (which often results in 
policy failure) might be overcome through incorporating various ethical values and 
concerns about the environment into a policy framework. 
Before I consider a policy framework for sustainable development, the notion 
of policy should briefly be introduced. A policy is a set of normative guidelines directed 
at practice. It could be private or public. A private policy is a set of normative guidelines 
chosen by someone to practice at the individual level. On the other hand, a public policy 
is a set of enforceable normative guidelines (directed at practice) which is accepted and 
governed by official public bodies or a party, such as an agency of government, or a 
legislature. There is a close relationship between public policy and law, inasmuch as all 
laws constitute public policies. Nevertheless a public policy need not be explicitly 
formulated or codified as law,1 for not all policies are, in the conventional sense, laws. In 
advancing a public policy proposal, one enjoys much autonomy (i.e. one is not obliged to 
act along the lines of an existing or agreed public policy directive) as opposed to one‘s 
obligation to abide by the rule of law. In the light of this, sustainable development, as a 
public policy, means a plan of action which governs (or warrants an external control on) 
development activities (an area of human activities that can cause environmental 
problems), pursuing a set of enforceable normative guidelines (directed at practice). 
Regulations and guidelines of public policies are generally accepted and promulgated by 
official public bodies such as an agency of government, or a legislature.  
                                                     
1 For more see Beauchamp, T. L. and Childress, J.F., Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), pp. 13-14. 
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Since the Rio summit in 1992, governments all over the world have been 
practising and promulgating numerous influential regulations made in line with the UN 
standard definitions of sustainable development. But as the standard definitions of 
sustainable development face some serious problems, and as some of these problems 
suggest the need for revisions, while others seem fatal to the definitions as they stand (as 
I discussed in Part One), a great deal still remains to be done in order to devise a 
satisfactory framework for sustainable development.  
It is widely recognised that the key objective of planning a sustainable policy 
framework is to contribute to securing a sustainable future through setting out suitable 
concrete policies. As I argued on several occasions in the earlier Parts, achievement of 
this objective is essentially reliant on whether or not human development needs and 
environmental limits (in other words, sensitivities) are given the required priority, as 
opposed to the sheer pursuit of high economic growth, in a given concrete policy. One 
of the key underpinnings of this verdict is a wider understanding of the notion of 
environmental problems. As was suggested in Part Three, there are at least two 
distinctive traits of environmental problems. They are as follows: (1) just as with standard 
environmental problems (such as resource degradation and depletion, pollution and 
waste, and biodiversity loss), problems of human insecurity (which stem from a lack of 
security from various ‗wants‘ and ‗fears‘) also amount to environmental problems; (2) 
environmental problems are not only about the efficient use of various resources, but 
also are about various ethical responses we make to them.  
The first trait of environmental problems, mentioned in the paragraph above, 
implies that a policy framework for sustainable development can not accomplish its 
objective of a sustainable future without recognising the importance of the integration of 
standard environmental problems (which extend to issues ranging from resources to 
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biodiversity) with the ones relating to human security threats, which, as I contended in 
Part Three, stem from various ‗wants‘ and ‗fears‘. And the second trait of environmental 
problems entails that it is far from clear that a policy framework for sustainable 
development will make the difference to policy-making that it is expected to make (i.e. 
securing a sustainable future) if all the ethical concerns which arise from various 
undesirable implications of human environmental interventions with those creatures 
which deserve to be sustained are set to one side.      
To deliver a sustainable future, policy-makers, therefore, must make efforts to get 
the above mentioned traits of environmental problems covered by the sustainable policy 
framework. But in so doing, policy-makers at the outset need to know clearly about the 
solution to the query ‗what to sustain‘, to be more precise ‗which creatures are entitled to 
be sustained?‘, before they begin to set out concrete policies simultaneously to address 
developmental and environmental  predicaments.   
Given this, before I begin to explore ‗how to secure a sustainable future‘, it is 
important to clarify ‗what to sustain‘. Responding to this query is not a straightforward 
task, if not impossible, for there has not appeared hitherto any solution to this query that 
ethicists accept in common. A number of traditional ethicists, including the 
environmentalists who promote anthropocentrism, maintain the view that since human 
beings are the only moral agents, they are also the only qualified contenders for moral 
consideration. As was argued in Part Two, this traditional human-centred view clearly 
fails to address some issues, which are envisaged to be central to ‗environmental 
problems‘ in the wider sense of these words.  Examples include human beings‘ 
relationship with and responsibilities towards non-human living creatures, species, 
ecosystems and future generations.  
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In chapter three of Part Two, I defended Attfield‘s variety of biocentric 
consequentialism as a strong contender as an acceptable value theory, as opposed to non-
biocentric normative ethical theories. In responding to the query ‗what to sustain‘, 
biocentric consequentialism argues that the flourishing or wellbeing of living creatures 
(present and future) is the locus of intrinsic value, and having capacity to flourish and 
also having goods and interests of their own, all  living creatures are bearers of intrinsic 
value, and should be recognised and sustained as such.  
Furthermore, it has been observed that biocentric consequentialism supplies a 
foundation for seeking to sustain (or conserve) species and ecosystems (habitats). It is 
argued that, despite having no intrinsic value (according to this stance only living 
creatures or members of a species possess intrinsic value, not the collection to which 
they belong), species and ecosystems, being the bearers of instrumental value and 
instrumental plus inherent value (see Part Two for details) respectively, have immense 
implications for the enduring existence of all living creatures. Just to recapitulate, the 
types and implications of the various values of ecosystems and species for bearers of 
intrinsic value, while ecosystems involve inherent value (in the sense that appreciators 
can be benefited through appreciating the aesthetic value of ecosystems) and 
instrumental value (in the sense that ecosystems are the only source of habitats for  many 
bearers of intrinsic value), species involve instrumental value (in the sense that the 
continued existence of members of a species depends on the continuance of the species 
they belong to, and species contribute to ecosystems and their health). (For more see 
chapter three of Part Two).  
So far so good. But a serious question might be asked: do all living creatures 
possess an equal strength of intrinsic value?  As I maintained in the same Part, Wilfred 
Beckerman is right in saying that it would be morally repugnant if it was suggested that 
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we should preserve each and every beetle in the name of their intrinsic value at the cost 
of leaving human poverty unremedied. The standpoint of biocentric consequentialism, 
regarding this matter, is very clear. It recognises that intrinsic values found in various 
living creatures have different degrees of strength and concentration, and also argues that 
the difference in degrees of strength and concentration explains why the extensive 
presence of intrinsic value does not make this approach counterintuitive, or pointless.  
In preference to the holistic environmentalist‘s views and the animal 
liberationist‘s (individualistic) view, biocentric consequentialism -- as a middle-of-the-
road view 2 -- thus maintains that neither every drop of nature nor the whole of nature 
generate duties for us, but rather that our duty is to protect the bearers of intrinsic value 
as well as species (biodiversity) and the intactness of suitable ecosystems (such as a 
forest) for their immense value in helping to continue the bearers of intrinsic value 
(which thus underpins a moderately strong sustainability view). Concerning our duties 
towards species, it has been recognised that whilst the continuation of a species solely 
depends on the survival of the last remaining members of a species, our duty is to 
prioritise their protection as opposed to that of the members of species which are 
plentiful. In so arguing, this stance makes its arguments more persuasive; and more 
importantly it keeps itself away from drawing two bizarre conclusions, to say the least: (1) 
each and every member of a species should be preserved, and (2) every drop of every 
ecosystem should be a cherished and preserved (which upholds the ‗absurdly strong 
                                                     
2 Biocentric consequentialism, as opposed to single-value monistic theories, and also as opposed to any 
radical variety of moral pluralism (which maintains and highlights that values are always incommensurable, 
and thus implies that clashes between values are never rationally resolvable), recognises that there is a range 
of values (such as health, the development of capacities, worthwhile life, autonomy, justice, etc.) which are 
commensurable, and conflicts among them can be adjudicated through meta-principles being used. For 
details see chapter three of Part Two.      
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sustainability‘ view3 ). Thus it seems that overall biocentric consequentialism not only 
protects itself from being exposed to conclusive criticisms, but also protects itself from 
being ethically repugnant since it upholds strong sustainability theory without being 
committed to the view that everything valuable in nature must be preserved.  
Two characteristic traits of Attfield‘s version of biocentric consequentialism 
appear to justify it as a strong theoretical basis for the policy framework required for a 
sustainable future. They are: (1) as a variety of needs-consequentialism (which is based on 
needs, not on happiness nor on wellbeing defined in terms of preferences either), it takes 
present and future needs adequately into account; (2) as a variety of biocentric theory, it 
transcends human interests, taking into account the interests of nonhuman creatures and 
importance of biotic systems (but doing so without prioritising these systems over the 
valuable creatures which they sustain) and species (without prioritising species over their 
individual members). 
From the above discussion it is now apparent that, in line with biocentric 
consequentialism, our responsibilities concern all living creatures (present and future), 
and species and ecosystems because of their respective values. Going back to the query 
‗what to sustain‘, it can now be replied that all living creatures merit being sustained; but 
if the situation requires us to make decisions through making comparisons between the 
bearers of intrinsic value,  then it should be based on  degrees of strength and 
concentration of  their intrinsic value. Species and ecosystems are immensely significant 
                                                     
3 See Holland, A., ‗Substitutability: Why Strong Sustainability is Weak and Absurdly Strong Sustainability is 
Not Absurd‘, in Valuing Nature? Economics, Ethics and the Environment, ed. by Foster, J. (London: Routledge, 
1997), pp. 119-134;  Holland, A., ‗Nature - Every Last Drop - is Good‘,  in The Ethics of the Environment ed. 
by Attfield, R.(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008),  pp. 79-95; and Holland, A., ‗Must We Give up Environmental 
Ethics?‘, in Environmental Ethics and International Policy. ed. by ten Have, H.A.M.J. and others (Paris: 
UNESCO Publishing, 2006), pp. 191-216. 
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for their instrumental and inherent values, and thus merit being sustained, but for the 
sake of the bearers of intrinsic value.  
In light of this value stance, it seems that there are at least four ethical issues of 
concern, with four types of responsibilities corresponding to the wider notion of 
environmental problems. The four ethical concerns which immediately generate duties 
are: 
 increasing concern for the growing economic gap between the affluent and 
the poor of the world (through worsening the condition of security from 
want this gap contributes to degradation of the environment), which appeals 
to a variety of  justice  called  ‗intra-generational justice‘ (see chapter 3, Part 
One). (One of the responsibilities is to eliminate evils such as extreme 
poverty from societies, and to ensure access for everyone to nature/ natural 
resources to fulfil their basic needs.); 
 increasing concern for future generations, which leads to enlargement of the 
concept of justice; this can thus be called ‗inter-generational justice‘ (which 
involves a duty to preserve natural resources for future generations to meet 
their basic needs: see chapter 3, Part One); 
 increasing concern for non-human living creatures, which leads to further 
transformation of the concept of justice; this can thus be called ‗inter-
species justice‘ (which involves a duty to ensure that no goods and interests 
of any bearers of intrinsic value are unrepresented in our ethical 
deliberations); 
 and increasing concern for species and  ecosystems, which requires a policy 
of  conserving species and habitats and of preventing unnecessary 
destruction of ecosystems. It involves the need for protection of species and 
habitats for the sake of the survival of all the bearers of intrinsic value 
(which involves a duty to preserve ecosystems). 
 
 
Thus, to be acceptable  a policy framework  must be able to set out concrete 
policies which recognise the four issues of concern mentioned in the paragraph above, 
and also  pursue the presupposed related responsibilities in an integrated manner, looking 
for solutions (to challenges of environmental problems) which deliver the relevant goal, a 
sustainable future. The four issues of ethical concern, listed in the paragraph above, seem 
to have implications for mapping out the contours of sustainable policy and 
understanding its framework. They also attest that no policy decision can succeed in 
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realising its objective of a secured sustainable future (i.e. desired economic, social and 
environmental goals) if it sidesteps the issue of environmental justice. In fact, however, 
ethical issues such as the ones listed in the paragraph above are central to the success of a 
nation as regards those goals.  
In a recent working paper, Glotzbach and Baumgartner have categorised 
different theoretical stances about the nature of interaction between intra- and 
intergenerational justice as regards ecology into three distinct varieties: (1) the 
independent justice hypothesis (there is no distinguishable link between the achievement 
of the two types of justice); (2) the facilitation hypothesis (intergenerational justice 
increases the chance of achieving intragenerational justice and intra-generational justice 
helps securing intergenerational justice); and (3) the rivalry hypothesis (the demands of 
intergenerational justice conflict with those of intra-generational justice; by attaining one 
the other becomes more inaccessible).4 One might now argue that this distinction can be 
applied more generally to intra- and intergenerational contexts of justice, which means 
that it is also applicable to the classification of justice I have made in the two paragraphs 
above; and the theory presented here belongs to the second variety-- the facilitation 
hypothesis.  
Intra-generational justice is indubitably distinct from intergenerational justice in 
the sense that, while the former focuses on lines of cleavage between contemporaries 
(namely economic disparity between the rich and the poor and differences between states 
in the international systems), the latter focuses on justice between generations. But the 
question is whether or not this dissimilarity creates any theoretical or practical problem 
for us in recognising interdependences between the types of justice. It is a fact that, if 
                                                     
4 Glotzbach, S. and Baumgartner, S., The Relationship between Intra-generational and Intergenerational Ecological 
Justice, (Lüneburg: Working Paper Series in Economics at University of Lüneburg 141, 2009) 
<http://www.leuphana.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Forschungseinrichtungen/ifvwl/WorkingPapers/wp_1
41_Upload.pdf> [accessed 20 January, 2012] (pp. 1-33) 
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either of the two hypotheses -- i.e. the independent justice hypothesis or the rivalry 
hypothesis (classified by Glotzbach and Baumgartner above) -- turn out to be true, then 
the facilitation hypothesis has to be discarded. Consequently our understanding of the 
framework of sustainable development which concerns four ethical issues (intra-
generational justice, intergenerational justice, inter species justice and duty to protect 
ecosystems) becomes open to criticism. 
This, however, is not the case because the chance of achieving one can be 
increased by achieving the other, which justifies the facilitation hypothesis. Consider the 
argument:  
A1: If there is an increase in the degree of intra-generational justice, then 
there will be a reduced amount of inequality in societies; 
B1: If there is a reduced amount of inequality in societies, then overuse, 
misuse and inefficient use of natural resources will be reduced; 
C1: If overuse, misuse and inefficient use of natural resources are reduced, 
then there will be enough natural resources reserved for future generations;  
D1: If there are enough natural resources reserved for future generations, 
then intergenerational justice will be upheld; 
E1: If there is an increase in the degree of intra-generational justice, then 
intergenerational justice will be upheld; 
Therefore, F1: The facilitation hypothesis is true with regard to intra-
generational justice facilitating intergenerational justice. 
Consider another argument:  
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A2: If intergenerational justice is upheld, then there will be enough resources 
reserved for the use of future generations;   
B2: If there are enough resources reserved for the use of future generations, 
then the degree of overuse, misuse and inefficient use of natural resources 
will essentially be reduced;  
C2: If overuse, misuse and inefficient use of natural resources are reduced, 
then inequality in societies will tend to be reduced; 
D2: When inequality in societies tends to be reduced, then intra-generational 
justice will be upheld;   
E2: If intergenerational justice is upheld, then intra-generational justice will 
tend to be upheld; 
Therefore F2: There are grounds to hold that the facilitation hypothesis is 
true with regard to intergenerational justice facilitating intra-generational 
justice. 
It can be assumed that all the premises of both the arguments are true in view of the fact 
that many proponents of the independent justice hypothesis and the rivalry hypothesis 
could accept them without difficulty except for certain problems within the third 
premises (i.e. C1 and C2) of both the arguments. One might express one‘s perplexity 
about C1 and C2 by saying that the truth of C1 and C2 is not straightforward like other 
premises. C1 (if overuse, misuse and inefficient use of natural resources are reduced, then 
there will be enough natural resources reserved for future generations) can be said to be 
applicable only to the societies or countries where there is already a standard level of 
reserves of natural resources, not to those societies/countries that are extremely 
resource–poor. The perplexity expressed here is understandable. For while the target of 
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maintaining a sufficient quantity of reserves of natural resources  for future generations is 
unlikely to be able to be achieved on the part of countries  such as Somalia, Sierra Leone 
and Burundi in Sub-Saharan Africa (where resource-scarcity has long been a reason for 
extreme poverty and other related problems), through reducing  overuse, misuse and 
inefficient use of natural resources the goal in question is realisable to a considerable 
extent on the part of countries with current reserves of natural resources, such as  South 
Africa, Algeria and Bangladesh and many others.  
But this problem does not rule out the possibility of the premise being true in a 
qualified sense and the argument being sound as well. I can read C1 as saying that 
although the above version of C1 can be false in some cases, it can at the same time be 
true for other circumstances depending on the existing reserves of natural resources of 
the country in question. C1 was used in the first argument to refer to countries where 
there are standard quantities of resources in reserve. Accordingly C1 (if overuse, misuse 
and inefficient use of natural resources are reduced, then there will be enough natural 
resources reserved for future generations) is true if understood on this basis. Thus C1, 
understood in this way, will succeed in avoiding the problem it seemed to involve.   
The difficulty with C2 may well be claimed to be more significant. The criticism 
of C2 is that the thought rooted in this premise (if overuse, misuse and inefficient use of 
natural resources are reduced, then inequality in societies will tend to be reduced) is not 
justifiable.  For, one might say, there are societies where a thorough practice of the 
imperative that prohibits overuse, misuse and inefficient use of natural resources may 
well not be able to bring about equality (a social goal of sustainable development) in 
those societies. Undoubtedly there are grounds for this criticism. For benefits that come 
from this practice can play no role in alleviating inequality unless they are justly 
distributed among the individuals in societies.  
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Despite the criticism being significant, C2 seems to turn out to be true in a 
qualified sense. The sense is that, if the conditions of distributive justice are satisfied in a 
society (i.e. if a society, by virtue of various forms of economic and social reform, is able 
to enjoy the benefits of the practices in question and distribute then fairly), and also if the 
society has a standard quantity of reserves of natural resources, then C2 (if overuse, 
misuse and inefficient use of natural resources are reduced, then inequality in societies 
will tend to be reduced) turns out to be true.  
One might, however, now raise the concern that there is still a time-factor 
problem here, e.g. one might argue that fairness in 2100 is not fairness in 2015, and this 
facilitates reverse discrimination, amounting to a violation of intergenerational justice. 
Undoubtedly, there is a point in this concern, for the controlled and skilful use of natural 
resources on the part of the current generation requires them to shoulder an unfair share 
of burden or sacrifice to reduce inequality in later societies across the entire future of 
humanity. Nevertheless, from another perspective the practice implicit in C2 seems 
justified in a qualified sense. The perspective is that we, the current generation, have been 
benefited (through fulfilling our basic needs) with the reserve of natural resources left by 
our predecessors; this support (‗sacrifice‘ if you like) has been crucial for the survival of 
our current contemporaries in a world of limited resources; thus what the predecessors 
did for us (i.e., their sacrifice) was indispensable and desirable. By the same token, our 
successors require a minimum reserve of natural resources to fulfil their basic needs for 
survival; thus we are obliged to pursue or are justified in pursuing the policies of 
controlled and skilful use of natural resources to assist our successors to realise their 
basic needs (in other words, to protect their existence) on the same moral ground. Thus 
it seems that, given the necessity and fairness of the controlled use of natural resources 
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(as suggested by the basic needs approach), we can overcome the above mentioned time-
factor problem. Thus C2, understood in this way, can become a defensible premise.        
In addition, the empirical evidence, which could indicate the general reliability of 
the other premises (excepting C1 and C2) used in the two arguments above, is available 
to be referred to.5 Hence the two arguments formulated above justify the view that there 
is a discernible link between the achievement of intra-and intergenerational justice, and 
this link gives expression to the view of the two-fold division of justice, that by achieving 
one the other becomes rather easier to achieve, attesting to the view that there is no 
theoretical or practical difficulty in recognising the interdependence between intra- and 
intergenerational justice as claimed in F1 and F2. 
Going back to the currently dominant economic practice, the existing two 
dominant economic approaches (i.e. the economic capture approach and the moral 
expert approach6) are not capable of combining widely held ethical values about the 
environment and processing them into relevant decision-making. One of the major 
problems that these two approaches face is that they cannot capture individuals‘ values 
about the environment by their willingness to pay (WTP) (because WTP is not sensitive 
to humans‘ ethical obligations to the environment and relevant concerns about justice).     
                                                     
5 For a discussion of sustainability and justice yielding support for the premises I have used here in the two 
arguments, see Vanderheiden, S., ‗Two Concept of Sustainability‘, Political Studies, 56(2008), pp. 435-455; 
and Streeten, P., ‗The Distinctive Features of a Basic Needs Approach to Development‘, International 
Development Review, 19.3 (1997), pp. 8-16, (p. 50).                                                                                               
6 According to the economic capture approach, ‗existing economic method can be successfully extended to 
include ethical concerns. For example, stated preference methods, especially contingent valuation, have 
been developed to try to capture ethical responses as ―non-use value‖ of the environment. [On the other 
hand], a moral expert approach [is the one] which confines economic methods to the analysis of welfare 
gains, and assumes a committee of ethical experts will complement economic expertise‘. O‘Neill, J., and C. 
Spash. ‗Conceptions of Value in Environmental Decision-Making‘, Environmental Values 9.4 (2000), 521–35 
(p. 521). 
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Another major problem with these approaches is that they fail to satisfy 
democratic legitimacy in the procedures they apply in environmental valuation. 
Normative assumptions made in these approaches offer conflict resolution and policy 
without public debate. For example, cost-benefit analysis, one of the dominant methods 
used in environmental decision-making, appears to measure the strength and weakness of 
the intensity of preferences of individuals, not the strength and weakness of reasons for 
them.7 These limitations have a significant implication for the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of decisions that are made under the dominant economic approaches in 
question.   
Furthermore, the tradition associated with the standard economic paradigm of 
discounting future costs and benefits by a social discount rate appears to be incapable of 
addressing the issues of justice and the responsibilities listed above. As has been 
mentioned earlier, biocentric consequentialism suggests that the range of ‗moral patients‘ 
extends beyond those currently alive or conceived, and thus our responsibilities expand 
to the extent to which the predictable impacts of current activities extend. But the fact of 
the matter is that, if the percentage of discounting is high, then the interests of more than 
thirty years from now become underrated, and thereby the interests of the distant future 
are effectively disregarded.8 Over and above its other limitations (such as a sheer focus 
on profitability), the practice of the standard economic paradigm of discounting future 
benefits and costs discloses the unsuitability of this paradigm in delivering a secure 
sustainable future, thus making it worthy of rejection.  
       I now go on to revisit the UN formulation of sustainable development to see 
whether or not it accommodates the various aforementioned issues of justice and related 
                                                     
7 Ibid. p. 523. 
8 Attfield, R., ‗Environmental Ethics and Global Sustainability‘. In: ten Have, H. A.M.J. et al. eds. 
Environmental Ethics and International Policy, (Paris: UNESCO, 2006), pp. 69-87 (p. 70).                                                                     
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responsibilities in its framework. Arguments adopted in Part One uphold the view that 
the conceptualisation of sustainable development in Our Common Future does not reveal 
that it represents an inclusive solution to the range of environmental problems facing 
humanity. While it warrants praise for articulating the conscious point that sustainable 
development entails as integration among economic, social and environmental elements, 
it can be criticised for being incomplete (as it leaves out reflection on other values such 
as justice). 
         It is worth repeating here that sustainability and desirability (in this connection, 
justice) are not inseparable. As was argued  and defended in Part One, sustainable 
solutions need not be just in themselves, but the importance of justice means that they 
should be supplemented or qualified to make them morally attractive as well as 
sustainable. For practical measures for promoting sustainability recurrently involve the 
problems of justice. For example, the accomplishment of the objectives of sustainability 
significantly depends on the realisation of measures such as global limits upon 
consumption and waste management. Thus a justifiable version of sustainable 
development must be able to accommodate this overall concern, without making justice 
a constituent element of sustainability.  
          Given this, I have supplemented the solutions proposed by the Brundtland 
commission in Our Common Future through recognising and adopting the aforementioned 
issues of justice: intra-generational, inter-generational, and inter-species justice as well as 
responsibilities to species and ecosystems. Through this modification, the framework of 
this version sets out policies that accommodate development that meet the basic needs 
of the present generation without undermining environmental limits. As has been 
observed earlier, the practice of ecological modernisation and economic democracy can 
hardly address these competing significant issues, namely, developmental needs and 
240 | P a g e  
environmental limits, which in turn strengthen the framework of the proposed version of 
sustainable development as a satisfactory alternative grounded on solid ethical 
foundations at variance with currently dominant economic policy and practices.  
        The main force of the supplemented version of sustainable development, as is 
apparent from the paragraphs above and also from chapter three in Part Two, is implicit 
in its consilience with the value theory of biocentric consequentialism. Consider this 
example: in Part Two, I mentioned that biocentric consequentialism allows the use of a 
small tract of an ecosystem (e.g. of a forest) to meet human basic needs. To be more 
specific, building a hospital in a clearing in a rain forest is allowed to vaccinate the 
children (living within the area of the forest) against malaria. Approval of the use of a 
small tract of forest (to meet human basic needs) implies that there is no contradiction 
between an increased level of development (at least to the extent it is necessary to meet 
human basic needs) and protecting and enhancing the relevant ecosystems. Also 
ecosystems have an economic role over and above their environmental role; hence a 
policy framework will not be adequate without recognising the multiple values and roles 
of ecosystems.  
       As I have argued on several occasions in this chapter and also in earlier parts, a 
plausible way to secure a sustainable future is to accommodate both developmental needs 
and environmental limits within the policy framework. Since the supplemented version 
of sustainable development satisfies this requirement, and also since it adequately focuses 
on the aforementioned issues of justice, the framework of the supplemented version of 
sustainable development seems to be the right answer to the query ‗how to secure a 
sustainable future‘. Thus to tackle the challenges in question, we need to uphold the core 
normative force of the supplemented version of sustainable development in our concrete 
policy decisions. To be more specific, a satisfactory handling of the current socio-
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economic and environmental problems to a large extent depends on whether or not the 
policy framework that we follow reflects the concept of sustainable development with 
due focus on its ethical dimension (the issues of intra- and intergenerational justice, inter-
species justice and the duty to protect ecosystems) and also whether or not the 
framework has the capacity to transform ethical values and duties into concrete policy 
decisions as regards development activities. 
Now a question might be asked: who will assist in applying the supplemented policy 
framework in our concrete policy-making process? As I mentioned in Part One, the UN 
has assisted in many ways, including its declaration of MDGs to address some significant 
economic and social challenges implicit in the Brundtland definition of sustainable 
development. But as this definition does not address the above-mentioned issues of 
justice, it warrants criticism, and needs to be supplemented in line with our supplemented 
version of sustainable development. To overcome the limitation of the Brundtland 
Commission‘s policy framework, UNESCO established the World Commission on the 
Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST) in 1998, to advise it on 
ethical issues regarding scientific knowledge and technology.9 And since the birth of the 
Commission, the Division of Ethics of Science and Technology of UNESCO has been 
working with COMEST jointly, and has published outcomes of a number of 
interdisciplinary dialogues (in particular between environmental scientists and 
environmental ethicists) in the form of books10 so as to encourage the scientific 
community to examine fundamental ethical questions and to motivate them in taking 
                                                     
9 ten Have, H.A.M.J.,  ‗Introduction: Environment, Ethics and Policy‘, in Environmental Ethics and 
International Policy, ed. by Henk A.M.J. ten Have (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2006), 11-22 (p. 12).                                                                                                                                                             
10 Example includes: Environmental Ethics and International Policy, ten Have, H.A.M.J., ed. (Paris: UNESCO; 
2006); Nanotechnologies, Ethics and Politics, ten Have, H.A.M.J., ed. (Paris: UNESCO; 2007) 
 
 
242 | P a g e  
necessary measures if they find any early indications of a risk situation. Plainly stated, it is 
an attempt to motivate relevant members of the scientific community and policy-makers 
to concentrate on promoting the best ethical guidance for concrete policy actions as 
regards sustainable development, rather than merely conceptualising the ethical issues (of 
environment and development) as such.  
This initiative surely represents an improvement, but to make this effort a fruitful 
move,  frequent dialogues should run among relevant scientists, ethicists, policy-makers, 
special interest groups and the general public, and they must identify and recognise 
various values and goals (in particular  economic, social and environmental) along with 
the ethical commitment that sustainable development involves. The supplemented 
version of sustainable development, which was offered in Part One, could be discussed 
in that forum, and there should be clear incorporation of the outcomes of such 
interdisciplinary dialogues (on the proposed four ethical concerns and our responsibilities 
corresponding to them) into concrete policy decisions and practice.  
 The UN is not, however, the only international organisation that works for people to 
increase their opportunities and prospects. There are several other supra-national 
economic and military institutions as well as international legal processes that largely 
determine the opportunities and prospects of humanity. Examples include the World 
Bank, the IMF and WTO, NATO and the international court of justice. Given this, a 
supra-national institution seems necessary to deal with socio-economic and 
environmental matters and also such institutions need to be accountable to a higher 
elected body. Held, in this context, has been found to refer to a directly elected global 
parliament, i.e. a democratically elected second chamber of the UN.11  
                                                     
11 For an explicit expression of this proposal, see Held, D., Democracy and the Global Order (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 279. 
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The policy implications of issues of justice for the governments of developed and 
developing countries are not always identical. Consider the following two assertions: (1) it 
is now widely accepted that the environmental impacts of development activities are 
global in scope; thus underdeveloped/developing countries are considerably affected by 
the development activities of the developed world. As underdeveloped/developing 
countries become (environmentally) victims of the development activities of the 
developed world and also as the victims are in no way culpable for such sufferings and in 
no way benefited from those development activities either, the policy of such 
development activities raises a serious problem of justice.  
Thus a policy framework for the development practised in the developed world 
cannot be sustainable, unless it is capable of addressing transboundary environmental 
impacts as such. (2) As has been observed in Part Three (on several occasions), while the 
immediate challenge of the environment for the poor communities who are based in 
underdeveloped and developing countries is not an issue of the quality of life but is a 
matter of survival, the issue of quality of life is primarily just a matter of the quality of life 
of the affluent (who are mostly located in the developed countries). Given this (and here 
we reach assertion (2)), the pressing need for the poor communities is to achieve 
economic (and then social) sustainability, while the pressing need of the affluent is to 
ensure environmental sustainability. Thus while the principal task of governments of 
underdeveloped countries is to set out policies with a view to attaining economic goals 
(such as poverty alleviation), the major task of the governments of developed countries is 
to introduce policies to attain environmental sustainability (recognise environmental 
limits). Thus a development policy of an underdeveloped or a developed country cannot 
be acceptable (or sustainable either) without being capable of addressing the pressing 
needs of the country as appropriate.   
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Through upholding the four principles of justice and recommending responsibilities 
corresponding to them, the framework of the supplemented version of sustainable 
development seems to take into account various implications of developmental activities 
relating to the issue of justice as well as the implications mentioned in the above-
mentioned two arguments. Thus the supplemented version of sustainable development 
seems to provide comprehensive guidance in setting out national, regional and 
international development policy decisions satisfying the requirements for sustainable 
development.   
To deliver their duties in the face of the current environmental challenges, 
governments of underdeveloped/developing countries therefore first need to address 
(extreme) poverty, which means that they must inevitably  prioritise economic goals (i.e. 
economic growth) over social and environmental goals. Now a question may well be 
asked: does this undermine the two other goals of sustainable development: social and 
environmental sustainability? The answer is no. For these two goals (social and 
environmental sustainability) are not capable of being achieved through ignoring 
economic goals. Evils such as poverty, malnutrition, and economic inequality, as 
observed in Part Three, are among the major reasons for growing environmental 
problems in the underdeveloped and developing countries; in other words, these evils 
have been found as the major barriers to the attainment of environmental sustainability. 
And this suggests that there is a strong connection between the attainment of economic 
goals (in other words, fulfilment of all unsatisfied basic needs) and the achievement of 
environmental sustainability. Thus it seems that addressing economic sustainability (and 
overcoming evils such as poverty, economic inequality and malnutrition) on the part of 
the governments of underdeveloped and developing countries does not undermine social 
and environmental goals; rather, it is a step toward them.  
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On the other hand, the governments of the developed countries (in particular, 
countries that have already fulfilled the basic needs of their inhabitants) are required to 
prioritise the values and goals of sustainability as appropriate for them. As they have 
already crossed the basic needs threshold, they are required to prioritise environmental 
and social goals over economic ones. Whatever they are doing now as regards 
development, it is mostly for further improvement of the quality of people‘s lives. But 
this very frequently affects the poor wherever they are located through undermining the 
social and environmental aspects of sustainable development (in particular, through 
expanding the economic gap between the rich and the poor, and adversely affecting the 
environments locally and globally because, as I have mentioned earlier, some impacts of 
environmental problems are global in scope). This directs us to the consideration that 
policy objectives for the poor can never in fact be realised entirely without co-operation 
from the other part of humanity, the affluent.  
The subject matter of sustainable development policy, as a public policy, involves 
issues of choice and decision that essentially become objects of governance at all levels of 
society – local, national, regional, transnational, intergovernmental and nongovernmental. 
Options for delivery accomplishment eventually involve institutions and practices of 
(political) government through which public choices are made. Hence the success of the 
policy framework of our suggested version of sustainable development significantly 
depends on its universal recognition and implementation (i.e. it should be recognised by 
all sectors of society and should be practised universally; in other words, both in 
developed and underdeveloped/developing countries across the world all together). This 
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directs our attention to a cosmopolitan theory of justice. But there is no scope here to go 
into the details of this view.12 
From the above analysis it is now apparent that the limitations of the currently 
dominant policy framework of sustainable development are implicit in the imperfect 
perception of poverty-linked environmental problems, and also in its exclusion of social 
and environmental values and goals in deliberation about sustainable development. These 
limitations are illustrated in most of the recent policy-decisions revealed in the areas of 
international trade, agriculture and forestry.13 Contrariwise, as has been observed here, 
the proposed framework for sustainable development does not have such limitations.     
Now another question may be asked: is the practice of gearing towards each set of 
sustainability goals in line with the priority of the day truly supportive of realising the 
ultimate goal of a sustainable development, a sustainable future? The answer is ‗yes‘. For, 
as has been argued on several occasions, if the constitution of sustainable development 
with its economic, social and environmental values and goals is prioritised appropriately, 
as well as the basic needs approach being relatedly maintained, then a framework for 
sustainable development can be made defendable. Our supplemented version can be 
envisaged as an attempt to achieve that end, since it is able to accomplish the key 
objective of sustainable development, a sustainable future. It follows from this that 
considerations about environmental protection and social goals would begin as soon as 
we took into account the economic issues, and vice versa. In other words, to embrace the 
economic goals of sustainable development does not give us grounds or even the option 
                                                     
12 For discussion of cosmopolitan theories of justice, see: Pogge, T., World Poverty and Human Rights: 
Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms, 2nd edn ( Cambridge: Polity, 2008) ; Pogge, T. and Moellendorf, D., 
Global Ethics: Seminal Essays: Global Responsibilities (St.Paul, MN: Paragon, 2008); Cohen, G. A., Rescuing Justice 
and Equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008); Cohen, G. A., ‗Incentives, Inequality and 
Community’, Oxford Online Resource Centre(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
<www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/cohen92.pdf>[accessed 1 February 2012]     
13  Lele, S.M., ‗Sustainable Development: A Critical Review‘, World Development 19.6 (1991), pp. 607-621.         
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to reject its social and environmental goals; rather it requires us to reconcile the 
exigencies of these goals: economic, social and environmental.  
Post-war European Union experience, which seems to be supportive of the proposed 
framework for sustainable development, can consider here as an example where 
development (regional level) did not begin from the objectives and goals of sustainability 
straightaway, but rather advanced from phase to phase: at the earliest stage these 
countries focused on continuous economic growth, and then proceeded to attempt to 
balance economic growth with social goals followed by efforts to balance economic 
growth with environmental limits. Thus it seems that sustainable development is not 
something that can be attained by a country overnight, and it is not something of which 
all the standard goals can be realised at once either. But rather it is something that a 
human society absorbs in the course of its ongoing development through realising its 
goals in succession as time and opportunities permit.  
Thus when a government of an underdeveloped country gives priority to economic 
goals, if its policies are sound and consistent it cannot overlook social and environmental 
goals. It prioritises economic goals, as a response to a demand or the pressing needs of a 
given time, to help people to realise their basic needs, and once such needs are 
accomplished, the government in question is required by the theory of sustainable 
development to change the order of priority so as to balance economic goals with social 
and environmental goals. But this is not always as easy as it seems to be. It could at times 
be a really hard task to strike a judicious balance between economic goals and ecological 
ones, or vice versa. For an overpopulated (developing or underdeveloped) country, 
where the population-growth rate is still on the rise, can hardly be able to uphold 
environmental sustainability when this conflicts with the growing demands of the 
growing population. In this situation, concerned countries should take immediate and 
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effective measures to cut the excessive growth of their population.   There is no space to 
say more about this in the present context. I will come back to this issue in the next 
chapter which explores the prospects of the supplemented version of sustainable 
development in the case of Bangladesh, one of the most densely populated countries in 
the world.  
Simon Caney writes that we ‗consider the argument that it is unfair if persons are 
disadvantaged in terms of their opportunities because of their cultural identity [such as 
national or civic identity], and, hence, that persons should enjoy equality of 
opportunity.‘14 Caney‘s point is well taken in view of his unswerving concerns about the 
equality of opportunities, which advances the cause of sustainable development through 
tackling the issue of distributive justice. For example, as a concern about equality of 
opportunities, Caney‘s view upholds the following value assumptions with reference to  
distributive justice: (1) attempts should be made so as to ensure that basic needs are 
fulfilled at the individual level; (2) the governments of underdeveloped /developing 
countries are justified in attempting to utilise their (financial) resources for economic 
development to facilitate access for their starving people to food, drinking water and to 
other basic needs; and (3) the governments of developed countries are not justified in 
attempting to increase economic growth as their people already have access to food and 
their basic needs are fulfilled; but rather they should attempt to promote energy 
efficiency among other relevant policies15.     
                                                     
14 Caney, M., ‗Cosmopolitanism, Democracy and Distributive Justice‘, in Global Justice Global Institutions, ed. 
by Daniel, W. (Alberta: University of Calgary Press, 2005), 29-64, (pp. 30-31). 
15  Such as policies about developing methods of storing CO2 underground, planting a growing number of 
trees, and developing mechanisms for raising public awareness about the necessity and implications of 
transforming materialistic and consumptive lifestyles which have a very harmful carbon footprint, and so 
on. 
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There is one more reason, at least, for which Caney‘s view merits recognition: this 
view concerns equality of opportunities for individuals to participate in policy-decisions 
that affect them. This is another important aspect of justice between contemporaries, 
which can be called ‗participatory justice‘. 
Caney‘s view suggest that over and above equality of opportunity to fulfil basic 
needs, every individual deserves to have equality of opportunities to participate in 
decision-making processes that have an effect on them. This view suggests that it is 
justified to use natural resources in underdeveloped and developing countries for 
attaining economic development and in developed countries for energy efficiency, which 
runs parallel with the normative assumptions and requirements of the supplemented 
version of sustainable development.  
As almost all countries signed up to sustainable development at the Rio summit of 
1992 and afterwards their commitment was reinforced at its successors of 1997 and 2002, 
and  as one important type of sustainable development, namely policies of maximum 
sustainable yield, is endemically flawed (for more see chapter three of Part One), it is a 
pressing need to have a new framework for sustainable development to be followed by 
governments, institutions and individuals,  which is  internationally cohesive and  
ethically sound as well. From the above discussion it can be argued that the framework 
for sustainable development that I have proposed in this study merits being envisaged as 
a sound alternative, for over and above the central goals of sustainable development 
(economic, social and environmental), people in policy making positions can address 
ethical concerns as regards development activities and humans' corresponding duties 
relating to them by adopting the supplemented version of sustainable development.  
It is now apparent that policy-makers can tackle a range of current environmental 
problems, such as the challenge of global warming, the world‘s inequality and poverty, 
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and the ongoing diminution of natural resources (both renewable and non-renewable) 
because of their misuse and overconsumption etc., by adopting the supplemented 
version of  sustainable development. The major ethical concerns with reference to 
environmental problems are various issues of justice, and the supplemented version can 
tackle such concerns by commending equitable approaches to them. The underpinning 
of such equitable approaches, as has been observed here, is the (intrinsic) value of living 
creatures (including human beings) and the enormous instrumental and inherent value of 
species and ecosystems as well as various normative principles and duties that derive 
therefrom.  
Global warming, for example, causes vast damage to other living creatures as well as 
humans. All living creatures located in and around coastal areas are most significantly 
affected by sea level rise on account of global warming. Here the disproportionate 
suffering of innocent people (in the sense that they are hardly responsible for global 
warming) generates ethical concerns. It is a manifest violation of intra-generational 
justice. Part of the solution to global warming is to reduce the total of greenhouse gas 
emissions towards as much as 85 per cent by 2050 as recommended by the International 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).16 To achieve this target, the burden of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions has to be shared fairly among humans as well as governments. 
One form of policy is famously known as the Greenhouse Development Rights 
Approach, which attempts to strike a balance between issues of GHGs emissions and 
issues of development needs.17The cost of greenhouse gas mitigation and of supporting 
                                                     
16 Combat Global Worming (Brussels: Bellona Environmental CCS Team, 2009) 
<http://bellona.org/ccs/home/bellona-and-ccs/bellona-studies/combat-global-warming.html>, 
[accessed 29 January, 2012] 
17 Baer, P., Athanasiou, T., Kartha, S. and Kemp-Benedict, E., ‗Greenhouse Development Rights: a 
Framework for Climate Protection That is ―More Fair‖ Than Equal Per Capita Emissions Rights‘, in 
Climate Ethics: Essential Reading, ed. by Gardiner, S. M., Caney, S., Jamieson, D., and Shue, H. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010).  
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development, according to this approach, should be shouldered by people who are at or 
above a certain level of development (who would be taxed accordingly). The success of 
this policy, as it seems now, depends on the recognition and practice of the 
supplemented version of sustainable development, which explicitly focuses on multiple 
forms of justice including that of intra-generational justice. It is in this sense that the 
framework of the supplemented version of sustainable development seems to require 
progress in tackling global warming. 
As I mentioned earlier, the same framework is equally applicable to other issues 
arising from global problems, such as the world‘s inequality and poverty, the diminution 
of natural resources (both renewable and non-renewable), contamination of water, air 
and soil, and the lessening of the restorative capacities of over-stressed species and 
ecosystems often to the point of annihilation because of misuse and overconsumption of 
resources and overpopulation. Addressing all these issues requires the application of the 
same framework.   
       It thus appears overall that environmental problems ((local or global, standard 
(which extends to issues ranging from resources to biodiversity) or the ones relating to 
human security threats (which stem from various ‗wants‘ and ‗fears‘)) are not just about 
efficient utilisation of resources. As has been disclosed above, they involve, at the very 
least, four aspects of justice, which mainly encompass some basic ethical values, such as 
the issue of justice in the sharing of environmental burdens and benefits, equality in 
environmental decision making processes and the ethical claims of non-human creatures 
and ecosystems. This gives good reason for our responses to environmental problems. 
The proposed framework seems satisfactorily to tackle issues of development needs and 
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environmental limits without failing to respect the ethical dimension of environmental 
problems.  
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Chapter Three 
4.3 The Case of Bangladesh 
 
In the previous chapter I proposed a framework for sustainable development which 
entails a radical reform of human systems. In this reform it is suggested that human 
beings‘ economic well-being and social development (i.e. economic and social 
sustainability) must be addressed, but without undermining the issue of environmental 
sustainability (i.e. without disregarding environmental limits), and vice versa.  Omitting 
any one of these can render a development policy unsustainable. This chapter explores 
the possible application of the proposed policy framework for sustainable development 
to the case of Bangladesh. Bangladesh is a developing country where poverty (i.e. 
economic sustainability) is still the foremost challenge. The main concern of this chapter 
is to show how the seemingly opposing objectives of the proposed framework for 
sustainable development - economic, social and environmental sustainability - can 
satisfactorily be addressed in a developing country like Bangladesh, if this is possible at 
all.   
 Before such concerns can be addressed, first I need to look back at what the 
environmental and security impacts of development activities are which obstruct 
sustainable development in Bangladesh. In chapter three of Part Three, I presented a 
thorough discussion about major sectors and means of human development activities, 
and the current and potential environmental impacts of these activities on the major 
components of the Earth: water, ground-water, air, coastal or marine areas and land. 
Bangladesh has been covered in chapter four of the same Part as a case in point.   
254 | P a g e  
The overriding conclusion regarding environmental challenges in Bangladesh, 
drawn in the relevant chapter of Part Three, is that inhabitants of this country face 
diverse environmental problems which are both widespread and alarming, and which can 
be categorized into local and global environmental problems. As has been pointed out 
there, pollution caused by pollutants from local factories, as well as other environmental 
problems originating from human activities within the land, belongs to the former 
category, local environmental problems. Among the major environmental impacts of 
human activities that are labelled ‗local environmental problems‘ are: water, land and air 
pollution through unplanned disposal of excreta and litter, air pollution on account of 
various activities, such as increased use of motor vehicles, open burning and cooking 
with biomass fuels, unplanned city expansion, impairment of drinking water quality, 
reduced ground water owing to the growing demand for irrigation and drinking water  
and frequent changes in morphological features such as rivers, due to erosion and 
siltation which have been caused through growing deforestation, emergence of 
unprecedented environmental threats and a huge decline of biodiversity, caused by the 
destruction of mangrove forests and coastal ecosystems through various anthropocentric 
activities, namely harvesting of timber and many other forest resources, fishing inside 
forests areas, destruction of natural habitat through farming and developing human 
habitation within the forest area. 
On the other hand, environmental problems include problems (such as global 
warming through releases of CO2 and greenhouse gases, river bank erosion and siltation1 
and more frequent occurrences of floods due to reduced water carrying capacity in rivers 
as a result of deforestation in and around the territory) which are shaped by the 
                                                     
1 As previously mentioned in Part Three, hitherto one million people, mostly the poor, have been affected, 
which in monetary terms has resulted in an economic loss of $ 40 million per annum. 
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ecological systems of the planet (which have thus been called the systemic kind of global 
environmental problems). They also include ones (such as reduction in biodiversity and 
wetlands which provide a large number of fauna and flora) which occur worldwide and 
affect global economic and financial systems (which have thus been called the repetitive 
kind of global environmental problems). These environmental problems all belong to the 
second category, global environmental problems. 
The most typical kind of human-caused environmental problems (endured by the 
inhabitants of Bangladesh both presently and even more prospectively), which I covered 
in chapter four of Part Three, is the lack of water (for irrigation and other uses) due to 
the withdrawal of water by India at different points on a number of common rivers for 
an indefinite period of time. Examples include water withdrawal at the point of the 
Farakka Barrage2, at the connecting point of the Brahmaputra and Teesta rivers, and the 
launching of the Indian-Giant-River-Link Project, which indicates that such activities are 
set to continue into the future.  
A further Indian project, as I mentioned in chapter four of Part Three, is the 
Tipaimukh Dam, a hydroelectric project. Despite repeated assurance from the highest 
administrative level in India that it would not authorize anything that might harm 
Bangladesh, a treaty has recently (on 22 October 2011) been signed by the heads of 
India, Manipur state and the allied hydroelectric company, and work on the dam 
                                                     
2 Water withdrawal at the point of the Farakka barrage by India, as has been referred to in chapter four of 
Part Three, has already resulted in the current deadly conditions of drought and salinity in the south-
western region of Bangladesh, and has also resulted in an unfavourable change to the weather and to the 
vulnerable ecosystems of this region, including the ecosystems of the world‘s largest mangrove forest - the 
‗Sundharbans‘. Also it has caused severe salinity intrusion in the south-western coastal area as well as 
desertification and soil erosion in the north-western region of the country.     
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construction will begin very soon in line with the agreement.3 The potential threat of the 
Tipaimukh Dam is utterly destructive to the ecosystems and all living entities including 
humans of the whole north-east region of Bangladesh, as well as to ecosystems of the 
dam area of Manipur state.   
What emerges from the above recapitulation is that the government of 
Bangladesh can and should set out and execute policies that address environmental 
problems that have emerged from local sources. Nevertheless environmental problems 
which are trans-boundary in terms of their source cannot be expected to be successfully 
addressed through policy initiatives by the government of Bangladesh or other local 
organizations alone. Solutions to regional and global environmental problems need 
regional/global involvement and initiatives.  
Thus if Bangladesh wants to tackle current environmental problems and 
accomplish sustainable development, then she has to set out policies in view of  the 
framework for sustainable development that are capable of addressing current 
environmental problems caused by human activities at various levels: namely local, 
regional and global. In so doing, firstly the government of Bangladesh has to set out 
policies to address environmental problems that are rooted in human activities within the 
territory. Furthermore the government must take the initiative to explain and influence 
regional and global governments, international organizations and non-governmental 
bodies to set out appropriate policies about trans-boundary problems. Much the same 
applies to the government of Bangladesh as regards its task with reference to global 
                                                     
3 India did not even inform Bangladesh before they signed the Tipaimukh agreement on 22 October, 2011, 
which is a clear violation of all laws, policies, and agreements that have been practised hitherto globally on 
sharing water of cross-boundary rivers. For more see Khalequzzaman, M.,  ‗Impact of Tipai Dam on the 
haor Regions‘, Daily Star, 10 January, 2012, p.9 
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environmental problems. The government in this case also must take initiatives to 
explain and influence global governments and relevant international organizations as well 
as non-governmental bodies, in particular the governments/countries which are culpable 
for global environmental problems that  inhabitants of Bangladesh have been suffering 
from (without being responsible for creating such environmental problems, such as 
climate change), to persuade them to cooperate with Bangladesh in realizing appropriate 
policies to protect her inhabitants, both human and non-human.  For, even though 
Bangladesh sincerely tries her level best to comply with international agreements and 
combat the adverse effects of climate change, she is not capable of tackling such 
environmental challenges unaided. So she requires assistance in managing and adjusting 
to the changes (adaptation), which is not a favour, but a duty on the part of the 
developed world as they have a role in causing such changes and sufferings.   
Now the question arises whether or not the framework for my supplemented 
version of sustainable development is applicable to Bangladesh. The prime task of the 
government of Bangladesh, in line with our proposed framework for sustainable 
development, is to set out policies to fulfil basic human needs. This involves eradication 
of poverty, which in turn addresses the issues of security from ‗wants‘. And through 
fulfilling basic human needs, one of the issues of justice is addressed. As has been argued 
earlier (in the previous chapter), to fulfil human basic needs is to fulfil economic 
sustainability, which is one of the pillars of sustainable development, and also a way 
forward towards fulfilling another two pillars of sustainable development: social and 
environmental sustainability. For the proposed framework for sustainable development 
searches for a cure to poverty, which is required to make provision for the value of life 
and to ensure participation of affected individuals, and in so doing this framework 
encompasses some central prerequisites of social justice, and is foreseeably compatible 
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with others. In so doing the framework seems to be able to assist in removing major 
causes of insecurity due to ‗fears‘ as well. On the issue of environmental protection, this 
framework involves a considerable environmental sensitivity and advocates defence of 
natural values, in particular through recognizing and reflecting in policy decisions the 
intrinsic value of non-human entities and the immense inherent and instrumental value 
of species and ecosystems respectively (which are essential for the continued existence of 
all the bearers of intrinsic value).  
 Given this, it is apparent that the government of Bangladesh should set out 
policies in such a way that in the first place all unfulfilled basic human needs are fulfilled. 
And for this a certain level of economic development is required. But, as I have just 
argued in the paragraph above, the proposed framework for sustainable development 
does not advocate that economic development can be made to happen at the cost of 
social and/or environmental sustainability.  
However, being grounded on biocentric consequentialism, the proposed 
framework for sustainable development, as has been mentioned in the previous chapter, 
discards the view that everything in nature must be preserved. This keeps the theory of 
biocentric consequentialism and by the same token the proposed framework for 
sustainable development grounded on it away from drawing bizarre conclusions, such as 
that each and every member of a species should be preserved; every drop of every 
ecosystem should be sustained. This proposed framework has further been strengthened 
through the implications of biocentric consequentialism that the bearers of intrinsic value 
overall merit to be sustained, but that if the situation requires us to take decisions 
through making comparisons between the bearers of intrinsic values, then they can be 
taken on the basis of the degrees of strength and concentration of their intrinsic value.  I 
have discussed in detail and defended in the previous chapter and in Part Two how, in 
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addition to other major characteristic features, this very feature of biocentric 
consequentialism make it a strong contender for a defensible normative ethical theory.   
What the proposed framework for sustainable development says is that economic 
development should receive first priority as without accomplishing economic 
sustainability, social and environmental sustainability are not possible to attain. The 
justification, as I have argued in the previous chapter, of the proposed framework for 
sustainable development is implicit in the four concerns of justice it involves: intra-
generational justice, intergenerational justice, inter-species justice and the need for and 
duty to protect biodiversity and ecosystems for the sake of the continued existence of 
lives on earth.  
Recognizing economic sustainability as the pressing need for underdeveloped and 
developing countries, Ramachandra Guha argues that intervention with nature should be 
guided primarily by human needs (arguably human basic needs), not by the needs of 
biotic integrity.4 For him, the proximate reasons for current environmental problems are 
the violation of this principle at both macro and micro level: at macro level the proximate 
reasons are the violation of this principle in the dialectics of economic and political 
structure; and at micro level the proximate reasons are violation of this principle in 
lifestyle choices at individual level. Given this, criticizing the Deep Ecology (or American 
wilderness) view (which manifests itself with a far greater emphasis on equality and the 
integration of ecological concerns with livelihood and work), Guha asserts that the 
implementation of such a wilderness agenda is thus unjustified when applied to the Third 
World.  
                                                     
4 Guha, R., ‗Radical American Environmentalism and Wilderness Preservation: A Third World Critique‘, 
Environmental Ethics , 11.1(1989), 71-83, (p.74). 
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Ramachandra Guha‘s argument, mentioned in the paragraph above, rightly says 
that addressing economic sustainability (human basic needs) in the Third World 
countries is a pressing need, and in the light of this understanding the implementation of 
a wilderness agenda to the case of Bangladesh will be unjustified. On several occasions, 
in particular in the previous chapter, I argued that a policy decision cannot be adequate 
and sustainable if it ignores or remains silent about any of the three pillars of sustainable 
development: economic, social and environmental sustainability. Focusing on two pillars 
of sustainable development (economic and social sustainability) and remaining silent 
about the third pillar (i.e. environmental sustainability), Guha‘s view seems to remain 
open to criticism.           
 As opposed to the wilderness agenda as well as Guha‘s view, the proposed 
framework for sustainable development thus seems to offer details of the fundamental 
requisite conditions which an adequate framework for sustainable development must 
tackle. Furthermore this framework can also be envisaged as a ‗guideline‘ by which the 
plausibility and comprehensiveness of any proposed strategy for sustainable development 
in Bangladesh can be judged. Given this, it is both crucial and justified for the 
government of Bangladesh to set out policies along the lines of the proposed framework 
for sustainable development. In the light of the proposed framework for sustainable 
development,  some local, regional and global policy initiatives, which the government of 
Bangladesh needs to set out and act on earnestly for the accomplishment of sustainable 
development in this country, are now provided: 
Policy decisions should be made urgently at national level (by the government of 
Bangladesh and non-government local organizations):  
 Effective policies should be set out in order to reduce poverty by a 
considerable amount, if not entirely, with immediate effect. For fulfilment of 
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the unfulfilled basic needs of the inhabitants is a pressing need, which 
addresses the issue of economic sustainability; and this is the first step 
towards a sustainable future in line with our proposed framework for 
sustainable development. Yet there is no mention of the concept of 
sustainable development in the constitution of Bangladesh. As to recognizing 
sustainable development as its key policy objective, there has not hitherto 
been set out any comprehensive and proactive national policy of sustainable 
development either. The closest action plan that the government of 
Bangladesh has been found to adopt are the policies of the Bangladesh: 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP)5.  Albeit not a proactive policy of 
sustainable development, the Bangladesh Strategy for the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) has also been found to be consistent with as 
well as supportive of the goals of sustainable development.   
In view of the goal of sustainable development, the abovementioned 
action plans (i.e., the policies of PRSP and the MDGs) need to be 
implemented with greater priority until a comprehensive proactive national 
policy of sustainable development is set out and introduced by the 
government of Bangladesh. However, it is worth noting here that the policies 
                                                     
5  Dated October 16, 2005, and jointly prepared by the World Bank and the IMF member countries in a 
board meeting with development partners and stakeholders, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) 
illustrate various policies (such as macroeconomic, structural and social) for economic growth and poverty 
reduction in Bangladesh. It also describes related overseas funding needs and key supplies of financing for 
this country. This document seems to be very significant in attaining the three pillars of sustainable 
development: economic, social and environmental sustainability. Among the major issues covered in this 
document, which seem to be supportive of sustainable development in Bangladesh, are:  Roadmap for 
Accelerated Poverty Reduction (pp. 61-181), Medium-Term Macroeconomic Framework (pp. 185-189), 
Target-Setting on Major Goals Against Benchmarks (pp. 191-196) as well as the proposal for up scaling 
Micro-Credit ( at p. 49), and  its emphasis on  pro-poor economic growth (pp. 61-120) , participation, and 
social inclusion and empowerment (of women, children, ethnic minorities, disabled people  and  other 
disabled groups) (pp. 148-150), criminal justice reform and affordable justice for the poor (p. 166), and 
caring for environmental and sustainable development (pp. 176-181).  For details see International 
Monetary Fund, Bangladesh: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, IMF Country Report No. 05/410, (Washington, 
D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2005)  
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05410.pdf.> [accessed 19 February, 2012]    
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(or recommendations) of PRSP are mainly made in general terms, and the 
allocation of responsibilities for bringing about sustainable development is 
weak. Formulated and set out by the UN, the goals and targets of the MDGs 
are undeniably the most significant global initiatives ever. These mutually 
reinforcing and time-bound goals have been universally acknowledged as a 
framework for measuring development progress. Nevertheless they seem to 
be oversimplified in places. Having a dollar-a-day poverty line, for instance, 
was possibly too modest a target. The release of poverty figures by the 
World Bank in August 2008, which were based on cost-of-living data of 
2005, justifies the abovementioned concern and leads us to the view that 
MDGs income poverty target needs to be upgraded.  
The Millennium Development Goals: Bangladesh Progress Report 
2009, jointly prepared by the General Economics Division (Planning 
Commission, Government of the People‘s Republic of Bangladesh), the UN 
system in Bangladesh and the five Thematic Working Groups (who prepared 
five thematic papers on poverty and hunger, education, gender, health and 
environment) notes that whilst Bangladesh has made good progress in 
several key areas of the MDGs, it is yet to make progress in attaining 
satisfactory levels in some other key areas. The list of areas of progress 
involves primary schooling, gender parity in primary and secondary level 
education, reducing the under-five mortality rate, lowering the occurrence of 
communicable diseases and improving indicators of environmental changes. 
The reduction of poverty programme is well placed for reaching relevant 
targets, provided there are macroeconomic stability, economic growth and 
employment creation in the remaining period.  
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Contrariwise challenges involving  key areas of MDGs that are yet to 
be tackled include maternal health, retaining of students at the primary level 
to complete primary education, gender parity in tertiary education, better 
sanitation and access to safe drinking water. Furthermore, as expressed in the 
report, foremost among the reasons for not achieving the hunger target have 
been the challenges of food security in the country. And the main difficulties 
with future poverty reduction, as it further notes,  include lack of diversity in 
food crops, constant under-nutrition of children, occurrence of small 
pockets of high poverty, lack of clear targets and related competence,  lack  
of programme organization and coordination, and structural constraints. 
These difficulties show that necessary steps on the part of the government 
have to be taken immediately in order to face the challenges of hunger and 
poverty in Bangladesh.  
Considerable difficulties are present as obstacles to achieving gender 
equality. Useful and capable linkage between different relevant ministries is 
needed for tackling women‘s and development issues as well as various 
socio-cultural factors that strengthen their exposure. Proper implementation 
of policies, improving delivery of health care services, and the addressing of 
the limited supply of technical and managerial manpower, of the limited 
supply of drugs and commodities, and of the lack of information for making 
strategic and policy level decisions are required to face the challenges for 
reducing child mortality. Inadequate coordination between health and family 
planning care services, improper skill mix and insufficient numbers of the 
health workforce, sector planning based on insufficient data, inadequate 
government funding and underlying socio-cultural factors are the main 
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barriers in addressing the challenges of achieving improved maternal health, 
MDG 5. Inadequate coverage of the Most at Risk Population, limited 
technical and managerial capacity and inadequate government funding in the 
government bodies in charge of control of these diseases, and lack of 
strategic information management have been the main reasons for not being 
able to continue the trend of the low incidence of communicable diseases. 
Absence of broad mechanisms for the production and distribution of quality 
planting material and efficient use of forest resources, lack of facilitating 
technology, institutional support and dedicated financing to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, lack of proper regulation that addresses the 
present gaps in fisheries sector development, poorly planned development 
programmes, upstream withdrawal of water, lack of policies and strategies to 
ensure conjunctive use of water resources, and to ensure developing water 
efficient agricultural practices, are the foremost among the reasons for 
current environmental challenges in Bangladesh.  
Given this, the authors of the Millennium Development Goals: 
Bangladesh Progress Report 2009 have mentioned that Bangladesh needs 
substantial resources; immediate efforts need to be undertaken by 
Development Partners to examine the gaps and strengthen support to 
achieve the MDGs. The global menace of climate change, which Bangladesh 
is most vulnerable to, warrants urgent support from the developed world 
that is morally responsible for this. Adequate financial support will enable 
Bangladesh to start work on the additional challenges that climate change 
poses to its MDGs gains. 
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Given this, Bangladesh should set national poverty thresholds to 
ensure a goal which is contextually more suitable. As is reflected in the MDG 
report or in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, upper and lower poverty 
thresholds have been estimated in line with the expenditure required for 
basic needs. But no information is supplied in either of the two documents 
(in the MDG report or in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers) on how 
these two boundaries were estimated. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
of October 2005 seemed slightly more ambitious than its original target of 
reducing income poverty. It sets specific targets for reducing the number of 
people living below the upper threshold to 25 per cent by 2015 and those 
living in the lower bracket to 9.5 per cent, which was far more ambitious 
than its original targets of reducing the upper group to 29 per cent and 
extreme poverty to 14 per cent.  Given this, the success of reaching the 
poorest of the poor in Bangladesh (which is the key objective of economic 
sustainability) through MDGs and PRSP plans requires making appropriate 
adjustments in their goals, targets and indicators as required.  The Millennium 
Development Goals: Mid-Term Bangladesh Progress Report 2007 seems to recognize 
that although having succeeded in halving income poverty, the MDGs have 
not been able to meet the target of halving the proportion of the poorest 
cohort (which is 20 per cent of the total population) in both national income 
and consumption.6 
Bangladesh is a signatory to the Rio Convention on Biodiversity (1992), 
and the Kyoto Protocol that came into effect from 17 February 2005. In 
addition to the two action plans (the PRSP and the MDGs) mentioned 
                                                     
6 United Nations, Human Rights and the Millennium Development Goals in Practice:  A Review of Country Strategies 
and Reporting 2010 (New York, Geneva: United Nations, 2010)                                                                                
< http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HRAndMDGsInPractice.pdf >[ accessed 18 
February, 2012]      
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above, the government of Bangladesh has also been found to adopt and 
enact some acts of legislation, such as the Protection (Amendment) Act 
1974, the Environmental Protection Act, 1995, the National Environment 
Management Action Plan (NEMP), 1996, and the Wild Life and 
Environmental Court Act 2000.  Among these acts of legislation, the NEMP 
seems to be more close to sustainable development than others. Through 
identifying key environmental issues, creating a large database of 
environmental vulnerabilities of the country, giving emphasis to grassroots 
participation, improving in some measure environmental conditions and 
raising the human quality of life, the NEMP has proved its suitability 
towards the accomplishment of the objective of sustainable development.7  
 
Another action plan, called the National Conservation Strategy (NCS) 
and agreed as a draft in 2005, is formulated mainly on the basis of the 
NEMP, and now awaits parliamentary approval. The NCS is the upgraded 
version of The Bangladesh Conservation Strategy, 1995 (BCS). And this has 
been done to make this action plan more suitable in attaining sustainable 
development. Furthermore, a sectoral implementation approach has been 
recommended in the restructured version of the NCS.8 The rate of the 
progress of implementing the NEMP, however, has considerably diminished 
owing to funding constraints. Given this, to achieve progress or significant 
achievement in terms of sustainable development, the NEMP and the NSC 
have to be made more comprehensive and also the government of 
                                                     
7 Hossain, I., and Tamim, M., ‗2005/2006: Energy and Sustainable Development in Bangladesh‘, Sustainable 
Energy Watch 2005/2006 (Dhaka: Helio International, 2007)      <http://www.helio-
international.org/reports/pdfs/Bngldesh-EN.pdf> [accessed 18 February 2012] (p.7) 
8  Ibid, p.9 
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Bangladesh should arrange adequate funding for these action plans. Since the 
government cannot provide adequate funding for implementing these action 
plans without external assistance, it should take precise and rapid initiatives 
to persuade world governments and relevant national and international 
institutions to assist Bangladesh to implement the action plans in question 
and achieve her objectives of sustainable development.  
From the forgoing analysis, it seems that the policy of sustainable 
development in Bangladesh is a blend of a range of strategies (which include 
the ones in the MDGs, the PRSP and the NCS) and agreements (which 
include the Rio Convention on Biodiversity and the Kyoto Protocol).  But to 
carry out responsibilities pertaining to the formulation and implementation 
of sustainable strategies in different sectors, a high-powered body is needed. 
Through setting up a national Commission for Sustainable Development 
under the head of state, the challenge in question may be addressed in a 
more successful manner.   
 Micro-credit, an anti-poverty innovation in Bangladesh, which won 
world recognition and has been practised to eradicate poverty by many 
governments all over the world, has been playing a considerable role for over 
a decade in alleviating poverty in Bangladesh. More importantly, it helps 
alleviate gender discrimination mainly through giving security to women as 
the main recipients of loans under this programme (according to 
documentation, 90 per cent of the borrowers are women9). Thus the 
significance of the micro-credit policy for the empowerment of women, 
                                                     
9 Ibid, p.7                                                                                                                                            
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achieving gender equality and enhancing the rural economy in Bangladesh is 
undeniably substantial. Thus the micro-credit programme can be of great 
support in attaining the goal of gender equality and MDGs can be benefited 
from continuation of this policy.  
 Non-government sectors as well as private sector bodies should be 
encouraged to make efforts alongside the government. This will considerably 
help to achieve the goals and targets of MDGs, and thereby sustainable 
development in Bangladesh.  
 Energy policies that encourage inferior technology utilization and 
wastage and also discourage efficiency improvements should be rejected. 
However, low energy prices can greatly assist in attaining the MDGs, but 
there is a risk of energy profligacy and hence of increased per capita GHG 
emissions. Taking into consideration the issue of clean energy investment, 
World Bank funding for the energy sector has started shrinking since the 
early nineties.   
However, as the per capita carbon emission in Bangladesh is still below 
the global average, Bangladesh can continue to develop unless and until it 
manages to fulfil all unfulfilled basic needs of her inhabitants. But it should 
move to renewable energy generation. Possible options include hydroelectric 
energy, tidal energy, wave energy, wind energy, energy from biomass and 
solar energy. Yet Bangladesh needs funding for this. Thus if global leaders 
want countries, in particular developing/underdeveloped countries like 
Bangladesh not to increase their carbon emissions any further in order to 
help to save life on the Earth then they have to assist these countries to 
procure technology for renewable energy generation, and also have to 
persuade international funding agencies like the World Bank to be proactive 
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about their funding assistance for the energy sector in countries like 
Bangladesh.  
 Government should make available affordable treatment plants for 
excreta disposal, should develop road communication infrastructures and 
simultaneously should ensure control on the rapid increase in the number of 
motor vehicles. All municipalities should have a waste collection service, 
sanitary landfills or incinerators to control solid disposal (in particular, 
landfill and composting projects can be very useful for the management of 
municipal solid disposal). Introduction of sanitary toilets in all villages is 
essential to keep surface and ground water clean. Distinctive environmental 
regulation as regards these matters should be set out, and also as regards 
environmental degradation caused by point sources of pollution caused 
through disposing of untreated industrial wastes (as well as metal 
contamination of soils, for example,  by the Hazaribagh tannery in Dhaka), 
and releasing medical, chemical and liquid wastes as effluents into rivers and 
streams. And relevant departments of the government should be charged 
with the implementation of these regulations.  
Execution of a correctly constructed ‗Polluters Pay Policy‘ (PPP) can 
be an effective principle in such cases.10 Setting such regulations is urgent as 
the causes of death and illness in Bangladesh, in particular in urban areas, are 
frequently environmental diseases, namely diarrhoea, cholera, typhoid, 
                                                     
10 The PPP states that ‗whoever is responsible for damage to the environment should bear the costs 
associated with it‘ For more see, United Nations Environmental Programme, Taking Action, Chapter 2, 
<www.rona.unep.org.action.02.htm>[accessed 28 July 2012] (p.3). Although a number of scholars criticize 
this principle, a correctly construed property rights-based polluter pays principle, according to Roy, would 
resolve several of these troubles. For more see, Roy, E.C., The Polluter Pays Principle: A Proper Guide for 
Environmental Policy (Washington: The Institute for Research on the Economics of Taxation, 2001) 
<http://iret.org/pub/SCRE-6.PDF> [accessed 28 July 2012] 
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respiratory infections and vector-borne diseases. A huge amount of health 
costs can be saved by setting out and implementing the abovementioned 
regulations and projects. Through such measures, the quality of water could 
be improved and the depletion of the fish population and degradation of the 
quality of fish (which is one of the main sources of protein for the poor of 
riverine Bangladesh) could be prevented.  
 A suitable land management policy has to be set out to address 
agricultural non-point sources of contamination, such as fertilizers, arsenic, 
detergent, pesticides, pathogens, sediment, animal waste and solid wastes. 
For, among other aspects, agricultural non-point source pollution is one of 
the key types of land-based source pollution in Bangladesh. This measure 
appears costly for the peasant farmers of Bangladesh in the short run, but in 
the long run it is less costly in preference to tougher environmental cures and 
destruction of major natural resources. But the fact of the matter is that 
peasant farmers will be less interested in slowing down soil erosion at the 
cost of short-term agricultural production and economic gain. Thus the land 
management policies have to be attractive (in the sense that they are capable 
of bringing about short-term benefits) to the peasant farmers besides their 
effectiveness in retaining the quality of land. It means that over and above its 
environmental function, a suitable and effective land management policy has 
to involve some recognizable incentives (namely economic gain in the short 
term) for peasant farmers who are being asked to practise it. For example, 
farmers would more happily agree to retain moisture (which ultimately 
retains soil) of their land to increase agricultural production rather than to 
lessen the degradation of the land. ‗Erosion control measures in Haiti have 
271 | P a g e  
been adopted only when they were shown to result in economic gain to a 
farmer in the short term, not because they save soil.‘11  
Policy initiatives should be taken to halt or at least to reduce deforestation 
activities immediately. Government regulation should be set out to penalize 
the relevant criminals who are actually well off, but have taken this course of 
action to fulfil their greed for profit. The poor who are involved in such 
activities to fulfil their basic needs, however, should not be punished in the 
beginning, but rather they should be offered suitable and legitimate 
opportunities to earn their living. Through these initiatives river bank 
erosion, siltation and the frequent occurrence of floods can be reduced to a 
considerable extent.   
 The policy of land redistribution should be implemented in order to 
remove the root of many social inequalities. For a number of social evils, 
such as poverty, marginalization, social exclusion, discrimination (in 
particular gender discrimination) and numerous other social inequalities are 
largely connected to the discriminatory distribution of land. Emancipation 
from landlessness should be ensured without delay through setting out and 
implementing a suitable land reform policy.   
 As a densely populated country, the people of Bangladesh may not be 
benefited at the expected level from the land reform policy. Under that 
condition a more powerful policy would be to make people aware of their 
                                                     
11 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Best Management Practices for Agricultural Non-Point 
Sources of Pollution, CEP Technical Report No. 41 (Jamaica: Caribbean Environment Programme, 1998) 
<http://www.cep.unep.org/publications-and-resources/technical-reports/tr41en.pdf > [accessed 1 June 
2012] 
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well-being through the spread of literacy. The power of literacy may be 
expected to influence every aspect of people‘s life, which in turn is able to 
help develop a distinctive realization among  them, and with that realization 
their being satisfied with the attainment of standard (including basic) needs, 
and being successful in keeping themselves away from overconsumption and 
misuse of resources.  
One might argue that implementation of the proposed framework for 
sustainable development would stabilize economic development at a certain 
level, making unemployment and underemployment a permanent problem 
for Bangladesh. This concern is not beyond repair. National and 
international initiatives can address this problem. The government could 
introduce a liberal pension scheme, and an underemployment compensation 
law, in addition to land reform policy. Unemployed people could be engaged 
with various local environment-friendly social businesses supported by local 
and non-local NGOs and multinational companies and international aid 
agencies. But for these forms of help to come to the doorstep of the 
unemployed, government has to take initiatives to attract them, and also has 
to provide necessary forms of support (such as  infrastructure, legal and 
administrative support).  
The proposed policy of reasonable consumption is not just a dream; it 
is difficult but not impossible. The triumph of hope over a non-sustainable 
over-consumptive life style in Kerala is an example before not only 
Bangladesh, but also before all countries developed, developing and 
underdeveloped all over the world. As Bill McKibben puts it, ‗Kerala may be 
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as significant a school house for the rich world as for the poor‘.12 Kerala 
shows the possibility of making an enlightened choice between two 
approaches, the traditional development goal of ‗higher economic growth‘ 
and living lightly on the earth, producing less waste and consuming fewer 
resources. Furthermore, McKibben adds: ‗Kerala demonstrates that a low-
level economy can create a decent life, abundant in the things - health, 
education, community - that are most necessary for us all.‘ 13  
 The Bangladesh government should apply stricter laws to control 
housing and other construction activities on the flood plain, and should set 
out and foster (as well as encourage people to follow) a more 
environmentally sound housing strategy, such as cluster housing and 
compact townships. For construction of new houses and roads on a flood 
plain can eventually result in disastrous upshots, such as frequent flooding 
and a decline in the ground water table owing to reduced amount of the total 
run-off and reduced recharge areas for ground water.   
 Another most significant task of the government of Bangladesh is to 
set out effective policies to stabilize the ever-expanding population of 
Bangladesh. According to some evidence, the density of population of this 
country is 50 times higher than in the United States, an intimidating 
situation.14  For rapid population growth has placed incredible stress on the 
country‘s economy and on both its renewable and non-renewable resources. 
                                                     
12McKibben, B., What is True Development? The Kerala Model                                                                              
< http://www.ashanet.org/library/articles/kerala.199803.html> [accessed 6 July, 2011] (p.6). 
13 Ibid 
14Khalequzzaman,M.,  Environmental Philosophy in the Context of Bangladesh 
<http://www.lhup.edu/mkhalequ/Earth%20Resources%20&%20Env/Env.Philosophy.pdf> [accessed 
19 February 2012 ] (p. 3) 
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Given this untrammelled rapid growth of population, Bangladesh arguably 
needs laws to control such growth, regrettable as such use of power would 
be. The one child policy of China is a case in point to refer to. The Chinese 
government has managed to contain its population through implementing 
this policy, a population that otherwise would have grown beyond China‘s 
ability to support it.  
        But this policy can be criticized for two reasons: (1) it raises moral   
concern on account of a possible undermining of human autonomy15 (2) and 
it loses its effectiveness in the light of the view that ‗compulsion does not 
work except in the very short term‘.16 Against this, one might argue that if the 
Chinese are freed ‗from the grip of communists, the demand for children 
may well touch off a massive baby boom‘.17  This is not the only way to 
achieve the goal of a stabilized population. There is an example of achieving 
such a goal in a non-coercive way. Kerala, a state of India, defying traditional 
wisdom, did manage to reduce the birth rate to replacement level back in 
1992. This was ‗40 per cent below that of India as a whole and almost 60 per 
cent below the rate for poor countries in general‘18. Kerala achieved this goal 
through the spreading of education throughout the state. This literacy policy 
                                                     
15 It is a controversial issue whether or not a compulsory ‗one child policy‘ is morally sound. One may well 
argue that human autonomy cannot be compromised under any circumstances. Thus implementation of 
this policy in Bangladesh would essentially raise moral concerns. But another person may well argue that if 
such a compulsory policy is not adopted in Bangladesh for the sake of human autonomy, then this country 
might have to face a time in future when there will be a serious scarcity of resources to fulfil people‘s basic 
needs, let alone other needs that contribute to the improvement of the quality of life. So, bearing in mind 
this dire consequence, one may well argue that it would rather be harmful to human well-being overall 
(both for present and future generations of Bangladesh) not to implement a policy that can reduce the 
present rate of growth of the already very densely populated country of Bangladesh.  
 
16 Harrison, P. The Third Revolution: Pollution Environmental and a Sustainable World (London and New York:  
Penguin, 1993), p. 45                                                                                                                                              
17 McKibben, p.2. 
18 Ibid, p. 3. 
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equipped people in general with essential knowledge, especially women, who 
are the people best placed to take charge of family life, and managed to 
implement a one child policy under no compulsion, just through using the 
guidance of wisdom acquired through literacy. This is well illustrated in Bill 
McKibben‘s account of the statement of the representative of the 
International Family Planning Association about Trivandrum, the capital of 
Kerala, who said that ‗ …when we send our surveyors out, people are 
embarrassed to say if they have more than two kids. Seven or eight years ago, 
the norm was three children and we thought we were doing pretty well. Now 
it‘s two, among the most educated people, it‘s one.‘19    
Thus since compulsion does not work for at all long, and also since 
compulsion is unnecessary if people can be enlightened through literacy, a 
compulsory one child policy can and should be implemented for the time 
being in Bangladesh, and a policy of mass education has to be set out and 
implemented purposefully as in Kerala. When people with an enlightened 
understanding are able to realize the benefit of a one child policy, then a 
legally compulsory one child policy on the part of the government will not 
be needed at all, and hence this policy will be redundant. Thus, understood 
this way, implementation of a one child policy can be a justifiable option for 
the government of Bangladesh before the size of the population goes beyond 
repair. But, as I have mentioned earlier, this policy cannot or should not be 
practised for long, for a literate and enlightened future generation will 
foreseeably bring an end to it. Provision for affordable health care for 
women and children in the rural areas as well as slum dwellers‘ areas in cities, 
                                                     
19 Ibid 
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and also provision for free and easy forms of birth control can be effective 
to attain the goal in question.  
 The majority of polices proposed above involve command-and-
control types of regulation, and hence it will be hard for elected politicians to 
convince people who are already faced with financial hardship to adopt 
them. The spread of education, through developing awareness about the 
significance of environmental problems for their overall well-being, can help 
enormously in this regard.     
 Over and above the spread of literacy, economic (i.e. market) 
instruments, as opposed to a command-and-control approach, can help 
Bangladesh in attaining the objectives of the abovementioned policy 
proposals. Bangladesh has traditionally used restrictions and regulation to 
restrain environmental damage from economic activity. This command-and-
control approach gives rise to a standards-driven environmental policy that 
employs quantity constraints to control levels of pollutants and limit the 
depletion of resources. Experience in developed countries suggests that 
mandated environmental standards and technologies may act as an effective 
constraint on economic growth and costs, but it may not be of use within 
the means of low-income economies like Bangladesh. Thus the challenge of 
integrating environmental and economic (sectoral) policies may be addressed 
for the most part by economic instruments. The effectiveness of economic 
instruments in harnessing a sustainable shrimp culture in Bangladesh can be 
used as an example in this context. For example, economic instruments such 
as a land use tax, an effluent charge on water pollutants and a soil 
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conservation fund can be of significant help in attaining the goal of a 
sustainable shrimp culture in Bangladesh.20  
The shortage of funds is the single most significant factor that to one 
degree or another influences all other factors necessary to attain sustainable 
development in Bangladesh. Despite knowing about the right strategy, 
sometimes decision makers follow a path which is contrary to sustainable 
development because of a shortage of funds. For instance, because of this 
circumstance, Bangladesh chooses inferior technology, and in so doing 
causes damage to the environment. This is well illustrated in the declining 
energy strength of the economy. Addressing these complex funding 
difficulties requires liberal, sustained and long-term assistance from 
developed countries.  
 In many instances policy makers are not fully aware of the implications of 
sustainable development for the development path they are pursuing. Thus 
capacity building of government agencies is essential in planning or choosing 
a development path that is sustainable. They should also look at the chosen 
development path to see whether or not it satisfies moral requirements.  
                                                     
20 (1) There is no tax on the users of agricultural land for shrimp cultivation. Because of the free goods it 
involves, this practice thus tends to be misused for private gain. A ‗Land use tax‘ can significantly reduce 
such misuse and also can raise substantial revenue. The revenue collected through this process can in turn 
be used in reducing degradation of natural resources as a result of shrimp cultivation. (2) Through 
imposing an effluent charge on pollutants of water, the shrimp firms can be required to employ more 
environmentally sound production practices. Water treatment plants can be constructed with the revenue 
raised. (3) A soil conservation fund can encourage the shrimp firms to employ environmentally sound 
technologies to reduce salinity and water logging.  
For more see, United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), Environmental Impacts of Trade 
Liberalization and Policies for the Sustainable Management of Natural Resources: A Case Study on Bangladesh’s Shrimp 
Farming Industry (New York, Geneva: UNEP, 1999)                                                                                             
< http://www.unep.ch/etu/etp/acts/capbld/rdone/bangladesh.pdf > [accessed 19 February 2012]   
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 A significant concern is the political instability in Bangladesh. It is one of 
the major obstacles in attaining economic sustainability, and hence a hurdle 
to sustainable development. Despite all the odds, the democratic process has 
started going along the road ahead adopted in Bangladesh in 1990, but 
constant disagreement and conflict among the political parties, especially 
between the two major parties, results in frequent strikes and shutdowns. A 
mutual understanding and working relationship between the two major 
parties seems to be a prerequisite for Bangladesh to practise democracy and 
to prepare an ideal constitutional framework to implement the framework 
for sustainable development.    
 Corruption is envisaged by scholars and people in general as one of the 
worst evils in the society of Bangladesh. It has significantly been hindering 
the overall development of Bangladesh since its birth. Corruption is 
widespread at all levels of government, politics and economics. Political 
corruption and its expansion over time seem to be the most vital concern of 
the government of Bangladesh. For it endures and flourishes in different 
kinds of bureaucratic corruption. Considerable progress in combating all 
levels of corruption including the political one is likely to depend on 
economic development and enhancement of the state‘s capacities through 
the entire range of state functions.21 Economic development, it may well be 
expected, will allow the country to collect tax and redistribute more 
resources partly in order to achieve political stability. On the other hand, 
enhancement of state capacities (through the entire range of state functions) 
                                                     
21 The Anti Corruption Commission (ACC) Bangladesh was created through an Act promulgated on 23 
February 2004 that came into force on 9 May 2004. The aim of this commission is to carry out the purpose 
of the Anti Corruption Act, 2004, and the commission has been vested with the power to make rules by 
notification published in the official Gazette with the prior approval of the President.                                   
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enhances good governance through considerably increasing the prospects of 
economic development and political stability being attained.  
 The government of Bangladesh should set out suitable policies to 
enhance state initiatives to get rid of the chronic evil of corruption. The Anti 
Corruption Commission of Bangladesh, which should be composed of 
ethically insightful, politically unbiased and dedicated individuals, should be 
freed from all kind of political and governmental influences, and should be 
operative at its highest capacity under the Act promulgated in 2004.22 Given 
this, good governance seems to be a possibility for Bangladesh. But for 
some, to what extent ‗good governance‘ is dependable in the context of a 
country like Bangladesh raises a question to which there is no 
straightforward answer.  
Relevant policy decisions should be made urgently at regional level (involving 
regional governments and other relevant regional organizations, in particular the 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation - SAARC):  
 
In connection with environmental problems that stem from sources located 
outside the territory (in particular India), the first and foremost problem for 
Bangladesh is the unfair withdrawal of water by India from common rivers, 
on which subsistence agriculture and all other irrigation-based cultivation 
and water-based activities of the inhabitants of Bangladesh are dependent. 
As I explained  in chapter four of Part Three, India has been unilaterally 
withdrawing water at the point of the Farakka Barrage, which significantly 
reduces the discharge of water of the Ganges River (from an annual 
                                                     
22 Khan, M., ‗Corruption and Governance in South Asia 2009‘, In: Europa South Asia Yearbook 2009 
(London: Europa, 2009) < http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/11683/> [accessed 21 February 2012] 
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minimum discharge of 1297 m3/sec in April 1966 to 135 m3/s in April 
199623). The reduction of freshwater flow to the Bangladesh area has 
adversely affected the dynamic function of ecosystems, desertifying the 
northwestern region and degrading mangrove wetland ecosystems, and 
increasing inland salinity intrusion in the southwestern region of Bangladesh. 
Thus, one of the key tasks of the government of Bangladesh is to reach an 
agreed and fair solution to the water sharing of the river Ganges.   
Three short-term water sharing agreements (i.e., the Ganges Water 
agreement of 1977 and the Memorandums of Understanding of 1982 and 
1985) had been signed by India and Bangladesh, before Bangladesh managed 
to persuade India finally to agree to sign a 30-year water-sharing Treaty of 
the River Ganges in 1996. There are, however, some fundamental limitations 
to this Treaty.24 This treaty needs to be revised in order to get rid of existing 
loopholes and to ensure fair sharing of the water of the river Ganges. The 
experience of Bangladesh concerning the implementation of the existing 
Treaty is not satisfactory. For India has been releasing a lesser amount of 
water to Bangladesh at the point of Farakka compared with her quantum 
                                                     
23 Mirza, M.M.Q., ed. The Ganges Water Diversion: Environmental Effect and Implication (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publications, 2004), p. 22  
 
24 24. Among the major loopholes are: ‗ 1. The instruments signed by Bangladesh and India do not provide 
entitlement to the former to participate or to become party to negotiations on any water course or in any 
consultations thereof e.g. Bangladesh cannot participate in the bilateral negotiations between India and 
Nepal which aim to implement projects on major tributaries of the Ganges river emanating from the 
Nepalese territory like the Pancheswar and Saptkosi High Dam Projects. 2. Over the last three decades the 
Bangladesh government has repeatedly requested India for upstream hydro-meteorological data of the 
Ganges, Brahmaputra and other rivers. The Indian side has declined to supply or exchange such upstream 
data and information. The 1996 treaty and other Indo-Bangladesh agreements are totally silent about the 
provisioning of this information. 3. The 1996 Treaty and other Indo-Bangladesh [agreements] do not 
provide for any third-party arbitration on settlement of disputes.‘ For more see:  Munshi, M.B.I., ‗Water 
Scarcity and the Threat of Water Wars in South Asia - A Bangladesh Perspective‘.                                                              
< http://groups.yahoo.com/group/MuktoChinta/>, [accessed 27 February, 2012], p. 3.   
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mentioned in Annexure II of the Treaty.25 In addition to this, India together 
with Nepal and Bhutan has undertaken a planned programme of exploiting 
and controlling more water resources of the Brahmaputra, Meghna and some 
of their tributaries along with the Ganges. India has been undertaking these 
activities without informing the downstream riparian country Bangladesh, let 
alone involving her.26 
Since the treaty of 1996 is defective, Bangladesh should make efforts to 
adjust this treaty without delay. The adjustment work should be based on 
conventional international law, particularly the provisions of the 1997 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses and on the Berlin Rules on Water Resources.27 These 
regulations involve worldwide expected protections and assurances, but 
unfortunately these have been omitted from the 1996 treaty.  
 Furthermore, as I discussed in chapter four of Part Three, the giant River 
Linking Project (RLP) considers inter-linking of major rivers at different 
points (which is labelled ‗Peninsular Rivers Development‘) as well as 
construction of storages on the principle tributaries of the Ganges and 
Brahmaputra in India, Nepal and Bhutan (which is labelled ‗Himalayan 
Rivers Development‘). This is unquestionably a source of trouble. The 
                                                     
25 Ibid       
26 Ibid       
27 The 1996 treaty seems to be in breach of Articles 7, 8, 12, 13, 16, 17, 29, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 68,72 and 73 
of the Berlin Rules. See Loibl, G., et al., International Law Association Berlin Conference 2004: Water Resource Law 
(Berlin: ILA, 2004)< http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/intldocs/ILA_Berlin_Rules-
2004.pdf > [accessed 28 February 2012] . For detail on ‗UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses‘ see, United Nations, Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses (New York:  the General Assembly of the United Nations, 1997)                           
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf>[ accessed 28 
February 2012]                                                          
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effects of this project on Bangladesh are devastating and catastrophic. 
Unfortunately the damage this project has caused to the ecosystems of 
Bangladesh is immense. Thus, there is no alternative for Bangladesh but to 
develop a bilateral relationship with India with the aim of convincing her to 
refrain from operating the giant RLP, which has incalculable and irreparable 
catastrophic impacts (in particular environmental and economic) on millions 
of people, nonhuman creatures and the ecosystems of Bangladesh.   
The government of Bangladesh should not simply depend on the 
conventional diplomatic devices (such as developing its relationship with 
India through arranging meetings on a regular basis, and discussing the most 
recent status of the water sharing matter at diplomatic levels including with 
the head of India‘s government) to meet the challenge in question. For, 
despite many meetings and efforts over the last three decades,  (1) the 
experience of Bangladesh hitherto as regards the sincerity of the Indian side 
in executing the terms of the Treaty of 1996 is not satisfactory, and also (2) 
India - without informing and involving Bangladesh - has undertaken the 
giant River Linking Project (RLP)  with a view to  withdrawing a larger 
quantity of water at several points along the course of major crossborder 
rivers, in particular the Ganges and the Brahmaputra ( which jointly provide  
85 per  cent of the total surface water accessible in Bangladesh28). Thus the 
government of Bangladesh should set out new strategies in such a way that it 
becomes able to keep the Indian side under pressure and stop it from 
withdrawing water unilaterally and unfairly at several points along the course 
of Cross Border Rivers under the River Linking Project (RLP).  
                                                     
28 Munshi, A.B.I., Water Scarcity and the Threat of Water Wars in South Asia – A Bangladesh Perspective ( Untold 
Facts, 2008) http://www.untoldfacts.com/bangladesh/water-scarcity-and-the-threat-of-water-wars-in-
south-asia-%E2%80%93-a-bangladesh-perspective >[accessed 27 February 2012](p.4)   
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 This is not the whole story. As I have mentioned earlier in this chapter 
and also discussed in detail in chapter four of Part Three, another vital 
environmental and survival concern of Bangladesh is the declaration of the 
construction of the Tipaimukh Dam on the Barak river in Manipur state on 
the Indian side and the completion of official formalities in constructing this 
dam despite repeated appeals and protests from the Bangladesh side, and 
also repeated assurances from the Indian side saying that India would not do 
anything which is harmful for Bangladesh. But by breaking its promise to the 
people of Bangladesh, the government of India has seriously hampered the 
bilateral relationship between the two countries, as it has made the people of 
Bangladesh suspicious about its sincerity regarding the bilateral relationship 
between the two countries through breaching the terms of the Treaty of 
1996 (i.e., through releasing a lesser amount of water to Bangladesh than its 
quantum as per the terms of Treaty of 1996).     
In addition to its noncompliance with all key recommendations of the 
World Commission of Dam Framework (WCD),29 the decision to construct 
                                                     
29 Key WCD recommendations: ‗1. Development needs and objectives should be clearly formulated 
through an open and participatory process, before various project options are identified. 2. A balanced and 
comprehensive assessment of all options should be conducted, giving social and environmental aspects the 
same significance as technical, economic and financial factors. 3. Before a decision is taken to build a new 
dam, outstanding social and environmental issues from existing dams should be addressed, and the benefits 
from existing projects should be maximized. 4. All stakeholders should have the opportunity for informed 
participation in decision-making processes related to large dams through stakeholder fora. Public 
acceptance of all key decisions should be demonstrated. Decisions affecting indigenous peoples should be 
taken with their free, prior and informed consent. 5. The project should provide entitlements to affected 
people to improve their livelihoods and ensure that they receive the priority share of project benefits 
(beyond compensation for their losses). Affected people include communities living downstream of dams 
and those affected by dam-related infrastructure such as transmission lines and irrigation canals. 6. 
Affected people should be able to negotiate mutually agreed and legally enforceable agreements to ensure 
the implementation of mitigation, resettlement and development entitlements. 7. The project should be 
selected based on a basin-wide assessment of the river ecosystem and an attempt to avoid significant 
impacts on threatened and endangered species. 8. The project should provide for the release of 
environmental flows to help maintain downstream ecosystems. 9. Mechanisms to ensure compliance with 
regulations and negotiated agreements should be developed and budgeted for, compliance mechanisms 
should be established, and compliance should be subject to independent review. 10. A dam should not be 
constructed on a shared river if other riparian States raise an objection that is upheld by an independent 
panel.‘ The International Rivers, The World Commission on Dams Framework - A Brief Introduction (WCD, 2008) 
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the Tipaimukh Dam on the Barak, a crossborder river, is a clear violation of 
article 9 of the Treaty of 1996.30 It also conflicts with the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, 1992.31  
 Given all this, if India fails to resolve this dispute peacefully, the 
government of Bangladesh should form a strong uniform consensus 
including the party in opposition and the population in general to make India 
abstain from constructing the Tipaimukh Dam. Bangladesh should also raise 
this issue at the level of influential global governments and international 
forums including the relevant department of the UN.    
Now one might be suspicious about the positive outcome of the 
recommendations that I have hitherto suggested. For very recently on 22 
October, 2011 a Treaty has already been signed by the related parties of the 
Indian side; and thus there is no official barrier for them to start construction 
work on the dam site. This very suspicion is penetrating but still there is 
hope. The postponement order (8 December 2010) by the regional 
governments (which comprise four neighbouring countries: Cambodia, 
                                                                                                                                                        
<http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/the-world-commission-on-dams-framework-a-brief 
introduction-2654> [accessed 27 February, 2012]   
30 Article IX of the 1996 thirty-year Ganges Water Sharing Treaty reads as follows: ‗Guided by the 
principles of equity, fairness and no harm to either party both the Governments agree to conclude water 
sharing Treaties/Agreements with regard to other common rivers.‘ See, Khan, M. A. M., ‗Waging                                           
International Legal War against Tipaimukh Dam‘, Blitz: Comprehensive Tabloid Weekly, 12 January 2012, 
opinion and editorial section <http://www.weeklyblitz.net/2071/waging-international-legal-war-against-
tipaimukh > [accessed 27February, 2012] 
                                                                                                                                                                       
31 The Tipaimukh hydroelectric project in particular conflicts with principles 2, 6 and 16 of the Rio 
declaration. In principle 2, the Rio Declaration recognizes the obligation of national states to guarantee that 
activities within their territory or control do not cause harm to the environment of the other States or of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. In principle 6, it recognizes that the interests and needs of 
developing and least developing countries, in particular ones which are environmentally vulnerable, should 
be given special priority. And in principle 16, it recognizes that the polluter should bear the cost of 
pollution. See, UNEP, Reo Declaration on Environment and Development (New York: United Nations, 1992)   
<http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163 > accessed 
28 February, 2012] 
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Vietnam, Thailand and Laos, which jointly comprise the Mekong River 
Commission (MRC)) on a controversial plan of the government of Laos to 
build a hydro-electric Dam (the Xayaburi Dam) on the Mekong River can be 
envisaged here as a case in point. Taking into consideration the potential 
impacts on the fragile ecology and associated fishing industries of the 
Mekong river basin, the regional governments postponed the Xayaburi Dam 
project for the duration of further (10-year) environmental studies.  Defying 
the decision of the regional governments taken in the MRC meeting, the 
government of Laos started initial construction work at the Xayaburi Dam 
site. But it has in effect failed to move ahead with the construction work as 
there has been widespread public opposition to the Dam project.  Through 
creating widespread opposition to the Xayaburi Dam, the lower riparian 
countries of the Mekong river basin have succeeded in compelling the 
government of Laos to stop the construction work it had already started.  
The list of widespread campaigners involves relevant scientists, academics, 
civil society groups and members of the general public both from within the 
Mekong River region and from other parts of the globe.32 The government 
                                                     
32 More than 22,000 people from Vietnam and Cambodia submitted a petition to the prime ministers of 
Laos and Thailand on 30 November 2010 for the cancellation of the Xayaburi Dam project. And a day 
earlier, on 29 November, 2010 a resolution to protect the Mekong river and allocate funding towards 
research on sustainable alternatives to mainstream hydropower dams was unanimously approved by the US 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. These protest initiatives have been very useful. The Lao government 
has attempted to justify its position with a report produced by a Swiss engineering company Poyry Energy 
AG. But an analysis of the report of Poyry Energy AG found numerous inconsistencies and scientific 
limitations, in particular impacts of the Dam on fisheries. Among the other campaigners are: International 
Rivers (formerly known as International Rivers Network) and the Save the Mekong Coalition. These 
campaigners have urged the government of Laos to halt immediately all construction at Xayaburi Dam site 
and withdraw all equipment from that place. For more see Reap, S., ‗Mekong Governments Delay 
Xayaburi Dam Pending Further Study‘ International Rivers, 8 December 2011< 
http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/2011-12-8/mekong-governments-delay-xayaburi-dam-pending-
further-study> [accessed 29 February, 2012]; and available at : http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-
16085584 [accessed 1 March, 2012]. 
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of Bangladesh can adopt this strategy to create extensive opposition to the 
Tipaimukh Dam both within the Barak river basin (i.e. thousands of 
potential victims who live in the site area of the Manipuri state and millions 
of people who live in the lower riparian country of Bangladesh) and 
worldwide.  
In order to meet the challenge in question, the government of 
Bangladesh can and should make earnest efforts to strengthen the Indo-
Bangladesh JRC (Joint River Commission).  It should be adjusted in such a 
way that the JRC receives clear and authorized responsibility for  
implementing and reviewing all the relevant agreements hitherto that have 
been signed by the two countries and will be signed in the future.  
To reach its target of bringing India to the negotiating table, the 
government of Bangladesh can also consider raising this issue in the 
meetings of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC). If Bangladesh succeeds in making other member countries of 
SAARC take a stance about her various problems with India, in particular 
the water-related one, then Bangladesh can be benefited from that. For India 
cannot undermine all of her neighbours‘ wishes if she really wants to adopt 
the leadership of the region of South Asia. This might also be of substantial 
help in keeping India in compliance with the signed Treaty of 1996. And 
more importantly it might be of great use in efforts to compel India to 
abstain from repeating the same policy initiatives in the future 
In addition to the strategy mentioned a few paragraphs above,  
Bangladesh should wage an international legal campaign against India 
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through bringing her to the International Court of Justice with a view to 
compelling her to ensure that she would respect the principles of equity, 
fairness and a no harm policy to Bangladesh in resolving existing problems 
with regard to water-sharing and dam-construction, and also pursue the same 
principles before withdrawing water, or regulating water flow from or 
constructing any large dam (like the Tipaimukh  Dam) on any cross-border 
river.   
India has been trying to persuade the government of Bangladesh to let 
her have a land route (through the territory of Bangladesh) with her land-
locked seven northeastern states (which are famously known as the seven 
sisters and are home to more than 40 million people, and also where political 
insurgencies have been taking place for a long time for the independence of 
the seven-state cluster from mainland India). The transit facility is of 
paramount importance to India in terms of trade and politics. The present 
government of Bangladesh has already started responding positively to the 
Indian demand for transit by allowing her to use the Ashuganj river fort 
(located in the present Brahmonbaria district) to transship goods from 
Kolkata to Agartala (under the Inland Water Transit Protocol 2010).33 
It is quite a controversial matter whether or not Bangladesh should give 
transit to India. For one might argue that this will bring severe economic loss 
to Bangladesh through reducing the current dependency of the seven 
northeastern states of India on Bangladesh for manufactured goods. One 
                                                     
33 Star Report, ‗Kolkata to Agartala: Ashuganj Used for First Time for Transhipment‘, Daily Star, 29 
February 2012 <http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=204527> [accessed 29 
February, 2012].   
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might add that it goes against the territorial integrity of Bangladesh. Given 
this, I would argue that before officially offering transit facilities to India, a 
detailed study must be undertaken of the problems and prospects involved 
for Bangladeshis. If the proposed studies allow the government of 
Bangladesh to consider giving transit to India, then this issue could and 
should be viewed as a bargaining counter, i.e., the government of Bangladesh 
could and should take advantage of it in order to ensure a fair and long-term 
solution to the longstanding water sharing problems of the crossborder 
rivers of the two countries. It should be noted here that theoretically the 
water sharing problem does not require to be integrated with other issues for 
its solution; customary international laws, rules and regulations are sufficient 
to address it. However, since India has not been cooperating with 
Bangladesh in solving the issues in question, the government needs to be 
determined about its diplomatic stance, and Bangladesh can be considerably 
benefited from such a diplomatic plan.   
A further way of addressing the challenge of water sharing could be to 
ensure growing and enhanced initiatives on the part of academia and civil 
society to generate public opinion at national, regional and global levels. 
These multisectoral experts and activities can succeed in reaching their goal 
to a considerable extent through disseminating and illustrating the fact of the 
irreparable environmental catastrophe, huge biodiversity loss and incalculable 
economic loss that India has already caused to Bangladesh through 
withdrawing water from common rivers. They should also give emphasis to 
the view that if the abovementioned water withdrawal projects (in particular  
the River Linking Project - RLP) are not stopped immediately, and also if a 
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fair share of the water of the river Ganges is not made available now, 
Bangladesh faces more dire economic, social and environmental 
consequences  in the future.  
 As the implementation and outcome of most of the recommendations  
made above are a time-consuming matter, and also as the sufferings of the 
affected people of Bangladesh (especially people of the south and 
northwestern regions) are unbearable in many regards (economically, 
ecologically and on health grounds), relevant researchers must be encouraged 
to undertake appropriate studies to contribute to formulating a management 
plan for the mangrove wetland ecosystems, to help the surviving people and 
other living creatures located in the Ganges delta of Bangladesh.  
   The government and people of Bangladesh in general should continue 
their efforts to cope with the very style of war over water until appropriate 
and effective strategies for facing these challenges become available to them. 
Among the effective tactics of modern warfare are: demonstrations inside 
Bangladesh, contact of opposition leaders with the affected communities in 
the upstream county India, organising protests world in cooperation with 
environmentalists. As a tool of defensive warfare, the world media can be of 
immense help in this regard, being likely to succeed in forcing India to give 
fare share of the common rivers, and also dissuading India from further 
implementation of any environmentally and economically devastating 
projects.   
Having argued that some sources of environmental problems are local 
and others are regional, and having also argued that we immediately need 
various national and regional initiatives to address these local and regional 
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environmental problems, I now go on to consider a different level of policy 
initiatives that satisfactorily tackle  environmental problems of which the 
sources are global (e.g., global climate change), without distorting the 
requirements of development needs and environmental limits as well as the 
principles of environmental  justice.  This consideration immediately leads us 
to global climate change, which I discuss in the following chapter. 
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Chapter Four  
 
4.4 Bangladesh and Global Climate Change   
 
The impacts of some human environmental interventions are global in scope. Such 
global environmental problems therefore warrant global attention and participation. 
Climate change and global warming are the most striking examples of such problems. 
There has been a growing scientific consensus that climate change and global warming 
are human–induced, and are arguably the greatest global environmental problems that 
the world is facing now. As one of the world‘s largest deltas, the subsistence and 
livelihood of the inhabitants of Bangladesh are greatly climate driven. Thus the people of 
Bangladesh are amongst the worst victims of these global environmental problems, in 
particular the poor (as well as the non-human creatures) who live in and around the 
coastal area of Bangladesh.  But these victims are not culpable for what they have been 
suffering. Future generations of humankind and non-human creatures will also be victims 
of these problems without being culpable for these damaging changes. 
 The largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) has originated in the world‘s developed or industrialised countries (which 
represent only about 20% of the world‘s population)1, entailing that the richer nations are 
responsible for these global environmental problems. It is in this context that the issue of 
ethical responsibility, or in other words of ‗climate justice‘, arises.   
 
                                                     
1 Boden, T.A., Marland, G., and Andres, R. J., Global Regional, and National Fossil-Fuel CO2 Emissions, (Oak 
Ridge, TN:  Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Library, U.S. Department 
of Energy, 2011) <http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/tre_usa.html> [accessed 10 March 2012] 
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Policy-decisions that should be made urgently at global level (involving global 
governments and relevant global organizations, in particular the United Nations) 
are now provided: 
 
 The principles of distribution of responsibility to bear the costs of 
mitigation and adaptation (in other words burden-sharing) should be set out 
in such a way that it becomes compatible with a system in which people as a 
whole are capable of being sustained into the future. In this sense, 
responsibilities should not merely be calculated on the record of historical 
emissions; for, until the 1980s, the act of emitting GHGs was not an act of 
conscious pollution. Attfield, in this context, correctly distinguishes ‗causal 
responsibility‘ from ‗moral responsibility‘. And he argues that it is 
implausible to write off moral responsibility from the record of historical 
emissions. Nevertheless, he recognizes that disproportionate current 
emissions of GHGs do point towards ‗greater-than-average moral 
responsibility‘.2  Thus the negotiation of a climate change and global warming 
treaty seems to need to be founded on a global climate change agreement 
that pays due attention to the victim-countries like Bangladesh through 
reflecting on the principle of fair distribution of responsibilities.  
This above mentioned principle has been adopted in                                                                                                                     
the first principle of Article 3 of the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (signed and ratified by 152 countries at Rio in 1992) which reads as 
follows:   
[T]he Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of 
present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity 
                                                     
2 Attfield, R., ‗Climate Change: The Ethical Dimension‘, in Ethics and Climate Change: Scenarios for Justice and 
Sustainability, eds.  by Matteo Mascia and Lucia Mariani(Padova : Fondazione Lanza, 2010) 77-84 ( p.80) 
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and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed 
country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and 
the adverse effects thereof.3 
 
This principle recognizes that there is a huge gap between the developed 
countries and developing countries in term of their contribution to global 
environmental problems, and allocates key responsibilities and burdens to 
developed countries for taking action to tackle these problems. This means 
that the Climate Convention, through assuming this principle, recognizes 
that the rich should take responsibility to make space for deprived countries 
to grow.   
Principle 2 of Article 3 of the same document reads as follows:  
‗[T]he specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, 
especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change, and of those Parties, especially developing country Parties, 
that would have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden under the 
Convention, should be given full consideration.‘4  
 
Principle 2 here, on the ground of justice, disapproves of placing burdens on 
countries such as Bangladesh to tackle the challenges of climate change to 
which they have not contributed. Thus the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, in particular its principles 1 and 2, appears to be supportive 
of the need for a global climate change agreement that endorses the 
responsibilities of developed (or industrialised) countries to help developing 
nations.  Given this, it is an ethical obligation for developed countries to act 
                                                     
3 United Nations, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UN Document, Principle 1, Article 
3, (New York: United Nations, 1992) <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf >[accessed 
2 March, 2012] 
4 Ibid 
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upon their commitments under the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change to assist the victims   with an adaptation fund, transfer of knowledge 
and (cleaner) technology. Martin Khor expresses the sharing of knowledge 
and technology by the notion of ‗negative emissions‘.5 This is quite significant 
in the sense that implementation of the Climate Convention largely depends 
on the effective implementation of the commitments of assistance of the rich 
countries to the developing countries under the same Convention.  
Since Bangladesh is, as has been argued earlier, one of the worst 
victims of climate change and global warming, the relevant authority should 
immediately release the US$10 billion initial fund (Bangladesh looks forward 
to receiving a 15% share of the sum) which was promised by world leaders at 
the Copenhagen Climate Summit of 2009.  Also the government of 
Bangladesh should make an earnest attempt to persuade world leaders to 
release the said fund.   
 Furthermore as Bangladesh needs to attain her development objectives 
(at least to a certain level so as to be able to fulfil basic human needs), and 
also as the per capita carbon emissions in Bangladesh are still far below the 
desired global average, it seems unfair to expect a Bangladesh emission 
reduction in the same proportion as that of rich nations. According to our 
proposed framework for sustainable development, Bangladesh must attain 
economic sustainability but not at the cost of environmental sustainability. It 
is in this context, under the proposed framework for sustainable 
development, that Bangladesh has no alternative but making the attempt to 
                                                     
5  Khor, M., ‗Threat to Block South‘s Exports on Climate Grounds‘, South Bulletin, 40 (2009) 1-12 (p.1) 
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involve the rich countries (who are responsible for suffering related to 
climate change and global warming) to help provide her with means to 
switch to cleaner technology. In particular, the developed world should 
ensure funding for Bangladesh to invest in plants for renewable energy 
generation, such as hydroelectric energy, tidal energy, wave energy, wind 
energy, energy from biomass and solar energy plants.  Such assistance should 
not be curtailed until Bangladesh can generate enough energy to address the 
basic human needs of her inhabitants. Also developed countries are morally 
obliged to assist Bangladesh in reducing the climate-change-related suffering 
of non-human creatures (which are bearers of intrinsic value just as human 
beings are), as this suffering is not acceptable in accordance with the 
proposed framework for sustainable development.   
 To secure the victims of climate change in Bangladesh and other places in 
the world, developed countries must reduce the current growing rate of 
GHG emissions. The ‗polluters pay‘ principle in this regard would not be as 
effective as it is usually considered to be. For, while we should plan at least 
to aim at a level of 400ppm, the current total of atmospheric carbon-
equivalent gases is about 450ppm.6 Thus there is no alternative to an 
obligatory reduction of the current rate of emissions by the big polluters so 
that the total falls to an acceptable level (of 400ppp). Thus the global 
community should reach an effective global climate change agreement to 
combat the current rate of emissions.  
The target for reduction of emissions set out in the Kyoto protocol of 
1997 has effectively been reneged on. As mentioned in chapter four of Part 
Three, while the USA still accounts for just over one-fifth of the world‘s 
                                                     
6 Attfield, p.78 
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total GHG emissions, Bangladesh accounts for half of one per cent. The 
foremost among the factors that has contributed to making the Kyoto 
protocol a failure is that this protocol places the entire burden of reducing 
GHG emissions on developed countries and gives developing countries (in 
particular, China, India, Brazil, Mexico and Turkey, which are now known as 
the most rapidly growing economies of the developing world) relief from the 
burden as such. This has foreseeably demotivated developed countries from 
being committed to their assigned duty.  
To achieve the key goal of a global climate change agreement, it now 
seems that issues of international justice must be reflected in the agreement 
in such a way that it remains reasonable as well as possible to motivate the 
participation of the developed world. This means that reductions in 
emissions require a workable global agreement unlike the Kyoto protocol. 
Now the question arises: is there any approach that is able both to 
motivate the developed world and address the challenges of climate change 
together with the global problem of poverty, malnutrition and disease?  To 
answer this question, it is worth thinking about two prominent approaches 
that have been recognized for their feasibility. They are: (1) the Contraction 
and Convergence Approach, and (2) the Greenhouse Development Rights 
Approach. As opposed to the Kyoto Protocol, the Contraction and 
Convergence Approach is founded on the thought that ‗all human beings 
should be entitled to an equal share of the atmospheric commons‘7. Thus 
national allocations, according to this approach, should be based on 
                                                     
7 Brown, D., et al., ed. White Paper on the Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change (Philadelphia: Rock Ethics 
Institute, 2006), p. 20 
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population levels and unused entitlements could be traded by the relevant 
countries to countries emitting above the entitlements of their own 
populations. Execution of this approach combined with an annually 
contracting total for entitlements, as has been argued by the proponents of 
this approach, would produce a contraction sufficient for sustainability as 
well as an equitable convergence of human entitlements.8 While this 
approach has won widespread recognition9 for focusing on ‗equal per capita 
emission allocation‘, it is, according to Robin Attfield, not beyond criticism. 
As he argues, this approach would not do enough to address the global 
problems of poverty, malnutrition and disease, since the redistributive 
elements of this approach would rapidly reduce due to the total of allowable 
emissions being contracted.10 Due to this limitation (i.e., the incapability of 
addressing the issue of poverty and disease), this approach fails to address 
economic sustainability - one of the pillars of sustainable development – and 
thus it seems not compatible with our proposed framework for sustainable 
development. However an attempt at striking a balance between the 
problems of mitigation and of poverty, malnutrition and disease can help this 
approach turn into a more dependable one if separate provision for fostering 
development is introduced at the same time.  
On the other hand, the Greenhouse Development Approach attempts 
to strike a balance between issues of GHGs emissions and issues of 
development needs. The cost of greenhouse gas mitigation and of 
                                                     
8 Meyer, A., Contraction and Convergence, The Global Solution to Climate Change, Schumacher Briefing no. 5, 
(Devon: Green Books, 2005) 
9 George Monbiot and Peter Singer have supported this approach. For more see Monbiot, G, Heat: How to 
Stop the Planet Burning (London: Penguin Books, 2007); and Singer, P., One World: the Ethics of Globalization 
(New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 2002)  
10 Attfield, p.78  
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supporting development, according to this approach, should be shouldered 
by people who are at or above a certain level of development (who would be 
taxed accordingly).11 Thus it advocates that everyone has a right to 
development as well as being entitled to a live a life at or above that level. 
More importantly while it takes into account the emissions of people who 
are at or above this level of development in calculating their country‘s 
contribution quota, it ignores the emissions of individuals who live below 
that level.  
As opposed to the Contraction and Convergence approach, this 
approach seems more plausible on account of its being appropriately focused 
on issues of development. It assigns responsibilities upon wealthy individuals 
to meet the cost of greenhouse gas mitigation and funding development (to 
eradicate poverty, malnutrition and disease) irrespective of their country of 
origin.  It means that the rich of the poor countries and the rich of the 
developed countries will share the same responsibility toward funding the 
goal in question. This system thus makes provision for the issue of 
‗economic sustainability‘- one of the pillars of sustainable development. It is 
also compatible with the notion of intra-generational justice. Thus it seems 
that the Greenhouse Development Approach is compatible with the 
framework for sustainable development I have suggested.  
                                                     
11 According to this approach, the key objective here would be realized through establishing the right to 
exempt from sharing the burden of climate protection up to a given income of $ 9,000 ( Purchasing Power 
Parity, PPP).  For more see,   Baer, P., Athanasiou, T., Kartha, S. and Kemp-Benedict, E., ‗Greenhouse 
Development Rights: a Framework for Climate Protection That is ―More Fair‖ Than Equal Per Capita 
Emissions Rights‘, in Climate Ethics: Essential Reading, ed. by Gardiner, S. M., Caney, S., Jamieson, D., and 
Shue, H., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) pp.215-230 
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 Furthermore, focusing equally on GHG emission mitigation and 
funding development, the Greenhouse Development Rights Approach 
seems to recognize the view that economic sustainability and environmental 
sustainability can not be attained in isolation in a sustainable manner. This is 
one of the major arguments that I have attempted to defend in our proposed 
framework for sustainable development.  
What is more, the idea of ‗at or above a certain level of development‘ 
used in the Greenhouse Development Approach and the idea of ‗basic 
needs‘ used in our proposed framework for sustainable development also 
emerge as identical (both involving the level at which basic needs are 
satisfied). Thus not only is the Greenhouse Development Approach 
compatible with our suggested framework, but also the two are mutually 
supportive.  
Despite its appropriateness at a theoretical level, the Greenhouse 
Development Approach could still be unsuccessful in the absence of an 
agreement about international institutions to co-ordinate its major objectives: 
greenhouse gas mitigation and development support. Given this, earnest 
global efforts should be made by global leaders and relevant global 
authorities and institutions to reach an agreement. The Greenhouse 
Development Rights Approach, as I have just argued, could be a serious 
possibility in this context, and one which seems to be reasonable and 
practicable as well as compatible with our proposed framework for 
sustainable development. 
From the above discussion, it can now be concluded that all the 
recommendations I have made in this and in the previous chapter seem explicitly to 
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derive from the proposed guidance framework for sustainable development (which 
arguably meets all the requisite conditions that an adequate framework for sustainable 
development is required to satisfy). More importantly the proposed framework can play a 
significant role in harmonizing the three diverse and seemingly conflicting goals (pillars) 
of sustainable development. As has been suggested in the proposed framework, although 
all three goals are equally significant, they cannot all be prioritized simultaneously. At the 
early stage of development a developing country like Bangladesh, in line with the 
proposed framework, might advance through focusing on economic sustainability, but 
this must be done while preserving a balance with the other two goals or pillars of 
sustainable development: social sustainability and environmental sustainability. If the 
framework proposed here is not pursued consistently then, as has been argued here, a 
development activity cannot qualify as being sustainable or moral. For example, while 
exclusion of social issues of development from a policy of development undermines the 
value of social equity,  exclusion of environmental  issues of development undermines 
the value of non-human creatures and their interests (which already makes the policy 
immoral) as well as the inherent and instrumental value of species and ecosystems (that 
are of immense value for the survival of all the bearers of intrinsic value including 
humans), something which would make the policy of development both unsustainable 
and immoral.         
The above list of recommendations, however, is neither exhaustive nor 
unalterable. But these recommendations are supportive of turning the process and end 
results of development activities in Bangladesh into sustainable ones.  The items on the 
recommendation list can be expanded. But to do so one has to look at what the 
proposed guidance framework is meant to do functionally. What is more, as has been 
observed here, it is essential for Bangladesh to formulate a comprehensive national 
301 | P a g e  
strategy for sustainable development. The government of Bangladesh should make 
earnest efforts to implement the existing action policies (e.g. policies of PRSP, MDGs, 
NEMAP, NCS) until it becomes successful in setting up just such a comprehensive 
national strategy for sustainable development. The list of policy recommendations also 
involves calls on the government of Bangladesh and all political parties to agree on 
crucial measures that are required to be introduced urgently to combat the catastrophic 
environmental impact of water withdrawal by India from different cross-border rivers.  
As has been observed, this chapter reflects the increasing impacts of climate 
change on Bangladesh.  In particular, it discusses and recognizes the incalculable 
economic and environmental consequences of climate change for the poorer 
communities of Bangladesh as whole.  Given this it urges that, since climate change is a 
global environmental problem, it needs a global solution. Part of the solution, as has 
been suggested here, is to reach an effective global agreement that can effectively address 
and resolve the challenge of global climate change for Bangladesh. As I have argued, 
through recognizing and combining a measure of responsibility on the part of emitters 
and their ability to pay as a potential ground for sharing the burden of climate change, 
and through recognizing such a burden-sharing principle as consistent with the level and 
exigency of development activities, and also through recognizing the implementation of 
precautionary protection of the climate, and the  entitlement of everyone to the services 
of atmosphere, the Greenhouse Development Rights Approach turns out to be a 
possible basis for a post-Kyoto agreement, and hence applicable to  the developing world  
including  Bangladesh.  
International co-operation is, however, needed to attain and implement such an 
agreement. For a large amount of investment will be needed to meet the expenditure 
mitigation of and adaptation to the devastating impacts of climate change in Bangladesh. 
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Thus to attain the key objective of sustainable development, a sustainable future,  the 
government of Bangladesh should set out policies on a priority basis to persuade 
international organizations, the world governments and other  relevant bodies to channel  
funds to help face the challenges in question. The government,  academics, 
environmental activists and other relevant bodies of Bangladesh should work together to 
attract the attention of  global governments and relevant international organizations, in 
particular the United Nations,  to ensure their  proactive participation in solving the 
multidimensional environmental problems of Bangladesh and bringing about sustainable 
development and human security.  Failure to attain the suggested agreement (i.e. the one 
offered in the Greenhouse Development Rights approach) is not only a problem for 
Bangladesh but also for the whole of the developing and the underdeveloped world.  
On a realistic calculation, one may well envisage the Greenhouse Development 
Rights approach merely as an illustrative model for arguing that while developed 
countries may well assume more responsibility in sharing the global cost of climate 
security, the developing countries will only assume a level of responsibility in proportion 
to their level of development.12 This is surely not a pointless concern. But the framework 
for sustainable development that I have introduced in my thesis can plausibly be 
envisaged as a response to this concern. For the suggested framework for sustainable 
development will be able to address relevant issues of justice through suggesting a global 
allocation of ‗shared but differentiated responsibility‘.13   
                                                     
12  Unite Nations, World Economic and Social Survey 2009: Promoting Development, Saving the Planet (New York: United Nations Publication, 
2009), p. x  http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wess/wess_archive/2009wess.pdf>[accessed 27 July 2012] 
13 This is not the place to discuss this issue in any further detail. Some further issues needing to be resolved if such an agreement is to 
be an equitable and sustainable one are discussed in Gardiner, S., et al. ed., Climate Ethics: Essential Readings, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), and in Arnold D. G., ed., The Ethics of Global Climate, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
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Conclusion 
 
This study has set out to tackle the existing misrepresentations of and disagreements 
about the concepts of ‗development‘, ‗sustainability‘ and ‗sustainable development‘. 
Having identified and recognised the multiple and/or ambiguous usages of the concept 
of ‗development‘ in chapter one of Part One, I argued that although there is a broad area 
of agreement about and a ‗core‘ meaning of development over and above its ‗specialised 
interpretative‘ meanings, it fails to capture all desirable goals (such as the well-being of 
non-human creatures and preservation of species and ecosystems). The importance of 
the values it omits suggests that not all types of development should be accepted or 
welcomed. Any improvement of a partial kind can be envisaged as development, but 
development, as thus understood and utilised, cannot in itself answer the question: ‗need 
development be sustainable?‘   
In chapter two of this Part, I critically expounded the concept of ‗sustainability‘ 
and argued that it is not a morally loaded concept. Introducing and justifying three 
conceptions of the concept of sustainability, I argued that ‗sustainability‘ remains a 
crucial characteristic of a system or practice, which can be good in one context, and bad 
in another, i.e. the moral value of sustainability is context sensitive. To be more specific, 
albeit sustainable, a system or a practice can be bad, and vice versa. This leads to the 
observation that separate concepts are required to permit distinctive judgments to be 
made about the sustainability of a scheme, about its justice and about its advantage.  
In chapter three of this Part, I discussed in greater detail the concept of 
sustainable development and argued that the UN (and standard) definitions of 
sustainable development face some serious problems. Some of these problems suggest 
the need for revisions, while others seem fatal to the definitions as they stand. I sought 
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here to defend the stance that ‗sustainable development‘ is not a mere buzzword; rather, 
properly analysed and understood (in other words, supplemented) the existing standard 
definitions (in particular the UN ones) of sustainable development suggest that it has 
been a meaningful phrase all along. In so doing, I have considered the problems, together 
with revisions suggested by the ‗capabilities‘ approach. Here I maintained that a different 
revision, suggested by the basic needs approach, can surmount the various problems, and 
I present and defend a revised definition accordingly. Overall, the findings here provide a 
case for a supplemented version of sustainable development, which reads as follows:  
It is the state or practice of society that implements a procedure leading to 
attaining a certain level of economic well being which is capable of satisfying the 
basic needs of contemporary and future human beings without compromising the 
opportunity for other living creatures to meet their basic existence needs, and 
which also is capable of being continued indefinitely both socially and 
environmentally. 
This redefined (or in other words, supplemented) version of sustainable development 
affirms that sustainable development addresses economic sustainability subject to the 
demands of social sustainability and environmental sustainability (limits). As thus 
redefined, it has to be guided by the basic needs approach; that is, it cannot avoid 
addressing pressing development needs (economic sustainability) and social progress 
(social sustainability) in environmental decision-making. More importantly this entails 
that those policies that disregard this guidance (i.e. depriving the poor of satisfying their 
basic or survival needs and proper position in society) have often deserved to be 
described as unsustainable.  
In chapter one and two in Part Two, I have introduced the genesis of 
environmentalism, and tackled some philosophical problems for it that Elliott Sober 
alleged in his influential paper, ‗Philosophical Problems for Environmentalism‘. The 
discussion in chapter one has shown that although environmentalism warrants 
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appreciation for adequately focusing on the issue of environmental limits, it remains 
open to criticism for omitting, at times, the issue of human basic needs (in other words, 
pressing development needs). Chapter one of this Part thus concluded that a defensible 
version of environmentalism must strike a balance between development needs and 
environmental limits. 
 The analysis of chapter two of this Part has revealed that Sober‘s criticisms (that 
environmentalism, whatsoever its ‗practical political effectiveness‘, faces substantial 
philosophical difficulties of justification and that environmentalists cannot appeal to 
anything that could be used as the basis for species preservation without discarding the 
familiar principles of ethical arguments) are flawed. Contrariwise, in line with the 
proposal Robin Attfield has made in his article ‗Sober, Environmentalists, Species and 
Ignorance‘, it defends the view that environmentalists can appeal to familiar kinds of 
approach that can readily be employed in support of environmental (e.g. species) 
preservation without disparaging traditional theories or endorsing holistic value.  
In chapter three of Part Two, I have introduced and defended Attfield‘s version 
of biocentric consequentialism, and argued how environmentalists‘ arguments could best 
be defended on the basis of his biocentric value theory. I have critically analysed the 
exchanges between Alan Carter and Attfield on the plausibility of Attfield‘s version of 
biocentric consequentialism. The investigation uncovered the thought that by being able 
to cope with some infamous problems, such as the Non-identity Problem and the 
Repugnant Conclusion, and by being able to endorse a value-based rationale for choice 
between recognised values, and also, as opposed to any radical pluralistic value theory, by 
being able to recognise some meta-principles that can plausibly help to adjudicate 
conflicts between various recognised values, Attfield‘s version of biocentric 
consequentialism deserves to be a serious contender for an acceptable and defensible 
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normative ethical theory. The proposed framework for sustainable development, offered 
in Part Four, has therefore been formulated on the basis of this biocentric normative 
theory.   
In chapter one of Part Three, I tackled different approaches to security. The 
investigation expounded how, as opposed to the conventional and new realists‘ 
approaches to security, the approach to human security depicted here seems less 
inadequate. In chapter two of this Part, I defended the view that the wider understanding 
of human security, which involves and envisages security issues such as security from 
‗want‘ and ‗fear‘ as environmental problems, and also which amounts to sustainable 
security, offers much to the field of sustainable development. By recognising seven 
interrelated significant components of human security (i.e. economic, food, health, 
environmental, personal, community and political), as expressed in the 1994 UNDP 
report, as well as recognising all bearers of intrinsic value as referents of security, the 
wider approach to human security satisfactorily underlies the three major pillars of 
sustainable development: economic, social and environmental sustainability. The 
implications of the wider human security view for a sustainable future were found to be 
fairly similar to the implications of the supplemented version of sustainable development 
for a sustainable future, and hence mutually reinforcing. In sum, I argued here that it is 
hardly possible to attain the key objective of sustainable development, a sustainable 
future, while disregarding the human security view in its wider sense.     
Chapter three of Part Three put on record the view that major human security 
concerns are rooted in the development activities of human beings. Consequently, these 
security concerns are anthropogenic, and thus the cures for them are not merely a matter 
of scientific or technological fix, but rather they are matters that require contributions 
from multidisciplinary discourses, such as economic, political, ethical, ecological, and so 
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on. Over and above the various kinds of air, water and land pollution affecting 
Bangladesh, chapter four of Part Three identified the withdrawing of water from cross-
border rivers by the bordering countries India and China, through constructing barrages 
and dams on them, salinity increases, floods, droughts, river erosion and siltation, sea 
level rise, wetland degradation, deforestation, poverty, the impacts of shrimp cultivation, 
arsenic contamination in groundwater, and the disastrous impacts of global warming and 
climate change as the main environmental problems in that country. Environmental 
challenges that the people of Bangladesh are facing now are caused by excessive human 
intervention with nature within and across the countries. It has been argued here that 
people living in the south-western zone of Bangladesh have permanently lost the 
opportunity of subsistence agriculture due to water withdrawal at the point of the 
Farakka Barrage in India. This has in turn forced people of this area to resort to shrimp 
cultivation for their survival, further degrading their own habitat and cultivable land. It is 
also argued that a severe environmental catastrophe in the north-eastern zone of 
Bangladesh is now just a matter of time since the related parties have already signed the 
agreement as regards the commissioning of the Tipaimukh Dam on the Barak River in 
India. 
Given my claim that there is a certain way we should use the term ‗sustainable 
development‘ and the claim that biocentric consequentialism is defensible, empirical facts 
about the human security situation in Bangladesh, which I described in chapter five, 
support or lead us towards a revised framework for sustainable development which is 
defended in my thesis (in particular in chapter two of Part Four). For, according to many 
anthropocentric or non-biocentric normative theories, what is happening in Bangladesh 
is an economic or social matter, while from the perspective of biocentric 
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consequentialism, what is happening there is an ethical matter, and not addressing these 
issues in relevant policies is ethically unappealing.  
Chapter one of Part Four revealed that the theories of ecological modernisation 
and economic democracy are inadequate to substantially advance the cause of the key 
objective of sustainable development: a sustainable future. The practice of the theory of 
ecological modernisation under the current capitalistic political economy fails to succeed 
mainly because of the over-reliance of the dominant economic practice on incessant 
profitability. The theory of economic democracy, on the other hand, proves defective in 
the sense that there is nothing inbuilt in the idea of any kind of democracy that 
guarantees environmental justice (i.e. none of its kinds recognise the well-being of non-
human living entities, and all actual kinds fail to address the long-term values of 
biological and genetic diversity).  
As opposed to potential criticisms of my conclusion that there is nothing inbuilt 
in the idea of any kind of democracy that guarantees environmental justice, I argue that 
even if people decide that they will not make economic profit at the cost of the values 
and interests of non-human creatures and the value of ecosystems, such pro-
environmental aspiration cannot substantially be realised under the dominant capitalistic 
political economy that chiefly relies on perpetual profitability. A radical change in the 
currently dominant economic and political system, in this sense, is a requirement to 
achieve such a transition.   
This reasoning simultaneously suggested the need for a radical reform of this 
pervasive human system (i.e. the capitalistic political economy) and the introduction of a 
satisfactory framework for sustainable development. 
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Considering these findings, as mentioned in the paragraph above, chapter two of 
Part Four investigated the possibility of a framework for sustainable development that 
appropriately focuses on the economic and social well-beings of humans (as well as the 
interests and well-being of non-human creatures) without undermining the 
indispensability of environmental sustainability in developmental and environmental 
decision-making. The investigation led to an insightful upshot. The upshot attested the 
view that environmental problems (local or global, standard (which extends to issues 
ranging from resources to biodiversity) or the ones relating to human security threats 
(which stem from various ‗wants‘ and ‗fears‘)) are not just about efficient utilisation of 
resources. These problems have an ethical dimension. Omission or misrepresentation of 
the ethical dimension in relevant policy-making processes, therefore, causes policy failure. 
Accordingly, this chapter suggested that we should first explore and extract ethical 
principles that stem from a wider understanding of the notion of environmental 
problems, and then should consider how problems arising from the framework of the 
dominant economic practice and the UN formulation of sustainable development might 
be overcome through incorporating ethical values and corresponding responsibilities into 
a policy framework. 
On ethical principles that stem from a wider understanding of the notion of 
environmental problems, this chapter introduced the view that environmental problems 
involve four aspects of justice (intra-generational justice, intergenerational justice, 
interspecies justice and a duty to protect ecosystems), to say the least. These aspects of 
justice encompass some basic ethical values, such as the issue of justice in the sharing of 
environmental burdens and benefits, equality in environmental decision-making 
processes and the ethical claims of future generations, non-human creatures and 
ecosystems. Thus it is inevitable for a satisfactory framework for sustainable 
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development to embody concern for the four ethical issues mentioned above. These 
issues of justice supply further good reasons for my interpretation of environmental 
problems. Having properly focused on all bearers of intrinsic value, on the inherent and 
instrumental value of species and ecosystems, and on our corresponding duties towards 
them, and also having appropriately focused on equality and the integration of ecological 
concern with basic needs, the proposed framework for sustainable development seemed 
capable of tackling satisfactorily the issues of development needs and environmental 
limits without disregarding the ethical dimension of environmental problems, and in 
particular without causing deprivation in the underdeveloped/developing world.   
As opposed to the existing frameworks for sustainable development (such as the 
framework of the dominant economic practice and the variant of the deep ecological 
view – radical American environmentalism), chapters three and four of Part Four 
explored the possible application of the suggested framework for sustainable 
development to the case of Bangladesh. Being a developing country the nature of 
environmental problems in Bangladesh is different in many respects from that of first 
world countries. Here I have argued that a policy framework that gives the guidance that 
intervention with nature should be mainly guided by the imperative to preserve the biotic 
community rather than basic human needs is not applicable to the case of Bangladesh; 
rather Bangladesh needs to adopt a framework for sustainable development that fits the 
pressing needs of the present without compromising the needs of the future to meet its 
basic needs. Here I have argued that the proposed framework for sustainable 
development is a satisfactory means to that end. For, as was argued there, the proposed 
framework is capable of harmonising the three seemingly conflicting pillars (goals) of 
sustainable development. Although all three goals are equally significant, there is no 
theoretical or practical obligation to prioritise all the goals at once. At the early stage of 
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development, as was argued there, Bangladesh, in line with the proposed framework, 
might advance through focusing on economic sustainability, but this must be done while 
preserving a balance with (and between) the other two goals or pillars of sustainable 
development: social sustainability and environmental sustainability. If the framework 
proposed here is not pursued consistently then a development activity cannot qualify as 
being sustainable. This claim is reinforced through supplying and defending the example 
of the post-war European Union experience of development practice, where 
development began with the target of attaining economic sustainability and then 
advanced to the attainment of environmental sustainability via achieving social goals.   
The arguments of this chapter reveal that some of the environmental problems 
of Bangladesh have local origins and need local solutions. In connection with 
environmental problems (e.g. the unfair withdrawal of water by India from common 
rivers) that adversely affect subsistence agriculture and all other irrigation-based 
cultivation and water-based activities of the inhabitants of Bangladesh, this chapter 
strongly recommends that effective moves be taken to urgently agree and implement 
relevant policy-decisions at regional level (involving regional governments and other 
relevant regional organisations, in particular the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC)). Relevant sciences cannot successfully address these problems 
ignoring the ethical dimension they involve, for these problems and possible solutions to 
them cannot be recognised unless we have a framework for sustainable development that 
is defensible by good ethical theories and views. The framework for sustainability that I 
have introduced in this thesis is a way forward to that end.  
In chapter four of Part Four I have examined the growing impacts of global 
warming and climate change on Bangladesh. In addition to many other impacts, this 
chapter has demonstrated that the economic and environmental consequences of climate 
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change for the poorer communities of Bangladesh as a whole are incalculable. There is an 
ethical dimension of this empirical claim. For global warming and climate change are 
largely caused by the rich North, while victims are mainly the guiltless people of the poor 
South. Thus I argued that such global environmental problems need a global ethical 
solution. It is not only an unduly onerous task for Bangladesh to address global 
environmental problems like the impacts of climate change alone but also an unfair 
burden on her, because people of this country are hardly responsible for global warming 
and climate change. Part of the solution, as has been suggested here, is thus to reach a 
global agreement that attempts to minimise such global problems through fairly 
allocating environmental burdens on nation states, multinational companies and so forth, 
which are responsible for the change and suffering in question. Success in formulating 
and implementing such a global agreement can effectively address and resolve the 
challenge of global climate change for Bangladesh. Finally it was argued that reaching a 
possible agreement at global level in the light of the Greenhouse Development Rights 
approach, as a possible basis for a post-Kyoto agreement, can guide all the affected 
countries like Bangladesh towards a possible way out of the global environmental 
problem in question. International initiatives, not least, but not only on the part of the 
UN, and necessary co-operation on the part of its member states, are needed to attain 
and implement such an agreement. Non-cooperation with victims of climate change in 
Bangladesh on the part of the developed countries and relevant international 
organisations would clearly be morally unacceptable from the perspective of biocentric 
consequentialism, as that would impinge on all living creatures, species and ecosystems.   
The study has overall attempted to affirm the view that there are serious 
problems in the dominant economic practice. The over-reliance of the dominant 
economic practice on perpetual profitability is the main limitation of this practice. The 
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standard definitions of sustainable development of the UN have also been found subject 
to criticism. The possible solution to these problems, as I have suggested in this study, 
could be to formulate a new framework for sustainable development integrating social 
and environmental sustainability over and above the economic kind into relevant policy 
decisions. By offering a policy framework for sustainable development that strikes a 
balance between the development needs of the poor, the interests of non-human 
creatures and responsibility to protect biodiversity and ecosystems, the proposed policy 
framework for sustainable development is expected to make a positive contribution to 
sustainable developmental and environmental decision-making in developing countries 
like Bangladesh.  
The main strength of the proposed framework for sustainable development as a 
guideline for sustainable policy-making in developing and underdeveloped countries 
alongside Bangladesh is implicit in the following principles that it upholds, to say the 
least:  
 Environmental problems are anthropogenic. 
  The poor are hardly responsible for global environmental problems like 
global warming and climate change. But the consequences of such 
problems are often borne unduly by the poor (i.e. racially and 
economically disadvantaged groups). 
 Issues of environmental justice require enhanced attention worldwide (i.e. 
1. distributional environmental justice which concerns equitable sharing 
of environmental benefits and burdens; and 2. participatory 
environmental justice which concerns participation of everyone in 
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environmental decision-making, in particular the potential victims of such 
decisions).         
I would thus argue that being addressed (as it is) towards various issues of justice over 
and above the development needs of the economically disadvantaged groups, the 
proposed framework for sustainable development seems significant not only for 
Bangladesh, but also for all other developing and underdeveloped countries across the 
globe. However, as types and severity of environmental problem may differ from one 
nation to another, especially depending on their internal context, further research is 
required to expound to what extent the proposed sustainable policy framework fits in 
with or is suitable to be extended to other nations, developing or underdeveloped.   
Further research is also needed on the implications for global governance and 
global ethics with a view to the effective implementation of the proposed framework for 
sustainable development. I have argued in the last chapter of Part Four that global 
environmental problems, such as global climate change, cannot be overcome without 
international agreement and combined action, and to give the agreement and concerted 
efforts a justified and practicable basis, an arguably acceptable global authority/body is 
required to monitor both developing and developed countries, so that the former receive 
required assistance to strike the proper balance between economic sustainability and 
socio-environmental sustainability in attaining a certain level of development that suffices 
to meet their basic needs, and the latter reduce the high economic growth and high 
consumption of resources and energy and give victims their due in mitigating global 
environmental problems caused by them in their territories. A global ethics is necessary 
for the global body as ethical guidance to help attain the key objective of sustainable 
development – a sustainable future – through setting out and implementing relevant 
sustainable policy decisions. This suggested further research is likely to contribute 
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significantly to improving conditions for adopting or acting on the proposed framework 
for sustainable development for the government of Bangladesh and also governments of 
developing and underdeveloped countries at large. There is no room here to continue 
with these significant issues. I would therefore suggest that scholars in this field should 
undertake further studies on global governance and global ethics.      
Despite limitations, as has been mentioned in the paragraph above, this study has 
produced some interesting insights by focusing on the need to apply an ethical dimension 
in environmental and developmental decision-making. There is evidently a tension 
between the necessity of realising human development needs (in particular, those of the 
world‘s poor) and the need for environmental sustainability. The dominant economic 
practice prioritises economic growth as opposed to environmental sustainability, and thus 
fails to strike a balance between the two equally significant issues: development needs 
and environmental limits. Besides, radical environmentalism misguidedly prioritises the 
integrity of nature over human development needs. It is hoped that the findings of this 
study will advance responsiveness to the framework for sustainable development 
developed here among the relevant researchers in this field, and instigate further research 
in the areas of sustainable development and environmentalism.  
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